

THE
WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE, Esq;



In Three Volumes.

The CONTENTS of which follow in the next Leaf.

With ALPHABETICAL TABLES.

VOL. I.

The FOURTH EDITION.



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LONDON,

Printed for EDMUND PARKER, at the Bible and Crown, in Lombard-Street; EDWARD SYMON, against the Royal-Exchange, in Cornhill; CHARLES HITCH, at the Red-Lion, in Paternoster-Row; and JOHN PEMBERTON, at the Golden-Buck, in Fleetstreet.

M. DCC. XL.



THE
C O N T E N T S
OF THE
THREE VOLUMES.

V O L. I.

AN Essay concerning Human Understanding. In Four Books.

A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester, concerning some passages relating to Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding, in a late Discourse of his Lordship's, in Vindication of the Trinity.

Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter.

Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter.

V O L. II.

SOME Considerations of the consequences of the lowering of interest, and raising the value of money. In a Letter sent to a Member of Parliament, 1691.

Short Observations on a printed paper, entitled, For encouraging the coining Silver Money in England, and after, for keeping it here.

Further Observations, concerning raising the Value of Money. Wherein Mr. Lowndes's Arguments for it, in his late Report concerning An Essay for the Amendment of the Silver Coin, are particularly examined.

Two Treatises of Government. In the former, the false principles and foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and his followers, are detected and overthrown: the latter, is an Essay concerning the true original, extent, and end of Civil Government.

A Letter concerning Toleration.

A Second Letter concerning Toleration.

A Third Letter for Toleration: To the Author of the Third Letter concerning Toleration.

The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures.

CONTENTS.

- A Vindication of The Reasonableness of Christianity, from
Mr. Edwards's Reflections.
A Second Vindication of The Reasonableness of Christianity.

V O L. III.

SOME Thoughts concerning Education.

A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the
Galatians, I. and II. Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians.
To which is prefixed, An Essay for the understanding of
St. Paul's Epistles, by consulting St. Paul himself.

Posthumous Works, viz.

I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding.

II. An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing
all things in God.

III. A Discourse of Miracles.

IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration.

V. Memoirs relating to the Life of Anthony, first Earl of
Shaftesbury.

VI. A new Method of a Common-Place-Book; written ori-
ginally in French, and translated into English.

Some familiar Letters between Mr. Locke, and several of his
Friends.



TO THE R E A D E R.



THOU hast here a compleat collection of the several works of Mr. JOHN LOCKE, which were published in his life-time, either with, or without, his name to them. And, that thou may'st be assured that the latter are truly his, I think it proper to transcribe the following clause out of his last will and testament: "*Whereas the Reverend Dr. Hudson, library-keeper of the Bodleian library, in the university of Oxford, writ to me some time since, desiring of me, for the said library, the books, whereof I was the author; I did, in return to the honour done me therein, present to the said library, all the books that were published under my name; which, tho' accepted with honourable mention of me, yet were not understood to answer the request made me, it being supposed that there were other treatises whereof I was the author, which have been published without my name to them. In compliance, therefore, with what was desired, in the utmost extent of it, and in acknowledgement of the honour done me, in thinking my writings worthy to be placed among the works of the learned, in that august repository; I do hereby further give to the publick library of the university of Oxford, these following books; that is to say, Three Letters concerning Toleration: Two Treatises of Government, (whereof Mr. Churchill has published several editions, but all very incorrect:) The reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures: A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity from Mr. Edwards's Reflections: And, A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity. These are all the books, whereof I am the author, which have been published without my name to them.*"

To these books published by Mr. LOCKE in his life-time, are added these following, which have been printed since his death;

VOL. I.


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viz.

To the Reader.

viz. His Paraphrase on St. Paul's Epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, and Ephefians: *To which is prefixed, An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles, by consulting St. Paul himself.* His Posthumous works: and some familiar Letters between him and his Friends.

As to this edition of all his works together, I have this to advertise the reader, that most of them are printed from copies corrected and enlarged under Mr. LOCKE's own hand; and in particular, that the two Treatises of Government were never, till now, published from a copy, corrected by himself.





A N
E S S A Y
C O N C E R N I N G
Human Understanding.

In Four BOOKS.

ECCLES. XI. 5.

As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child: Even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things.

Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere!

CIC. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I.





To the Right Honourable

T H O M A S,

Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery,

Baron Herbert of Cardiff, Lord Rofs of Kendal, Par, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, and Shurland; Lord-President of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy-Council; and Lord Lieutenant of the County of Wilts, and of South-Wales.

MY LORD,



HIS treatise, which is grown up under your Lordship's eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your Lordship for that protection, which you several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for truth, than a fair unprejudiced hearing, no body is more likely to procure me that, than your Lordship; who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your Lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach, or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the design of this treatise, will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading; and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might otherwise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of novelty is a terrible charge amongst those, who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion; and can allow none to be right, but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote, any where, at its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without

The Epistle Dedicatory.

any other reason, but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so, for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antick fashion: and tho' it be not yet current by the publick stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordship can give great and convincing instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the publick with some of those large and comprehensive discoveries you have made of truths, hitherto unknown, unless to some few, to whom your Lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient reason, were there no other, why I should dedicate this Essay to your Lordship: and its having some little correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences, your Lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some thoughts, not wholly different from your's. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your encouragement, this should appear in the world, I hope it may be a reason, some time or other, to lead your Lordship farther; and you will allow me to say, that you here give the world an earnest of something, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, shews what a present I here make to your Lordship; just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers, or fruit, is not ill taken, tho' he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthless things receive a value, when they are made the offerings of respect, esteem, and gratitude; these you have given me so mighty and peculiar reasons to have, in the highest degree, for your Lordship, that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own greatness, I can with confidence brag, I here make your Lordship the richest present you ever received. This I am sure, I am under the greatest obligation to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours, I have received from your Lordship; favours, tho' great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the forwardness, concern, and kindness, and other obliging circumstances, that never fail to accompany them. To all this, you are pleased to add that, which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest: you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem, and allow me a place in your good thoughts; I had almost said friendship. This, my Lord, your words and actions so constantly shew, on all occasions, even to others, when I am absent, that it is not vanity

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in me to mention what every body knows: but it would be want of good manners, not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your Lordship. This, I am sure, I should write of the understanding without having any, if I were not extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world, how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,

Dorset-Court, 24th
May, 1689.

My LORD,

Your LORDSHIP'S

Most Humble, and

Most Obedient Servant,

John Locke.

THE
E P I S T L E
TO THE
R E A D E R.

READER,



HERE put into thy hands, what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours: if it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this, for a commendation of my work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it, now it is done. He that hawks at larks and sparrows, has no less sport, tho' a much less considerable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game: and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know, that as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater and more constant delight, than any of the other. Its searches after truth, are a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure. Every step the mind takes, in its progress towards knowledge, makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least.

FOR the understanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has escaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he, who has raised himself above the alms-basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, sets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the hunter's satisfaction: every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with some delight, and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition.

THIS, reader, is the entertainment of those, who let loose their own thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy them, since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading. It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself: but if they are taken upon trust from others, it is no great matter what they are; they not following truth, but some meaner consideration. And it is not worth while to be concerned, what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thy self, I know thou wilt judge candidly; and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy censure. For tho' it be certain, that there is nothing in this treatise, of the truth whereof I am not fully persuaded; yet I consider myself as liable to mistakes, as I can think thee; and know, that this book must stand or fall with thee, not by any opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new, or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject, and made a thorough acquaintance

acquaintance with their own understandings; but for my own information, and the satisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before we set our selves upon enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first enquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour, or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it.

THIS discontinued way of writing, may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, viz. that too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any thing wanting, I shall be glad that what I have writ gives thee any desire that I should have gone farther: if it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the subject; for when I first put pen to paper, I thought all I should have to say on this matter, would have been contained in one sheet of paper; but the farther I went, the larger prospect I had: new discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is; and that some parts of it might be contracted: the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cause some repetitions. But to confess the truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy, to make it shorter.

I AM not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers. But they who know stoic is apt to content itself with any excuse, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore allege in my defence, that the same notion having different respects, may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse; and that so it has happened in many parts of this: but avowing that, I shall frankly avow, that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument, and expressed it different ways, with a quite different design. I pretend not to publish this Essay for the information of men of large thoughts, and quick apprehensions; to such masters of knowledge, I profess my self a scholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what being spun out of my own coarse thoughts, is fitted to men of my own size; to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths, which established prejudice, or the abstractness of the ideas themselves, might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every side; and when the notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me, or out of the ordinary road, as I suspect they will appear to others, it is not one simple view of it, that will gain it admittance into every understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observed in themselves, or others, that what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible: tho' afterward the mind found little difference in the phrases, and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every man's imagination. We have our understandings no less different than our palates; and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery: the meat may be the same, and the nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning;

and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong constitutions. The truth is, those who advised me to publish it, advised me, for this reason, to publish it as it is: and since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it. I have so little affection to be in print, that if I were not flattered, this Essay might be of some use to others, as I think it has been to me; I should have confined it to the view of some friends, who gave the first occasion to it. My appearing therefore in print, being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say, as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers, as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accustomed to abstract speculations, or prepossessed with different notions, should mistake, or not comprehend my meaning.

I will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity, or insolence, in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing age; it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this Essay with hopes it may be useful to others. But if it may be permitted to speak freely of those, who with a feigned modesty condemn, as useless, what they themselves write, methinks it favours much more of vanity or insolence, to publish a book for any other end; and he fails very much of that respect he owes the publick, who prints, and consequently expects men should read that, wherein he intends not they should meet with any thing of use to themselves or others: and should nothing else be found allowable in this treatise, yet my design will not cease to be so: and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present. It is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure, which I expect not to escape more than better writers. Men's principles, notions, and reli-shes are so different, that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men. I acknowledge the age, we live in, is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easy to be satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet no body ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my readers, except half a dozen, this treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it securely: for I shall find some better way of spending my time, than in such kind of conversation. I shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness, tho' in one of the meanest ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great—Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some other of that strain; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish, that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned, but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree, that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or incapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard or misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning, and height of speculation; that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding: tho' so few are apt to think, they deserve or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of, has any faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwell long on this subject; and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalence of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those, who will not take

take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be enquired into.

I HAVE been told, that a short epitome of this treatise, which was printed 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because innate ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate ideas were not supposed, there would be little left, either of the notion or proof of spirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this treatise, I shall desire him to read it thorough; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of truth; which is never injured or endangered so much, as when mixed with, or built on falsehood. In the second edition I added as followeth.

THE bookseller will not forgive me, if I say nothing of this second edition, which he has promised, by the correctness of it, shall make amends for the many faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should be known, that it has one whole new chapter concerning identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. These, I must inform my reader, are not all new matter, but most of them either farther confirmation of what I had said, or explanations, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it: I must only except the alterations I have made in book ii. chap. 21.

WHAT I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deserved as accurate a view as I was capable of: those subjects having, in all ages, exercised the learned part of the world with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; those parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of men's minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had, concerning that, which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world, with as much freedom and readiness, as I at first published what then seemed to me to be right, thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone I seek, and that will always be welcome to me, when, or from whencesoever it comes.

BUT what forwardness soever I have to resign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; yet this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book; nor have, from any thing has been urged against it, found reason to alter my sense, in any of the points have been questioned. Whether the subject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention, than cursory readers, at least such as are prepossessed, are willing to allow; or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to others apprehension in my way of treating them: so it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly understood. There are so many instances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myself, to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those, who peruse it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or else that I have writ mine so obscurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be that truth, it is myself only am affected thereby, and therefore I shall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be said, in answer to those several objections I have met with, to passages here and there of my book. Since I persuade myself, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned, whether they are true or false, will be able to see, that what is said, is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood.

IF any, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have published their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they will
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not suffer it to be an *Essay*; I leave it to the publick to value the obligation they bear to their critical pens, and shall not waste my reader's time in so idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others in so hasty a confutation of what I have written.

THE booksellers preparing for the fourth edition of my *Essay*, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that, besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran thro' the whole book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said, was this:

CLEAR and distinct ideas are terms, which, tho' familiar and frequent in men's mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly it is but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them: I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the mind, and consequently determined, i. e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind, or determinate idea.

TO explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by determined, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it. I say, should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language; as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this, is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses.

I KNOW there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas, that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination.

UPON this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistake, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows and sees there, be determined, without any change, to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their enquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own enquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.

BESIDES this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the association of ideas, the other of enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions, never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this *Essay* had the second impression.

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- 6, 7. *That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered.*
8. *If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.*
- 9, 11. *It is false, -that reason discovers them.*
12. *The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these maxims.*
13. *By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths.*

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14. *If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.*
- 15, 16. *The steps by which the mind attains several truths.*
17. *Assenting, as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.*
18. *If such an assent be a mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three; that sweetness is not bitterness; and a thousand the like, must be innate.*
19. *Such less general-propositions known, before these universal maxims.*
20. *One and one equal to two, &c. not general, nor useful, answered.*
21. *These maxims not being known, sometimes, till proposed, proves them not innate.*
22. *Implicitly known, before proposing, signifies, that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.*
23. *The argument of assenting, on first hearing, is, upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.*
24. *Not innate, because not universally assented to.*
25. *These maxims not the first known.*
26. *And so not innate.*
27. *Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shews itself clearest.*
28. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. III.

No innate practical principles.

SECT.

1. *No moral principles so clear, and so generally received, as the fore-mentioned speculative maxims.*
2. *Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men.*
3. *Obj. Tho' men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their thoughts, answered.*
4. *Moral rules need a proof, ergo, not innate.*
5. *Instance in keeping compacts.*

6. *Virtue*

6. *Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable.*
7. *Men's actions convince us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.*
8. *Conscience no proof of any innate moral rule.*
9. *Instances of enormities practised without remorse.*
10. *Men have contrary practical principles.*
- 11-13. *Whole nations reject several moral rules.*
14. *Those, who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are.*
- 15-19. *Lord Herbert's innate principles examined.*
20. *Obj. Innate principles may be corrupted, answered.*
21. *Contrary principles in the world.*
- 22-26. *How men commonly come by their principles.*
27. *Principles must be examined.*
- 2, 3. *Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children.*
- 4, 5. *Identity, an idea not innate.*
6. *Whole and part, not innate ideas.*
7. *Idea of worship not innate.*
- 8-11. *Idea of God, not innate.*
12. *Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him, answered.*
- 13-16. *Ideas of God, various in different men.*
17. *If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.*
18. *Idea of substance, not innate.*
19. *No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate.*
20. *No ideas are remembered, till after they have been introduced.*
21. *Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.*
22. *Difference of men's discoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties.*
23. *Men may think and know for themselves.*
24. *Whence the opinion of innate principles.*
25. *Conclusion.*

CHAP. IV.

Other considerations about innate principles, both speculative and practical.

SECT.

1. *Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate.*

BOOK II.

Of ideas.

CHAP. I.

Of ideas in general, and their original.

SECT.

1. *Idea is the object of thinking.*
2. *All ideas come from sensation or reflection.*
3. *The objects of sensation, one source of ideas.*
4. *The operations of our minds, the other source of them.*
5. *All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.*
6. *Observable in children.*
7. *Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different objects they converse with.*
8. *Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention.*
9. *The soul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive.*
10. *The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.*
11. *It is not always conscious of it.*
12. *If a sleeping man thinks, without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.*
13. *Impossible to convince those that sleep, without dreaming, that they think.*
14. *That men dream, without remembering it, in vain urged.*
15. *Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational.*
16. *On this hypothesis, the soul must have ideas, not derived from sensation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.*
17. *If I think, when I know it not, no body else can know it.*
18. *How knows any one that the soul always thinks? For, if it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof.*
19. *That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.*
- 20-23. *No ideas, but from sensation or reflection, evident, if we observe children.*
24. *The original of all our knowledge.*
25. *In the reception of simple ideas, the understanding is most of all passive.*

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of simple ideas.

SECT.

1. Uncompounded appearances.
- 2, 3. The mind can neither make nor destroy them.

CHAP. III.

Of ideas of one sense.

SECT.

1. As colours of seeing, sounds of hearing.
2. Few simple ideas have names.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

SECT.

1. We receive this idea from touch.
2. Solidity fills space.
3. Distinct from space.
4. From hardness.
5. On solidity depends impulse, resistance, and protrusion.
6. What it is.

CHAP. V.

Of simple ideas by more than one sense.

CHAP. VI.

Of simple ideas of reflection.

SECT.

1. Are the operations of the mind about its other ideas?
2. The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.

CHAP. VII.

Of simple ideas, both of sensation and reflection.

SECT.

- 1-6. Pleasure and pain.
7. Existence and unity.
8. Power.
9. Succession.
10. Simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge.

CHAP. VIII.

Other considerations concerning simple ideas.

SECT.

- 1-6. Positive ideas from privative causes.
- 7, 8. Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies.

- 9, 10. Primary and secondary qualities.
- 11, 12. How primary qualities produce their ideas.
- 13, 14. How secondary.
- 15-22. Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary, not.
23. Three sorts of qualities in bodies.
- 24, 25. Reason of our mistake in this.
26. Secondary qualities twofold; first, immediately perceivable; secondly, mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX.

Of perception.

SECT.

1. It is the first simple idea of reflection.
- 2-4. Perception is only when the mind receives the impression.
- 5, 6. Children, tho' they have ideas in the womb, have none innate.
7. Which ideas first, is not evident.
- 8-10. Ideas of sensation often changed by the judgment.
- 11-14. Perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings.
15. Perception, the inlet of knowledge.

CHAP. X.

Of retention.

SECT.

1. Contemplation.
2. Memory.
3. Attention, repetition, pleasure, and pain, fix ideas.
- 4, 5. Ideas fade in the memory.
6. Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost.
7. In remembering, the mind is often active.
8. Two defects in the memory, oblivion, and slowness.
10. Brutes have memory.

CHAP. XI.

Of discerning, &c.

SECT.

1. No knowledge without it.
2. The difference of wit and judgment.
3. Clearness alone hinders confusion.
4. Comparing.
5. Brutes compare but imperfectly.
6. Compounding.
7. Brutes compound but little.
8. Naming.
9. Abstraction.
- 10, 11. Brutes abstract not.
- 12, 13. Idiots and madmen.
14. Method.
15. These are the beginnings of human knowledge.
16. Ap-

16. *Appeal to experience.*
 17. *Dark room.*

CHAP. XII.

Of complex ideas.

SECT.

1. *Made by the mind out of simple ones.*
2. *Made voluntarily.*
3. *Are either modes, substances, or relations.*
4. *Modes.*
5. *Simple and mixed modes.*
6. *Substances single or collective.*
7. *Relation.*
8. *The abstrusest ideas from the two sources.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of space, and its simple modes.

SECT.

1. *Simple modes.*
2. *Idea of space.*
3. *Space and extension.*
4. *Immenity.*
- 5, 6. *Figure.*
- 7-10. *Place.*
- 11-14. *Extension and body not the same.*
15. *The definition of extension, or space, does not explain it.*
16. *Division of beings into bodies and spirits, proves not space and body the same.*
- 17, 18. *Substance which we know not, no proof against space without body.*
- 19, 20. *Substance and accidents of little use in philosophy.*
21. *A vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of body.*
22. *The power of annihilation, proves a vacuum.*
23. *Motion proves a vacuum.*
24. *The ideas of space and body distinct.*
- 25, 26. *Extension being inseparable from body, proves it not the same.*
27. *Ideas of space and solidity distinct.*
28. *Men differ little in clear simple ideas.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of duration and its simple modes.

SECT.

1. *Duration is fleeting extension.*
- 2-4. *Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.*
5. *The idea of duration, applicable to things whilst we sleep.*
- 6-8. *The idea of succession, not from motion.*
- 9-11. *The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness.*
12. *This train, the measure of other successions.*

- 13-15. *The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea.*

16. *Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion.*
17. *Time is duration set out by measures.*
18. *A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods.*
19. *The revolutions of the sun and moon, the properest measures of time.*
20. *But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.*
21. *No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.*
22. *Time not the measure of motion.*
23. *Minutes, hours, and years, not necessary measures of duration.*
24. *The measure of time two ways applied.*
- 25-27. *Our measure of time, applicable to duration, before time.*
- 28-32. *Eternity.*

CHAP. XV.

Of duration and expansion considered together.

SECT.

1. *Both capable of greater and less.*
2. *Expansion not bounded by matter.*
3. *Nor duration by motion.*
4. *Why men more easily admit infinite duration, than infinite expansion.*
5. *Time to duration, is as place to expansion.*
6. *Time and place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the existence and motion of bodies.*
7. *Sometimes for so much of either, as we design by measures taken from the bulk, or motion of bodies.*
8. *They belong to all beings.*
9. *All the parts of extension, are extension; and all the parts of duration, are duration.*
10. *Their parts inseparable.*
11. *Duration is as a line, expansion as a solid.*
12. *Duration has never two parts together, expansion all together.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of number.

SECT.

1. *Number, the simplest and most universal idea.*
2. *Its modes made by addition.*
3. *Each mode distinct.*
4. *Therefore demonstrations in numbers, the most precise.*
- 5, 6. *Names necessary to numbers.*
7. *Why children number not earlier.*
8. *Number measures all measurables.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of infinity.

SECT.

1. *Infinity, in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.*
2. *The idea of finite easily got.*
3. *How we come by the idea of infinity.*
4. *Our idea of space boundless.*
5. *And so of duration.*
6. *Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.*
7. *Difference between infinity of space, and space infinite.*
8. *We have no idea of infinite space.*
9. *Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.*
- 10, 11. *Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expansion.*
12. *Infinite divisibility.*
- 13, 14. *No positive idea of infinite.*
15. *What is positive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.*
- 16, 17. *We have no positive idea of an infinite duration.*
18. *No positive idea of infinite space.*
19. *What is positive, what negative in our idea of infinite.*
20. *Some think they have a positive idea of eternity, and not of infinite space.*
21. *Supposed positive ideas of infinity, cause of mistakes.*
22. *All these ideas from sensation and reflection.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other simple modes.

SECT.

- 1, 2. *Modes of motion.*
3. *Modes of sounds.*
4. *Modes of colours.*
5. *Modes of tastes and smells.*
6. *Some simple modes have no names.*
7. *Why some modes have, and others have not names.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of the modes of thinking.

SECT.

- 1, 2. *Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.*
3. *The various attention of the mind in thinking.*
4. *Hence it is probable that thinking is the action, not essence of the soul.*

CHAP. XX.

Of modes of pleasure and pain.

SECT.

1. *Pleasure and pain simple ideas.*
2. *Good and evil, what.*

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3. *Our passions moved by good and evil.*
4. *Love.*
5. *Hatred.*
6. *Desire.*
7. *Joy.*
8. *Sorrow.*
9. *Hope.*
10. *Fear.*
11. *Despair.*
12. *Anger.*
13. *Envy.*
14. *What passions all men have.*
- 15, 16. *Pleasure and pain, what.*
17. *Shame.*
18. *These instances do shew how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of power.

SECT.

1. *This idea, how got.*
2. *Power active and passive.*
3. *Power includes relation.*
4. *The clearest idea of active power, had from spirit.*
5. *Will and understanding, two powers.*
6. *Faculties.*
7. *Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.*
8. *Liberty, what.*
9. *Supposes understanding and will.*
10. *Belongs not to volition.*
11. *Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.*
12. *Liberty, what.*
13. *Necessity, what.*
- 14-20. *Liberty belongs not to the will.*
21. *But to the agent, or man.*
- 22-24. *In respect of willing, a man is not free.*
- 25, 26. *The will determined by something without it.*
27. *Volition, what.*
29. *What determines the will.*
30. *Will and desire must not be confounded.*
31. *Uneasiness determines the will.*
32. *Desire is uneasiness.*
33. *The uneasiness of desire determines the will.*
34. *This the spring of action.*
35. *The greatest positive good determines not the will, but uneasiness.*
36. *Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to happiness.*
37. *Because uneasiness alone is present.*
38. *Because all, who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not. But a great uneasiness is never neglected.*
39. *Desire accompanies all uneasiness.*
40. *The most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will.*
41. *All desire happiness.*
42. *Happiness.*

42. Happiness, what.
43. What good is desired, what not.
44. Why the greatest good is not always desired.
45. Why, not being desired, it moves not the will.
46. Due consideration raises desire.
47. The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire, makes way for consideration.
48. To be determined by our own judgment, is no restraint to liberty.
49. The freest agents are so determined.
50. A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness, no abridgment of liberty.
51. The necessity of pursuing true happiness, the foundation of all liberty.
52. The reason of it.
53. Government of our passions, the right improvement of liberty.
- 54, 55. How men come to pursue different courses.
56. How men come to abuse ill.
57. First, from bodily pains. Secondly, from wrong desires arising from wrong judgment.
- 58, 59. Our judgment of present good or evil, always right.
60. From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness.
- 61, 62. A more particular account of wrong judgments.
63. In comparing present and future.
- 64, 65. Causes of this.
66. In considering consequences of actions.
67. Causes of this.
68. Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our happiness.
69. We can change the agreeableness, or disagreeableness, in things.
70. Preference of vice to virtue, a manifest wrong judgment.
- 71, 72, } Recapitulation.
- 73.

CHAP. XXII.

Of mixed modes.

SECT.

1. Mixed modes, what.
2. Made by the mind.
3. Sometimes got by the explication of their names.
4. The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.
5. The cause of making mixed modes.
6. Why words in one language have none answering in another.
7. And languages change.
8. Mixed modes, where they exist.
9. How we get the ideas of mixed modes.

10. Motion, thinking, and power, have been most modified.
11. Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect.
12. Mixed modes, made also of other ideas.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the complex ideas of substances.

SECT.

1. Ideas of substances, how made.
2. Our idea of substance in general.
- 3-6. Of the sorts of substances.
4. No clear idea of substance in general.
5. As clear an idea of spirit as body.
7. Powers, a great part of our complex ideas of substances.
8. And why.
9. Three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of substances.
10. Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances.
11. The now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts.
12. Our faculties of discovery suited to our state.
13. Conjecture about spirits.
14. Complex ideas of substances.
15. Idea of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily substances.
16. No idea of abstract substance.
17. The cohesion of solid parts, and impulse, the primary ideas of body.
18. Thinking and motivity, the primary ideas of spirit.
- 19-21. Spirits capable of motion.
22. Idea of soul and body compared.
- 23-27. Cohesion of solid parts in body, as hard to be conceived, as thinking in a soul.
- 28, 29. Communication of motion by impulse, or by thought, equally intelligible.
30. Ideas of body and spirit compared.
31. The notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it, than that of body.
32. We know nothing beyond our simple ideas.
- 33-35. Idea of God.
36. No ideas in our complex one of spirits, but those got from sensation or reflection.
37. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective ideas of substances.

SECT.

1. One idea.
2. Made by the power of composing in the mind.

3. All

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3. *All artificial things are collective ideas.*

CHAP. XXV.

Of relation.

SECT.

1. *Relation, what.*
2. *Relations, without correlative terms, not easily perceived.*
3. *Some seemingly absolute terms contain relations.*
4. *Relation different from the things related.*
5. *Change of relation may be, without any change in the subject.*
6. *Relation only betwixt two things.*
7. *All things capable of relation.*
8. *The ideas of relation, clearer often, than of the subjects related.*
9. *Relations all terminate in simple ideas.*
10. *Terms, leading the mind beyond the subject denominated, are relative.*
11. *Conclusion.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Of cause, of effect, and other relations.

SECT.

1. *Whence their ideas got.*
2. *Creation, generation, making alteration.*
- 3,4. *Relations of time.*
5. *Relations of place and extension.*
6. *Absolute terms often stand for relations.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Of identity and diversity.

SECT.

1. *Wherein identity consists.*
2. *Identity of substances, identity of modes.*
3. *Principium individuationis.*
4. *Identity of vegetables.*
5. *Identity of animals.*
6. *Identity of man.*
7. *Identity suited to the idea.*
8. *Same man.*
9. *Personal identity.*
10. *Consciousness makes personal identity.*
11. *Personal identity in change of substances.*
- 12-15. *Whether in the change of thinking substances.*
16. *Consciousness makes the same person.*
17. *Self depends on consciousness.*
- 18,19. *Objects of reward and punishment.*
20. *5*
- 21,22. *Difference between identity of man and person.*

- 23,24, } *Consciousness alone makes self.*
25.

- 26,27. *Person a forensic term.*

28. *The difficulty from ill use of names.*

29. *Continued existence makes identity.*

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other relations.

SECT.

1. *Proportional.*
2. *Natural.*
3. *Instituted.*
4. *Moral.*
5. *Moral good and evil.*
6. *Moral rules.*
7. *Laws.*
8. *Divine law, the measure of sin and duty.*
9. *Civil Law, the measure of crimes and innocence.*
- 10,11. *Philosophical law, the measure of virtue and vice.*
12. *Its enforcements, commendation, and discredit.*
13. *These three laws, the rules of moral good and evil.*
- 14,15. *Morality is the relation of actions to the rules.*
16. *The denominations of actions often mislead us.*
17. *Relations innumerable.*
18. *All relations terminate in simple ideas.*
19. *We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) notion of the relation, as of its foundation.*
20. *The notion of the relation is the same, whether the rule, any action is compared to, be true or false.*

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear and distinct, obscure and confused ideas.

SECT.

1. *Ideas, some clear and some distinct, others obscure and confused.*
2. *Clear and obscure, explained by sight.*
3. *Causes of obscurity.*
4. *Distinct and confused, what.*
5. *Objection.*
6. *Confusion of ideas, is in reference to their names.*
7. *Defaults, which make confusion.*
First, complex ideas, made up of too few simple ones.
8. *Secondly, or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.*
9. *Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.*
10. *Confusion, without reference to names, hardly conceivable.*

11. *Confusion*

11. *Confusion concerns always two ideas.*
12. *Causes of confusion.*
13. *Complex ideas may be distinct in one part, and confus'd in another.*
14. *This, if not heeded, causes confusion in our arguments.*
15. *Influence in eternity.*
16. *Dissolvibility of matter.*

C H A P. XXX.

Of real and fantastical ideas.

SECT.

1. *Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.*
2. *Simple ideas all real.*
3. *Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.*
4. *Mixed modes, made of consistent ideas, are real.*
5. *Ideas of substances are real, when they agree with the existence of things.*

C H A P. XXXI.

Of adequate and inadequate ideas.

SECT.

1. *Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes.*
2. *Simple ideas all adequate.*
3. *Modes are all adequate.*
- 4, 5. *Modes, in reference to settled names, may be inadequate.*
- 6, 7. *Ideas of substances, as referred to real essences, not adequate.*
- 8-11. *Ideas of substances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.*
12. *Simple ideas $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha$, and adequate.*
13. *Ideas of substances are $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha$, inadequate.*
14. *Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

C H A P. XXXII.

Of true and false ideas.

SECT.

1. *Truth and falsehood properly belongs to propositions.*
2. *Metaphysical truth contains a tacit proposition.*
3. *No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true or false.*
4. *Ideas, referred to any thing, may be true or false.*

5. *Other men's ideas, real existence, and supposed real essences, are what men usually refer their ideas to.*

- 6-8. *The cause of such references.*

9. *Simple ideas may be false, in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.*

10. *Ideas of mixed modes most liable to be false, in this sense.*

11. *Or at least to be thought false.*

12. *And why.*

13. *As referred to real existences, none of our ideas can be false, but those of substances.*

- 14-16. *First, simple ideas in this sense not false, and why.*

15. *Tho' one man's idea of blue should be different from another's.*

17. *Secondly, modes not false.*

18. *Thirdly, ideas of substances, when false.*

19. *Truth or falsehood always supposes affirmation or negation.*

20. *Ideas, in themselves, neither true nor false.*

21. *But are false; first, when judged agreeable to another man's idea, without being so.*

22. *Secondly, when judged to agree to real existence, when they do not.*

23. *Thirdly, when judged adequate, without being so.*

24. *Fourthly, when judged to represent the real essence.*

25. *Ideas, when false.*

26. *More properly to be called right or wrong.*

C H A P. XXXIII.

Of the association of ideas.

SECT.

1. *Something unreasonable in most men.*

2. *Not wholly from self-love.*

3. *Nor from education.*

4. *A degree of madness.*

5. *From a wrong connection of ideas.*

6. *This connection, how made.*

- 7, 8. *Some antipathies, an effect of it.*

9. *A great cause of errors.*

- 10-12. *Instances.*

13. *Why time cures some disorders in the mind, which reason cannot.*

- 14-16. *Farther instances of the effects of the association of ideas.*

17. *Its influence on intellectual habits.*

18. *Observable in different sects.*

19. *Conclusion.*

BOOK III.

Of words.

CHAP. I.

Of words, or language in general.

SECT.

1. *Man fitted to form articulate sounds.*
2. *To make them signs of ideas.*
- 3, 4. *To make general signs.*
5. *Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible ideas.*
6. *Distribution.*

CHAP. II.

Of the signification of words.

SECT.

1. *Words are sensible signs, necessary for communication.*
- 2, 3. *Words are the sensible signs of his ideas, who uses them.*
4. *Words often secretly referred, first, to the ideas in other men's minds.*
5. *Secondly, to the reality of things.*
6. *Words, by use, readily excite ideas.*
7. *Words often used without signification.*
8. *Their signification, perfectly arbitrary.*

CHAP. III.

Of general terms.

SECT.

1. *The greatest part of words general.*
2. *For every particular thing to have a name is impossible.*
- 3, 4. *And useless.*
5. *What things have proper names.*
- 6-8. *How general words are made.*
9. *General natures are nothing but abstract ideas.*
10. *Why the genus is ordinarily made use of, in definitions.*
11. *General and universal are creatures of the understanding.*
12. *Abstract ideas are the essences of the genera and species.*
13. *They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.*
14. *Each distinct, abstract idea is a distinct essence.*
15. *Real and nominal essence.*
16. *Constant connection between the name and nominal essence.*
17. *Supposition, that species are distinguished by their real essences, useless.*
18. *Real and nominal essence, the same in simple ideas and modes, different in substances.*
19. *Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.*
20. *Recapitulation.*

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CHAP. IV.

Of the names of simple ideas.

SECT.

1. *Names of simple ideas, modes, and substances, have each something peculiar.*
2. *First, names of simple ideas and substances, intimate real existence.*
3. *Secondly, names of simple ideas, and modes, signify always both real and nominal essence.*
4. *Thirdly, names of simple ideas, undefinable.*
5. *If all were definable, it would be a process in infinitum.*
6. *What a definition is.*
7. *Simple ideas, why undefinable.*
- 8, 9. *Instances. Motion.*
10. *Liger.*
11. *Simple ideas, why undefinable, farther explained.*
- 12, 13. *The contrary shewed in complex ideas, by instances of a statue, and rainbow.*
14. *The names of complex ideas, when to be made intelligible by words.*
15. *Fourthly, names of simple ideas, least doubtful.*
16. *Fifthly, simple ideas have few ascents in *linca predicamentali*.*
17. *Sixthly, names of simple ideas stand for ideas, not at all arbitrary.*

CHAP. V.

Of the names of mixed modes and relations.

SECT.

1. *They stand for abstract ideas, as other general names.*
2. *First, the ideas they stand for, are made by the understanding.*
3. *Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without patterns.*
4. *How this is done.*
5. *Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the existence.*
6. *Instances, murder, incest, stabbing.*
7. *But still subservient to the end of language.*
8. *Whence the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof.*
9. *This shews species to be made for communication.*
- 10, 11. *In mixed modes, 'tis the name that ties the combination together, and makes it a species.*
12. *For the originals of mixed modes, we look*

- look no further than the mind, which also shows them to be the workmanship of the understanding.
13. Their being made by the understanding, without patterns, shows the reason why they are so compounded.
 14. Names of mixed modes stand always for their real essences.
 15. Why their names are usually got before their ideas.
 16. Reason of my being so large on this subject.

C H A P. VI.

Of the names of substances.

SECT.

1. The common names of substances stand for sorts.
2. The essence of each sort, is the abstract idea.
3. The nominal and real essence different.
- 4-6. Nothing essential to individuals.
- 7, 8. The nominal essence bounds the species.
9. Not the real essence, which we know not.
10. Not substantial forms, which we know less.
11. That the nominal essence is that whereby we distinguish species, farther evident from spirits.
12. Whereof there are, probably, numberless species.
13. The nominal essence that of the species, proved from water and ice.
- 14-18. Difficulties against a certain number of real essences.
- 19, 20. Our nominal essences of substances, not perfect collections of properties.
21. But such a collection as our name stands for.
22. Our abstract ideas are to us the measures of species: instances in that of man.
23. Species not distinguished by generation.
24. Not by substantial forms.
25. The specific essences are made by the mind.
- 26, 27. Therefore very various and uncertain.
28. But not so arbitrary, as mixed modes.
29. Though very imperfect.
30. Which yet serve for common converse.
31. But make several essences, signified by the same name.
32. The more general our ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.
33. This, all accommodated to the end of speech.
34. Instance in cassuaries.
35. Men make the species; instance, gold.
36. Though nature makes the similitude.
37. And continues it in the races of things.
38. Each abstract idea is an essence.

39. Genera and species, in order to naming; instance, watch.
40. Species of artificial things, less confused than natural.
41. Artificial things of distinct species.
42. Substances alone have proper names.
43. Difficulty to treat of words with words.
- 44, 45. Instance of mixed modes in Kinab and Niapb.
- 46, 47. Instance of substances in Zabab.
48. Their ideas perfect, and therefore various.
49. Therefore to fix their species, a real essence is supposed.
50. Which supposition is of no use.
51. Conclusion.

C H A P. VII.

Of particles.

SECT.

1. Particles connect parts, or whole sentences together.
2. In them consists the art of well-speaking.
- 3, 4. They show what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts.
5. Instance in But.
6. This matter but lightly touched here.

C H A P. VIII.

Of abstract and concrete terms.

SECT.

1. Abstract terms, not predicable, one of another, and why.
2. They show the difference of our ideas.

C H A P. IX.

Of the imperfection of words.

SECT.

1. Words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts.
2. Any words will serve for recording.
3. Communication by words, civil or philosophical.
4. The imperfection of words, is the doubtfulness of their signification.
5. Causes of their imperfection.
6. The names of mixed modes doubtful: first, because the ideas, they stand for, are so complex.
7. Secondly, because they have no standards.
8. Propriety not a sufficient remedy.
9. The way of learning these names contributes also to their doubtfulness.
10. Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors.
11. Names of substances of doubtful signification.
12. Names of substances referred, first, to real essences, that cannot be known.

- 13, 14. Secondly, to co-existing qualities, which are known but imperfectly.
15. With this imperfection they may serve for civil, but not well for philosophical use.
16. Instance, liquor of nerves.
17. Instance, gold.
18. The names of simple ideas, the least doubtful.
19. And next to them, simple modes.
20. The most doubtful, are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances.
21. Why this imperfection charged upon words.
- 22, 23. This should teach us moderation in imposing our own sense of old authors.
22. Sixthly, a supposition that words have a certain and evident signification.
23. The ends of language: first to convey our ideas.
24. Secondly, to do it with quickness.
25. Thirdly, therewith to convey the knowledge of things.
- 26-31. How men's words fail in all these.
32. How in substances.
33. How in modes and relations.
34. Seventhly, figurative speech also an abuse of language.

C H A P. XI.

Of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses.

SECT.

C H A P. X.

Of the abuse of words.

SECT.

1. Abuse of words.
- 2, 3. First, words without any, or without clear ideas.
4. Occasioned by learning names, before the ideas they belong to.
5. Secondly, unjustly application of them.
6. Thirdly, affected obscurity, by wrong application.
7. Logic and dispute has much contributed to this.
8. Calling it subtilty.
9. This learning very little benefits society.
10. But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication.
11. As useful as to confound the sound of the letters.
12. This art has perplexed religion and justice.
13. And ought not to pass for learning.
14. Fourthly, taking them for things.
15. Instance in matter.
16. This makes errors lasting.
17. Fifthly, setting them for what they cannot signify.
18. V. g. putting them for the real essences of substances.
19. Hence we think every change of our idea in substances, not to change the species.
20. The cause of this abuse, a supposition of nature's working always regularly.
21. This abuse contains two false suppositions.
1. They are worth seeking.
2. Are not easy.
3. But yet necessary to philosophy.
4. Misuse of words, the cause of great errors.
5. Obstinacy.
6. And wrangling.
7. Instance, bat and bird.
8. First remedy, to use no word without an idea.
9. Secondly, to have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes.
10. And distinct and conformable in substances.
11. Thirdly, propriety.
12. Fourthly, to make known their meaning.
13. And that three ways.
14. First, in simple ideas by synonymous terms, or shewing.
15. Secondly, in mixed modes by definition.
16. Morality, capable of demonstration.
17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear.
18. And is the only way.
19. Thirdly, in substances, by shewing and defining.
- 20, 21. Ideas of the leading qualities of substances, are best got by shewing.
22. The ideas of their powers, best by definition.
23. A reflection on the knowledge of spirits.
24. Ideas also of substances must be conformable to things.
25. Not easy to be made so.
26. Fifthly, by constancy in their signification.
27. When the variation is to be explained.

BOOK IV.

Of knowledge and opinion.

CHAP. I.

Of knowledge in general.

SECT.

1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas.
2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas.
3. This agreement fourfold.
4. First, of identity, or diversity.
5. Secondly, relation.
6. Thirdly, of co-existence.
7. Fourthly, of real existence.
8. Knowledge actual or habitual.
9. Habitual knowledge, twofold.

CHAP. II.

Of the degrees of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. Intuitive.
2. Demonstrative.
3. Depends on proofs.
4. But not so easy.
5. Not without precedent doubt.
6. Not so clear.
7. Each step must have intuitive evidence.
8. Hence the mistake *ex præcognitis* & *præconcepis*.
9. Demonstration, not limited to quantity.
- 10-13. Why it has been so thought.
14. Sensitive knowledge of particular existence.
15. Knowledge not always clear, where the ideas are so.

CHAP. III.

Of the extent of human knowledge.

SECT.

1. First, no farther than we have ideas.
2. Secondly, no farther than we can perceive their agreement or disagreement.
3. Thirdly, intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the relations of all our ideas.
4. Fourthly, nor demonstrative knowledge.
5. Fifthly, sensitive knowledge, narrower than either.
6. Sixthly, our knowledge, therefore, narrower than our ideas.
7. How far our knowledge reaches.
8. First, our knowledge of identity and diversity, as far as our ideas.
9. Secondly, of co-existence, a very little way.

10. Because the connection between most simple ideas is unknown.

11. Especially of secondary qualities.

12-14. And farther, because all connection between any secondary and primary qualities is undiscoverable.

15. Of repugnancy to co-exist larger.

16. Of the co-existence of powers, a very little way.

17. Of spirits, yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, of other relations, it is not easy to say how far.

Morality capable of demonstration.

19. Two things have made moral ideas thought incapable of demonstration. Their complexedness and want of sensible representations.

20. Remedies of those difficulties.

21. Fourthly, of real existence, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensitive of some few other things.

22. Our ignorance great.

23. First, one cause of it, want of ideas, either such as we have no conception of, or such as particularly we have not.

24. Because of their remoteness, or,

25. Because of their minuteness.

26. Hence no science of bodies.

27. Much less of spirits:

28. Secondly, want of a discoverable connection, between ideas we have.

29. Instances.

30. Thirdly, want of tracing our ideas.

31. Extent in respect of universality.

CHAP. IV.

Of the reality of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. Objection, knowledge placed in ideas, may be all bare vision.

2,3. Answer, not so, where ideas agree with things.

4. As, first, all simple ideas do.

5. Secondly, all complex ideas, except of substances.

6. Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge.

7. And of moral.

8. Existence not required to make it real.

9. Nor will it be less true, or certain, because moral ideas are of our own making and naming.

10. Mis-naming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge.

11. Ideas of substances have their archetypes without us.

12. So far as they agree with those, so far our

- our knowledge concerning them is real.
13. In our inquiries about substances, we must consider ideas, and not confine our thoughts to names, or species supposed, set out by names.
 - 14, 15. Objection against a changeling being something between man and beast, answered.
 16. Monsters.
 17. Words and species.
 18. Recapitulation.

CHAP. V.

Of truth in general.

SECT.

1. What truth is.
2. A right joining, or separating of signs; i. e. ideas or words.
3. Which make mental, or verbal propositions.
4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but the joining, or separating ideas, without words.
6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all chimerical.
8. Answered, real truth is about ideas, agreeing to things.
9. Fallhood is the joining of names, otherwise than their ideas agree.
10. General propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical truth.

CHAP. IV.

Of universal propositions, their truth and certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of words, necessary to knowledge.
2. General truths, hardly to be understood, but in verbal propositions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge.
4. No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of each species mentioned, is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns substances.
6. The truth of few universal propositions, concerning substances is to be known.
7. Because co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known.
- 8, 9. Instance in gold.
10. As far as any such co-existence can be known, so far universal propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,
- 11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes.
13. Judgement may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.

14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances.
15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constitutions, we can make but few, general, certain propositions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

SECT.

1. They are self-evident.
2. Wherein that self-evidence consists.
3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms.
4. First, as to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self-evident.
5. Secondly, in co-existence we have few self-evident propositions.
6. Thirdly, in other relations we may have.
7. Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none.
8. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.
9. Because they are not the truths the first known.
10. Because on them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend.
11. What use these general maxims have.
12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may prove contradictions.
13. Instance in vacuum.
14. They prove not the existence of things without us.
15. Their application dangerous, about complex ideas.
- 16-18. Instance in man.
19. Little use of these maxims, in proofs, where we have clear and distinct ideas.
20. Their use dangerous, where our ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propositions.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge.
- 2, 3. As, first, identical propositions.
4. Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole.
5. As part of the definition of the terms defined.
6. Instance, man and palfry.
7. For this teaches but the signification of words.
8. But no real knowledge.
9. General propositions, concerning substances, are often trifling.
10. And why.
11. Thirdly, using words variously, is trifling with them.

12. *Marks of verbal propositions. First, predication in abstract.*
13. *Secondly, a part of the definition, predicated of any terms.*

C H A P. IX.

Of our knowledge of existence.

SECT.

1. *General, certain propositions concern not existence.*
2. *A threefold knowledge of existence.*
3. *Our knowledge of our own existence, is intuitive.*

C H A P. X.

Of the existence of a GOD.

SECT.

1. *We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a GOD.*
2. *Man knows that he himself is.*
3. *He knows also, that nothing cannot produce a being, therefore something eternal.*
4. *That eternal being must be most powerful.*
5. *And most knowing.*
6. *And therefore GOD.*
7. *Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a GOD.*
8. *Something from eternity.*
9. *Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative.*
10. *Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative.*
- 11, 12. *Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom.*
13. *Whether material, or no.*
14. *Not material, first, because every particle of matter is not cogitative.*
15. *Secondly, one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative.*
16. *Thirdly, a system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative.*
17. *Whether in motion or at rest.*
- 18, 19. *Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind.*

C H A P. XI.

Of the knowledge of the existence of other things.

SECT.

1. *Is to be had only by sensation.*
2. *Instance, whiteness of this paper.*
3. *This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us.*
4. *First, because we cannot have them but by the inlet of the senses.*
5. *Secondly, because an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very distinct perceptions.*
6. *Thirdly, pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensation, accompanies not the returning of those ideas, without the external objects.*

7. *Fourthly, our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of outward things.*

8. *This certainty is as great as our condition needs.*

9. *But reaches no farther than actual sensation.*

10. *Folly to expect demonstration in every thing.*

11. *Past existence is known by memory.*

12. *The existence of spirits not knowable.*

13. *Particular propositions concerning existence, are knowable.*

14. *And general propositions concerning abstract ideas.*

C H A P. XII.

Of the improvement of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Knowledge is not from maxims.*
2. *(The occasion of that opinion.)*
3. *But from the comparing clear and distinct ideas.*
4. *Dangerous to build upon precarious principles.*
5. *This no certain way to truth.*
6. *But to compare clear, complex ideas under steady names.*
7. *The true method of advancing knowledge, is by considering our abstract ideas.*
8. *By which, morality, also, may be made clearer.*
9. *But knowledge of bodies is to be improved, only by experience.*
10. *This may procure us convenience, not science.*
11. *We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improvements.*
12. *But must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles.*
13. *The true use of hypotheses.*
14. *Clear and distinct ideas, with settled names, and the finding of those, which shew their agreement or disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our knowledge.*
15. *Mathematics an instance of it.*

C H A P. XIII.

Some other considerations concerning our knowledge.

SECT.

1. *Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.*
2. *The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.*
3. *Instances in number, and in natural religion.*

C H A P. XIV.

Of judgment.

SECT.

1. *Our knowledge being short, we want something else.*

2. *What*

2. *What use to be made of this twilight estate.*
3. *Judgment supplies the want of knowledge.*
4. *Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it.*

CHAP. XV.

Of probability.

SECT.

1. *Probability is the appearance of agreement, upon fallible proofs.*
2. *It is to supply the want of knowledge.*
3. *Being that, which makes us presume things to be true, before we know them to be so.*
4. *The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others experience.*
5. *In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.*
6. *The being capable of great variety.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of assent.

SECT.

1. *Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability.*
2. *These cannot always be actually in view, and then we must content ourselves with the remembrance, that we once saw ground for such a degree of assent.*
3. *The ill-consequence of this, if our former judgment were not rightly made.*
4. *The right use of it, is mutual charity and forbearance.*
5. *Probability is either of matter of fact, or speculation.*
6. *The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces assurance approaching to knowledge.*
7. *Unquestionable testimony and experience for the most part produce confidence.*
8. *Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident belief.*
9. *Experience and testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability.*
10. *Traditional testimonies, the farther removed, the less their proof.*
11. *Yet history is of great use.*
12. *In things, which sense cannot discover, analogy is the great rule of probability.*
13. *One case, where contrary experience lessens not the testimony.*
14. *The bare testimony of revelation is the highest certainty.*

CHAP. XVII.

Of reason.

SECT.

1. *Various significations of the word reason.*

2. *Wherein reasoning consists.*
3. *Its four parts.*
4. *Syllogism, not the great instrument of reason.*
5. *Helps little in demonstration, less in probability.*
6. *Serves not to increase our knowledge, but fence with it.*
7. *Other helps should be sought.*
8. *We reason about particulars.*
9. *First, reason fails us for want of ideas.*
10. *Secondly, because of obscure and imperfect ideas.*
11. *Thirdly, for want of intermediate ideas.*
12. *Fourthly, because of wrong principles.*
13. *Fifthly, because of doubtful terms.*
14. *Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning.*
15. *The next is demonstration by reasoning.*
16. *To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning.*
17. *Intuition, demonstration, judgment.*
18. *Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas.*
19. *Four sorts of arguments: first, ad verendum.*
20. *Secondly, ad ignorantiam.*
21. *Thirdly, ad hominem.*
22. *Fourthly, ad judicium.*
23. *Above, contrary, and according to reason.*
24. *Reason and faith not opposite.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of faith and reason, and their distinct provinces.

SECT.

1. *Necessary to know their boundaries.*
2. *Faith and reason, what, as contradistinguished.*
3. *No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation.*
4. *Traditional revelation may make us know propositions, knowable also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason doth.*
5. *Revelation cannot be admitted, against the clear evidence of reason.*
6. *Traditional revelation much less.*
7. *Things above reason.*
8. *Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith.*
9. *Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.*
10. *In matters, where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.*
11. *If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted.*

CHAP.

C H A P. XIX.

Of enthusiasm.

SECT.

1. *Love of truth necessary.*
2. *A forwardness to dictate, from whence.*
3. *Force of enthusiasm.*
4. *Reason and revelation.*
5. *Rise of enthusiasm.*
- 6, 7. *Enthusiasm.*
- 8, 9. *Enthusiasm, mistaken for seeing and feeling.*
10. *Enthusiasm, how to be discovered.*
11. *Enthusiasm fails of evidence, that the proposition is from GOD.*
12. *Firmness of persuasion, no proof that any proposition is from God.*
13. *Light in the mind, what.*
14. *Revelation must be judged of, by reason.*
- 15, 16. *Belief, no proof of revelation.*

C H A P. XX.

Of wrong assent, or error.

SECT.


1. *Causes of error.*
2. *First, want of proofs.*
3. *Obj. what shall become of those who want them, answered.*

4. *People hindered from inquiry.*5. *Secondly, want of skill to use them.*6. *Thirdly, want of will to use them.*7. *Fourthly, wrong measures of probability; whereof,*8, 10. *First, doubtful propositions, taken for principles.*11. *Secondly, received hypotheses.*12. *Thirdly, predominant passions.*13. *The means of evading probabilities, 1st, supposed fallacy.*14. *2dly, supposed arguments for the contrary.*15. *What probabilities determine the assent.*16. *Where it is in our power to suspend it.*17. *Fourthly, authority.*18. *Men not in so many errors, as is imagined.*

C H A P. XXI.

Of the division of the sciences.

SECT.

1. *Three sorts.*2. *First, physica.*3. *Secondly, practica.*4. *Thirdly, spiritual.*5. *This is the first division of the objects of knowledge.*

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.



INCE it is the understanding, that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to enquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself: and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

§ 2. THIS, therefore, being my purpose, to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent: I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter, or no. These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way, in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employ'd about the objects, which they have to do with: And I shall imagine, I have not wholly misemploy'd myself, in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those persuasions, which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted, somewhere or other, with such assurance and confidence, that he, that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embrac'd, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintain'd; may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

§. 3. It is therefore, worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent, and moderate our persuasions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method.

BOOK I. FIRST, I shall enquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the understanding comes to be furnish'd with them.

SECONDLY, I shall endeavour to shew, what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

THIRDLY, I shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.

Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.

§ 4. IF, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things, to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out, how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

Our capacity suited to our state and concerns.

§ 5. FOR, tho' the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things; yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful author of our being, for that portion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfy'd with what God hath thought fit for them, since he has given them (as St. Peter says) *πάντα ἡμῶς (αὐτοῖς) ἐνέσχετο*, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue; and has put, within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come, of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concerns, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker, and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are fill'd with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it, to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad sun-shine. The candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us: and we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are suited to our faculties; and upon those grounds they are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concerns. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-worse as wisely as he, who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.

§ 6. WHEN

No innate principles in the mind.

3

§ 6. WHEN we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success: and when we have well survey'd the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclin'd either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; or, on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. 'Tis of great use to the sailor, to know the length of his line, tho' he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. 'Tis well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state which man is in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.

CHAP. II.

Knowledge of our capacity, a cure of scepticism and idleness.

§ 7. THIS was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries, the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction, in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escap'd its comprehension. Thus men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing; 'tis no wonder that they raise questions, and multiply disputes, which never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well consider'd, the extent of our knowledge once discover'd, and the horizon found, which sets the bounds between the enlighten'd and dark parts of things, between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us; men would perhaps with less scruple, acquiesce in the avow'd ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.

Occasion of this Essay.

§ 8. THUS much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this enquiry into human understanding. But before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word "Idea," which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks; I have us'd it to express whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

What idea stands for.

I PRESUME it will be easily granted me, that there are such ideas in men's minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.

OUR first enquiry then shall be, how they come into the mind?

CHAP. II.

No innate principles in the mind.

§ 1. IT is an establish'd opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, *νομοὶ ἐννοεῖς*, shown how characters, as it were stamp'd upon the mind of man, which the soul receives we come by in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient any knowledge, sufficient to convince unprejudic'd readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should prove it not only shew (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this discourse) how men, prove it not innately, barely

The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innately, barely

BOOK I. barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions, or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose, the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be, to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

BUT because a man is not permitted without censure, to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road; I shall set down the reasons, that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one: which I leave to be consider'd by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth, wherever they find it.

General assent, the great argument.

§ 2. THERE is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles both speculative and practical (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all mankind; which therefore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

Universal consent proves nothing innate.

§ 3. THIS argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

"What is, is;" and " 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," not universally assented to.

§ 4. BUT, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such; because there are none, to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnify'd principles of demonstration: "whatsoever is, is;" and " 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" which, of all others, I think, have the most allow'd title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally receiv'd, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.

Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c.

§ 5. FOR, first 'tis evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceiv'd. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, 'tis evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is, of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind,

mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a man may live long, and die at last, in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that, if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate principles. For no body, I think, ever deny'd, that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then, to what end such contest for certain, innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding, without being perceiv'd, I can see no difference there can be between any truths, the mind is capable of knowing, in respect of their original: they must all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore, that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding, as it never perceiv'd, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind, and never to be perceiv'd, is all one as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the mind, or understanding. If therefore, these two propositions, "whatsoever is, is;" "and 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

§ 6. To avoid this, 'tis usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,

§ 7. DOUBTFUL expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons, to those, who being prepossess'd, take not the pains to examine, even what they themselves say. For to apply this answer, with any tolerable sense, to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, that, as soon as men come to the use of reason, these suppos'd native inscriptions come to be known, and observed by them: or else, that the use and exercise of men's reason assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them. That men know them, when they come to the use of reason, answer'd.

§ 8. If they mean that, by the use of reason, men may discover these principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, (viz.) that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind: since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that, by the use of reason, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of, and assent to them: and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them. All must be equally allow'd innate, they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths, that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way. If reason discover'd them, that would not prove them innate.

§ 9. BUT how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles, that are suppos'd innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else, but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles, or propositions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reason to discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths, that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason, necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding, before it be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths, thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before; and if men have those innate impress'd truths, originally, and before the use of reason,

Book I. son, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the use of reason, 'tis in effect to say, that men know, and know them not, at the same time.

§ 10. 'Twill here perhaps be said, that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to, as soon as propos'd, wherein they are distinguish'd from these maxims, and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent, upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow that these maxims, and mathematical demonstrations are in this different; that the one has need of reason, using of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the use of reason, for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confess'd, that, in their discovery, there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those, who give this answer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it, with any tolerable sense, be suppos'd, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?

§ 11. Those, who will take the pains to reflect, with a little attention, on the operations of the understanding, will find, that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason; but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason, be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these maxims.

§ 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, when we come to the use of reason, be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that, as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false: Because it is evident, these maxims are not in the mind, so early as the use of reason; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assign'd, as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason, may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be?" And a great part of illiterate people, and savages, pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so; because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not fram'd in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are, indeed, discoveries made, and verities introduc'd, and brought into the mind, by the same way, and discover'd by the same steps, as several other propositions, which no body was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this discourse. I allow therefore a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason, before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.

By this, they are not distinguish'd from other knowable truths.

§ 13. In the mean time it is observable, that this saying, that men know, and assent to these maxims, when they come to the use of reason, amounts, in reality of fact, to no more but this, that they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the use of reason, but may, possibly, be assented to, some time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain; and so may all other knowable truths, as well as these, which therefore have no advantage, nor distinction from others, by this note of being known, when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby prov'd to be innate, but quite the contrary.

§ 14. But

§ 14. But, secondly, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is so frivolous, as the supposition of itself is false. For, by what kind of logick will it appear, that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind, in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observ'd, and assented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore, the coming to the use of speech, if it were suppos'd the time that these maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the use of reason) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate, because men assent to them, when they come to the use of reason. I agree then, with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time, when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men assent to them, when they come to the use of reason, is no more but this, that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names, that stand for them, till having for a good while exercis'd their reason, about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledg'd to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true, in any other sense, I desire it may be shewn; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.

If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.

§ 15. THE senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodg'd in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnish'd with ideas and language, the materials, about which to exercise its discursive faculty: and the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials, that give it employment, increase. But tho' the having of general ideas, and the use of general words and reason, usually grow together; yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquir'd: it being about those first, which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers, that some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain it does so, long before it has the use of words, or comes to that which we commonly "call the use of reason." For a child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter, (i. e. that sweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugar-plumbs are not the same thing.

The steps, by which the mind attains several truths.

§ 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count to seven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then, because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas, that these names stand for: and then he knows the truth of that proposition, upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, that a rod and cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, "that 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" as shall be more fully shewn hereafter. So that the later it is, before any one comes to have those general ideas, about which

BOOK I. which those maxims are ; or to know the signification of those general terms, that stand for them ; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for : the latter also will it be, before he comes to assent to those maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate, than those of a cat, or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them ; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion, that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is express'd in those propositions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three : yet a child knows this not so soon as the other, not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signify'd by one, two, and three.

Assenting, as soon as propos'd and understood, proves them not innate.

§ 17. THIS evasion therefore, of general assent, when men come to the use of reason, failing, as it does, and leaving no difference between those suppos'd innate and other truths, that are afterwards acquir'd and learnt ; men have endeavour'd to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to, as soon as propos'd, and the terms, they are propos'd in, understood : seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodg'd in the understanding ; which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

If such an assent be a mark of innate, then " that one and two are equal to three ; that sweetness is not bitterness ; " and a thousand the like, must be innate.

§ 18. IN answer to this, I demand " whether ready assent, given to a proposition upon first hearing, and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of " an innate principle ? " If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urg'd, as a proof of them : if it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to, as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully flor'd with innate principles. For, upon the same ground, (viz.) of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers, to be innate : and thus, that one and two are equal to three ; that two and two are equal to four ; and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that every body assents to, at first hearing, and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them ; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences afford propositions, which are sure to meet with assent, as soon as they are understood. That two bodies cannot be in the same place, is a truth that no body any more sticks at, than at this maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be ; that white is not black ; that a square is not a circle ; that yellowness is not sweetness : these, and a million of other such propositions, as many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate propositions, as men have distinct ideas ; but as many as men can make propositions, wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition, where one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find assent, at first hearing and understanding the terms, as this general one, " it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be ; " or that which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, " the same is not different : " by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But, since no proposition can be innate, unless the ideas, about which it is, be innate ; this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, &c. innate ; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to reason and experience.

Universal

Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the terms, is (I grant) CHAP. II.
 a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence depending, not on innate impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several propositions, which no body was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. NOR let it be said, that those more particular, self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as that one and two are equal to three; that green is not red, &c. are receiv'd as the consequences of those more universal propositions, which are look'd on as innate principles: since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find, that these and the like less general propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are call'd) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent, wherewith they are receiv'd at first hearing.

Such less general propositions known, before these universal maxims.

§ 20. IF it be said that "these propositions, viz. two and two are equal to four; red is not blue, &c. are not general maxims, nor of any great use:" I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever proposition can be found, that receives general assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim, that "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And, as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions, than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore 'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to, by the growing understanding. And, as to the usefulness of these magnify'd maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great, as is generally conceiv'd, when it comes to its due place to be more fully consider'd.

One and one equal to two, &c. not general, nor useful, answer'd.

§ 21. BUT we have not yet done, with assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms; 'tis fit we first take notice, that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: since it supposes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles, till they are propos'd, to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths, till he hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be propos'd, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? Or, doth the proposing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that these principles may be made more evident to us, by others teaching, than nature has made them by impression: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths, upon their being propos'd: but it is clear, that whosoever does so, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things, contain'd in those words, would not suffer him to think otherwise; how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to, at first hearing and understanding the terms, must pass for an innate principle, every well grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions; not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuse their assent to.

These maxims not being known, sometimes, till propos'd, proves them not innate.

BOOK I.

Implicitly known, before proposing, signifies, that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.

The argument, of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.

§ 22. If it be said, "the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing," (as they must, who will say, "that they are in the understanding, before they are known") it will be hard to conceive, what is meant by a principle, imprinted on the understanding implicitly; unless it be this, that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be receiv'd, as native impressions on the mind; which, I fear, they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition, than assent to it, when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of those innate characters, which nature had ingraven upon their minds.

§ 23. THERE is, I fear, this farther weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us, that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing, because they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument, or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing "de novo;" when in truth they are taught, and do learn something, they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, they have learned the terms and their signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case; the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to, at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions, that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition, whose terms, or ideas, were either of them innate. We, by degrees, get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expressed, we at first hearing assent: tho' to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas, not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For tho' a child quickly assents to this proposition, "that an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas, of those two different things distinctly, imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will assent to this proposition "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." Because that, tho', perhaps, the words are as easy to be learnt; yet the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the names annexed to those sensible things, the child hath to do with; it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas, they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition, made up of such general terms; but, as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learn'd their names, he forwardly closes with the one, as well as the other, of the foremention'd propositions: and with both, for the same reason, (viz.) because he finds the ideas, he has in his mind, to agree, or disagree, according as the words, standing for them, are affirmed, or denied one of another, in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words, which stand for ideas, he has not yet in his mind; to such propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any farther than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them, as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the shewing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the

the business of the following discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles. CHAP. II.

§ 24. To conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it, at the same time. But then, by these men's own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to, by those who understand not the terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But, were the number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these propositions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

Not innate, because not universally assented to.

§ 25. BUT, that I may not be accused, to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what passes in their understandings, before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths, that first possess the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which, if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think; and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. When, therefore, they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be suppos'd, they can be ignorant of those notions, that nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagin'd, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions, from things without? and be at the same time ignorant of those characters, which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those, which are suppos'd woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquir'd knowledge, and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose, or at least to write very ill; since its characters could not be read by those eyes, which saw other things very well; and those are very ill suppos'd the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child certainly knows "that the nurse that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the black-moor it is afraid of; that the wormseed, or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for;" this it is certainly and undoubtedly assur'd of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," that it so firmly assents to these, and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition, at an age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, children join these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.

These maxims not the first known.

§ 26. THOUGH, therefore, there be several general propositions, that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as propos'd to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be suppos'd innate; it being impossible that any truth, which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one, who knows any thing else: since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on, the first that appear there.

And so not innate.

§ 27. That the general maxims, we are discoursing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved; whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions,

Not innate, because they appear least, where, what is

BOOK I.

is innate,
shews itself
clearest.

fions. But there is this farther argument in it, against their being innate; that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons, in whom yet we find no foot-steps of them: and 'tis, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they are least known to those, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or borrow'd opinions; learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by super-inducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there: one might reasonably imagine, that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly, to every one's view, as 'tis certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals; which, being stamped immediately on the soul (as these men suppose) can have no dependance on the constitutions, or organs of the body, the only confess'd difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should in those, who have no reserves, no arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure, and abhorrence of pain. But, alas! amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What universal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrow'd only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age: and a young savage has, perhaps, his head fill'd with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that, from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims, and reputed principles of sciences; will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mention'd in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accusom'd to that sort of conversation, or learning, where disputes are frequent: these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation, and useful for conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, B. iv. c. 7.

Recapitulation.

§ 28. I KNOW not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration: and probably, it will hardly down with any body, at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out, in the sequel of this discourse, being very willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinc'd, that I have been too fond of my own notions: which I confess we are all apt to be, when application and study have warm'd our heads with them.

UPON the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two famed, speculative maxims innate, since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find, is no other than what several propositions, not allow'd to be innate, equally partake in with them: and since the assent, that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear, in the following discourse. And if these first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other speculative maxims can (I suppose) with better right pretend to be so.

C H A P. III.

No innate practical principles.

§ 1. **I**F those speculative maxims, whereof we discours'd in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all mankind, as we there prov'd, it is much more visible, concerning practical principles, that they come short of an universal reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule, which can pretend to so general and ready an assent, as, "what is, is;" or to be so manifest a truth as this, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." Whereby it is evident, that they are farther remov'd from a title to be innate: and the doubt, of their being native impressions on the mind, is stronger against these moral principles, than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They are equally true, tho' not equally evident. Those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters, engraven on the mind; which, if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth, or certainty, of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not so evident, as, the whole is bigger than a part; nor so apt to be assented to, at first hearing. It may suffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonstration: and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance, wherein many men are of them, and the slowness of assent, wherewith others receive them, are manifest proofs, that they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.

§ 2. **W**HETHER there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and look'd abroad, beyond the smoak of their own chimneys. Where is that practical truth, that is universally receiv'd, without doubt or question, as it must be, if innate? Justice, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men seem to agree in. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they, who have gone farthest towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of justice one with another. I grant that out-laws themselves do this one amongst another; but 'tis without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them, as rules of convenience, within their own communities: but it is impossible to conceive, that he embraces justice, as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow-highway-men, and at the same time plunges, or kills, the next honest man he meets with. Justice and truth are the common ties of society; and therefore, even out-laws, and robbers, who break with all the world besides, must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, that those, that live by fraud and rapine, have innate principles of truth and justice, which they allow and assent to?

§ 3. **P**ERHAPS it will be urg'd, that the tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I answer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But since it is certain, that most men's practice, and some men's open professions, have either question'd, or deny'd, these principles, it is impossible to establish an universal consent (tho' we should look for it only amongst grown men) without which, it is impossible to conclude them innate. Secondly, 'Tis very strange and unreasonable, to suppose innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles, derived from nature, are there for operation, and must produce conformity of action, not barely speculative assent to their truth; or else they

No moral principles so clear, and so generally receiv'd, as the fore-mention'd speculative maxims.

Faith and justice, not own'd as principles by all men.

Object. Tho' men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their thoughts, answer'd.

BOOK I. they are in vain distinguish'd from speculative maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into a man a desire of happiness, and an aversion to misery: these, indeed, are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions, without ceasing. These may be observ'd in all persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies, imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impressions on the understanding, are so far from being confirm'd hereby, that this is an argument against them; since, if there were certain characters, imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite; which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

Moral rules
need a proof,
ergo, not in-
nate.

§ 4. ANOTHER reason, that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be propos'd, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-evident; which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain its approbation. He would be thought void of common sense, who ask'd on the one side, or on the other side went to give, a reason, why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms, assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social virtue, "that one should do as he would be done unto," be propos'd to one who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not, without any absurdity, ask a reason why? And were not he that propos'd it, bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shews it not to be innate: for, if it were, it could neither want, nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and understood) be receiv'd and assented to, as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be, if either they were innate, or so much as self-evident.

Instance in
keeping
compacts.

§ 5. THAT men should keep their compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality: but yet, if a christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be ask'd, why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason; because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbist be ask'd why, he will answer, because the publick requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you, if you do not. And, if one of the old heathen philosophers had been ask'd, he would have answer'd; because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.

Virtue gene-
rally ap-
prov'd, not
because in-
nate, but
because pro-
fitable.

§ 6. HENCE naturally flows the great variety of opinions, concerning moral rules, which are to be found amongst men, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves: which could not be, if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds, immediately by the hand of God. I grant the existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the obedience, we owe him, so congruous to the light of reason, that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature: but yet I think it must be allow'd, that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing, or admitting the true ground of morality; which

which can only be the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender. For God having, by an inseparable connexion, join'd virtue and publick happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all, with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify those rules to others, from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself. He may, out of interest, as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred; which, if once trampled on and profan'd, he himself cannot be safe, nor secure. This, tho' it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation, which these rules evidently have, yet it shews that the outward acknowledgment, men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are innate principles; nay, it proves not so much, as that men assent to them inwardly, in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice: since we find that self-interest, and the conveniencies of this life, make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them, whose actions sufficiently prove, that they very little consider the law-giver, that prescribed these rules, nor the hell he has ordained, for the punishment of those that transgress them.

§ 7. For, if we will not, in civility, allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we shall find, that they have no such internal veneration for these rules, nor so full a persuasion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality, "to do as one would be done to," is more commended than practis'd; but the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madness, and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. Perhaps conscience will be urg'd, as checking us for such breaches, and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserv'd.

Men's actions convince us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.

§ 8. To which I answer, that I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, many men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation. Others also may come to be of the same mind, from their education, company, and customs of their country: which persuasion, however got, will serve to set conscience on work, which is nothing else but our own opinion, or judgment of the moral rectitude, or pravity of our own actions. And if conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; since some men, with the same bent of conscience, prosecute what others avoid.

Conscience, no proof of any innate, moral rule.

§ 9. But I cannot see, how any men should ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence and serenity, were they innate, and stamp'd upon their minds. View but an army, at the sacking of a town, and see what observation, or sense of moral principles, or what touch of conscience, for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men, set at liberty from punishment and censure. Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civiliz'd people, amongst whom the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields, to perish by want, or wild beasts, has been the practice, as little condemned, or scrupled, as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with their mothers, if they die in childbirth; or dispatch them, if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? and are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill, or expose, their parents, without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia, the sick, when their case comes to be thought desperate, are carried out, and laid on the earth, before they are dead, and left there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without assistance, or pity. * It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people professing christianity, to bury their children alive, without scruple. † There are places, where they eat their own children. ‡ The Caribbes were wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them. § And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us

Instances of enormities, practis'd without remorse.

* Gruber apud Thevenot, part iv. p. 13. Nili origine, c. 18, 19.

† Lambert apud Thevenot, p. 38.

‡ Vossius de

BOOK I. of a people in Peru, which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, whom they kept as concubines, for that purpose; and, when they were past breeding, the mothers themselves were killed too and eaten. "The virtues, whereby the Tououpinambos believ'd they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. 'They have not so much as a name for God, and have no religion, no worship. The saints, who are canoniz'd amongst the Turks, lead lives, which one cannot with modesty relate. A remarkable passage to this purpose, out of the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every day to be met with, I shall set down at large, in the language it is publish'd in. "Ibi (sc. prope Belbes in Ægypto) vidimus "sanctum unum Saracenicum, inter arenarum cumulos, ita, ut ex utero matris "prodiit, nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didicimus, Mahometistis, ut eos, qui "amentes & sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis colant & venerentur. Insuper & eos, "qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam, voluntariam demum poenitentiam " & paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejusmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effœrenem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, "edendi, bibendi, & quod majus est, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles "secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò, vel templa, vel monumenta, extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac sepelire maximæ fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta & dicenda per interpretem à Mucrelo nostro. Insuper sanctum illum, quem eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprime commendari, eum esse hominem sanctum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec feminarum unquam esset, nec puerorum, sed tantummodo aellarum concubitor, atque mularum." Peregr. Baumgarten, l. ii. c. i. p. 73. More of the same kind, concerning these precious saints amongst the Turks, may be seen in Pietro della Valle, in his letter of the 25th of January, 1616. Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? Or where is that universal consent, that assures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels, when fashion has made them honourable, are committed, without remorse of conscience; nay, in many places, innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy. And, if we look abroad, to take a view of men, as they are, we shall find that they have remorse in one place, for doing, or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Men have contrary practical principles.

§ 10. HE, that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, (those only excepted, that are absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies) which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemn'd, by the general fashion of whole societies of men, govern'd by practical opinions, and rules of living, quite opposite to others.

Whole nations reject several moral rules.

§ 11. HERE, perhaps, 'twill be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good, where men, tho' they transgress, yet disown not the law; where fear of shame, censure, or punishment, carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But it is impossible, to conceive, that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and renounce, what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a law; for so they must, who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. 'Tis possible men may sometimes own rules of morality, which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem, amongst those who are persuaded of their obligation. But 'tis not to be imagin'd, that a whole society of men should, publicly and professedly, disown, and cast off a rule, which they could not, in their own minds, but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant that all men, they should have to do with, knew it to be such: and therefore, must every one of them apprehend from others, all the contempt and abhorrence due to one, who professes himself void

* Hist. des Incas, l. i. c. 12. † Lery, c. 16, 216, 231.

of humanity; and one, who, confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong, cannot but be look'd on, as the profess'd enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known, to every one, to be just and good. It is, therefore, little less than a contradiction to suppose, that whole nations of men should, both in their professions and practice, unanimously and universally give the lie to what, by the most invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy us, that no practical rule, which is any where universally, and with publick approbation, or allowance, transgress'd, can be supposed innate. But I have something farther to add, in answer to this objection.

§ 12. THE breaking of a rule, say you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the generally allow'd breach of it any where, I say, is a proof that it is not innate. For example; let us take any of these rules, which, being the most obvious deductions of human reason, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men, fewest people have had the impudence to deny, or inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this; "parents, preserve and cherish your children." When therefore you say, that this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either that it is an innate principle, which, upon all occasions, excites and directs the actions of all men; or else, that it is a truth, which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which, therefore, they know and assent to: but in neither of these senses is it innate. First, that it is not a principle, which influences all men's actions, is what I have prov'd, by the examples before-cited; nor need we seek so far as Mingrelia, or Peru, to find instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay, and destroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations, when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemn'd practice amongst the Greeks and Romans, to expose, without pity or remorse, their innocent infants. Secondly, That it is an innate truth, known to all men, is also false: for, parents, preserve your children, is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all; it being a command, and not a proposition, and so not capable of truth, or falsehood. To make it capable of being assented to, as true, it must be reduced to some such proposition as this; "it is the duty of parents to preserve their children." But what duty is, cannot be understood, without a law; nor a law be known, or suppos'd, without a law-maker, or without reward and punishment: so that it is impossible that this, or any other practical principle, should be innate, i. e. be imprinted on the mind, as a duty, without supposing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of punishment, of a life after this, innate: for that punishment follows not, in this life, the breach of this rule, and consequently, that it has not the force of a law, in countries where the generally allow'd practice runs counter to it, is in it self evident. But these ideas (which must be all of them innate, if any thing as a duty be so) are so far from being innate, that 'tis not every studious, or thinking man, much less every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct: and that one of them, which of all others seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the idea of God) I think, in the next chapter, will appear very evident, to any considering man.

§ 13. FROM what has been said, I think, we may safely conclude, that whatever practical rule is, in any place, generally, and with allowance broken, cannot be supposed innate; it being impossible that men should, without shame or fear, confidently and serenely break a rule, which they could not but evidently know that God had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of (which they must, if it were innate) to a degree, to make it a very ill bargain to the transgressor. Without such a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that any thing is his duty. Ignorance, or doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge, or power, of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a present appetite: but let any one see the fault, and the rod by it, and, with the transgression, a fire ready to punish it; a pleasure tempting, and the hand of the almighty visibly held up, and prepared to take vengeance (for this

BOOK I. must be the case, where any duty is imprinted on the mind) and then tell me, whether it be possible for people, with such a prospect, such a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to offend against the law, which they carry about them, in indelible characters, and that stares them in the face, whilst they are breaking it? Whether men, at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an omnipotent law-maker, can, with assurance and gayety, slight and trample under foot his most sacred injunctions? And lastly, whether it be possible, that, whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law, and supreme law-giver, all the by-standers, yea, even the governors and rulers of the people, full of the same sense both of the law and law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their dislike, or laying the least blame on it? Principles of actions, indeed, there are lodg'd in men's appetites, but these are so far from being innate, moral principles, that, if they were left to their full swing, they would carry men to the over-turning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires, which they cannot be, but by rewards and punishments, that will over-balance the satisfaction, any one shall propose to himself, in the breach of the law. If, therefore, any thing be imprinted on the minds of all men, as a law, all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge, that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it: for, if men can be ignorant, or doubtful, of what is innate, innate principles are insisted on, and urg'd, to no purpose. Truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured by them; but men are in the same uncertain, floating estate with, as without them. An evident, indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment, great enough to make the transgression very uneligible, must accompany an innate law; unless, with an innate law, they can suppose an innate gospel too. I would not here be mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but positive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature: between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth, who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law, knowable by the light of nature, i. e. without the help of positive revelation.

Those, who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are.

§ 14. THE difference there is amongst men, in their practical principles, is so evident, that, I think, I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find any innate, moral rules, by this mark of general assent: and 'tis enough to make one suspect, that the supposition of such innate principles, is but an opinion, taken up at pleasure; since those, who talk so confidently of them, are so sparing to tell us which they are. This might with justice be expected from those men, who lay stress upon this opinion: and it gives occasion to distrust, either their knowledge, or charity, who declaring, that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge, and the rules of living, are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are distracted with. But, in truth, were there any such innate principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did men find such innate propositions, stamp'd on their minds, they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths, that they afterwards learned and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more easy than to know what, and how many they were. There could be no more doubt about their number, than there is about the number of our fingers; and 'tis like then every system would be ready to give them us by tale. But since no body, that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them, they cannot blame those, who doubt of these innate principles; since even they, who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions, do not tell us what they are. 'Tis easy to foresee, that if different men, of different sects, should go about to give us a list of those innate, practical principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypotheses, and

were

were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools, or churches; a plain evidence, that there are no such innate truths! Nay, a great part of men are so far from finding any such innate moral principles in themselves, that, by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how any thing can be capable of a law, that is not a free agent: and, upon that ground they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot put morality and mechanism together, which are not very easy to be reconciled, or made consistent.

§ 15. WHEN I had writ this, being inform'd that my lord Herbert had, in his books "de Veritate," assign'd these innate principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find, in a man of so great parts, something that might satisfy me in this point, and put an end to my enquiry. In his chapter, de Infinitu Naturali, p. 72. edit. 1656. I met with these six marks of his Notitiæ Communes. "1. Prioritas. 2. Independentia. 3. Universalitas. 4. Certitudo. 5. Neceffitas; i. e. as he explains it, "faciunt ad hominis conservationem." 6. Modus conformationis, i. e. "assensus, nullâ interpositâ morâ." And at the latter end of his little treatise De Religione Laici, he says this, of these innate principles, "Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arcentur, quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsâ mente cœlitus descriptæ, nullisque traditionibus, five scriptis, five non scriptis, obnoxia, p. 3. And, veritates nostræ catholice, quæ, tanquam indubia Dei effata, in foro interiori descripta." Thus having given the marks of the innate principles, or common notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men, by the hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these: "1. Esse aliquod supremum numen. 2. Numen illud coli debere. 3. Virtutem, cum pietate conjunctam, optimam esse rationem cultus divini. 4. Respicendum esse a peccatis. 5. Dari præmium, vel penam, post hanc vitam transactam." Tho' I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explain'd, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate impressions, "in foro interiori descriptæ." For I must take leave to observe,

§ 16. FIRST, That these five propositions are either not at all, or more than all, those common notions, writ on our minds by the finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written: since there are other propositions, which, even by his own rules, have as just a pretence to such an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as at least some of these five he enumerates, viz. "Do, as thou wouldst bid one unto;" and perhaps some hundreds of others, when well consider'd.

§ 17. SECONDLY, That all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions, viz. his first, second, and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propositions. For, besides that we are assured from history, of many men, nay, whole nations, who doubt, or disbelieve some, or all of them; I cannot see how the third, viz. "that virtue, join'd with piety, is the best worship of God," can be an innate principle, when the name, or sound, "virtue," is so hard to be understood; liable to so much uncertainty in its signification; and the thing it stands for, so much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore, this can be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore, very unfit to be assign'd as an innate, practical principle.

§ 18. FOR let us consider this proposition, as to its meaning (for it is the sense, and not sound, that is, and must be the principle, or common notion) viz. "virtue is the best worship of God, i. e. is most acceptable to him;" which, if virtue be taken, as most commonly it is, for those actions, which, according to the different opinions of several countries, are accounted laudable, will be a proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God's will, or to the rule prescrib'd by God, which is the true and only measure of virtue, when virtue is us'd to signify what is, in
its

Lord Herbert's innate principles examin'd.

Book I. its own nature right, and good; then this proposition, that "virtue is the best worship of God," will be most true and certain, but of very little use in human life: since it will amount to no more but this, viz. that God is pleas'd with the doing of what he commands; which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and so be as far from any rule, or principle of his actions, as he was before: and I think very few will take a proposition, which amounts to no more than this, viz. "that God is pleas'd with the doing of what he himself commands," for an innate, moral principle, writ on the minds of all men (however true and certain it may be) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so, will have reason to think hundreds of propositions, innate principles; since there are many, which have as good a title as this, to be receiv'd for such, which no body yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.

§ 19. NOR is the fourth proposition, (viz.) "men must repent of their sins," much more instructive, till what those actions are, that are meant by sins, be set down: for the word "peccata," or sins, being put, as it usually is, to signify in general, ill actions, that will draw punishment upon the doers; what great principle of morality can that be, to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that, which will bring mischief upon us, without knowing what those particular actions are, that will do so? Indeed, this is a very true proposition, and fit to be inculcated on, and receiv'd by, those who are suppos'd to have been taught, what actions in all kinds are sins: but neither this, nor the former, can be imagin'd to be innate principles; nor to be of any use, if they were innate; unless the particular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices, were engraven in men's minds, and were innate principles also, which, I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will scarce seem possible, that God should engrave principles in men's minds, in words of uncertain signification, such as virtues and sins which, amongst different men, stand for different things: nay, it cannot be suppos'd to be in words at all, which, being, in most of these principles, very general names, cannot be understood, but by knowing the particulars, comprehended under them. And, in the practical instances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves, and the rules of them, abstracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man must know, what language soever he chance to learn, whether English, or Japan, or if he should learn no language at all, or never should understand the use of words, as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men. When it shall be made out, that men, ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and customs of their country, know that it is part of the worship of God, not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it ourselves, but, on the contrary, relieve and supply his wants; and, whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: when, I say, all men shall be proved actually to know, and allow all these, and a thousand other such rules, all which come under these two general words, made use of above, viz. "virtues and peccata," virtues and sins; there will be more reason for admitting these, and the like, for common notions, and practical principles. Yet, after all, universal consent (were there any, in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attain'd otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.

Obj. Innate principles may be corrupted, answered. § 20. NOR will it be of much moment here, to offer that very ready, but not very material answer, (viz.) that the innate principles of morality, may, by education, and custom, and the general opinion of those, amongst whom we converse, be darken'd, and, at last, quite worn out of the minds of men. Which assertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of universal consent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavour'd to be prov'd; unless those men will think it reasonable, that their private persuasions, or that of their party, should pass for universal consent; a thing not unfrequently done, when

when men, presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason, cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their argument stands thus: "the principles, which all mankind allow for true, are innate; those, that men of right reason admit, are the principles allow'd by all mankind: we, and those of our mind, are men of reason; therefore, we agreeing, our principles are innate:" which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to infallibility. For, otherwise, it will be very hard to understand, how there be some principles, which all men do acknowledge, and agree in; and yet there are none of those principles, which are not, by deprav'd custom, and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men; which is to say, "that all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and dissent from them." And, indeed, the supposition of such first principles will serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss with, as without them, if they may, by any human power, such as is the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions, be alter'd, or lost in us: and, notwithstanding all this boast of first principles, and innate light, we shall be as much in the dark, and uncertainty, as if there were no such thing at all; it being all one to have no rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But, concerning innate principles, I desire these men to say, whether they can, or cannot, by education and custom, be blurr'd and blotted out: if they cannot, we must find them in all mankind alike, and they must be clear in every body: and if they may suffer variation, from adventitious notions, we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous, nearest the fountain, in children, and illiterate people, who have received least impression from foreign opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact, and daily observation.

§ 21. I EASILY grant, that there are great numbers of opinions, which, by men of different countries, educations and tempers, are received and embraced, as first and unquestionable principles; many whereof, both for their absurdity, as well as opposition one to another, it is impossible should be true. But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from reason, are so sacred, somewhere or other, that men, even of good understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question the truth of them.

§ 22. THIS, however strange it may seem, is that which every day's experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps, by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines, that have been derived from no better original, than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time, and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of principles in religion, or morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be, who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in) instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced understanding (for white paper receives any characters) those doctrines, they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them, as soon as they have any apprehension, and still, as they grow up, confirm'd to them, either by the open profession, or tacit consent, of all they have to do with; or, at least, by those, of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety, they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mention'd, but as the basis and foundation, on which they build their religion, or manners; come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.

§ 23. To which we may add, that when men, so instructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find any thing more antient there, than those opinions, which were taught them, before their memory began to keep a register of their actions, or date the time, when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore, make no scruple to conclude, that those propositions,

Contrary principles in the world.

How men commonly come by their principles.

BOOK I. of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the impressions of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else. These they entertain, and submit to, as many do to their parents, with veneration; not because it is natural; nor do children do it, where they are not so taught: but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.

§ 24. THIS will appear very likely, and almost unavoidably to come to pass, if we consider the nature of mankind, and the constitution of human affairs; wherein most men cannot live, without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings; nor be at quiet in their minds, without some foundation, or principles, to rest their thoughts on. There is scarce any one so floating, and superficial in his understanding, who hath not some revered propositions, which are to him the principles, on which he bottoms his reasonings; and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood, right and wrong; which, some, wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found, who are not expos'd by their ignorance, laziness, education, or precipitancy, to take them upon trust.

§ 25. THIS is evidently the case of all children and young folk; and custom, a greater power than nature, seldom failing to make them worship for divine, what she hath inur'd them to bow their minds, and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplex'd in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially, when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned. And, had men leisure, parts, and will, who is there almost, that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring, upon himself, the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach, which is every where prepared for those, who dare venture to dissent from the receiv'd opinions of their country, or party? And where is the man to be found, that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or atheistic, which he is sure to meet with, who does, in the least, scruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more afraid to question those principles, when he shall think them, as most men do, the standards, set up by God in his mind, to be the rule, and touchstone, of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most revered by others?

§ 26. IT is easy to imagine, how, by these means, it comes to pass, that men worship the idols, that have been set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors, become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinion. "Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit." For since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly, tho' not always warily, nor wisely, employ'd, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most men; who, thro' laziness, or avocation, do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original; 'tis natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed, and presumed, to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind, and entertain them there, with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believ'd, may take up from his education, and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles; and, by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight, as to take monsters, lodg'd in his own brain, for the images of the deity, and the workmanship of his hands.

Principles
must be ex-
amined.

§ 27. BY this progress, how many there are, who arrive at principles, which they believe innate, may be easily observ'd, in the variety of opposite principles, held

held and contended for, by all sorts and degrees of men. And he, that shall deny this to be the method, wherein most men proceed, to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will, perhaps, find it a hard matter, any other way, to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready, at any time, to seal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles, to be received upon their own authority, without examination; I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's principles can be question'd. If they may, and ought to be examin'd, and try'd, I desire to know how first and innate principles can be try'd; or, at least, it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters, whereby the genuine, innate principles may be distinguished from others; that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes, in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and, till then, I may, with modesty, doubt; since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced, will scarce prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure me of any innate principles. From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles, wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.

C H A P.
III.

C H A P. IV.

Other considerations concerning innate principles, both speculative and practical.

§ 1. **H**AD those, who would persuade us that there are innate principles, not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts, out of which those propositions are made; they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate: since, if the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the propositions, made up of them, should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time, when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be deriv'd from some other original. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental, or verbal, propositions about them.

C H A P.
IV.

Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate.

§ 2. IF we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think, that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For, bating, perhaps, some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of ideas, answering the terms, which make up those universal propositions, that are esteem'd innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience, and the observation of things, that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not original characters, stamped on the mind.

Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children.

§ 3. "It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," is certainly (if there be any such) an innate principle. But can any one think, or will any one say, that impossibility and identity are two innate ideas? Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? And are they those, that are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquir'd ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle, that it concludes, that wormwood rubb'd on the nipple, hath not the same taste, that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of, "impossibile est idem esse, & non esse," that makes a child distinguish

distinguish

BOOK I. distinguish between its mother and a stranger; or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the mind regulate itself, and its assent, by ideas, that it never yet had? Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles, which it yet never knew, or understood? The names, impossibility and identity, stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention, to form them right in our understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood; that, I believe, upon examination, it will be found, that many grown men want them.

Identity, an
idea not in-
nate.

§ 4. IF identity (to instance in that alone) be a native impression, and, consequently, so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs know it, even from our cradles; I would gladly be resolved by one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man, when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same man, tho' they lived several ages asunder? Nay, Whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our idea of sameness is not so settled and clear, as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For, if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths; but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose, every one's idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras, and thousands others of his followers have: and which then shall be the true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?

§ 5. NOR let any one think, that the questions, I have here propos'd, about the identity of man, are bare empty speculations; which, if they were, would be enough to shew, that there was, in the understandings of men, no innate idea of identity. He that shall, with a little attention, reflect on the resurrection, and consider, that divine justice shall bring to judgment, at the last day, the very same persons, to be happy, or miserable, in the other, who did well, or ill, in this life; will find it, perhaps, not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists: and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themselves, have, naturally, a clear idea of it.

Whole and
part, not in-
nate ideas.

§ 6. LET us examine that principle of mathematicks, viz. "that the whole is bigger than a part." This, I take it, is reckon'd amongst innate principles. I am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so; which, yet, no body can think it to be, when he considers the ideas it comprehends in it, "whole and part," are perfectly relative: but the positive ideas, to which they properly and immediately belong, are extension and number, of which, alone, whole and part are relations. So that, if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be so too; it being impossible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing, to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extension and number, I leave to be consider'd by those, who are the patrons of innate principles.

Idea of wor-
ship, not in-
nate.

§ 7. "THAT God is to be worship'd," is, without doubt, as great a truth as any can enter into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles; but yet it can, by no means, be thought innate, unless the ideas of God and worship are innate. That the idea, the term worship stands for, is not in the understanding of children, and a character stamp'd on the mind, in its first original, I think, will be easily granted by any one, that considers how few there be amongst grown men, who have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say, that children have this practical principle innate, "that God is to be worship'd;" and yet, that they know not what that worship of God is, which is their duty. But to pass by this:

§ 8. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for many reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a deity: without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the atheists, taken notice of, amongst the antients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discover'd, in these latter ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania^a, in Brazil^b, in Boranday^c, and the Caribbee islands, &c. amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholas del Techo, in literis ex Paraquaria, de Caaguvarum conversione, has these words^d: “Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum et hominis animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.” These are instances of nations, where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters, and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd these, in a very great measure; who, yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. 'Twill, I doubt not, be a surprize to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But, for this, let them consult the king of France's late envoy thither^e, who gives no better account of the Chineses themselves^f. And, if we will not believe La Loubere, the missionaries of China, even the Jesuits themselves, the great encomiasts of the Chineses, do all, to a man, agree, and will convince us, that the sect of the literati, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheists. Vid. Navareite, in the collection of voyages, vol. the first, and Historia cultus Sinensium. And, perhaps, if we should, with attention, mind the lives and discourses of people, not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many, in more civiliz'd countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a deity upon their minds; and that the complaints of atheism, made from the pulpit, are not without reason. And, tho' only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet, perhaps, we should hear more, than we do of it, from others, did not the fear of the magistrate's sword, or their neighbour's censure, tie up people's tongues: which, were the apprehensions of punishment, or shame, taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheism, as their lives do.

§ 9. But had all mankind, every where, a notion of a God (whereof, yet, history tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For, tho' no nation were to be found without a name, and some few dark notions, of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind, no more than the names of fire, or the sun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas, they stand for, to be innate: because the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are so universally receiv'd and known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a name, or the absence of such a notion, out of men's minds, any argument against the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof, that there was no loadstone in the world, because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing, nor a name for it; or be any shew of argument to prove, that there are no distinct and various species of angels, or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct species, or names for them: For men, being furnish'd with words, by the common language of their own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things, whose names, those, they converse with, have occasion frequently to mention to them. And, if it carry with it the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it; if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind; the idea is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especially, if it be such an idea, as is agreeable to the common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge,

^a Rhoe apud Thevenot, p. 2. ^b Jo. de Lery, c. 16. ^c Martiniere 322. Terry 371, & 372. ^d Ovington, 422. ^e Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaguvarum 73. ^f La Loubere du Royaume de Siam, t. 1. c. 9. sect. 15, &c. 20. sect. 22, &c. 22. sect. 6. ^g Ib. t. 1. c. 20, sect. 4, &c. 23.

BOOK I. as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly, in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a deity. And the influence, that the discovery of such a being must necessarily have on the minds of all, that have but once heard it, is so great, and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it, that it seems stranger to me, that a whole nation of men should be, any where, found so brutish, as to want the notion of a God; than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

§ 10. THE name of God being once mentioned, in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide, and continue it down to all generations; tho', yet, the general reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions, convey'd thereby, to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they, who made the discovery, had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other, less considering people, having once receiv'd so important a notion, it could not easily be lost again.

§ 11. THIS is all could be infer'd from the notion of a God, were it to be found universally, in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledg'd, by men grown to maturity, in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate: since, I think, it may truly be said, that there is not a person in the world, who has a notion of a God, who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not, but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island, where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor name for it; how generally soever it were receiv'd, and known in all the world besides: and, perhaps too, their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion of a God, till some one amongst them had employ'd his thoughts, to enquire into the constitution and causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion of a God: which, having once taught to others, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him; answered.

§ 12. INDEED it is urg'd, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint, upon the minds of men, characters, and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a concernment; and also, by that means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration, due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.

THIS argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those, who use it in this case, expect from it. For, if we may conclude, that God hath done for men, all that men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do; it will prove, not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men, an idea of himself, but that he hath plainly stamp'd there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know, or believe of him, all that they ought to do, in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they should in the dark grope after knowledge, as St. Paul tells us, all nations did after God, Acts xvii. 27. than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say, 'tis best for men, and so, suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the same reason, say, 'tis better for men, that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether, by the force of this argument, they shall think, that every man is so. I think it a very good argument, to say, the infinitely wise God hath made it so: and therefore it is best. But it

it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom, to say, "I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so;" and, in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topick, that God hath done so, when certain experience shews us that he hath not. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original impressions of knowledge, or ideas stamp'd on the mind: since he hath furnish'd man with those faculties, which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things, requisite to the end of such a being. And I doubt not but to shew, that a man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain the knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God, having endu'd man with those faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more oblig'd, by his goodness, to implant those innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges, or houses; which some people in the world, however, of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of; as well as others are wholly without ideas of God, and principles of morality; or, at least, have but very ill ones. The reason, in both cases, being, that they never employ'd their parts, faculties, and powers, industriously, that way, but contented themselves with the opinions, fashions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you, or I, been born at the bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots, that inhabit there: and had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him, and a more improved Englishman, lying barely in this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other, or farther enquiries: and, if he had not any idea of a God, it was only, because he pursu'd not those thoughts that would have led him to it.

§ 13. I GRANT, that, if there were any ideas to be found, imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect, it should be the notion of his maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependance and duty; and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge. But how late is it, before any such notion is discoverable in children? And, when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God? He, that shall observe in children the progress, whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects, they do first, and most familiarly converse with, are those that make the first impressions on their understandings: nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice, how their thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put them together. How, by these means, they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a deity, I shall hereafter shew.

Ideas of God
various, in
different
men.

§ 14. CAN it be thought, that the ideas men have of God, are the characters and marks of himself, engraven in their minds, by his own finger: when we see that, in the same country, under one and the same name, men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name, or sound, will scarce prove an innate notion of him.

§ 15. WHAT true, or tolerable, notion of a deity could they have, who acknowledged, and worshipped, hundreds? Every deity, that they own'd above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity, were excluded. To which, if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity, express'd in their images, and representations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, lusts, quarrels, and other mean qualities, attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think, that the heathen world, i. e. the greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their minds, as he himself,

out

BOOK I. out of care that they should not be mistaken about him, was author of. And this universality of consent, so much argu'd, if it prove any native impressions, 'twill be only this, that God imprinted on the minds of all men, speaking the same language, a name for himself, but not any idea; since those people, who agreed in the name, had, at the same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signify'd. If they say, that the variety of deities, worshipped by the heathen world, were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible being, or several parts of his providence: I answer, what they might be in their original, I will not here inquire; but that they were so, in the thoughts of the vulgar, I think no body will affirm. And he that will consult the voyage of the bishop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other testimonies) will find, that the theology of the Siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the abbé de Choisy more judiciously remarks, in his *Journal du voyage de Siam*, $\frac{1}{177}$, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§ 15. If it be said, that wise men, of all nations, came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the deity, I grant it. But then this,

FIRST, Excludes universality of consent in any thing, but the name; for those wise men, being very few, perhaps one of a thousand, this universality is very narrow.

SECONDLY, It seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions, men had of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties; since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attain'd true notions in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making the far greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition, and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And, if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate, for that also wise men have always had.

§ 16. THIS was evidently the case of all Gentilism: nor hath, even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations, to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevail'd so far, as to make men to have the same, and true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a man, sitting in heaven, and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians, as well as Turks, have had whole sects, owning and contending earnestly for it, that the deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and tho' we find few amongst us, who profess themselves anthropomorphites, (tho' some I have met with, that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his business, may find, amongst the ignorant and uninstructed christians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country-people, almost of any age, or young people, almost of any condition; and you shall find, that, tho' the name of God be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions, they apply this name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much less that they were characters, writ by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnish'd, with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies uncloth'd, and that there is no art, or skill, born with us: for, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry, and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two strait lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that set himself, sincerely, to examine the truth of these propositions, that could fail to assent to them; tho' yet it be past doubt, that there are many men, who, having not apply'd their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal consent, such an one I easily allow; but such an universal consent as this, proves not the idea of God, no more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.

§ 17. SINCE

§ 17. SINCE then, tho' the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will scarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: since, if God had set any impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect, it should have been some clear and uniform idea of himself, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds, being at first void of that idea, which we are most concern'd to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be inform'd by any other.

CHAP.
IV.

If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.

§ 18. I CONFESS there is another idea, which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation, or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such, as, by our own faculties, we cannot procure to ourselves: but we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways, whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not; we have no such clear idea at all, and, therefore, signify nothing, by the word, substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what (i. e. of something, whereof we have no particular, distinct, positive) idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know.

Idea of substance not innate.

§ 19. WHATEVER then we talk of innate, either speculative, or practical principles, it may, with as much probability, be said, that a man hath room, sterling in his pocket, and, yet, deny'd that he hath either penny, shilling, crown, or any other coin, out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think that certain propositions are innate, when the ideas, about which they are, can, by no means, be suppos'd to be so. The general reception, and assent, that is given, doth not at all prove, that the ideas, express'd in them, are innate: For, in many cases, however the ideas came there, the assent to words, expressing the agreement, or disagreement, of such ideas, will necessarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God, and worship, will assent to this proposition, "that God is to be worshipp'd," when express'd in a language he understands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and, yet, millions of men may be well suppos'd to want one, or both, of those ideas to-day. For, if we will allow savages, and most country-people, to have ideas of God, and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe,) yet, I think, few children can be suppos'd to have those ideas, which, therefore, they must begin to have some time or other: and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent, upon hearing, no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow; because, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition, "that the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow:" and, therefore, if such an assent, upon hearing, cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much less the propositions, made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate.

§ 20. To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodg'd in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For, to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known, or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness, of its having been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceiv'd by the mind, was never in the mind.

No innate ideas in the memory.

BOOK I.

mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that, by the memory, it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea, without memory, the idea appears perfectly new, and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one's observation: and then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it, by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember, as an idea he had formerly known, without which consciousness of a former perception, there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind, without that consciousness, is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind, before that appearance: for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one, as if it never had been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes, till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty, or fifty, years perfectly in the dark, and, in that time, perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talk'd with, who lost his sight by the small-pox, when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say, this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And, I think, no body will say, that either of them had, in his mind, any idea of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, *de novo*, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance; and these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case, all these ideas of colours, which, when out of view, can be revived, with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and, if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and, if it be in the memory, it cannot, by the memory, be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If, therefore, there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else no where in the mind; and, if they be in the memory, they can be revived, without any impression from without; and, whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impression from sensation, or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who, when he came to the use of reason, or, at any other time, remembered any of them; and, to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory; I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says, intelligible.

Principles
not innate,
because of
little use, or
little cer-
tainty.

§ 21. BESIDES what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other principles, are innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself, why he should be supposed to print, upon the minds of men, some universal principles, whereof those, that are pretended innate, and concern speculation, are of no great use; and those, that concern practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths, not allowed to be innate. For, to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind, by the finger of God, which are not clearer there, than those which are afterwards introduced,

introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which, by their clearness and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us, which they are; and then every one will be a fit judge, whether they be so or no; since, if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness, I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 22. To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men's understandings; some sort of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions; other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us, than arts and sciences, tho' some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others, and, therefore, are more generally received; tho' that too be according as the organs of our bodies, and powers of our minds, happen to be employed: God having fitted men with faculties, and means, to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference, that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is from the different use they put their faculties to; whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not, blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose, in the search of other inquiries. Thus; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth, as certain as any thing can be, and, I think, more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and, yet, there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles: and he, that certainly knows this proposition, may, yet, be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity: for tho' there be no truth, which a man may more evidently make out to himself, than the existence of a God; yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little farther, into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof, with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a being. And, if any person hath, by talk, put such a notion into his head, he may, perhaps, believe it; but, if he hath never examin'd it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration, and may yield his assent, as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which, yet, his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to shew how much our knowledge depends upon the right use of those powers, nature hath bestowed upon us, and how little upon such innate principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction; which all men could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose: and which, since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

Difference of
men's discoveries
depends upon
the different
application
of their fa-
culties.

BOOK I.
Men must
think, and
know, for
themselves.

§ 23. WHAT censure, doubting thus, of innate principles, may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I persuade myself at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This, I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit, or follow, any authority in the ensuing discourse: truth has been my only aim, and, wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way, or no. Not that I want a due respect to other men's opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and, I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that, perhaps, we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, in the consideration of things themselves, and made use rather of our own thoughts, than other men's, to find it: For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes, as to know by other men's understandings. So much as we ourselves consider, and comprehend, of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men's opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, tho' they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiatiety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason, to understand those truths, which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man; but no body ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And, if the taking up of another's principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher; I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows, and comprehends: what he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however, will, in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock, who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy-money, tho' it were gold in the hand, from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.

Whence the
opinion of
innate prin-
ciples.

§ 24. WHEN men have found some general propositions, that could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the enquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once filed innate. And it was of no small advantage to those, who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, "that principles must not be questioned;" for having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them on believing, and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to, some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths, and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle, which may serve to his purpose, who teaches them; whereas, had they examined the ways, whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result, in the minds of men, from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.

Conclusion.

§ 25. To shew how the understanding proceeds herein, is the design of the following discourse; which I shall proceed to, when I have first premised, that hitherto, to clear my way to those foundations, which, I conceive, are the only true ones, whereon to establish those notions we can have, of our own knowledge, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles. And since the arguments, which are against them, do some of them rise from common, received opinions, I have been forced to take

take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose task it is to shew the falshood, or improbability, of any tenet: it happening, in controversial discourses, as it does in the assailing of towns, where, if the ground be but firm, whereon the batteries are erected, there is no farther inquiry, of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But, in the future part of this discourse, designing to raise an edifice uniform, and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed, or begged foundations; or, at least, if mine prove a castle in the air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader, not to expect undeniable, cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say, for the principles I proceed on, is, that I can only appeal to men's own unprejudiced experience and observation, whether they be true, or no; and this is enough for a man, who professes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design, than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.

CHAP.
IV.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of ideas in general, and their original.



VERY man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about, whilst thinking, being the ideas that are there, 'tis past doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness, and others. It is in the first place then to be enquired, how he comes by them? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds, in their very first being. This opinion I have, at large, examined already; and, I suppose, what I have said, in the foregoing book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn, whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.

CHAP. I.
Idea is the
object of
thinking.

§ 2. LET us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed, either about external, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived, and reflected on, by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

All ideas
come from
sensation or
reflection.

VOL. I.

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BOOK II.

The objects
of sensation,
one source of
ideas.

§ 3. FIRST, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways, wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those, which we call sensible qualities; which, when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they, from external objects, convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

The operations
of our
minds, the
other source
of them.

§ 4. SECONDLY, The other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do, from these, receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and tho' it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But, as I call the other, Sensation, so I call this, REFLECTION; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets, by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external, material things, as the objects of sensation; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of reflection; are, to me, the only originals, from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term, Operations, here, I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind, about its ideas, but some sort of passions, arising sometimes from them; such as is the satisfaction, or uneasiness, arising from any thought.

All our ideas
are of the
one or the
other of
these.

§ 5. THE understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

THESE, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thorowly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, "whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection?" and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind, but what one of these two have imprinted; tho', perhaps, with infinite variety, compounded and enlarged by the understanding; as we shall see hereafter.

Observable
in children.

§ 6. HE, that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge: 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them. And, tho' the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves, before the memory begins to keep a register of time and order; yet, tis often so late, before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few men, that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: and, if it were worth while, no doubt, a child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world, being surrounded with bodies, that perpetually

perpetually and diversly affect them; variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand, every where, when the eye is but open: sounds, and some tangible qualities, fail not to sollicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that, if a child were kept in a place, where he never saw any other but black and white, till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he, that from his childhood never tasted an oyster, or a pine-apple, has of those particular relishes.

§ 7. MEN then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas, from without, according as the objects they converse with, afford greater or less variety; and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For tho' he, that contemplates the operations of his mind; cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture, or clock, may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts, they are made up of, 'till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular.

Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different objects they converse with.

§ 8. AND hence we see the reason, why it is pretty late, before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and some have not any very clear, or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them, all their lives: because, tho' they pass there continually, yet, like floating visions, they make not deep impressions enough, to leave in the mind, clear, distinct, lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant sollicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus, the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.

Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention.

§ 9. To ask at what time a man has first any ideas, is to ask when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception, being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself, constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body: which, if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man's ideas, is the same as to enquire after the beginning of his soul. For by this account, soul, and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist, both at the same time.

The soul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive.

§ 10. BUT whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after, the first rudiments or organization, or the beginnings of life in the body; I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations. And therefore, tho' thinking be supposed ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action: That, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite author, and preserver of things, who never slumbers, nor sleeps; but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly by experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us, that has a power

The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.

BOOK II.

to think : but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assured, than experience informs us. For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason ; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, " that the soul always thinks," be a self-evident proposition, that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted, whether I thought all last night, or no ; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it, to bring as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute ; by which way one may prove any thing : and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think ; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he, that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis ; that is, because he supposes it to be so : which way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, tho' I myself cannot perceive that I always do so.

BUT men, in love with their opinions, may not only suppose what is in question, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep ? I do not say, there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep : but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it, is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts ; and to them it is, and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think, without being conscious of it.

It is not always conscious of it.

§ 11. I GRANT that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake : but whether sleeping, without dreaming, be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration ; it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the soul doth think, in a sleeping man, without being conscious of it ; I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery ? I am sure, the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable, without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments, and concerns, its pleasure, or pain, apart, which the man is not conscious of, or partakes in ; it is certain that Socrates asleep, and Socrates awake, is not the same person : but his soul, when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are two persons ; since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happiness, or misery of his soul, which it enjoys alone by itself, whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it ; no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For, if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.

If a sleeping man thinks, without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.

§ 12. " THE soul, during sound sleep, thinks," say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight, or trouble, as well as any other perceptions ; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions. But it has all this apart ; the sleeping man, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then, the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping, retired from his body ; which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life, without a thinking soul, to all other animals : These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul ; nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated, during his sleep, from his body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chuses

chuses for its scene of thinking, the body of another man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul: for if Castor's soul can think, whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, it is no matter what place it chuses to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men, with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For I suppose, no body will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter; for, if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in that constant flux, of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the same person two days, or two moments, together.

§ 13. THUS, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach, that the soul is always thinking. Those at least, who do at any time sleep without dreaming, can never be convinced, that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy, without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it. Impossible to convince those that sleep, without dreaming, that they think.

§ 14. IT will perhaps be said, that "the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not." That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion, to make it be believed. For who can, without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which, if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life, till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. I suppose, the world affords more such instances: at least every one's acquaintance, will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming. That men dream, without remembering it, in vain urged.

§ 15. To think often, and never to retain it, so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking: and the soul, in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, "that in a waking man the materials of the body are employed, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of thoughts, is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left, after such thinking; but that in the thinking of the soul, which is not perceived in a sleeping man, there the soul thinks apart, and making no use of the organs of the body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently, no memory of such thoughts." Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons, which follows from this supposition, I answer farther, that whatever ideas the mind can receive, and contemplate, without the help of the body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can retain, without the help of the body too; or else the soul, or any separate spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recal them upon occasion: if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former

BOOK II. mer experiences, reasonings, and contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They, who make the soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble being, than those do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing, but the subtlest parts of matter. Characters drawn on dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or impressions made on a heap of atoms, or animal spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the subject as noble, as the thoughts of a soul, that perish in thinking; that, once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves, behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean, or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a faculty, as the power of thinking, that faculty, which comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible being, to be so idly and uselessly employed, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing any good to itself, or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless matter, any where in the universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

On this hypothesis, the soul must have ideas, not derived from sensation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.

§ 16. It is true, we have sometimes instances of perception, whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those thoughts: but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being, those, who are acquainted with dreams, need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfied in, whether the soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the body, acts less rationally, than when conjointly with it, or no? If its separate thoughts be less rational, then these men must say, that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body: if it does not, it is a wonder, that our dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies and meditations.

If I think, when I know it not, no body else can know it.

§ 17. THOSE, who so confidently tell us, that the soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those ideas are, that are in the soul of a child, before, or just at the union with the body, before it hath received any by sensation? The dreams of sleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man's ideas, tho' for the most part oddly put together. It is strange, if the soul has ideas of its own, that it derived not from sensation or reflection, (as it must have, if it thought, before it received any impression from the body) that it should never, in its private thinking (so private, that the man himself perceives it not) retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable, that the soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those ideas, it borrowed not from sensation or reflection; or at least preserve the memory of none but such, which being occasioned from the body, must needs be less natural to a spirit? It is strange the soul should never once, in a man's whole life, recal over any of its pure native thoughts, and those ideas it had, before it borrowed any thing from the body: never bring into the waking man's view any other ideas, but what have a tang of the cask, and manifestly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had ideas, before it was united, or before it received any from the body, it is not to be supposed, but that during sleep it recollects its native ideas; and, during that retirement, from communicating with the body, whilst it thinks by itself, the ideas it is busied about should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones, which it had in itself, underrived from the body, or its own operations about them; which, since the waking man never remembers, we must from this hypothesis conclude, either that the soul remembers something that the man does not; or else that memory belongs only to such ideas, as are derived from the body, or the mind's operations about them.

How knows any one that the

§ 18. I WOULD be glad also, to learn from these men, who so confidently pronounce, that the human soul, or, which is all one, that a man always thinks, how

how they come to know it? nay, how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it? This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without proofs; and to know, without perceiving: It is, I suspect, a confused notion, taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths, that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it, is, that it is possible the soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: and, I say, it is as possible that the soul may not always think; and much more probable, that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to itself the next moment after, that it had thought.

CHAP. I.
the soul always thinks? For, if it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof.

§ 19. To suppose the soul to think, and the man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man: and, if one considers well these men's way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For they who tell us, that the soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, that a man always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man? or a man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of jargon in others. If they say, the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They, who talk thus, may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: whereas, hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, how they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not myself? No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him, what he was that moment thinking on? If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on; he must be a notable diviner of thoughts, that can assure him that he was thinking: may he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy; and it cannot be less than revelation, that discovers to another, thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myself: and they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see that I think, when I cannot perceive it myself, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can see that dogs, or elephants, do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This, some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosacruzians; it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others, than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But, it is but defining the soul to be "a substance that always thinks," and the business is done. If such definition be of any authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many men suspect, that they have no souls at all, since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking. For no definitions, that I know, no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experience; and, perhaps, it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world.

That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.

§ 20. I SEE no reason, therefore, to believe, that the soul thinks, before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes, by exercise, to improve its faculty of thinking, in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those ideas, and reflecting on its own operations; it increases its stock, as well as facility, in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.

No ideas, but from sensation, or reflection, evident, if we observe children.

§ 21. HE that will suffer himself to be informed by observation and experience, and not make his own hypothesis the rule of nature, will find few signs of a soul, accustomed to much thinking, in a new-born child, and much fewer of any reasoning at all. And, yet, it is hard to imagine, that the rational soul

should

BOOK II. should think so much, and not reason at all. And he, that will consider, that infants, newly come into the world, spend the greatest part of their time in sleep, and are seldom awake, but when either hunger calls for the teat, or some pain, (the most importunate of all sensations) or some other violent impression upon the body, forces the mind to perceive, and attend to it: he, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find reason to imagine, that a foetus, in the mother's womb, differs not much from the state of a vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its time without perception, or thought, doing very little but sleep, in a place where it needs not seek for food, and is surrounded with liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same temper; where the eyes have no light, and the ears, so shut up, are not very susceptible of sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of objects, to move the senses.

§ 22. FOLLOW a child from its birth, and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind, by the senses, comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time, it begins to know the objects, which, being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it. And so we may observe how the mind, by degrees, improves in these, and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these; of which I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 23. If it shall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas? I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive, that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation; which is such an impression, or motion, made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions, made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c.

The original
of all our
knowledge.

§ 24. IN time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions that are made on our senses, by outward objects, that are extrinsic to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinsic and proper to itself, which, when reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of human intellect, is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either thro' the senses by outward objects; or by its own operations, when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of any thing, and the groundwork, whereon to build all those notions, which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts, which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that great extent, wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas, which sense, or reflection, have offered for its contemplation.

In the recep-
tion of sim-
ple ideas, the
understand-
ing is for the
most part
passive.

§ 25. IN this part the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no: and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images,

or ideas, which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the bodies, that CHAP. I.
surround us, do diversly affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the im-
pressions, and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to
them.

C H A P. II.

Of simple ideas.

§ 1. **T**HE better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our CHAP. II.
knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concerning the ideas
we have; and that is, that some of them are simple, and some complex.

THO' the qualities, that affect our senses, are, in the things themselves, so Uncom-
united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet pounded ap-
it is plain, the ideas, they produce in the mind, enter by the senses, simple and pearances,
unmixed. For, tho' the sight and touch often take in, from the same object,
at the same time, different ideas; as a man sees at once motion and colour; the
hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax: yet the simple ideas,
thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct, as those that come in
by different senses: the coldness and hardness, which a man feels in a piece of
ice, being as distinct ideas in the mind, as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or
as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer
to a man, than the clear and distinct perceptions he has of those simple ideas;
which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uni-
form appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into
different ideas.

§ 2. **T**HESSE simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested The mind
and furnished to the mind, only by those two ways above-mentioned, viz. sen- can neither
sation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple make nor
ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost destroy
infinite variety; and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not them.
in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quick-
ness, or variety of thoughts, to invent, or frame, one new simple idea in the
mind, not taken in by the ways aforementioned: nor can any force of the un-
derstanding destroy those that are there. The dominion of man, in this little
world of his own understanding, being much-what the same as it is in the great
world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill,
reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to
his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new
matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability
will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understand-
ing any simple idea, not received in by his senses from external objects, or by
reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any
one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate; or frame the
idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also con-
clude, that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct no-
tions of sounds.

§ 3. **T**HIS is the reason why, tho' we cannot believe it impossible to God to
make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the under-
standing the notice of corporeal things, than those five, as they are usually
counted, which he has given to man: yet, I think, it is not possible for any one
to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they
can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible, and tangible qua-
lities. And had mankind been made with but four senses, the qualities then,
which are the objects of the fifth sense, had been as far from our notice, ima-
gination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth
sense, can possibly be: which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other
parts of this vast, and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great pre-
sumption

BOOK II. *sumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the immensity of this fabrick, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that, in other mansions of it, there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge, or apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses, or understanding, of a man: such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses; tho', perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.*

C H A P. III.

Of ideas of one sense.

CHAP. § I. **T**HE better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways, whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

III.
Division of
simple ideas.

FIRST, Then, there are some which come into our minds by one sense only.

SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind by more senses than one.

THIRDLY, Others that are had from reflection only.

FOURTHLY, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection.

WE shall consider them apart, under these several heads.

Ideas of one
sense, as co-
lours of see-
ing, sound
of hearing,
&c.

FIRST, There are some ideas which have admittance only thro' one sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their several degrees, or shades, and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest; come in only by the eyes: all kind of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears: the several tastes, and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them, from without, to their audience in the brain, the mind's presence-room (as I may so call it) are, any of them, so disordered, as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.

THE most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat, and cold, and solidity: all the rest consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more, or less, firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

Few simple
ideas have
names.

§ 2. I THINK, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas, belonging to each sense. Nor, indeed, is it possible, if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses, than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these ideas, which, in effect, is little more than to call them pleasing, or displeasing; tho' the smell of a rose and violet, both sweet, are, certainly, very distinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that, by our palates, we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt, are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colours and sounds. I shall, therefore, in the account of simple ideas I am here giving, content myself to set down only such, as are most material to our present

sent purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, tho' they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongst which, I think, I may well account solidity; which, therefore, I shall treat of in the next chapter.

CHAP.
III.

CHAP. IV.

Of solidity.

§ 1. **T**HE idea of solidity we receive by our touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no idea, which we receive more constantly from sensation, than solidity. Whether we move, or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking downwards; and the bodies, which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do, by an insurmountable force, hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them. That, which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call solidity. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the word solid, be nearer to its original signification, than that which mathematicians use it in; it suffices, that I think the common notion of solidity will allow, if not justify, this use of it; but, if any one think it better to call it impenetrability, he has my consent. Only I have thought the term solidity, the more proper to express this idea, not only because of its vulgar use in that sense; but, also, because it carries something more of positive in it than impenetrability, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself. This, of all other, seems the idea most intimately connected with, and essential to body; so as no where else to be found, or imagined, but only in matter. And, tho' our senses take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a sensation in us; yet the mind, having once got this idea, from such grosser sensible bodies, traces it farther; and considers it, as well as figure, in the minutest particle of matter that can exist: and finds it inseparably inherent in body, wherever, or however modified.

CHAP.
IV.

We receive
this idea
from touch.

§ 2. **T**HIS is the idea belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill space. The idea of which filling of space is, that, where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid substances; and will for ever hinder any two other bodies, that move towards one another in a straight line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them, in a line not parallel to that which they move in. This idea of it, the bodies which we ordinarily handle, sufficiently furnish us with.

§ 3. **T**HIS resistance, whereby it keeps other bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, that no force, how great soever, can surmount it. All the bodies in the world pressing a drop of water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the resistance which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space, which is capable neither of resistance nor motion; and from the ordinary idea of hardness. For a man may conceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching, or displacing, any solid thing, till their superficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear idea of space without solidity. For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body) I ask, whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one single body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its place? I think, it is evident he can: the idea of motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another, than the idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in another

Distinct
from space.

BOOK II. another. I do not ask, whether bodies do so exist, that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the question for, or against, a vacuum. But my question is, whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved, whilst others are at rest? And, I think, this no one will deny. If so, then the place, if deserted, gives us the idea of pure space, without solidity, whereinto another body may enter, without either resistance, or protrusion, of any thing. When the sucker in a pump is drawn, the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same, whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker, or no: nor does it imply a contradiction, that, upon the motion of one body, another, that is only contiguous to it, should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion is built only on the supposition that the world is full, but not on the distinct ideas of space and solidity; which are as different as resistance, and not resistance; protrusion, and not protrusion. And that men have ideas of space, without body, their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate; as is shewed in another place.

From hardness.

§ 4. SOLIDITY is, hereby, also, differenced from hardness, in that solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses; but hardness, in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure. And, indeed, hard and soft, are names that we give to things, only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain, sooner than change figure, by the pressure of any part of our bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which changes the situation of its parts upon an easy, and unpainful touch.

BUT this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world, than to the softest; nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water. For, tho' the two flat sides of two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water, or air, than if there be a diamond between them: yet, it is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water, or resist more; but because the parts of water being more easily separable from each other, they will, by a slide-motion be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place, by that slide-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble, as much as the diamond; and it would be as impossible, by any force, to surmount their resistance, as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond. The softest body in the world, will as invincibly resist the coming together of any two other bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found, or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air, or water, will quickly find its resistance: and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard, can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial, with the air inclosed in a foot-ball. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water, and exactly closed, farther shews the solidity of so soft a body as water. For the golden globe, thus filled, being put into a press, which was driven by the extreme force of screws, the water made itself way thro' the pores of that very close metal; and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it.

On solidity depends impulse, resistance, and protrusion.

§ 5. BY this idea of solidity, is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space: the extension of body being nothing but the cohesion, or continuity of solid, separable, moveable parts; and the extension of space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable parts. Upon the solidity of body also depends their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion. Of pure space then, and solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess myself one)

who

who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas: and that they can think on space, without any thing in it, that resists, or is protruded by, body. This is the idea of pure space, which, they think, they have as clear, as any idea they can have of the extension of body; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies, being equally as clear without, as with the idea of any solid parts between: and, on the other side, they persuade themselves, that they have, distinct from that of pure space, the idea of something that fills space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion. If there be others, that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how men, who have the same idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name, can, in that case, talk with one another; any more than a man, who not being blind, or deaf, has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet, and the sound of a trumpet, could discourse concerning scarlet-colour with the blind man I mention in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet.

§ 6. If any one asks me, what this solidity is? I send him to his senses to inform him: let him put a flint, or a foot-ball, between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists; when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what extension, or motion, is, which, perhaps, seems much easier. The simple ideas we have, are such as experience teaches them us; but, if beyond that, we endeavour, by words, to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better, than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking; and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall shew in another place.

CHAP. V.

Of simple ideas of divers senses.

THE ideas we get by more than one sense, are of space, or extension, figure, rest, and motion; for these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch: and we can receive, and convey into our minds, the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI.

Of simple ideas of reflection.

§ 1. THE mind, receiving the ideas, mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions, about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.

§ 2. THE two great, and principal, actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent, that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two: Perception, or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing. The power of thinking is called the Understanding, and the power of volition is called the Will; and these two powers, or abilities, in the mind, are denominated Faculties. Of some of the modes of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c. I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

C H A P. VII.

Of simple ideas of both sensation and reflection.

CHAP.
VII.Pleasure and
pain.

§ 1. **T**HERE be other simple ideas, which convey themselves into the mind, by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. Pleasure, or Delight, and its opposite, Pain, or Uneasiness, Power, Existence, Unity.

§ 2. **DELIGHT**, or uneasiness, one or other of them join themselves, to almost all our ideas, both of sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure, or pain. By pleasure and pain, I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights, or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c. on the one side; or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c. on the other; they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneasiness: which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

§ 3. **THE** infinitely wise author of our being, having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest, as we think fit; and also, by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of our body: having also, given a power to our minds, in several instances, to chuse, among its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this, or that subject, with consideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking, and motion, that we are capable of; has been pleased to join to several thoughts, and several sensations, a perception of delight. If this were wholly separated, from all our outward sensations, and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought, or action, to another; negligence to attention; or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may so call it) run a-drift, without any direction, or design; and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which state, man, however furnished with the faculties of understanding, and will, would be a very idle, unactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy, lethargick dream. It has, therefore, pleased our wise Creator, to annex to several objects, and to the ideas which we receive from them, as also, to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees: that those faculties, which he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle, and unemployed by us.

§ 4. **PAIN** has the same efficacy and use, to set us on work, that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties, to avoid that, as to pursue this: only this is worth our consideration, that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas, that produce pleasure in us. This, their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain, in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion, of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our maker; who, designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he, not designing our preservation, barely, but the preservation of every part, and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain to those very ideas, which delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordinary torment; and the most pleasant of all sensible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature, that when any object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder

the

the instruments of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate; we might, by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before the organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper functions for the future. The consideration of those objects that produce it, may well persuade us, that this is the end or use of pain. For, tho' great light be insufferable to our eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness, does not at all discompose them; because that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unharmed in its natural state. But yet, excess of cold, as well as heat, pains us, because it is equally destructive to that temper, which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies, confined within certain bounds.

§ 5. BEYOND all this, we may find another reason, why God hath scattered up and down, several degrees of pleasure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together, in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with; that we, finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of compleat happiness, in all the enjoyments, which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.

§ 6. THO' what I have here said, may not, perhaps, make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us, than our own experience does, which is the only way, that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the reason, why they are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give us due sentiments, of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign disposer of all things, may not be unfruitful, to the main end of these enquiries: the knowledge and veneration of him, being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all our understandings.

§ 7. EXISTENCE and unity, are two other ideas, that are suggested to the understanding, by every object without, and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have existence: and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being, or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity.

§ 8. POWER also, is another of those simple ideas, which we receive from sensation and reflection. For, observing in ourselves, that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies, which were at rest; the effects also, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses, we both these ways get the idea of power.

§ 9. BESIDES these, there is another idea, which, tho' suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered us, by what passes in our own minds; and that is, the idea of succession. For, if we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermission.

§ 10. THESE, if they are not all, are at least, (as I think) the most considerable of those simple ideas, which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which, it receives only, by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection.

NOR let any one think these, too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man, to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often, even beyond the utmost expansion of matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible inane. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any simple idea, which is not received from one of those inlets before-mentioned, or any complex idea, not made out of those simple ones. NOR will it be so strange, to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, or largest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind, if we consider how many words may

BOOK II.
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may be made, out of the various composition of twenty four letters ; or, if going one step farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, with barely one of the above mentioned ideas, viz. number, whose stock is inexhaustible, and truly infinite : and what a large and immense field doth extension alone, afford the mathematicians ?

## C H A P. VIII.

## Some farther considerations concerning our simple ideas.

CHAP.  
VIII.

Positive ideas  
from priva-  
tive causes.

§ 1. **C**ONCERNING the simple ideas of sensation, it is to be considered, that whatsoever is so constituted in nature, as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding, a simple idea ; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of, by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on, and considered there, to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever, tho' perhaps the cause of it be but a privation in the subject.

§ 2. **T**HUS the ideas of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally clear, and positive ideas in the mind ; tho' perhaps some of the causes, which produce them, are barely privations in those subjects, from whence our senses derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all, as distinct, positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them ; which is an enquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of the things, existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished ; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white, or black ; and quite another, to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.

§ 3. **A** PAINTER, or dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive, or privative ; and the idea of black, is no less positive in his mind, than that of white, however, the cause of that colour in the external object, may be only a privation.

§ 4. **I**F it were the design of my present undertaking, to enquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason, why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive idea ; viz. That all sensation, being produced in us only by different degrees, and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion, must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of it ; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits, in that organ.

§ 5. **B**UT whether this be so, or no, I will not here determine ; but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the shadow of a man, tho' it consists of nothing but the absence of light (and the more the absence of light is, the more discernible is the shadow) does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an idea in his mind, as a man himself, tho' covered over with clear sun-shine ? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing. Indeed we have negative names, which stand not directly for positive ideas, but for their absence, such as Insipid, Silence, Nihil, &c. which words denote positive ideas ; v. g. taste, sound, being, with a signification of their absence.

Positive ideas  
from priva-  
tive causes.

§ 6. **A**ND thus one may truly be said to see darkness. For supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may see the figure of it, or it may be painted ; or whether the ink, I write with, makes  
any



any other idea, is a question. The privative causes I have here assigned, of positive ideas, are according to the common opinion; but in truth, it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause, till it be determined, whether rest be any more a privation than motion.

§ 7. To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas, or perceptions, in our minds, and, as they are modifications of matter in the bodies, that cause such perceptions in us; that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images, and resemblances, of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind, no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them, are the likenesses of our ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

Ideas in the  
mind, quali-  
ties in bodies.

§ 8. WHATSOEVER the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject, wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball, having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snow-ball, I call qualities; and as they are sensations, or perceptions, in our understandings, I call them ideas: which ideas, if I speak of sometimes, as in the things themselves, I would be understood, to mean those qualities in the objects, which produce them in us.

§ 9. QUALITIES, thus considered in bodies, are, first, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; such as, in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds, in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, tho' less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses, v. g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible, they must retain still, each of them, all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two, or more, distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call original, or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number.

Primary  
qualities.

§ 10. SECONDLY, such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, by their primary qualities, i. e. by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. these I call secondary qualities. To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers, tho' they are as much real qualities in the subject, as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but, for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency in wax, or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea, or sensation of warmth, or burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

Secondary  
qualities.

§ 11. THE next thing to be considered, is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.

How prima-  
ry qualities  
produce their  
ideas.

§ 12. If then external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive these original qualities, in such of them as singly fall under our senses; it is evident that some motion must be thence continued, by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the

BOOK II. brains, or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight; it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies, must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas, which we have of them in us.

How secondary.

§ 13. AFTER the same manner, that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. For it being manifest, that there are bodies, and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot, by any of our senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion; as is evident in the particles of the air, and water, and other extremely smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water, as the particles of air or water are smaller than peas, or hail-stones: let us suppose at present, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations, which we have from the colours, and smells of bodies; v. g. that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees, and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds; it being no more impossible to conceive, that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain, to the motion of a piece of steel, dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.

§ 14. WHAT I have said, concerning colours and smells, may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we, by mistake, attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts; as I have said.

Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary, not.

§ 15. FROM whence I think it as easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas, produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

§ 16. FLAME is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet; from the ideas they produce in us: which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies, that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would, by most men, be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet, he that will consider that the same fire, that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire. Why is whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?

§ 17. THE particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire, or snow, are really in them, whether any one's senses perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies: but light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light, or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, odours and sounds, as they are such

such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i. e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

§ 18. A PIECE of manna, of a sensible bulk, is able to produce in us the idea of a round, or square figure, and by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it, as it really is in the manna moving: a circle, or square are the same, whether in idea, or existence, in the mind, or in the manna; and this both motion and figure are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them, or no: this every body is ready to agree to. Besides, manna, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion, of its parts, has a power to produce the sensations of sickness, and sometimes of acute pains, or gripings, in us. That these ideas of sickness and pain are not in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are no where, when we feel them not: this also every one readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to think, that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna; which are but the effects of the operations of manna, by the motion, size, and figure, of its particles, on the eyes and palate; as the pain and sickness, caused by manna, are confessedly nothing, but the effects of its operation on the stomach and guts, by the size, motion, and figure, of its insensible parts, (for by nothing else can a body operate, as has been proved :) as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas, which in itself it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach, and thereby produce distinct ideas, which, in itself, it has not. These ideas, being all effects of the operations of manna, on several parts of our bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion, of its parts; why those produced by the eyes and palate, should rather be thought to be really in the manna, than those produced by the stomach and guts; or why the pain and sickness, ideas, that are the effects of manna, should be thought to be no where, when they are not felt; and yet the sweetness and whiteness, effects of the same manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally as unknown, should be thought to exist in the manna, when they are not seen, nor tasted, would need some reason to explain.

§ 19. LET us consider the red and white colours in porphyre: hinder light but from striking on it, and its colours vanish, it no longer produces any such ideas in us; upon the return of light, it produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyre, by the presence, or absence, of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness, are really in porphyre, in the light, when, it is plain, it has no colour in the dark? It has, indeed, such a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and from others the idea of whiteness; but whiteness, or redness, are not in it at any time, but such a texture, that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.

§ 20. POUND an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it?

§ 21. IDEAS being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account, how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas, it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should, at the same time, be both hot and cold: for, if we imagine warmth, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves, or animal spirits, we may understand how it is possible, that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensation of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which, yet, figure never does; that never producing the idea of a square by one hand, which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But, if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing, but the increase, or diminution, of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood, that, if that motion be greater

in

Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary, not.

BOOK II. in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has, in its minute particles, a greater motion, than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other; it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.

§ 22. I HAVE, in what just goes before, been engaged in physical enquiries a little farther than, perhaps, I intended. But it being necessary, to make the nature of sensation a little understood, and to make the difference between the qualities in bodies, in the ideas produced by them in the mind, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy, it being necessary, in our present enquiry, to distinguish the primary, and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them, (viz. solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, or rest; and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies, they are in, are big enough singly to be discerned) from those secondary and imputed qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate, without being distinctly discerned; whereby we also may come to know what ideas are, and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

Three sorts  
of qualities  
in bodies.

§ 23. THE qualities then that are in bodies rightly considered, are of three sorts.

FIRST, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion, or rest of their solid parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have, by these, an idea of the thing as it is in itself, as is plain in artificial things. These I call primary qualities.

SECONDLY, The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible, primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called sensible qualities.

THIRDLY, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called powers.

THE first of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived, or no; and, upon their different modifications, it is, that the secondary qualities depend.

THE other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

The first are  
resemblan-  
ces. The  
second  
thought re-  
semblances,  
but are not.  
The third  
neither are,  
nor are  
thought so.

§ 24. BUT, tho' these two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities; yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the second sort, viz. the powers, to produce several ideas in us, by our senses, are looked upon as real qualities, in the things, thus affecting us: but the third sort are called, and esteemed, barely powers, v. g. the idea of heat, or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun, are commonly thought real qualities, existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But, when we consider the sun, in reference to wax, which it melts, or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by powers in it: whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me, when I am warmed, or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched, or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is able in the one case, so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion, of some of the insensible parts of my eyes,

eyes, or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light, or heat; and, in the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion, of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid.

§ 25. THE reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be, because the ideas we have of distinct colours, sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities, which appear not to our senses, to operate in their production; and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine, that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves: since sensation discovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts, in their production; nor can reason shew how bodies, by their bulk, figure, and motion, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue, or yellow, &c. But, in the other case, in the operations of bodies, changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore, we look on it as a bare effect of power. For, tho' receiving the idea of heat, or light, from the sun, we are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun; yet, when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the sun, we cannot imagine that to be the perception, or resemblance, of any thing in the sun, because we find not those different colours in the sun itself. For, our senses being able to observe a likeness, or unlikeness, of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject, to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it. But our senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it; we are apt to imagine, that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities; with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

§ 26. To conclude, besides those before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies, viz. bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion, of their solid parts: all the rest whereby we take notice of bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else but several powers in them depending on those primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies, to produce several different ideas in us; or else by operating on other bodies, so to change their primary qualities, as to render them capable of producing ideas in us, different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called secondary qualities, immediately perceivable: the latter, secondary qualities, mediately perceivable.

## CHAP. IX.

### Of perception.

§ 1. PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind, exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is, by some, called thinking in general. Tho' thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers any thing. For, in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

CHAP. IX.

Perception, the first simple idea of reflection.

## BOOK II.

Is only when  
the mind re-  
ceives the  
impression.

§ 2. WHAT perception is, every one will know better, by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects, on what passes in his own mind, cannot miss it: and, if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

§ 3. THIS is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies, with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain; and there the sense of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception.

§ 4. How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there; it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies, made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but, it not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and tho' the motion, that uses to produce the idea of sound, be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not thro' any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear: but that, which uses to produce the idea, tho' conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of, in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea on the mind, there follows no sensation. So that wherever there is sense, or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.

Children,  
tho' they  
have ideas in  
the womb,  
have none  
innate.

§ 5. THEREFORE I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses, about objects that affect them in the womb, receive some few ideas, before they are born; as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those wants, or diseases, they suffer: among which (if one may conjecture, concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two; which, probably, are some of the first that children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.

§ 6. BUT tho' it be reasonable to imagine, that children receive some ideas, before they come into the world; yet these simple ideas are far from those innate principles, which some contend for, and we above have rejected. These here mentioned being the effects of sensation, are only from some affections of the body, which happen to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the mind; no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas, derived from sense, but only in the precedence of time: whereas those innate principles are supposed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind, by any accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but, as it were, original characters impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its being and constitution.

Which ideas  
first, is not  
evident.

§ 7. As there are some ideas, which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb, subservient to the necessities of their life and being there; so, after they are born, those ideas are the earliest imprinted, which happen to be the sensible qualities which first occur to them: amongst which, light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how covetous the mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guessed, by what is observable in children new-born, who always turn their eyes to that part, from whence the light comes, lay them how you please. But the ideas, that are most familiar at first, being various, according to the divers circumstances of children's first entertainment in the world; the order wherein the several ideas come at first into the mind, is very various and uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.

Ideas of sen-  
sation often

§ 8. WE are farther to consider, concerning perception, that the ideas, we receive by sensation, are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, with-  
out



out our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, v. g. gold, alabaster, or jet ; it is certain that the idea, thereby imprinted in our mind, is of a flat circle variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light, by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies ; the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes : so that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour ; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plain variously coloured, as is evident in painting. To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter, some months since ; and it is this : Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see : quære, “ whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell, which is the “ globe, which the cube ? ” To which the acute and judicious proposer answers : Not. For tho’ he has obtained the experience of, how a globe, and how a cube affects his touch ; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that, what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so : or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem ; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able, with certainty, to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them ; tho’ he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an occasion for him to consider, how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he has not the least use of, or help from them : and the rather, because this observing gentleman farther adds, That having upon the occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one, that at first gave the answer to it, which he thinks true, till, by hearing his reasons, they were convinced.

§ 9. But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas, but those received by sight : because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense ; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours ; we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea formed by our judgment ; so that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself : as a man, who reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters, or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

§ 10. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed : for, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension ; so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require

Book II. require to put it into words, and step by step shew it another. Secondly, we shall not be so much surprized, that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility, which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our observation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by custom have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds, which, tho' taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear, nor observe. And therefore it is not so strange, that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation, into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

Perception  
puts the dif-  
ference be-  
tween ani-  
mals and  
inferiour be-  
ings.

§ 11. THIS faculty of perception seems to me to be that, which puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature. For however vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of motion, and, upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briskly alter their figure and motion, and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants, from a motion which has some resemblance to that, which in animals follows upon sensation: yet, I suppose it is all bare mechanism; and no otherwise produced, than the turning of a wild oat-beard, by the insinuation of the particles of moisture; or the shortening of a rope, by the affusion of water. All which is done without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

§ 12. PERCEPTION, I believe, is in some degree in all sorts of animals; tho' in some, possibly, the avenues, provided by nature for the reception of sensations, are so few, and the perception, they are received with, so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness, and variety of sensations, which is in the other animals: but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of that sort of animals, who are thus made. So that the wisdom and goodness of the maker, plainly appears, in all the parts of this stupendous fabric, and all the several degrees, and ranks of creatures in it.

§ 13. WE may, I think from the make of an oyster, or cockle, reasonably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick senses, as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would sight, and hearing, do to a creature that cannot move itself to, or from the objects, wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation, be an inconvenience to an animal, that must lie still, where chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?

§ 14. BUT yet I cannot but think, there is some small dull perception, whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in mankind itself. Take one, in whom decrepid old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas, his mind was formerly stored with; and has, by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell quite, and his taste to a great degree, stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter: or, if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made are scarce perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties, above the condition of a cockle, or an oyster, I leave to be considered. And, if a man has passed sixty years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three days; I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.

Perception,  
the inlet of  
knowledge.

§ 15. PERCEPTION then, being the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions are, that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are, that are employed about them; the more remote are they from that knowledge, which is to be found



found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds. And I am apt too, to imagine that it is perception in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals, and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture, by the by ; it being indifferent to the matter in hand, which way the learned shall determine of it.

CHAP.  
IX.

## CHAP. X.

### Of retention.

§ 1. **T**HE next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which from sensation, or reflection, it hath received. This is done two ways : first, by keeping the idea, which is brought into it, for some time actually in view ; which is called contemplation.

CHAP. X.  
Contem-  
pla-  
tion.

§ 2. THE other way of retention, is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight : and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, the object being removed. This is memory, which is as it were, the store-house of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man, not being capable of having many ideas under view, and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas, which at another time it might have use of. But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually no where ; but only there is an ability in the mind, when it will, to revive them again, and, as it were, paint them a-new on itself, tho' some with more, some with less difficulty ; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty, that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings, which, tho' we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities, which first imprinted them there.

Attention,  
repetition,  
pleasure and  
pain, fix  
ideas.

§ 3. ATTENTION and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory : but those, which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impression, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. The great business of the senses, being to make us take notice of what hurts, or advantages, the body, it is wisely ordered by nature (as has been shewn) that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas ; which, supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects, with that haste which is necessary for their preservation ; and in both, settles in the memory a caution for the future.

§ 4. CONCERNING the several degrees of lasting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may observe, that some of them have been produced in the understanding, by an object affecting the senses once only, and no more than once ; others, that have more than once offered themselves to the senses, have yet been little taken notice of : the mind, either heedless, as in children, or otherwise employed as in men, intent only on one thing, not settling the stamp deep into itself. And in some, where they are set on with care and

Ideas fade in  
the memory.

VOL. I.

Q

repeated

BOOK II. repeated impressions, either thro' the temper of the body, or some other default, the memory is very weak. In all these cases, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves, than shadows do, flying over fields of corn; and the mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

§ 5. THUS many of those ideas, which were produced in the minds of children, in the beginning of their sensation, (some of which, perhaps, as of some pleasures and pains, were before they were born, and others in their infancy) if in the future course of their lives they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those, who by some mischance have lost their sight, when they were very young, in whom the ideas of colours, having been but slightly taken notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some years after, there is no more notion, nor memory of colours left in their minds, than in those of people born blind. The memory in some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle; but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those kinds of objects, which at first occasioned them, the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often die before us: and our minds represent to us those tombs, to which we are approaching; where, tho' the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds, are laid in fading colours; and, if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our bodies, and the make of our animal spirits are concerned in this, and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like free-stone, and in others little better than sand; I shall not here enquire: tho' it may seem probable, that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory; since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever, in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting, as if graved in marble.

Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost.

§ 6. BUT, concerning the ideas themselves, it is easy to remark, that those that are ofteneft refreshed (amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind, by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects, or actions, that produced them, fix themselves best in the memory, and remain clearest and longest there: and therefore those, which are of the original qualities of bodies, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest; and those, that almost constantly affect our bodies, as heat and cold; and those, which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as existence, duration, and number, which almost every object, that affects our senses, every thought, which employs our minds, bring along with them: these, I say, and the like ideas, are seldom quite lost, whilst the mind retains any ideas at all.

In remembering, the mind is often active.

§ 7. IN this secondary perception, as I may so call it, or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive; the appearances of those dormant pictures, depending sometimes on the will. The mind very often sets itself on work, in search of some hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it; tho' sometimes too, they start up in our minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark cells, into open day-light, by some turbulent and tempestuous passions: our affections bringing ideas to our memory, which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observed, concerning ideas lodged in the memory, and upon occasion revived by the mind, that they are not only (as the word, revive, imports) none of them new ones; but also that the mind takes notice of them, as of a former impression, and renews its acquaintance with them, as with ideas it had known before. So that, tho' ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly

stantly in view, yet, in remembrance, they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted; i. e. in view, and taken notice of before, by the understanding. CHAP. X.

§ 8. MEMORY, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless: and we, in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects. Two defects in the memory, oblivion and slowness.

FIRST, That it loses the idea quite, and so far it produces perfect ignorance. For, since we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

SECONDLY, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough to serve the mind upon occasions. This, if it be to a great degree, is stupidity; and he, who, thro' this default in his memory, has not the ideas, that are really preserved there, ready at hand, when need and occasion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the opportunity, whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business, therefore, of the memory, to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas, which it has present occasion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occasions, consists that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.

§ 9. THESE are defects, we may observe, in the memory of one man compared with another. There is another defect, which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with some superiour, created, intellectual beings, which, in this faculty, may so far excel man, that they may have constantly in view the whole scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts, they have ever had, may slip out of their sight. The omniscience of God, who knows all things past, present, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men's hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt, but God may communicate to those glorious spirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections in what proportion he pleases, as far as created finite beings can be capable? It is reported of that prodigy of parts, Monsieur Pascal, that, till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege so little known to most men, that it seems almost incredible to those, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves; but yet, when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfections of it in superiour ranks of spirits. For this of Mr. Pascal was still with a narrowness, that human minds are confined to here, of having great variety of ideas only by succession, not all at once: whereas the several degrees of angels may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be always present to him. And, therefore, we may suppose it one of those ways, wherein the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

§ 10. THIS faculty of laying up, and retaining the ideas, that are brought into the mind, several other animals seem to have to a great degree, as well as man. For, to pass by other instances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use them for patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour to conform their voices to notes (as it is plain they do) of which they had no ideas. For tho' I should grant sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal spirits, in the brains of those birds, whilst the tune is actually playing; Brutes have memory.  
and

BOOK II. and that motion may be continued on, to the muscles of the wings, and so the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the bird's preservation: yet that can never be supposed a reason, why it should cause mechanically, either whilst the tune was playing, much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the organs of the bird's voice, as should conform it to the notes of a foreign sound, which imitation can be of no use to the bird's preservation. But which is more, it cannot, with any appearance of reason, be supposed (much less proved) that birds, without sense and memory, can approach their notes nearer and nearer, by degrees, to a tune played yesterday; which, if they have no idea of in their memory, is now no where, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason, why the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains, which, not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the like sounds; and why the sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the pipe, is impossible to conceive.

## C H A P. XI.

### Of discerning, and other operations of the mind.

#### CHAP. § I. XI.

No knowledge without discerning.

**A**NOTHER faculty we may take notice of, in our minds, is that of discerning and distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general: unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge; tho' the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general propositions, which have passed for innate truths; because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions: whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same, or different. But of this more hereafter.

The difference of wit and judgment.

§ 2. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another, lies either in the dulness, or faults, of the organs of sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, or attention, in the understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some tempers, I will not here examine: it suffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations, that the mind may reflect on, and observe in itself. It is of that consequence to its other knowledge, that, so far as this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of, for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our notions are confused, and our reason and judgment disturbed, or misled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able, nicely, to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason, which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some reason of that common observation, that men, who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment, or deepest reason: for wit, lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance, or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment

ment and pleafantry of wit, which ftrikes fo lively on the fancy, and therefore is fo acceptable to all people; becaufe its beauty appears at firft fight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth, or reafon, there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, refts fatisfied with the agreeablenefs of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy: and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the fevere rules of truth and good reafon; whereby it appears, that it confifts in fomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

§ 3. To the well diftinguifhing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, that they be clear and determinate: and, when they are fo, it will not breed any confufion, or miftake, about them, tho' the fenfes fhould (as fometimes they do) convey them from the fame object differently, on different occafions, and fo feem to err. For tho' a man in a fever fhould from fugar have a bitter tafte, which, at another time, would produce a fweet one; yet, the idea of bitter in that man's mind, would be as clear and diftinct from the idea of fweet, as if he had tafted only gall. Nor does it make any more confufion, between the two ideas of fweet and bitter, that the fame fort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea, by the tafte, than it makes a confufion in two ideas of white and fweet, or white and round, that the fame piece of fugar produces them both in the mind at the fame time. And the ideas of orange-colour and azure, that are produced in the mind, by the fame parcel of the infufion of lignum nephriticum, are no lefs diftinct ideas, than thofe of the fame colours, taken from two very different bodies.

§ 4. THE comparing them one with another, in refpect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumftances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that, upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas, comprehended under relation; which, of how vaft an extent it is, I fhall have occafion to confider hereafter.

§ 5. How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not eafy to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: for tho' they probably have feveral ideas diftinct enough, yet it feems to me to be the prerogative of human underftanding, when it has fufficiently diftinguifhed any ideas, fo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and fo confequently two, to caft about and confider in what circumftances they are capable to be compared: and, therefore, I think, beafts compare not their ideas farther than fome fenfible circumftances annexed to the objects themfelves. The other power of comparing, which may be obferved in men, belonging to general ideas, and ufeful only to abftract reafonings, we may probably conjecture beafts have not.

§ 6. THE next operation, we may obferve in the mind about its ideas, is Compound-Composition; whereby it puts together feveral of thofe fimple ones it has received from fenfation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of compofition may be reckoned alfo that of Enlarging; wherein, tho' the compofition does not fo much appear, as in more complex ones, yet it is, neverthelefs, a putting feveral ideas together, tho' of the fame kind. Thus, by adding feveral units together, we make the idea of a dozen; and putting together the repeated ideas of feveral perches, we frame that of a furlong.

§ 7. IN this, alfo, I fuppofe, brutes come far fhort of men: for tho' they take in, and retain together feveral combinations of fimple ideas; as, poffibly, the fhape, fmell, and voice of his mafter, make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or, rather, are fo many diftinct marks, whereby he knows him; yet, I do not think they do of themfelves ever compound them, and make complex ideas: and, perhaps, even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one fimple one that directs them in the knowledge of feveral things, which, poffibly, they diftinguifh lefs by their fight than we imagine: for I have been credibly informed, that a bitch will nurfe, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of her puppies, if you can but get them once to fuck her fo long, that her milk may go thro' them. And thofe animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any

BOOK II. knowledge of their number: for, tho' they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them, whilst they are in sight, or hearing; yet, if one, or two, of them be stolen from them in their abience, or without noise, they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessened.

Naming. § 8. WHEN children have, by repeated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of signs. And, when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words, to signify their ideas to others. These verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things, in their first use of language.

Abstracting. § 9. THE use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in, should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called Abstraction, whereby ideas, taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind, and their names, general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise, naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus, the same colour, being observed to day in chalk, or snow, which the mind, yesterday, received from milk, it considers that appearance alone makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name, whiteness, it, by that sound, signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined, or met with: and thus universals, whether ideas, or terms, are made.

Brutes abstract not. § 10. IF it may be doubted, whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency, which the faculty of brutes do, by no means, attain to. For it is evident, we observe no footsteps in them, of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.

§ 11. NOR can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds, that they have no use, or knowledge, of general words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any such application. And, on the other side, men, who, thro' some defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words; a faculty which we see beasts come short in. And, therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in this, that the species of brutes are discriminated from man; and it is that proper difference, wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance: for if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.

Idiots and madmen. § 12. How far idiots are concerned in the want, or weakness, of any, or all of the foregoing faculties, an exact observation of their several ways of faltering would



would no doubt discover : for those, who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those, who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of language, or judge or reason to any tolerable degree ; but only a little and imperfectly about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And, indeed, any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in men's understandings and knowledge.

§ 13. IN fine, the defects in naturals seem to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason ; whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme : for they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning ; but, having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err, as men do that argue right, from wrong principles. For, by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience : others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass, that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular, be as frantick as any in Bedlam ; if either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly ; the disorderly jumbling ideas together, is in some more, and some less. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them ; but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.

§ 14. THESE, I think, are the first faculties and operations of the mind, Method, which it makes use of in understanding ; and tho' they are exercised about all its ideas in general, yet the instances I have hitherto given, have been chiefly in simple ideas : and I have subjoined the explication of these faculties of the mind, to that of simple ideas, before I come to what I have to say concerning complex ones, for these following reasons :

FIRST, Because several of these faculties being exercised at first, principally about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements.

SECONDLY, Because, observing the faculties of the mind, how they operate about simple ideas, which are usually, in most men's minds, much more clear, precise, and distinct, than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the mind abstracts, denominates, compares, and exercises its other operations, about those which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.

THIRDLY, Because these very operations of the mind, about ideas, received from sensation, are themselves, when reflected on, another set of ideas, derived from that other source of our knowledge which I call Reflection, and therefore fit to be considered in this place, after the simple ideas of sensation. Of compounding, comparing, abstracting, &c. I have but just spoken, having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places.

§ 15. AND thus I have given a short, and, I think, true history of the first beginnings of human knowledge, whence the mind has its first objects, and by what steps it makes its progress, to the laying in, and storing up those ideas, out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of ; wherein I must appeal to experience and observation, whether I am in the right : the best way to come to truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of ourselves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

These are the  
beginnings  
of human  
knowledge.

§ 16. To

## BOOK II.

Appeal to  
experience.

§ 16. To deal truly, this is the only way that I can discover, whereby the ideas of things are brought into the understanding: if other men have either innate ideas, or infused principles, they have reason to enjoy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in myself, and is agreeable to those notions; which, if we will examine the whole course of men, in their several ages, countries, and educations, seem to depend on those foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this method, in all the parts and degrees thereof.

## Dark room.

§ 17. I PRETEND not to teach, but to enquire, and therefore cannot but confess here again, that external and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows, by which light is let into this dark room: for methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet, wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.

THESE are my guesses concerning the means, whereby the understanding comes to have and retain simple ideas, and the modes of them, with some other operations about them. I proceed now to examine some of these simple ideas, and their modes, a little more particularly.

## C H A P. XII.

## Of complex ideas.

CHAP.  
XII.

Made by the  
mind out of  
simple ones.

§ I. WE have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those simple ones, received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor have any idea, which does not wholly consist of them. But, as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby, out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: 1. Combining several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is separating them from all other ideas, that accompany them in their real existence; this is called Abstraction: and thus all its general ideas are made. This shews man's power, and its way of operation, to be much what the same in the material and intellectual world. For the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all, that man can do, is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them. I shall here begin with the first of these, in the consideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two, in their due places. As simple ideas are observed to exist, in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them, united together, as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. Ideas, thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call complex; such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which, tho' complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each, by itself, as one entire thing, and signified by one name.



§ 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power, in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with; but all this still confined to those simple ideas, which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions: for simple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind can have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without, by the senses, nor any ideas of other kind of operations, of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself; but, when it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what offers itself from without: it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received so united.

CHAP.  
XII.  
Made voluntarily.

§ 3. COMPLEX ideas, however compounded and decomposed, tho' their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three heads. 1. Modes, 2. Substances, 3. Relations. Are either modes, substances or relations.

§ 4. FIRST, Modes I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependances on, or affections of substances; such are the ideas, signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And if in this I use the word mode, in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in discourses, differing from the ordinary, received notions, either to make new words, or to use old words, in somewhat a new signification: the latter whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two. Modes.

§ 5. OF these modes, there are two sorts which deserve distinct consideration. First, there are some which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other; as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together: and these I call simple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea. Simple and mixed modes.

SECONDLY, There are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. beauty, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds: and these I call mixed modes.

§ 6. SECONDLY, The ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things, subsisting by themselves: in which the supposed, or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull, whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility and fusibility, we have the idea of lead, and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of substances also there are two sorts of ideas, one of single substances, as they exist separately, as of a man, or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of men, or flock of sheep: which collective ideas of several substances thus put together, are as much each of them one single idea, as that of a man, or an unit. Substances single or collective.

§ 7. THIRDLY, The last sort of complex ideas, is that we call relation, which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another. Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order. Relation.

§ 8. IF we trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas, received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us farther, than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from The abstrusest ideas from the two sources.

BOOK II. from sense, or from any operation of our minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them : so that those even large and abstract ideas, are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas, received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to shew, in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some few others, that seem the most remote from those originals.

## C H A P. XIII.

## Of simple modes; and, first, of the simple modes of space.

CHAP.  
XIII.  
Simple  
modes.

§ 1. **T**HOUGH in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different modifications of the same idea; which the mind, either finds in things existing, or is able to make within itself, without the help of any extrinsecal object, or any foreign suggestion.

THOSE modifications of any one simple idea (which, as has been said, I call simple modes) are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind, as those of the greatest distance and contrariety. For the idea of two is as distinct from that of one, as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number: and yet it is made up only of that simple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make those distinct simple modes, of a dozen, a gross, a million.

Idea of space.

§ 2. I SHALL begin with the simple idea of space. I have shewed above, chap. iv. that we get the idea of space, both by our sight and touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive, by their sight, a distance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see colours themselves; nor is it less obvious, that they can do so, in the dark, by feeling and touch.

Space and  
extension.

§ 3. THIS space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity. The term extension, is usually applied to it, in what manner soever considered.

Immenity.

§ 4. EACH different distance, is a different modification of space; and each idea of any different distance, or space, is a simple mode of this idea. Men, for the use, and by the custom of measuring, settle in their minds the ideas of certain stated lengths, such as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c. which are so many distinct ideas, made up only of space. When any such stated lengths, or measures of space, are made familiar to men's thoughts, they can, in their minds, repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or any thing else; and frame to themselves the ideas of long, square, or cubic, feet, yards, or fathoms, here, amongst the bodies of the universe, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies; and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their idea of space, as much as they please. This power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former, as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or flint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of immensity.

Figure.

§ 5. THERE is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation, which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have

have amongst themselves. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes, both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view: where, observing how the extremities terminate either in straight lines, which meet at discernible angles, or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived, by considering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body, or space, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For, besides the vast number of different figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of space, and thereby making still new compositions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible; and so it can multiply figures in infinitum.

§ 6. For the mind, having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction, which is to double the length of that straight line, or else join it to another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of angles it pleases; and being able also to shorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such divisions, it can make an angle of any bigness: so, also, the lines, that are its sides, of what length it pleases; which joining again to other lines of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly inclosed any space, it is evident, that it can multiply figures both in their shape and capacity in infinitum; all which are but so many different simple modes of space.

THE same that it can do with straight lines, it can do also with crooked, or crooked and straight together; and the same it can do in lines, it can also in superficies; by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures, that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the simple modes of space.

§ 7. ANOTHER idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is Place. that we call place: as, in simple space, we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies, or points; so, in our idea of place, we consider the relation of distance betwixt any thing, and any two, or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest: for when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was yesterday, from any two, or more points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it hath kept the same place; but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points, we say it hath changed its place: tho', vulgarly speaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise points; but from larger portions of sensible objects, to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to observe.

§ 8. THUS, a company of chess-men, standing on the same squares of the chess-board, where we left them, we say they are all in the same place, or unmoved; tho', perhaps, the chess-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another, because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The chess-board, we also say, is in the same place it was, if it remain in the same part of the cabin, tho', perhaps, the ship, which it is in, sails all the while: and the ship is said to be in the same place, supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land; tho', perhaps, the earth hath turned round: and so both chess-men, and board, and ship, have every one changed place, in respect of remoter bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board, being that which determines the place of the chess-men; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chess-board; and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the ship; these things may be said to be in the same place

BOOK II. place in those respects: tho' their distance from some other things, which, in this matter, we did not consider, being varied, they have, undoubtedly, changed place in that respect, and we our selves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

§ 9. BUT this modification of distance, we call place, being made by men, for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation; men consider and determine of this place, by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their present purpose, without considering other things, which, to another purpose, would better determine the place of the same thing. Thus, in the chess-board, the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man, being determined only within that chequered piece of wood; it would cross that purpose, to measure it by any thing else: but, when these very chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place, by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the chess-board; there being another use of designing the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chess-board, and so must be determined by other bodies. So, if any one should ask, in what place are the verses, which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by saying they were in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right designation of the place would be, by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper answer would be, that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his *Æneids*; and that they have been always constantly in the same place, ever since Virgil was printed: which is true, tho' the book itself hath moved a thousand times; the use of the idea of place here, being to know only in what part of the book that story is, that so, upon occasion, we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§ 10. THAT our idea of place is nothing else, but such a relative position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, tho' we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform space, or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say, that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist: this, tho' a phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind clearly and distinctly the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves, or stands still, in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space: tho' it be true, that the word place has, sometimes, a more confused sense, and stands for that space which any body takes up; and so the universe is in a place. The idea, therefore, of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular, limited consideration) viz. by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension, or distance.

Extension  
and body,  
not the same.

§ 11. THERE are some, that would persuade us, that body and extension are the same thing; who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful, or insignificant terms. If, therefore, they mean by body, and extension, the same that other people do, viz. by body, something, that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different ways; and by extension, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid, coherent parts, and which is possessed by them; they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet-colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet-colour exist without extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others as necessary to their existence, or conception,

ception, which, yet, are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion: space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion upon impulse. And, if it be a reason to prove, that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it: space and solidity being as distinct ideas, as thinking and extension, and as wholly separable in the mind one from another. Body, then, and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,

§ 12. FIRST, Extension includes no solidity, nor resistance to the motion of body, as body does.

§ 13. SECONDLY, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where, before, there was a continuity: and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where, before, there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done, in things considered by the mind, as capable of being separated; and, by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: but neither of these ways of separation, whether real, or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.

It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space, as is answerable, or commensurate, to a foot, without considering the rest; which is, indeed, a partial consideration, but not so much as a mental separation, or division: since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies, separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun, without its heat; or mobility in body without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.

§ 14. THIRDLY, The parts of pure space are immoveable, which follows from their inseparability; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable; which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

THUS the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immoveable, and without resistance to the motion of body.

§ 15. If any one ask me, what this space, I speak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, that extension is extension: for what am I the better informed in the nature of extension, when I am told, that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts; as if one asking, what a fibre was? I should answer him, that it was a thing made up of several fibres: would he hereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was, better than he did before? Or, rather, would he not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

§ 16. THOSE who contend that space and body are the same, bring this dilemma: either this space is something, or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch: if it be allowed to be something, they ask, whether it be body, or spirit? To which I answer, by another question, who told them, that there was, or could be nothing but solid beings, which could

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not

The definition of extension, explains it not.  
Division of beings into bodies and spirits, proves not space and body the same.

BOOK II. not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and spirit.

Substance  
which we  
know not,  
no proof  
against space  
without  
body.

§ 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space, void of body, be substance, or accident? I shall readily answer, I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear distinct idea of substance.

§ 18. I ENDEAVOUR, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance, to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, substance, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible God, to finite spirit, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will not thence follow, that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ any otherwise, than in a bare different modification of that substance; as a tree and a pebble being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter: which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirits, and matter, in three different significations; and that it stands for one idea, when God is said to be a substance; for another, when the soul is called substance; and for a third, when a body is called so: if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or, at least, to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors, that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that, in ordinary use, it has scarce one clear distinct signification: and if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

Substance  
and acci-  
dents, of  
little use in  
philosophy.

§ 19. THEY who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word substance to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. And he, that enquired, might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher, that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth; as we take it for a sufficient answer, and good doctrine, from our European philosophers, that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents. So that of substance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§ 20. WHATEVER a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who enquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if, desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told, that a pillar was a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told, that all learned books consisted of paper and letter, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper; but were the Latin words *inherentia* and *substantia* put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called sticking on, and underpropping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.

§ 21. BUT



A vacuum  
beyond the  
utmost  
bounds of  
body.

§ 21. BUT to return to our idea of space. If body be not supposed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would ask, whether if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm, where there was before space without body; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be space between them without body. If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him :) And then I ask, whether that, which hinders his hand from moving outwards, be substance or accident, something or nothing? And, when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as good, that where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies) a body put into motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch: for pure space between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact; but bare space in the way, is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own that they think body infinite, tho' they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that space is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space, more than he can to duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: and, therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

§ 22. FARTHER, those, who assert the impossibility of space existing without matter, must not only make body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that God can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this book, or the body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum: for it is evident that the space, that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body, will still remain, and be a space without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall of adamant, and in that state make it a perfect impossibility, for any other body to get into that space. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter, into the place, from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude; which will therefore need some better proof than a supposed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out: our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connection between space and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for, or against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinct ideas of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extension, void of solidity, tho' they deny its existence; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they, who so much alter the signification of words, as to call extension body, and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension, without solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they speak of vacuum, since it is impossible for extension to be without extension. For vacuum, whether we affirm, or deny its existence, signifies space without body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any particle of it.

§ 23. BUT not to go so far, as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe, nor appeal to God's omnipotency, to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seems to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts, to move up and down freely every way, within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as

The power  
of annihilation  
proves a vacuum.

big

BOOK II. big as the least part, into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided, is as big as a mustard-seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body, within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 times less than a mustard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000th part of a mustard-seed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on in infinitum. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For, if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body; and makes as great a difference between space and body, as if it were *μέγα χῶσμα*, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to  $\frac{1}{10}$  or  $\frac{1}{1000}$  of it; the same consequence will always follow, of space without matter.

The ideas of space and body distinct.

§ 24. BUT the question being here, "whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of the body," it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a vacuum, or no. For, if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence: and, if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.

Extension being inseparable from body, proves it not the same.

§ 25. IT is true the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible and most tangible qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external objects, without taking in impressions of extension too. This readiness of extension, to make itself be taken notice of, so constantly, with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, (the busiest of all our senses) so filled with the idea of extension, and as it were wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being, only from their narrow and gross imaginations: but having here to do only with those, who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension; I shall desire them to consider, that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on those of sight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extension at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.

§ 26. IF those ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things, which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any object of sensation, or reflection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shewn sufficiently.

Ideas of space and solidity distinct.

§ 27. TO conclude, whatever men shall think, concerning the existence of a vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of space, distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas, and we can as easily conceive space, without solidity, as we can conceive body, or space, without motion; tho' it be ever so certain, that neither body, nor motion, can exist without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a relation, resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words



words of the most knowing king Solomon, "The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee;" or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, "In him we live, move, and have our being;" are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of body. For, whether we consider in matter itself, the distance of its coherent, solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, extension; or whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any body, in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or else, considering it as lying between any two bodies, or positive beings, without any consideration, whether there be any matter or no between, we call it distance: however named, or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of space, taken from objects, about which our senses have been conversant; whereof, having settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another, as often as we will, and consider the space, or distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before; or else, as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty, or pure space may be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there. But, to avoid confusion in discourses concerning this matter, it were possibly to be wished, that the name extension were applied only to matter, or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term expansion to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say space is expanded, and body extended. But in this, every one has his liberty: I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.

§ 28. THE knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, Men differ in this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, tho', in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men, who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools, or sects, they have been bred up in: tho' amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon: especially if they be learned, bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But, if it should happen, that any two thinking men, should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse, or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains, is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation: it requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connexion and dependance one upon another. Till a man doth this, in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

## C H A P. XIV.

## Of duration, and its simple modes.

§ 1. THERE is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get, not from the permanent parts of space, but from the *fleeing* and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call duration, the *fleeing extension*, the simple modes

BOOK II. modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct ideas ; as hours, days, years, &c. time and eternity.

Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.

§ 2. THE answer of a great man, to one who asked what time was, " Si non rogas, intelligo," (which amounts to this ; the more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it) might perhaps persuade one, that time, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are, not without reason, thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But, however remote these may seem from our comprehension, yet, if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge, viz. sensation, and reflection, will be able to furnish us with these ideas, as clear and distinct as many other, which are thought much less obscure ; and we shall find, that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas.

§ 3. To understand time and eternity aright, we ought with attention to consider what idea it is we have of duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one, who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas, which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas, one after another, in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession : and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. For, whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds, we know that we do exist ; and so we call the existence, or the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or any thing else commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourselves, or any such other thing, co-existing with our thinking.

§ 4. THAT we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration, but by considering the train of ideas, that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it ; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year ; of which duration of things, whilst he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him ; and the moment, wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation, and the succession of others : and we see, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But, if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration, it is because, during that time, we have no succession of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his sleep, dreams, and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another ; he hath then, during such a dreaming, a sensation of duration, and of the length of it ; by which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflection on the train of the ideas, they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings ; without which observation they can have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world.

The ideas of duration, applicable to things whilst we sleep.

§ 5. INDEED a man having, from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts, got the notion, or idea, of duration, he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think ; as he that has got the idea of extension from bodies, by his sight, or touch, can apply it to distances, where no body is seen, or felt. And therefore, tho' a man has no perception of the length of duration, which passed whilst he slept, or thought not ; yet, having observed the revolution of days and nights, and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant, he can, upon the supposition

position that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner, whilst he was asleep, or thought not, as it used to do at other times; he can, I say, imagine, and make allowance for, the length of duration, whilst he slept. But, if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the world) instead of their ordinary night's sleep, had passed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued sleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for ever left out of their account of time.

§ 6. THUS by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another, in our understandings, we get the notion of succession; which, if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses, he will, perhaps, be of my mind, when he considers that even motion produces in his mind an idea of succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas. For a man, looking upon a body really moving, perceives, yet, no motion at all, unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas: v. g. a man becalmed at sea, out of sight of land, in a fair day, may look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; tho' it be certain, that two, and, perhaps, all of them, have moved, during that time, a great way. But, as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body, as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion. But, wherever a man is with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any motion at all; if, during this hour of quiet, he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby observe and find succession where he could observe no motion.

The idea of succession not from motion.

§ 7. AND this, I think, is the reason, why motions, very slow, tho' they are constant, are not perceived by us; because, in their remove from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another: and so, not causing a constant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which, consisting in a constant succession, we cannot perceive that succession, without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it.

§ 8. ON the contrary, things that move so swift, as not to affect the senses distinctly, with several distinguishable distances of their motion, and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind, are not also perceived to move: for any thing, that moves round about in a circle, in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter, or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion.

§ 9. HENCE I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable that our ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our minds, at certain distances, not much unlike the images in the inside of a lanthorn, turned round by the heat of a candle. This appearance of theirs in train, tho', perhaps, it may be sometimes faster, and sometimes slower, yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking man. There seem to be certain bounds to the quickness, and slowness, of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds, beyond which they can neither delay, nor hasten.

The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness.

§ 10. THE reason I have for this odd conjecture, is, from observing that in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which, if exceeding quick, the sense of succession is lost, even in cases where it is evident that there is a real succession. Let a cannon-bullet pass thro' a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleshy parts of a man; it is as clear as any demonstration can be, that it must strike successively the two sides of the room: it is also evident, that it must touch one part of the flesh first; and another after, and so in succession: and yet I believe no body, who ever felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive any succession either in the pain, or sound,

**Book II.** found, of so swift a stroke. Such a part of duration, as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an instant, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the succession of another, wherein, therefore, we perceive no succession at all.

§ 11. THIS also happens, where the motion is so slow, as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses, as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds, between those offered to our senses by the moving body, there the sense of motion is lost; and the body, tho' it really moves, yet not changing perceivable distance with some other bodies, as fast as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the hands of clocks, and shadows of sun-dials, and other constant, but slow motions; where, tho' after certain intervals, we perceive by the change of distance that it hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not.

This train,  
the measure  
of other suc-  
cessions.

§ 12. So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man, is, as it were, the measure and standard of all other successions, whereof, if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two sounds, or pains, &c. take up in their succession the duration of but one idea, or else where any motion, or succession, is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickness in which they take their turns; as when any one, or more ideas, in their ordinary course, come into our mind, between those which are offered to the sight, by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion, or between sounds, or smells, following one another, there also the sense of a constant continued succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of rest between.

The mind  
cannot fix  
long on one  
invariable  
idea.

§ 13. If it be so that the ideas of our minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change and shift, in a continual succession, it would be impossible, may any one say, for a man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it be meant, that a man may have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind, without any variation at all, I think, in matter of fact, it is not possible; for which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances) I can give no other reason but experience: and I would have any one try, whether he can keep one, unvaried, single idea in his mind, without any other, for any considerable time together.

§ 14. FOR trial, let him take any figure, any degree of light, or whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind: but that some, either of another kind, or various consideration of that idea (each of which considerations is a new idea) will constantly succeed one another in his thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§ 15. ALL that is in a man's power in this case, I think, is only to mind and observe what the ideas are, that take their turns in his understanding; or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire, or use of: but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, tho' he may commonly chuse whether he will heedfully observe and consider them.

Ideas, how-  
ever made,  
include no  
sense of mo-  
tion.

§ 16. WHETHER these several ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions, I will not here dispute; but this I am sure, that they include no idea of motion, in their appearance; and, if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all: which is enough to my present purpose, and sufficiently shews, that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing there one after another, is that, which gives us the idea of succession, and duration, without which we should have no such ideas at all. It is not then motion, but the constant train of ideas in our minds, whilst we are waking, that furnishes us with the idea of duration, whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception, than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas, as I have before shewed: and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration, by the train of other ideas, succeeding one another in our minds,

minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the train of ideas, caused by the uninterrupted, sensible change of distance between two bodies, which we have from motion; and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration, were there no sense of motion at all.

§ 17. HAVING thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the mind to do, is to get some measure of this common duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order, wherein several things exist, without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused, and a great part of history be rendered very useless. This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures, or epochs, is that, I think, which, most properly, we call time.

Time is duration set out by measures.

§ 18. IN the measuring of extension, there is nothing more required but the application of the standard, or measure, we make use of, to the thing, of whose extension we would be informed. But in the measuring of duration this cannot be done, because no two different parts of succession can be put together, to measure one another: and nothing, being a measure of duration, but duration, as nothing is of extension, but extension, we cannot keep by us any standing, unvarying measure of duration, which consists in a constant fleeting succession, as we can of certain lengths of extension, as inches, feet, yards, &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time, but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions, by constantly repeated periods. What portions of duration are not distinguished, or considered as distinguished and measured by such periods, come not so properly under the notion of time, as appears by such phrases as these, viz. before all time, and when time shall be no more.

A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods.

§ 19. THE diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun, as having been, from the beginning of nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have been, with reason, made use of, for the measure of duration. But the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another: for men, in the measuring of the length of time, having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c. which they found themselves, upon any mention of time, or duration, presently to think on, all which portions of time were measured out, by the motion of those heavenly bodies; they were apt to confound time and motion, or, at least, to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another: whereas any constant, periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas, in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguished the intervals of time, as those that have been made use of. For, supposing the sun, which some have taken to be a fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of time, that it now every day comes about to the same meridian, and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the space of an annual revolution, it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again; would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it, as well without as with motion? For, if the appearances were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant periods, they would serve mankind for measure of time as well, were the motion away.

The revolutions of the sun and moon, the proper measures of time.

§ 20. FOR the freezing of water, or the blowing of a plant, returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth, would as well serve men to reckon their years by, as the motions of the sun: and, in effect, we see, that some people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons, and leaving them at others. For a fit of an ague, the sense of hunger, or thirst, a smell, or a taste, or any other idea, returning constantly at equidistant periods, and making itself universally be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the course of succession, and distinguish the distances

But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.



BOOK II. distances of time. Thus we see that men born blind count time well enough by years, whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions, that they perceive not: and, I ask, whether a blind man, who distinguished his years either by the heat of summer, or cold of winter; by the smell of any flower of the spring, or taste of any fruit of the autumn; would not have a better measure of time than the Romans had, before the reformation of their calendar by Julius Cæsar, or many other people, whose years, notwithstanding the motion of the sun, which they pretend to make use of, are very irregular? And it adds no small difficulty to chronology, that the exact length of the years that several nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another; and, I think, I may say, all of them from the precise motions of the sun. And, if the sun moved from the creation to the flood constantly in the æquator, and so equally dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, in days all of the same length, without its annual variations to the tropicks, as a late, ingenious author supposes<sup>a</sup>; I do not think it very easy to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the sun) men should, in the antediluvian world, from the beginning, count by years, or measure their time by periods, that had no sensible marks, very obvious to distinguish them by.

No two parts  
of duration  
can be cer-  
tainly  
known to be  
equal.

§ 21. BUT, perhaps, it will be said, without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such periods were equal? To which I answer, the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same way that that of days was known, or presumed to be so at first; which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas, which had passed in men's minds in the intervals: by which train of ideas discovering inequality in the natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days, or *νοχθήμερα*, were guessed to be equal, which was sufficient to make them serve for a measure. Tho' exacter search has since discovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the sun, and we know not whether the annual also be not unequal: these, yet, by their presumed and apparent equality, serve as well to reckon time by (tho' not to measure the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We must, therefore, carefully distinguish betwixt duration itself, and the measures we make use of, to judge of its length. Duration in itself is to be considered as going on in one constant, equal, uniform course: but none of the measures of it, which we make use of, can be known to do so; nor can we be assured, that their assigned parts, or periods, are equal in duration one to another; for two successive lengths of duration, however measured, can never be demonstrated to be equal. The motion of the sun, which the world used so long, and so confidently, for an exact measure of duration, has, as I said, been found in its several parts unequal: and tho' men have of late made use of a pendulum, as a more steady and regular motion than that of the sun, or (to speak more truly) of the earth; yet, if any one should be asked how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so: since we cannot be sure, that the cause of that motion, which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally; and we are sure that the medium, in which the pendulum moves, is not constantly the same: either of which varying, may alter the equality of such periods, and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by motion, as well as any other periods of other appearances; the notion of duration still remaining clear, tho' our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact. Since, then, no two portions of succession can be brought together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a measure of time, is to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods; of which seeming equality we have no other measure, but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reasons, to persuade us of their equality.

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Burnet's Theory of the earth,

§ 22. ONE thing seems strange to me, that, whilst all men manifestly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world, time yet should be defined to be the "measure of motion;" whereas it is obvious to every one, who reflects ever so little on it, that to measure motion, space is as necessary to be considered as time; and those, who look a little farther, will find also the bulk of the thing moved, necessary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will estimate or measure motion, so as to judge right of it. Nor indeed does motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration, than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas, in seeming equidistant periods. For, if the motion of the sun were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds, sometimes very slow, and at others irregularly very swift; or, if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the same appearances, it would not at all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does.

§ 23. MINUTES, hours, days and years, are then no more necessary to time, or duration, than inches, feet, yards and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extension: for tho' we, in this part of the universe, by the constant use of them, as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun, or as known parts of such periods, have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time, whose lengths we would consider; yet there may be other parts of the universe, where they no more use these measures of our's, than in Japan they do our inches, feet or miles; but yet something analogous to them there must be. For, without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure ourselves, or signify to others the length of any duration, tho' at the same time the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures, that may be made use of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be measured; no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit, alter the notion of extension to those, who make use of those different measures.

§ 25. THE mind, having once got such a measure of time, as the annual revolution of the sun, can apply that measure to duration, wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: for should one say, that Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and twelfth year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the world, tho' there were so far back no motion of the sun, nor any other motion at all. For, tho' the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the sun; yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure duration as well, as if really at that time the sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration, equal to an annual revolution of the sun, is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no sun, nor motion was, as the idea of a foot, or yard, taken from bodies, here, can be applied in our thoughts, to distances, beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.

§ 26. FOR supposing it were five thousand six hundred and thirty nine miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remotest body of the universe (for, being finite, it must be at a certain distance) as we suppose it to be five thousand six hundred and thirty nine years from this time, to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world; we can, in our thoughts, apply this measure of a year, to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies, or motion, as we can this measure of a mile to space, beyond the utmost bodies: and by the one measure duration, where there was no motion, as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts, where there is no body.

§ 27. IF it be objected to me here, that in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I should not, viz. "That the world is neither eternal, nor infinite;" I answer, that to my present purpose it is not needful, in this place,

to

BOOK II. to make use of arguments, to evince the world to be finite, both in duration and extension; but, it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary: and I doubt not but that every one, that will go about it, may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, tho' not of all duration, and so may come to a stop, and non ultra, in his consideration of motion. So also in his thoughts he may set limits to body, and the extension belonging to it, but not to space, where no body is; the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind; and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another place.

Eternity.

§ 28. BY the same means therefore, and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time, we have also that idea, which we call eternity, viz. having got the idea of succession and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, caused in us, either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts, or else caused by external objects, successively affecting our senses; and, having, from the revolutions of the sun, got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add such lengths of duration to one another, as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations past, or to come: and this we can continue to do on, without bounds, or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration, supposed before the sun's, or any other motion had its being; which is no more difficult, or absurd, than to apply the notion I have, of the moving of a shadow one hour to-day upon the sun-dial, to the duration of something last night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion, and it is as impossible for the duration of that flame, for an hour last night, to co-exist with any motion that now is, or ever shall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exist with the motion of the sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial, between the marks of two hours, I can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light, last night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exist: and it is no more than to think, that had the sun shone then on the dial, and moved after the same rate it doth now, the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hour-line to another, whilst that flame of the candle lasted.

§ 29. THE notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical, regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory, derived from my senses, or reflection; I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration, antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute, or a day, antecedent to the motion, that at this very moment the sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday: the measuring of any duration, by some motion, depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution; but the having a clear idea of the length of some periodical, known motion, or other intervals of duration, in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

§ 30. HENCE we see, that some men imagine the duration of the world, from its first existence to this present year 1689, to have been five thousand six hundred and thirty nine years, or equal to five thousand six hundred and thirty nine annual revolutions of the sun, and others a great deal more: as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted twenty three thousand years from the reign of the sun; and the Chineses now, who account the world three million, two hundred and sixty nine thousand years old, or more: which



which longer duration of the world according to their computation, tho' I should not believe to be true; yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and say one is longer than the other, as I understand that Methusalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And, if the common reckoning of five thousand, six hundred, and thirty-nine should be true (as it may be, as well as any other assign'd) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world a thousand years older, since every one may, with the same facility, imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be fifty thousand years old, as five thousand, six hundred, and thirty-nine; and may as well conceive the duration of fifty thousand years, as five thousand, six hundred, and thirty-nine. Whereby it appears, that to the measuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion, we measure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular, periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion, or appearance never co-existed.

§ 31. FOR, as in the history of the creation deliver'd by Moses, I can imagine that light exist'd three days, before the sun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of light before the sun was created, was so long as (if the sun had mov'd then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; so by the same way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels, being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or a thousand years. For, if I can but consider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more, till I come to sixty; and by the same way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. e. such or such parts of the sun's revolution, or any other period, whereof I have the idea) proceed in infinitum, and suppose a duration, exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will: which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whose infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§ 32. AND thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. reflection and sensation, we get the ideas of duration, and the measures of it.

FOR, first, by observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly, some vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of succession.

SECONDLY, by observing a distance in the parts of this succession, we get the idea of duration;

THIRDLY, by sensation observing certain appearances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths, or measures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

FOURTHLY, by being able to repeat those measures of time, our ideas of stated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exist; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years hence.

FIFTHLY, by being able to repeat any such idea of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them to one another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of eternity, as the future, eternal duration of our souls, as well as the eternity of that infinite being, which must necessarily have always exist'd.

SIXTHLY, By considering any part of infinite duration, as set out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

## C H A P. XV.

## Of duration and expansion, consider'd together.

BOOK II.

§. I.

Both capable  
of greater  
and less.

**T**H<sup>O</sup> we have, in the precedent chapters, dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration; yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple, abstract conception, to avoid confusion, I call expansion, to distinguish it from extension, which by some is used to express this distance only, as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes, or at least intimates the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word expansion to space, because space is often apply'd to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (viz. expansion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater, or less quantities: for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour, and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

Expansion  
not bounded  
by matter;

§ 2. **T**HE mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a span, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been said, repeat that idea; and so adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two spans, or two paces; and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to the distance of the sun, or remotest star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in, or without body. 'Tis true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of solid extension; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find, nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unless he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts, when he says, "heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee:" and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself, that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exists, or imagine any expansion where he is not.

Nor dura-  
tion by mo-  
tion.

§ 3. **J**UST so is it in duration. The mind having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one easily admits, that tho' we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason, why any one should doubt, that he likewise fills immensity? His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter, to say, where there is no body, there is nothing.

Why men  
more easily  
admit infi-  
nite dura-  
tion, than  
infinite ex-  
pansion.

§ 4. **H**ENCE, I think, we may learn the reason why every one familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of, and supposes eternity, and sticks not to ascribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and reserve, that many admit, or suppose the infinity of space. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, that duration and extension being used as names of affections, belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so: but not attributing to him extension, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without

without matter; of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute. And therefore, when men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body; as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or, if their ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary space; as if it were nothing, because there is no body existing in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary; because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And, if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occasion to think, by the name duration, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute, anatomical parts of matter, is little different from hardness) were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words, so near of kin as *durare* and *durum esse*. And that *durare* is apply'd to the idea of hardness, as well as that of existence, we see in Horace, *epod. xvi.* "*ferro duravit sæcula.*" But, be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out, beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space, or expansion; the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body, and all other things: which may (to those who please) be a subject of farther meditation.

§ 5. TIME in general is to duration, as place to expansion. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity, and immensity, as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by land-marks; and so are made use of to denote the position of finite, real beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform, infinite oceans of duration and space. These, rightly consider'd, are only ideas of determinate distances, from certain known points, fixed in distinguishable sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from another. From such points, fixed in sensible beings, we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities; which, so considered, are that which we call time and place. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and position of things, without such known settled points, would be lost in them, and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion.

§ 6. TIME and place taken thus for determinate, distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration, set out, or supposed to be distinguished from the rest by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptance.

FIRST, time in general, is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration, as is measured out by, and co-existent with the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know any of them: and in this sense, time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world, as in these phrases before-mentioned, before all time, or when time shall be no more: place likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space, which is possessed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion; tho' this may more properly be called extension, than place. Within these two are confined, and by the observable parts of them are measur'd and determin'd the particular time, or duration, and the particular extension and place of all corporeal beings.

§ 7. SECONDLY, sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense, and is apply'd to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really distinguish'd, and measur'd out, by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies, that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years, and are accordingly our measures of time; but such other portions too, of that infinite, uniform duration, which we, upon any occasion, do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time; and so consider them as bounded, and determined. For, if we should suppose the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly

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Time to duration, is as place to expansion.

Time and place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the existence and motion of bodies.

Sometimes for so much of either, as we design by measures, taken from the bulk, or motion of bodies.

BOOK II.

perly enough, and should be understood, if we said, 'tis a longer time since the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by seven hundred, and sixty-four years: whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguish'd duration, as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted seven hundred, and sixty-four annual revolutions of the sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of place, distance, or bulk in the great inane, beyond the confines of the world, when we consider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive a body, of any assign'd dimensions, as a cubick-foot; or do suppose a point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the universe.

They belong  
to all beings.

§ 8. WHERE and When are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckon'd from some known parts of this sensible world, and from some certain epochs mark'd out to us by the motions observable in it. Without some such fix'd parts, or periods, the order of things would be lost to our finite understandings, in the boundless, invariable oceans of duration and expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the deity. And therefore, we are apt not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible being. But, when apply'd to any particular, finite beings, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space, as the bulk of that body takes up. And place is the position of any body, when consider'd at a certain distance from some other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing; so the time, when the thing existed, is the idea of that space of duration, which pass'd between some known and fix'd period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shews the distance of the extremities of the bulk, or existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square, or lasted two years; the other shews the distance of it in place, or existence, from other fix'd points of space, or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincoln's-inn-fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671. or the 1000th year of the Julian period: all which distances we measure, by preconceiv'd ideas of certain lengths of space and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.

All the parts  
of extension,  
are extension;  
and all the parts  
of duration,  
are duration.

§ 9. THERE is one thing more, wherein space and duration have a great conformity; and that is, tho' they are justly reckon'd amongst our simple ideas, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either, is without all manner of composition<sup>a</sup>; it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other idea hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension or duration, as excluded divisibility,

<sup>a</sup> It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if space consists of parts, as it is confess'd in this place, he should not have reckon'd it in the number of simple ideas; because it seems to be inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, that a simple idea is uncompos'd, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception of the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas. 'Tis farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the second chapter of the second book, where he begins to speak of simple ideas, an exact definition of what he understands by the word simple ideas. To these difficulties Mr. Locke answers thus: to begin with the last, he declares, that he has not treated this subject in an order perfectly scholastick, having not had much familiarity with those sort of books, during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method, in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions, regularly placed at the beginning of each new subject. Mr. Locke contents himself to employ the principal terms that he uses, so, that from his use of them the reader may easily comprehend what he means by them. But, with respect to the term simple idea, he has had the good luck to define that, in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reason to supply that defect. The question then is to know, whether the idea of extension agrees with this definition: which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the sense, which Mr. Locke had principally in his view; for that composition which he design'd to exclude in that definition, was a composition of different ideas in the mind, and not a composition of the same kind in a thing whose essence consists in having parts of the same kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this composition. So that if the idea of extension consists in having partes extra partes

visibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit, or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. But, since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts; instead thereof it makes use of the common measures, which by familiar use, in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parasangs; and so seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration :) the mind makes use, I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occasion, makes, by the addition of such known lengths, which it is acquainted with. On the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either, is look'd on as an unit in number, when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions. Tho' on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big, or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused; and it is the number of its repeated additions, or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to any one, who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration, is duration too; and every part of extension, is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But the least portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space, extension, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolv'd. Such a small part in duration may be call'd a moment, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train of their ordinary succession there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allow'd to call a sensible point, meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space, we can discern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the center.

§ 10. EXPANSION and duration have this farther agreement, that tho' they are both consider'd by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, no, not even in thought: tho' the parts of bodies, from whence we take our measure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the succession of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.

§ 11. BUT yet there is this manifest difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expansion, are turn'd every way, and so make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but as it were the length of one straight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever,

partes (as the schools speak) 'tis always, in the sense of Mr. Locke, a simple idea; because the idea, of having partes extra partes, cannot be resolv'd into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with respect to the nature of extension, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be seen in § 9. chap. xv. of the second book, where he says, that "the least portion of space, or extension, whereof we have a clear and distinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be consider'd by us, as a simple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space and extension are made up." So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a simple idea, since it is the least idea of space, that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any less, whereof it has in itself any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one simple idea; and that is sufficient to take away this objection: for it is not the design of Mr. Locke, in this place, to discourse of any thing, but concerning the ideas of the mind. But if this is not sufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extension is so peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the definition, that he has given of those simple ideas, so that it differs in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expos'd to this difficulty, than to make a new division in his favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be understood. 'Tis very common to observe intelligible discourses spoil'd by too much subtilty in nice divisions. We ought to put things together, as well as we can, doctrinae causa; but after all, several things will not be bundled up together, under our terms, and ways of speaking.

Z

wherein

BOOK II. wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the same moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this in respect of expansion, is beyond my comprehension: and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings; 'tis near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion; as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration: and therefore, what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know, is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of its solid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space, whilst it remains there.

Duration has never two parts together, expansion all together.

§ 12. DURATION, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in succession; as expansion is the idea of lasting distance, all whose parts exist together, and are not capable of succession. And therefore, tho' we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any being does now exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends not in his knowledge, or power, all past and future things: his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past, he can never recal: and what is yet to come, he cannot make present. What I say of man, I say of all finite beings; who tho' they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of any magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompany'd with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his knowledge, no farther remov'd from his sight, than the present: they all lie under the same view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For, the existence of all things depending upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude, expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great variety we do, or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther speculation.

## C H A P. XVI.

### Of number.

CHAP. § 1.  
XVI.

Number, the simplest and most universal idea.

**A**MONGST all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple than that of unity, or one. It has no shadow of variety, or composition in it; every object our senses are employed about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And, therefore, it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most universal idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be imagined.

Its modes made by addition.

§ 2. By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus, by adding one

one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen; and of a score, or a million, or any other number.

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§ 3. THE simple modes of number are, of all other, the most distinct; every the least variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different, from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote: two being as distinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not so easy, nor, perhaps, possible for us, to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which, yet, are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension?

Each mode distinct.

§ 4. THE clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate in their application. Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable, than in extension, where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed, or measured; because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness, beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and, therefore, the quantity, or proportion, of any the least excess cannot be discovered: which is clear otherwise in number, where, as has been said, ninety-one is as distinguishable from ninety, as from nine thousand, tho' ninety-one be the next immediate excess to ninety. But it is not so in extension, where whatsoever is more than just a foot, or an inch, is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot, or an inch; and in lines, which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other, by innumerable parts; nor can any one assign an angle, which shall be the next biggest to a right one.

Therefore demonstrations in numbers, the most precise.

§ 5. BY the repeating, as has been said, of the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name to it, may count, or have ideas for several collections of units, distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers, and a memory to retain that series, with their several names: all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new, or distinct name, or sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distinguish it from every smaller, or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his tale, taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression; and so again, by abstracting an unit from each collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the ideas of numbers, within the compass of his language, or for which he hath names, tho' not, perhaps, of more. For the several simple modes of numbers, being in our minds but so many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference, but more or less, names or marks, for each distinct combination, seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For, without such names, or marks, we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together, without a name, or mark, to distinguish that precise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.

Names necessary to numbers.

§ 6. THIS I think to be the reason, why some Americans I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means, count to one thousand; nor had any distinct idea of that number, tho' they could reckon very well to twenty. Because their language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessities of a needy, simple life, unacquainted either with trade, or mathematicks, had no words in it to stand

BOOK II. stand for a thousand; so that, when they were discoursed with, of those greater numbers, they would shew the hairs of their head, to express a great multitude, which they could not number: which inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above five; any number beyond that, they made out by shewing their fingers, and the fingers of others who were present\*. And I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or, at most, four and twenty decimal progressions, without confusion. But to shew how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having useful ideas of numbers, let us set all these following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number; v. g.

nonillions. octillions. septillions. sextillions. quintillions. quartillions. trillions. billions. millions. units.  
857324. 162486. 345896. 437916. 423147. 248106. 235421. 261734. 368149. 623137.

THE ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the second fix figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number: but, whether, by giving every fix figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and, perhaps, a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered. This I mention, only to shew how necessary distinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

Why children number not earlier.

§ 7. THUS children, either for want of names, to mark the several progressions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning; do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far, or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas: and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well; and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell twenty. And some, thro' the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, with their names annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependance of so long a train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their life-time to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For he that will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before, with the distinct name, or sign, of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one from another, only by the addition, or subtraction, of one unit. 2. That it retains in memory the names, or marks, of the several combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order, that the numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.

Number measures all measurables.

§ 8. THIS farther is observable in number, that it is that which the mind makes use of, in measuring all things, that by us are measurable, which principally are expansion and duration; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of eternity, and immensity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity of number, in which we can come to no end of addition? For such an inexhaustible stock,

\* Historie d'un voyage, fait en la terre du Brasil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20. 434.

number,



number, of all other our ideas, most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases, this multitude, how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number, where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endless addition, or addibility (if any one like the word better) of numbers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.

CHAP.  
XVI.

## C H A P. XVII.

### Of infinity.

§ 1. **H**E, that would know what kind of idea it is, to which we give the name of infinity, cannot do it better, than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed, and then how the mind comes to frame it.

CHAP.  
XVII.

FINITE and infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase, or diminution, by the addition, or subtraction, of any the least part: and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number, which we have considered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite: but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes, which are properly inexhaustible, and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity, but what carries with it some reflection on, and intimation of that number, or extent, of the acts, or objects, of God's power, wisdom, and goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts, as far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all possible perfection: but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our ideas of their infinity.

Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to space, duration, and number.

§ 2. FINITE then, and infinite, being by the mind look'd on as modifications of expansion and duration, the next thing to be considered, is, how the mind comes by them. As for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of extension, that affect our senses, carry with them into the mind the idea of finite: and the ordinary periods of succession, whereby we measure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless ideas of eternity and immensity; since the objects, which we converse with, come so much short of any approach, or proportion, to that largeness.

The idea of finite easily got.

§ 3. EVERY one, that has any idea of any stated lengths of space, as a foot, finds that he can repeat that idea; and joining it to the former, make the idea of two feet; and by the addition of a third, three feet; and so on; without ever coming to an end of his additions, whether of the same idea of a foot, or, if he pleases, of doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth, or of the orbis magnus: for whichever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds that, after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition, than he was at first setting out. The power

How we come by the idea of infinity.

BOOK II. of enlarging his idea of space, by farther additions, remaining still the same, he hence takes the idea of infinite space.

Our idea of space boundless.

§ 4. THIS, I think, is the way, whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite space. 'Tis a quite different consideration, to examine, whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually existing, since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things; but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think, that space in itself is actually boundless; to which imagination, the idea of space, or expansion, of itself, naturally leads us. For it being considered by us, either as the extension of body, or as existing by itself, without any solid matter taking it up, (for of such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the motion of body, its necessary existence) it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find, or suppose, any end of it, or be stopped any where, in its progress in this space, how far soever it extends its thoughts. Any bounds made with body, even adamant walls, are so far from putting a stop to the mind, in its farther progress, in space and extension, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it; for so far as that body reaches, so far no one can doubt of extension: and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body, what is there that can there put a stop, and satisfy the mind, that it is at the end of space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For, if it be necessary for the motion of body, that there should be an empty space, tho' ever so little, here amongst bodies; and if it be possible for body to move in, or thro' that empty space; nay, it is impossible for any particle of matter to move, but into an empty space: the same possibility of a body's moving into a void space, beyond the utmost bounds of body, as well as into a void space interpersed amongst bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the idea of empty pure space, whether within, or beyond, the confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in nature, tho' in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself, by any thought, either amongst, or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of space no-where find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

And so of duration.

§ 5. As by the power we find in ourselves of repeating, as often as we will, any idea of space, we get the idea of immensity; so by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds, with all the endless addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity. For we find in ourselves, we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas, than we can come to the end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again it is another question, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know, whether there were any real being, whose duration has been eternal. And as to this, I say, he that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed to some other considerations of our idea of infinity.

Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.

§ 6. If it be so, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves, of repeating without end our own ideas; it may be demanded, "why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas, as well as those of space and duration?" since they may be as easily, and as often repeated in our minds, as the other: and yet no body ever thinks of infinite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, tho' he can repeat the idea of sweet, or white, as frequently as those of a yard, or a day. To which I answer: all the ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase, by the addition of any equal, or less parts, afford us, by their repetition, the idea of infinity; because, with this endless repetition, there is continued an enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other ideas it is not so; for to the largest idea of extension, or duration, that I at present have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but to the perfectest idea I have of the whitest whiteness, if I add another of a less,

or

or equal whiteness (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the idea) it makes no increase, and enlarges not my idea at all: and therefore the different ideas of whiteness, &c. are called degrees. For those ideas that consist of parts, are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part; but, if you take the idea of white, which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to your sight, and another idea of white from another parcel of snow you see to-day, and put them together in your mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased; and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those ideas that consist not of parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses; but space, duration, and number, being capable of increase by repetition, leave in the mind an idea of an endless room for more: nor can we conceive any where a stop to a farther addition, or progression, and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.

§ 7. THO' our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases; yet, I guess, we cause great confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse, or reason, about an infinite quantity, viz. an infinite space, or an infinite duration. For, our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless growing idea, but the idea of any quantity the mind has, being, at that time, terminated in that idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk; and, therefore, I think, it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite: the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space, which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

Difference  
between in-  
finity of  
space, and  
space infi-  
nite.

§ 8. THIS, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number. Whatsoever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space, duration, or number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but, when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought, without ever completing the idea, there we have our idea of infinity, which, tho' it seems to be pretty clear, when we consider nothing else in it but the negation of an end, yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space, or duration, that idea is very obscure and confused, because it is made up of two parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space, or number, as great as he will; it is plain the mind rests and terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a supposed endless progression. And, therefore, I think it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue and reason about infinite space, or duration, &c. because the parts of such an idea not being perceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one side, or other, always perplexes whatever consequences we draw from the other; as an idea of motion not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such an idea, which is not better than an idea of motion at rest: and such another seems to me to be the idea of a space, or (which is the same thing) a number infinite, i. e. of a space, or number, which the mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a space, or number, which, in a constant and endless enlarging and progression, it can, in thought

We have no  
idea of in-  
finite space.

never

## BOOK II.

never attain to. For how large soever an idea of space I have in my mind, it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it, tho' I be capable the next instant to double it, and so on in infinitum: for that alone is infinite, which has no bounds; and that the idea of infinity, in which our thoughts can find none.

Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.

§ 9. BUT of all other ideas, it is number, as I have said, which, I think, furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions of millions of miles, or years, which are so many distinct ideas, kept best by number from running into a confused heap, wherein the mind loses itself; and when it has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleases, of known lengths of space, or duration, the clearest idea it can get of infinity, is the confus'd, incomprehensible remainder of endless, addible numbers, which affords no prospect of stop, or boundary.

Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expansion.

§ 10. IT will perhaps give us a little farther light, into the idea we have of infinity, and discover to us that it is nothing but the infinity of number, apply'd to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas, if we consider, that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence, that in number we are at one end as it were: for there being in number nothing less than an unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of number, we can set no bounds: and so it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards, beyond all that we can conceive; but in space, and duration, it is otherwise. For in duration we consider it, as if this line of number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else, but the turning this infinity of number both ways, à parte ante, and à parte post, as they speak. For when we would consider eternity, à parte ante, what do we but, beginning from our selves and the present time we are in, repeat in our minds the ideas of years, or ages, or any other assignable portion of duration past, with a prospect of proceeding in such addition, with all the infinity of number? And, when we would consider eternity, à parte post, we just after the same rate begin from our selves, and reckon by multiply'd periods yet to come, still extending that line of number, as before. And these two being put together, are that infinite duration we call eternity; which, as we turn our view either way forwards or backwards, appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite end of number, i. e. the power still of adding more.

§ 11. THE same happens also in space, wherein, conceiving ourselves to be as it were in the center, we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number; and reckoning any way from ourselves, a yard, mile, diameter of the earth, or orbis magnus, by the infinity of number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas than we have to set bounds to number, we have that indeterminable idea of immensity.

Infinite divisibility.

§ 12. AND since, in any bulk of matter, our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost divisibility, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also, in that which has the infinity also of number; but with this difference, that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration, we only use addition of numbers; whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind also can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the former additions, it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers: tho' in the addition of the one, we can have no more the positive idea of a space, infinitely great, than in the division of the other, we can have the idea of a body infinitely little; our idea of infinity being, as I may so say, a growing and fugitive idea, still in a boundless progression, that can stop no where.

§ 13. THO'

§ 13. THO' it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has the positive idea of an actual, infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like also being in the infinity of space and duration, which power leaves always to the mind room for endless additions; yet there be those, who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite, to ask him that has it, "whether he could add to it or no?" which would easily shew the mistake of such a positive idea. We can, I think, have no positive idea of any space, or duration, which is not made up of, and commensurate to repeated numbers of feet, or yards, or days, and years, which are the common measures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities. And therefore, since an idea of infinite space, or duration, must needs be made up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than that of number, capable still of farther addition, but not an actual, positive idea of a number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we have the positive ideas) can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite, than as number does; which, consisting of additions of finite units one to another, suggests the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression.

§ 14. THEY who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive, seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation of it is positive. He that considers that the end is, in body, but the extremity or superficies of that body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black, or white, will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure negation. Nor is it, when apply'd to duration, the bare negation of existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence, I am sure they cannot deny but that the beginning is the first instant of being, and is not by any body conceiv'd to be a bare negation; and therefore by their own argument, the idea of eternal, à parte ante, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.

§ 15. THE idea of infinite has, I confess, something of positive, in all those things we apply it to. When we would think of infinite space, or duration, we at first step usually make some very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which possibly we double, and multiply, several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space, or duration. But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a positive distinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the sea; where having let down a large portion of his sounding-line, he reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms, and more; but how much that more is, he hath no distinct notion at all: and could he always supply new line, and find the plummet always sink, without ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind, reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity. In which case let this line be ten, or ten thousand fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confus'd and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea of: but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. So much space, as the mind takes a view of, in its contemplation of greatness, is a clear picture and positive in the understanding: but infinite is still greater.

1. Then, the idea of so much, is positive and clear.
2. The idea of greater is also clear, but it is but a comparative idea.
3. The idea of so much greater, as cannot be comprehended; and this is plainly negative, not positive.

Book II. he has no positive, clear idea of the largeness of any extension (which is that sought for, in the idea of infinite) that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it: and such no body, I think, pretends to in what is infinite. For to say a man has a positive, clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, he has the positive, clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea-shore, who knows not how many they be; but only that they are more than twenty. For just such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space, or duration, who says, it is larger than the extent, or duration of ten, a hundred, or a thousand, or any other number of miles, or years, whereof he has, or can have a positive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity, lies in obscurity; and has the undeterminate confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do, nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: and that cannot but be very far from a positive, complete idea, wherein the greatest part, of what I would comprehend, is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater: for to say, that having, in any quantity, measur'd so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at an end, is only to say, that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity, is in other words, only to say, that it is bigger: and a total negation of an end, is but the carrying this bigger still with you, in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity; and adding this idea of still greater to all the ideas you have, or can be suppos'd to have, of quantity. Now, whether such an idea, as that, be positive, I leave any one to consider.

We have no positive idea of an infinite duration.

§ 16. I ASK those, who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it succession, or not? If it does not, they ought to shew the difference of their notion of duration, when apply'd to an eternal being, and to a finite: since perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point; and acknowledge, that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If to avoid succession in eternal existence, they recur to the punctum stans of the schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter, help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession. Besides that punctum stans, if it signify any thing, being not quantum, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has, or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number; I leave him to consider, till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it, a little too scanty for positive infinity.

§ 17. I THINK it unavoidable, for every considering rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other existence, to have the notion of an eternal, wise being, who had no beginning: and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have. But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a positive thing, scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity; which, whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to, I confess myself at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

No positive idea of infinite space.

§ 18. HE that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space, will, when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest, than he has of the least space. For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea. All our positive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; tho' our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no bounds; for that which remains, either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have, lies

lies in obscurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminishing the other, without ceasing. A pebble and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility, as the acutest thought of a mathematician: and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out infinite space, as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a positive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind, and so can frame one of  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$ ,  $\frac{1}{8}$ , and so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little; but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce. What remains of smallness, is as far from his thoughts as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness, which is consequent to infinite divisibility.

§ 19. EVERY one that looks towards infinity, does, as I have said, at first glance make some very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be space or duration; and possibly he wears his thoughts, by multiplying in his mind that first large idea: but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive, clear idea, of what remains to make up a positive infinite, than the country-fellow had of the water, which was yet to come and pass the channel of the river where he stood:

*Rusticus expectat dum transcat amnis; at ille  
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*

§ 20. THERE are some I have met with, that put so much difference between infinite duration and infinite space, that they persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of eternity; but that they have not, nor can have, any idea of infinite space. The reason of which mistake I suppose to be this, that finding, by a due contemplation of causes and effects, that it is necessary to admit some eternal being, and so to consider the real existence of that being, as taking up and commensurate to their idea of eternity; but, on the other side, not finding it necessary; but on the contrary, apparently absurd, that body should be infinite; they forwardly conclude, they can have no idea of infinite space, because they can have no idea of infinite matter. Which consequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; because the existence of matter is no ways necessary to the existence of space, no more than the existence of motion, or the sun, is necessary to duration, tho' duration uses to be measured by it: and I doubt not but a man may have the idea of ten thousand miles square, without any body so big, as well as the idea of ten thousand years, without any body so old. It seems as easy to me, to have the idea of space, empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a bushel, without corn, or the hollow of a nutshel, without a kernel in it: it being no more necessary that there should be existing a solid body, infinitely extended, because we have an idea of the infinity of space, than it is necessary that the world should be eternal, because we have an idea of infinite duration. And why should we think our idea of infinite space requires the real existence of matter to support it, when we find, that we have as clear an idea of infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration past? Tho', I suppose, no body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has existed in that future duration. Nor is it possible to join our idea of future duration, with present or past existence, any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, to be the same; or bring ages past and future together, and make them contemporary. But, if these men are of the mind, that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration, than of infinite space; because it is past doubt, that God has existed from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space: yet those philosophers, who are of opinion, that infinite space is possess'd by God's infinite omnipresence, as well as infinite duration by his eternal existence, must be allow'd to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of infinite duration; tho' neither of them, I think, has any positive idea of infinity in either case. For whatsoever positive ideas a man has in his mind, of any quantity, he can repeat

What is positive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.

Some think they have a positive idea of eternity, and not of infinite space.



BOOK II. *peat it, and add it to the former, as easily as he can add together the ideas of two days, or two paces; which are positive ideas of lengths he has in his mind, and so on, as long as he pleases: whereby, if a man had a positive idea of infinite, either duration, or space, he could add two infinities together; nay, make one infinite infinitely bigger than another: absurdities too gross to be confuted!*

Supposed positive ideas of infinity, cause of mistakes.

§ 21. BUT yet, after all this, there being men, who persuade themselves that they have clear, positive, comprehensive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege: and I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable difficulties, which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities. For whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space, or duration, as if they had as compleat and positive ideas of them, as they have of the names they use for them, or as they have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate quantity: it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing, they discourse of, or reason about, leads them into perplexities and contradictions; and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be surveyed and managed by them.

All these ideas from sensation and reflection.

§ 22. IF I have dwelt pretty long on the considerations of duration, space, and number, and what arises from the contemplation of them, infinity; it is possibly no more than the matter requires, there being few simple ideas, whose modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men than these do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude; it suffices to my design, to shew how the mind receives them, such as they are, from sensation and reflection; and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense, or operation of our mind, has nevertheless, as all our other ideas, its original there. Some mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themselves, as well as all other men, got the first ideas, which they had of infinity, from sensation and reflection, in the method we have here set down.

## C H A P. XVIII.

### Of other simple modes.

Modes of motion.

§ 1. **T**HO' I have in the foregoing chapters shewn, how, from simple ideas, taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself, even to infinity; which, however, it may, of all others, seem most remote from any sensible perception; yet, at last, hath nothing in it, but what is made out of simple ideas, received into the mind by the senses, and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas: tho', I say, these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation, and suffice to shew how the mind comes by them; yet I shall, for method's sake, tho' briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex ideas.

§ 2. To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no sooner heard, but every one, who understands English, has presently in his mind distinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion. Modes of motion answer those of extension: swift and slow are two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the distances of time, and space, put together; so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion.

§ 3. THE like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of sound: by which we see, that from the sense of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number. Sounds also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes, of different length, put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a musician may have in his mind, when he hears, or makes, no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds so put together silently in his own fancy.

§ 4. THOSE of colours are also very various: some we take notice of, as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, shades of the same colour. But since we very seldom make assemblages of colours, either for use, or delight, but figure is taken in also, and has its part in it; as in painting, weaving, needle-works, &c. those which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour; such as beauty, rainbow, &c.

Modes of  
colours.

§ 5. ALL compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses. But they being such as generally we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing; and, therefore, must be left without enumeration to the thoughts, and experience of my reader.

Modes of  
taste.

§ 6. IN general it may be observed, that those simple modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea, tho' they are in themselves, many of them, very distinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no distinct names, nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men have neglected these modes, and given no names to them, as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them; or because, when they were so distinguished, that knowledge would not be of general, or necessary use, I leave it to the thoughts of others: it is sufficient to my purpose to shew, that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection; and that, when the mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex ideas. But tho' white, red, or sweet, &c. have not been modified, or made into complex ideas, by several combinations so as to be named, and thereby ranked into species; yet some others of the simple ideas, viz. those of unity, duration, motion, &c. above instanced in, as also power and thinking, have been thus modified, to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them.

Some simple  
modes have  
no names.

§ 7. THE reason whereof, I suppose, has been this, that the great concernment of men being with men, one amongst another, the knowledge of men and their actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary; and, therefore, they made ideas of actions, very nicely modified, and gave those complex ideas, names, that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions; and that the things, they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men, in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another) is evident in the names, which in several arts have been found out, and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions, belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction, or discourse, about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men, not conversant about these operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the same language, are not understood: v. g. colf hire, drilling, filtration, cohobation, are words standing for certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any, but those few, whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts, those names of them are not generally understood, but by smiths and chymists; who having framed the complex ideas, which these words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hear-

Why some  
modes have,  
and others  
have not  
names.

BOOK II. ing of these names in communication, readily conceive those ideas in their minds; as by cohobation all the simple ideas of distilling, and the pouring the liquor distilled from any thing back upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see, that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names; and of modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of, in the affairs and converse of men; they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

## C H A P. XIX.

## Of the modes of thinking.

## CHAP. § I. XIX.

Sensation,  
remem-  
brance, con-  
templation,  
&c.

WHEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding, by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs, without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation. When ideas float in our mind, without any reflection, or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it. When the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas, succeeding one another, in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention. When the mind, with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off, by the ordinary sollicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention, or study: sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these: and dreaming itself, is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects, with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion, nor under any choice, or conduct, of the understanding at all. And whether that, which we call extasy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§ 2. THESE are some few instances of those various modes of thinking, which the mind may observe in itself, and so have as distinct ideas of, as it hath of white, and red, a square, or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, which are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It suffices to my present purpose to have shewn here, by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially, since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

The various  
attention of  
the mind in  
thinking.

§ 3. BUT, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some, or other, always present, in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, tho' the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides, remarks their

their relations and circumstances, and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses, which, at another season, would produce very sensible perceptions: at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no impression.

§ 4. THIS difference of intention, and remission of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study, and very near minding nothing at all; every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses; and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking: but in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming; and last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation, without difficulty, leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes, even in a waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and, at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact, and constant experience, I ask, whether it be not probable, that thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul? since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission, but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.

CHAP.  
XIX.

## C H A P. XX.

### Of modes of pleasure and pain.

§ 1. AMONGST the simple ideas, which we receive, both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For, as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain, or pleasure; so the thought, or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them, is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For to define them by the presence of good, or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to, or considered by us.

CHAP.  
XX.

Pleasure and  
pain simple  
ideas.

§ 2. THINGS then are good, or evil, only in reference to pleasure, or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause, or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce, or increase, any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body, or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; tho', in truth, they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts in the mind.

Good and  
evil, what.

§ 3. PLEA-

BOOK II. place in those respects: tho' their distance from some other things, which, in this matter, we did not consider, being varied, they have, undoubtedly, changed place in that respect, and we our selves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

§ 9. BUT this modification of distance, we call place, being made by men, for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation; men consider and determine of this place, by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their present purpose, without considering other things, which, to another purpose, would better determine the place of the same thing. Thus, in the chess-board, the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man, being determined only within that chequered piece of wood; it would cross that purpose, to measure it by any thing else: but, when these very chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place, by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the chess-board; there being another use of designing the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chess-board, and so must be determined by other bodies. So, if any one should ask, in what place are the verses, which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by saying they were in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right designation of the place would be, by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper answer would be, that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his *Æneids*; and that they have been always constantly in the same place, ever since Virgil was printed: which is true, tho' the book itself hath moved a thousand times; the use of the idea of place here, being to know only in what part of the book that story is, that so, upon occasion, we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§ 10. THAT our idea of place is nothing else, but such a relative position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, tho' we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform space, or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say, that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist: this, tho' a phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind clearly and distinctly the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves, or stands still, in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space: tho' it be true, that the word place has, sometimes, a more confused sense, and stands for that space which any body takes up; and so the universe is in a place. The idea, therefore, of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular, limited consideration) viz. by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension, or distance.

Extension  
and body,  
not the same.

§ 11. THERE are some, that would persuade us, that body and extension are the same thing; who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful, or insignificant terms. If, therefore, they mean by body, and extension, the same that other people do, viz. by body, something, that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different ways; and by extension, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid, coherent parts, and which is possessed by them; they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet-colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet-colour exist without extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others as necessary to their existence, or conception,

ception, which, yet, are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion: space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion upon impulse. And, if it be a reason to prove, that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it: space and solidity being as distinct ideas, as thinking and extension, and as wholly separable in the mind one from another. Body, then, and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,

§ 12. FIRST, Extension includes no solidity, nor resistance to the motion of body, as body does.

§ 13. SECONDLY, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where, before, there was a continuity: and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where, before, there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done, in things considered by the mind, as capable of being separated; and, by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: but neither of these ways of separation, whether real, or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.

It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space, as is answerable, or commensurate, to a foot, without considering the rest; which is, indeed, a partial consideration, but not so much as a mental separation, or division: since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies, separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun, without its heat; or mobility in body without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.

§ 14. THIRDLY, The parts of pure space are immoveable, which follows from their inseparability; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable; which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immoveable, and without resistance to the motion of body.

§ 15. If any one ask me, what this space, I speak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, that extension is extension: for what am I the better informed in the nature of extension, when I am told, that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts; as if one asking, what a fibre was? I should answer him, that it was a thing made up of several fibres: would he hereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was, better than he did before? Or, rather, would he not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

§ 16. THOSE who contend that space and body are the same, bring this dilemma: either this space is something, or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch: if it be allowed to be something, they ask, whether it be body, or spirit? To which I answer, by another question, who told them, that there was, or could be nothing but solid beings, which could

The definition of extension, explains it not.

Division of beings into bodies and spirits, proves not space and body the same.

BOOK II. not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and spirit.

Substance  
which we  
know not,  
no proof  
against space  
without  
body.

§ 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space, void of body, be substance, or accident? I shall readily answer, I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear distinct idea of substance.

§ 18. I ENDEAVOUR, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance, to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, substance, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible God, to finite spirit, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will not thence follow, that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ any otherwise, than in a bare different modification of that substance; as a tree and a pebble being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter: which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirits, and matter, in three different significations; and that it stands for one idea, when God is said to be a substance; for another, when the soul is called substance; and for a third, when a body is called so: if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or, at least, to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors, that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that, in ordinary use, it has scarce one clear distinct signification: and if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

Substance  
and acci-  
dents, of  
little use in  
philosophy.

§ 19. THEY who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word substance to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. And he, that enquired, might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher, that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth; as we take it for a sufficient answer, and good doctrine, from our European philosophers, that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents. So that of substance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§ 20. WHATEVER a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who enquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if, desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told, that a pillar was a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told, that all learned books consisted of paper and letter, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper; but were the Latin words *inhærentia* and *substantia* put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called sticking on, and underpropping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.

§ 21. BUT



§ 21. BUT to return to our idea of space. If body be not supposed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would ask, whether if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm, where there was before space without body; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be space between them without body. If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him :) And then I ask, whether that, which hinders his hand from moving outwards, be substance or accident, something or nothing? And, when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as good, that where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies) a body put into motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch: for pure space between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact; but bare space in the way, is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own that they think body infinite, tho' they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that space is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space, more than he can to duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: and, therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

CHAP.  
XIII.

A vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of body.

§ 22. FARTHER, those, who assert the impossibility of space existing without matter, must not only make body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that God can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this book, or the body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum: for it is evident that the space, that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body, will still remain, and be a space without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall of adamant, and in that state make it a perfect impossibility, for any other body to get into that space. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter, into the place, from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude; which will therefore need some better proof than a supposed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out: our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connection between space and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for, or against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinct ideas of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extension, void of solidity, tho' they deny its existence; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they, who so much alter the signification of words, as to call extension body, and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension, without solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they speak of vacuum, since it is impossible for extension to be without extension. For vacuum, whether we affirm, or deny its existence, signifies space without body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any particle of it.

The power of annihilation proves a vacuum.

§ 23. BUT not to go so far, as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe, nor appeal to God's omnipotency, to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seems to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts, to move up and down freely every way, within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as

The Motion proves a vacuum.

big

BOOK II. big as the least part, into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided, is as big as a mustard-feed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-feed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body, within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 times less than a mustard-feed, there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000th part of a mustard-feed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on in infinitum. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For, if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body; and makes as great a difference between space and body, as if it were μέγα χῶμα, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to  $\frac{1}{10}$  or  $\frac{1}{1000}$  of it; the same consequence will always follow, of space without matter.

The ideas of space and body distinct.

§ 24. BUT the question being here, "whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of the body," it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a vacuum, or no. For, if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence: and, if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.

Extension being inseparable from body, proves it not the same.

§ 25. IT is true the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible and most tangible qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external objects, without taking in impressions of extension too. This readiness of extension, to make itself be taken notice of, so constantly, with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, (the busiest of all our senses) so filled with the idea of extension, and as it were wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being, only from their narrow and gross imaginations: but having here to do only with those, who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension; I shall desire them to consider, that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on those of sight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extension at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.

§ 26. IF those ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things, which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any object of sensation, or reflection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shewn sufficiently.

Ideas of space and solidity distinct.

§ 27. TO conclude, whatever men shall think, concerning the existence of a vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of space, distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas, and we can as easily conceive space, without solidity, as we can conceive body, or space, without motion; tho' it be ever so certain, that neither body, nor motion, can exist without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a relation, resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the

words

words of the most knowing king Solomon, "The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee;" or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, "In him we live, move, and have our being;" are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of body. For, whether we consider in matter itself, the distance of its coherent, solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, extension; or whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any body, in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or else, considering it as lying between any two bodies, or positive beings, without any consideration, whether there be any matter or no between, we call it distance: however named, or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of space, taken from objects, about which our senses have been conversant; whereof, having settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another, as often as we will, and consider the space, or distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before; or else, as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty, or pure space may be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there. But, to avoid confusion in discourses concerning this matter, it were possibly to be wished, that the name extension were applied only to matter, or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term expansion to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say space is expanded, and body extended. But in this, every one has his liberty: I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.

§ 28. THE knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, Men differ in this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, tho', in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men, who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools, or sects, they have been bred up in: tho' amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon: especially if they be learned, bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But, if it should happen, that any two thinking men, should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse, or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains, is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation: it requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connexion and dependance one upon another. Till a man doth this, in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

## C H A P. XIV.

## Of duration, and its simple modes.

§ 1. **T**HERE is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get, not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call duration, the simple modes

BOOK II. modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct ideas; as hours, days, years, &c. time and eternity.

Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.

§ 2. THE answer of a great man, to one who asked what time was, "Si non rogas, intelligo," (which amounts to this; the more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it) might perhaps persuade one, that time, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are, not without reason, thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But, however remote these may seem from our comprehension, yet, if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge, viz. sensation, and reflection, will be able to furnish us with these ideas, as clear and distinct as many other, which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find, that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas.

§ 3. To understand time and eternity aright, we ought with attention to consider what idea it is we have of duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one, who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas, which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas, one after another, in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession: and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. For, whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the existence, or the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or any thing else commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourselves, or any such other thing, co-existing with our thinking.

§ 4. THAT we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration, but by considering the train of ideas, that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year; of which duration of things, whilst he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment, wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation, and the succession of others: and we see, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But, if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration, it is because, during that time, we have no succession of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his sleep, dreams, and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another; he hath then, during such a dreaming, a sensation of duration, and of the length of it; by which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflection on the train of the ideas, they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings; without which observation they can have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world.

The ideas of duration, applicable to things whilst we sleep.

§ 5. INDEED a man having, from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts, got the notion, or idea, of duration, he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think; as he that has got the idea of extension from bodies, by his sight, or touch, can apply it to distances, where no body is seen, or felt. And therefore, tho' a man has no perception of the length of duration, which passed whilst he slept, or thought not; yet, having observed the revolution of days and nights, and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant, he can, upon the supposition

position that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner, whilst he was asleep, or thought not, as it used to do at other times; he can, I say, imagine, and make allowance for, the length of duration, whilst he slept. But, if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the world) instead of their ordinary night's sleep, had passed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued sleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for ever left out of their account of time.

§ 6. THUS by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another, in our understandings, we get the notion of succession; which, if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses, he will, perhaps, be of my mind, when he considers that even motion produces in his mind an idea of succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas. For a man, looking upon a body really moving, perceives, yet, no motion at all, unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas: v. g. a man becalmed at sea, out of sight of land, in a fair day, may look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; tho' it be certain, that two, and, perhaps, all of them, have moved, during that time, a great way. But, as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body, as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion. But, wherever a man is with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any motion at all; if, during this hour of quiet, he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby observe and find succession where he could observe no motion.

The idea of  
succession  
not from  
motion.

§ 7. AND this, I think, is the reason, why motions, very slow, tho' they are constant, are not perceived by us; because, in their remove from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another: and so, not causing a constant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which, consisting in a constant succession, we cannot perceive that succession, without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it.

§ 8. ON the contrary, things that move so swift, as not to affect the senses distinctly, with several distinguishable distances of their motion, and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind, are not also perceived to move: for any thing, that moves round about in a circle, in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter, or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion.

§ 9. HENCE I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable that our ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our minds, at certain distances, not much unlike the images in the inside of a lanthorn, turned round by the heat of a candle. This appearance of theirs in train, tho' perhaps, it may be sometimes faster, and sometimes slower, yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking man. There seem to be certain bounds to the quickness, and slowness, of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds, beyond which they can neither delay, nor hasten.

The train of  
ideas has a  
certain de-  
gree of  
quickness.

§ 10. THE reason I have for this odd conjecture, is, from observing that in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which, if exceeding quick, the sense of succession is lost, even in cases where it is evident that there is a real succession. Let a cannon-bullet pass thro' a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleshy parts of a man; it is as clear as any demonstration can be, that it must strike successively the two sides of the room: it is also evident, that it must touch one part of the flesh first; and another after, and so in succession: and yet I believe no body, who ever felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive any succession either in the pain, or  
found,

BOOK II. found, of so swift a stroke. Such a part of duration, as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an instant, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the succession of another, wherein, therefore, we perceive no succession at all.

§ 11. THIS also happens, where the motion is so slow, as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses, as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds, between those offered to our senses by the moving body, there the sense of motion is lost; and the body, tho' it really moves, yet not changing perceivable distance with some other bodies, as fast as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the hands of clocks, and shadows of sun-dials, and other constant, but slow motions; where, tho' after certain intervals, we perceive by the change of distance that it hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not.

This train, the measure of other successions,

§ 12. So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man, is, as it were, the measure and standard of all other successions, whereof, if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two sounds, or pains, &c. take up in their succession the duration of but one idea, or else where any motion, or succession, is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickness in which they take their turns; as when any one, or more ideas, in their ordinary course, come into our mind, between those which are offered to the sight, by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion, or between sounds, or smells, following one another, there also the sense of a constant continued succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of rest between.

The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea.

§ 13. IF it be so that the ideas of our minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change and shift, in a continual succession, it would be impossible, may any one say, for a man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it be meant, that a man may have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind, without any variation at all, I think, in matter of fact, it is not possible; for which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances) I can give no other reason but experience: and I would have any one try, whether he can keep one, unvaried, single idea in his mind, without any other, for any considerable time together.

§ 14. FOR trial, let him take any figure, any degree of light, or whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind: but that some, either of another kind, or various consideration of that idea (each of which considerations is a new idea) will constantly succeed one another in his thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§ 15. ALL that is in a man's power in this case, I think, is only to mind and observe what the ideas are, that take their turns in his understanding; or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire, or use of: but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, tho' he may commonly chuse whether he will heedfully observe and consider them.

Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion.

§ 16. WHETHER these several ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions, I will not here dispute; but this I am sure, that they include no idea of motion, in their appearance; and, if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all: which is enough to my present purpose, and sufficiently shews, that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing there one after another, is that, which gives us the idea of succession, and duration, without which we should have no such ideas at all. It is not then motion, but the constant train of ideas in our minds, whilst we are waking, that furnishes us with the idea of duration, whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception, than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas, as I have before shewed: and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration, by the train of other ideas, succeeding one another in our minds,

minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the train of ideas, caused by the uninterrupted, sensible change of distance between two bodies, which we have from motion; and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration, were there no sense of motion at all.

CHAP. XIV.

§ 17. HAVING thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the mind to do, is to get some measure of this common duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order, wherein several things exist, without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused, and a great part of history be rendered very useless. This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures, or epochs, is that, I think, which, most properly, we call time.

Time is duration for out by measures.

§ 18. IN the measuring of extension, there is nothing more required but the application of the standard, or measure, we make use of, to the thing, of whose extension we would be informed. But in the measuring of duration this cannot be done, because no two different parts of succession can be put together, to measure one another: and nothing, being a measure of duration, but duration, as nothing is of extension, but extension, we cannot keep by us any standing, unvarying measure of duration, which consists in a constant fleeting succession, as we can of certain lengths of extension, as inches, feet, yards, &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time, but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions, by constantly repeated periods. What portions of duration are not distinguished, or considered as distinguished and measured by such periods, come not so properly under the notion of time, as appears by such phrases as these, viz. before all time; and when time shall be no more.

A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods.

§ 19. THE diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun, as having been, from the beginning of nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind; and supposed equal to one another, have been, with reason, made use of, for the measure of duration. But the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another: for men, in the measuring of the length of time, having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c. which they found themselves, upon any mention of time, or duration, presently to think on, all which portions of time were measured out, by the motion of those heavenly bodies; they were apt to confound time and motion, or, at least, to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another: whereas any constant, periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas, in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguished the intervals of time, as those that have been made use of. For, supposing the sun, which some have taken to be a fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of time, that it now every day comes about to the same meridian, and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the space of an annual revolution, it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again; would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it, as well without as with motion? For, if the appearances were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant periods, they would serve mankind for measure of time as well, were the motion away.

The revolutions of the sun and moon, the properest measures of time.

§ 20. FOR the freezing of water, or the blowing of a plant, returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth, would as well serve men to reckon their years by, as the motions of the sun: and, in effect, we see, that some people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons, and leaving them at others. For a fit of an ague, the sense of hunger, or thirst, a smell, or a taste, or any other idea, returning constantly at equidistant periods, and making itself universally be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the course of succession, and distinguish the distances

But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.



BOOK II. distances of time. Thus we see that men born blind count time well enough by years, whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions, that they perceive not: and, I ask, whether a blind man, who distinguished his years either by the heat of summer, or cold of winter; by the smell of any flower of the spring, or taste of any fruit of the autumn; would not have a better measure of time than the Romans had, before the reformation of their calendar by Julius Cæsar, or many other people, whose years, notwithstanding the motion of the sun, which they pretend to make use of, are very irregular? And it adds no small difficulty to chronology, that the exact length of the years that several nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another; and, I think, I may say, all of them from the precise motions of the sun. And, if the sun moved from the creation to the flood constantly in the æquator, and so equally dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, in days all of the same length, without its annual variations to the tropicks, as a late, ingenious author supposes<sup>a</sup>; I do not think it very easy to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the sun) men should, in the antediluvian world, from the beginning, count by years, or measure their time by periods, that had no sensible marks, very obvious to distinguish them by.

No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.

§ 21. BUT, perhaps, it will be said, without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such periods were equal? To which I answer, the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same way that that of days was known, or presumed to be so at first; which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas, which had passed in men's minds in the intervals: by which train of ideas discovering inequality in the natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days, or *synthetæ*, were guessed to be equal, which was sufficient to make them serve for a measure. Tho' exacter search has since discovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the sun, and we know not whether the annual also be not unequal: these, yet, by their presumed and apparent equality, serve as well to reckon time by (tho' not to measure the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We must, therefore, carefully distinguish betwixt duration itself, and the measures we make use of, to judge of its length. Duration in itself is to be considered as going on in one constant, equal, uniform course: but none of the measures of it, which we make use of, can be known to do so; nor can we be assured, that their assigned parts, or periods, are equal in duration one to another; for two successive lengths of duration, however measured, can never be demonstrated to be equal. The motion of the sun, which the world used so long, and so confidently, for an exact measure of duration, has, as I said, been found in its several parts unequal: and tho' men have of late made use of a pendulum, as a more steady and regular motion than that of the sun, or (to speak more truly) of the earth; yet, if any one should be asked how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so: since we cannot be sure, that the cause of that motion, which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally; and we are sure that the medium, in which the pendulum moves, is not constantly the same: either of which varying, may alter the equality of such periods, and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by motion, as well as any other periods of other appearances; the notion of duration still remaining clear, tho' our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact. Since, then, no two portions of succession can be brought together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a measure of time, is to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods; of which seeming equality we have no other measure, but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reasons, to persuade us of their equality.

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Burnet's Theory of the earth.

Time not  
the measure  
of motion.

§ 22. ONE thing seems strange to me, that, whilst all men manifestly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world, time yet should be defined to be the "measure of motion;" whereas it is obvious to every one, who reflects ever so little on it, that to measure motion, space is as necessary to be considered as time; and those, who look a little farther, will find also the bulk of the thing moved, necessary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will estimate or measure motion, so as to judge right of it. Nor indeed does motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration, than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas, in seeming equidistant periods. For, if the motion of the sun were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds, sometimes very flow, and at others irregularly very swift; or, if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the same appearances, it would not at all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does.

§ 23. MINUTES, hours, days and years, are then no more necessary to time, or duration, than inches, feet, yards and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extension: for tho' we, in this part of the universe, by the constant use of them, as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun, or as known parts of such periods, have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time, whose lengths we would consider; yet there may be other parts of the universe, where they no more use these measures of our's, than in Japan they do our inches, feet or miles; but yet something analogous to them there must be. For, without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure ourselves, or signify to others the length of any duration, tho' at the same time the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures, that may be made use of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be measured; no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit, alter the notion of extension to those, who make use of those different measures.

§ 25. THE mind, having once got such a measure of time, as the annual revolution of the sun, can apply that measure to duration, wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: for should one say, that Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and twelfth year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the world, tho' there were so far back no motion of the sun, nor any other motion at all. For, tho' the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the sun; yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure duration as well, as if really at that time the sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration, equal to an annual revolution of the sun, is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no sun, nor motion was, as the idea of a foot, or yard, taken from bodies, here, can be applied in our thoughts, to distances, beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.

§ 26. FOR supposing it were five thousand six hundred and thirty nine miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remotest body of the universe (for, being finite, it must be at a certain distance) as we suppose it to be five thousand six hundred and thirty nine years from this time, to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world; we can, in our thoughts, apply this measure of a year, to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies, or motion, as we can this measure of a mile to space, beyond the utmost bodies: and by the one measure duration, where there was no motion, as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts, where there is no body.

§ 27. IF it be objected to me here, that in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I should not, viz. "That the world is neither eternal, nor infinite;" I answer, that to my present purpose it is not needful, in this place,

to

BOOK II. to make use of arguments, to evince the world to be finite, both in duration and extension; but, it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary: and I doubt not but that every one, that will go about it, may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, tho' not of all duration, and so may come to a stop, and non ultra, in his consideration of motion. So also in his thoughts he may set limits to body, and the extension belonging to it, but not to space, where no body is; the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind; and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another place.

Eternity.

§ 28. BY the same means therefore, and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time, we have also that idea, which we call eternity, viz. having got the idea of succession and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, caused in us, either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts, or else caused by external objects, successively affecting our senses; and, having, from the revolutions of the sun, got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add such lengths of duration to one another, as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations past, or to come: and this we can continue to do on, without bounds, or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration, supposed before the sun's, or any other motion had its being; which is no more difficult, or absurd, than to apply the notion I have, of the moving of a shadow one hour to-day upon the sun-dial, to the duration of something last night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion, and it is as impossible for the duration of that flame, for an hour last night, to co-exist with any motion that now is, or ever shall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exist with the motion of the sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial, between the marks of two hours, I can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light, last night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exist: and it is no more than to think, that had the sun shone then on the dial, and moved after the same rate it doth now, the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hour-line to another, whilst that flame of the candle lasted.

§ 29. THE notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical, regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory, derived from my senses, or reflection; I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration, antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute, or a day, antecedent to the motion, that at this very moment the sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday: the measuring of any duration, by some motion, depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution; but the having a clear idea of the length of some periodical, known motion, or other intervals of duration, in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

§ 30. HENCE we see, that some men imagine the duration of the world, from its first existence to this present year 1689, to have been five thousand six hundred and thirty nine years, or equal to five thousand six hundred and thirty nine annual revolutions of the sun, and others a great deal more: as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted twenty three thousand years from the reign of the sun; and the Chinese now, who account the world three million, two hundred and sixty nine thousand years old, or more: which

which longer duration of the world according to their computation, tho' I should not believe to be true; yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and say one is longer than the other, as I understand that Methusalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And, if the common reckoning of five thousand, six hundred, and thirty-nine should be true (as it may be, as well as any other assign'd) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world a thousand years older, since every one may, with the same facility, imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be fifty thousand years old, as five thousand, six hundred, and thirty-nine; and may as well conceive the duration of fifty thousand years, as five thousand, six hundred, and thirty-nine. Whereby it appears, that to the measuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion, we measure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular, periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion, or appearance never co-existed.

§ 31. For, as in the history of the creation deliver'd by Moses, I can imagine that light existed three days, before the sun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of light before the sun was created, was so long as (if the sun had mov'd then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; so by the same way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels, being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or a thousand years. For, if I can but consider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more, till I come to sixty; and by the same way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. e. such or such parts of the sun's revolution, or any other period, whereof I have the idea) proceed in infinitum, and suppose a duration, exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will: which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whose infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§ 32. AND thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. reflection and sensation, we get the ideas of duration, and the measures of it.

For, first, by observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly, some vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of succession.

SECONDLY, by observing a distance in the parts of this succession, we get the idea of duration;

THIRDLY, by sensation observing certain appearances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths, or measures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

FOURTHLY, by being able to repeat those measures of time, our ideas of stated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exist; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years hence.

FIFTHLY, by being able to repeat any such idea of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them to one another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of eternity, as the future, eternal duration of our souls, as well as the eternity of that infinite being, which must necessarily have always existed.

SIXTHLY, By considering any part of infinite duration, as set out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

## C H A P. XV.

## Of duration and expansion, consider'd together.

BOOK II. §. 1. **T**H O' we have, in the precedent chapters, dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration; yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple, abstract conception, to avoid confusion, I call expansion, to distinguish it from extension, which by some is used to express this distance only, as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes, or at least intimates the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word expansion to space, because space is often apply'd to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (viz. expansion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater, or less quantities: for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour, and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

Both capable  
of greater  
and less,

Expansion  
not bounded  
by matter;

§ 2. THE mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a span, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been said, repeat that idea; and so adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two spans, or two paces; and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to the distance of the sun, or remotest star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in, or without body. 'Tis true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of solid extension; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find, nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unless he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts, when he says, "heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee:" and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself, that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exists, or imagine any expansion where he is not.

Nor duration  
by motion.

§ 3. JUST so is it in duration. The mind having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one easily admits, that tho' we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason, why any one should doubt, that he likewise fills immensity? His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter, to say, where there is no body, there is nothing.

Why men  
more easily  
admit infi-  
nite dura-  
tion, than  
infinite ex-  
pansion.

§ 4. HENCE, I think, we may learn the reason why every one familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of, and supposes eternity, and sticks not to ascribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and reserve, that many admit, or suppose the infinity of space. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, that duration and extension being used as names of affections, belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so: but not attributing to him extension, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without

without matter; of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute. And therefore, when men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body; as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or, if their ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary space; as if it were nothing, because there is no body existing in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary; because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And, if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occasion to think, by the name duration, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute, anatomical parts of matter, is little different from hardness) were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words, so near of kin as *durare* and *durum esse*. And that *durare* is apply'd to the idea of hardness, as well as that of existence, we see in Horace, *epod. xvi.* "*ferro duravit sacula.*" But, be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out, beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space, or expansion; the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body, and all other things: which may (to those who please) be a subject of farther meditation.

§ 5. TIME in general is to duration, as place to expansion. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity, and immensity, as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by land-marks; and so are made use of to denote the position of finite, real beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform, infinite oceans of duration and space. These, rightly consider'd, are only ideas of determinate distances, from certain known points, fixed in distinguishable sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from another. From such points, fixed in sensible beings, we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities; which, so considered, are that which we call time and place. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and position of things, without such known settled points, would be lost in them, and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion.

§ 6. TIME and place taken thus for determinate, distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration, set out, or supposed to be distinguished from the rest by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptation.

FIRST, time in general, is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration, as is measured out by, and co-existent with the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know any of them: and in this sense, time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world, as in these phrases before-mentioned, before all time, or when time shall be no more: place likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space, which is possessed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion; tho' this may more properly be called extension, than place. Within these two are confined, and by the observable parts of them are measur'd and determin'd the particular time, or duration, and the particular extension and place of all corporeal beings.

§ 7. SECONDLY, sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense, and is apply'd to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really distinguish'd, and measur'd out, by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies, that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years, and are accordingly our measures of time; but such other portions too, of that infinite, uniform duration, which we, upon any occasion, do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time; and so consider them as bounded, and determined. For, if we should suppose the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly

Time to duration, is as place to expansion.

Time and place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the existence and motion of bodies.

Sometimes for so much of either, as we design by measures, taken from the bulk, or motion of bodies.

BOOK II. *perly enough, and should be understood, if we said, 'tis a longer time since the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by seven hundred, and sixty-four years: whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguish'd duration, as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted seven hundred, and sixty-four annual revolutions of the sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of place, distance, or bulk in the great inane, beyond the confines of the world, when we consider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive a body, of any assign'd dimensions, as a cubick-foot; or do suppose a point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the universe.*

*They belong to all beings.*

§ 8. WHERE and When are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckon'd from some known parts of this sensible world, and from some certain epochs mark'd out to us by the motions observable in it. Without some such fix'd parts, or periods, the order of things would be lost to our finite understandings, in the boundless, invariable oceans of duration and expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the deity. And therefore, we are apt not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible being. But, when apply'd to any particular, finite beings, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space, as the bulk of that body takes up. And place is the position of any body, when consider'd at a certain distance from some other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing; so the time, when the thing existeth, is the idea of that space of duration, which pass'd between some known and fix'd period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shews the distance of the extremities of the bulk, or existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square, or lasted two years; the other shews the distance of it in place, or existence, from other fix'd points of space, or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincolns-inn-fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671. or the 1000th year of the Julian period: all which distances we measure, by preconceiv'd ideas of certain lengths of space and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.

*All the parts of extension, are extension; and all the parts of duration, are duration.*

§ 9. THERE is one thing more, wherein space and duration have a great conformity; and that is, tho' they are justly reckon'd amongst our simple ideas, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either, is without all manner of composition<sup>a</sup>; it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other idea hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension or duration, as excluded divisibility,

<sup>a</sup> It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if space consists of parts, as it is confess'd in this place, he should not have reckon'd it in the number of simple ideas; because it seems to be inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, that a simple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception of the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas. 'Tis farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the second chapter of the second book, where he begins to speak of simple ideas, an exact definition of what he understands by the word simple ideas. To these difficulties Mr. Locke answers thus: to begin with the last, he declares, that he has not treated this subject in an order perfectly scholastick, having not had much familiarity with those sort of books, during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method, in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions, regularly placed at the beginning of each new subject. Mr. Locke contents himself, to employ the principal terms that he uses, so, that from his use of them the reader may easily comprehend what he means by them. But, with respect to the term simple idea, he has had the good luck to define that, in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reason to supply that defect. The question then is to know, whether the idea of extension agrees with this definition: which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the sense, which Mr. Locke had principally in his view; for that composition which he design'd to exclude in that definition, was a composition of different ideas in the mind, and not a composition of the same kind in a thing whose essence consists in having parts of the same kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this composition. So that if the idea of extension consists in having partes extra partes



visibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit, or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. But, since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts; instead thereof it makes use of the common measures, which by familiar use, in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parasangs; and so seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration :) the mind makes use, I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occasion, makes, by the addition of such known lengths, which it is acquainted with. On the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either, is look'd on as an unit in number, when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions. Tho' on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big, or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confus'd; and it is the number of its repeated additions, or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to any one, who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration, is duration too; and every part of extension, is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But the least portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space, extension, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolv'd. Such a small part in duration may be call'd a moment, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train of their ordinary succession there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allow'd to call a sensible point, meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space, we can discern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the center.

§ 10. EXPANSION and duration have this farther agreement, that tho' they are both consider'd by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, no, not even in thought: tho' the parts of bodies, from whence we take our measure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the succession of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.

Their parts  
inseparable.

§ 11. BUT yet there is this manifest difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expansion, are turn'd every way, and so make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but as it were the length of one straight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever,

Duration is  
as a line, ex-  
pansion as a  
solid.

partes (as the schools speak) 'tis always, in the sense of Mr. Locke, a simple idea; because the idea, of having partes extra partes, cannot be resolv'd into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with respect to the nature of extension, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be seen in § 9. chap. xv. of the second book, where he says, that "the least portion of space, or extension, whereof we have a clear and distinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be consider'd by us, as a simple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space and extension are made up." So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be call'd a simple idea, since it is the least idea of space, that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any less, whereof it has in itself any determin'd perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one simple idea; and that is sufficient to take away this objection: for it is not the design of Mr. Locke, in this place, to discourse of any thing, but concerning the ideas of the mind. But if this is not sufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extension is so peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the definition, that he has given of those simple ideas, so that it differs in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expos'd to this difficulty, than to make a new division in his favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be understood. 'Tis very common to observe intelligible discourses spoil'd by too much subtilty in nice divisions. We ought to put things together, as well as we can, doctrinae causa; but after all, several things will not be bundled up together, under our terms, and ways of speaking.

**BOOK II.** wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the same moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this in respect of expansion, is beyond my comprehension: and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings; 'tis near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion; as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration: and therefore, what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know, is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of its solid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space, whilst it remains there.

Duration has never two parts together, expansion all together.

§ 12. DURATION, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in succession; as expansion is the idea of lasting distance, all whose parts exist together, and are not capable of succession. And therefore, tho' we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any being does now exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends not in his knowledge, or power, all past and future things: his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past, he can never recal: and what is yet to come, he cannot make present. What I say of man, I say of all finite beings; who tho' they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of any magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompany'd with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his knowledge, no farther remov'd from his sight, than the present: they all lie under the same view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For, the existence of all things depending upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude, expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great variety we do, or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther speculation.

## C H A P. XVI.

### Of number.

#### CHAP. XVI. § 1.

Number, the simplest and most universal idea.

**A**MONGST all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple than that of unity, or one. It has no shadow of variety, or composition in it; every object our senses are employed about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And, therefore, it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most universal idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be imagined.

Its modes made by addition.

§ 2. BY repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus, by adding one

one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen; and of a score, or a million, or any other number. CHAP. XVI.

§ 3. THE simple modes of number are, of all other, the most distinct; every the least variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different, from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote: two being as distinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not so easy, nor, perhaps, possible for us, to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which, yet, are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension? Each mode distinct.

§ 4. THE clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate in their application. Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable, than in extension, where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed, or measured; because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness, beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and, therefore, the quantity, or proportion, of any the least excess cannot be discovered: which is clear otherwise in number, where, as has been said, ninety-one is as distinguishable from ninety, as from nine thousand, tho' ninety-one be the next immediate excess to ninety. But it is not so in extension, where whatsoever is more than just a foot, or an inch, is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot, or an inch; and in lines, which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other, by innumerable parts; nor can any one assign an angle, which shall be the next biggest to a right one. Therefore demonstrations in numbers, the most precise.

§ 5. BY the repeating, as has been said, of the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name to it, may count, or have ideas for several collections of units, distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers, and a memory to retain that series, with their several names: all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new, or distinct name, or sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distinguish it from every smaller, or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his tale, taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression; and so again, by abstracting an unit from each collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the ideas of numbers, within the compass of his language, or for which he hath names, tho' not, perhaps, of more. For the several simple modes of numbers, being in our minds but so many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference, but more or less, names or marks, for each distinct combination, seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For, without such names, or marks, we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together, without a name, or mark, to distinguish that precise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion. Names necessary to numbers.

§ 6. THIS I think to be the reason, why some Americans I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means, count to one thousand; nor had any distinct idea of that number, tho' they could reckon very well to twenty. Because their language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessities of a needy, simple life, unacquainted either with trade, or mathematicks, had no words in it to stand

BOOK II. stand for a thousand; so that, when they were discoursed with, of those greater numbers, they would shew the hairs of their head, to express a great multitude, which they could not number: which inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above five; any number beyond that, they made out by shewing their fingers, and the fingers of others who were present\*. And I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or, at most, four and twenty decimal progressions, without confusion. But to shew how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having useful ideas of numbers, let us set all these following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number; v. g.

nonillions. octillions. septillions. sextillions. quintillions. quartillions. trillions. billions. millions. units.  
857324. 162486. 345896. 437916. 423147. 248106. 235421. 261734. 368149. 623137.

THE ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the second six figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number: but, whether, by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and, perhaps, a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered. This I mention, only to shew how necessary distinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

Why children number not earlier.

§ 7. THUS children, either for want of names, to mark the several progressions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning; do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far, or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas: and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well; and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell twenty. And some, thro' the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, with their names annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependance of so long a train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their life-time to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For he that will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before, with the distinct name, or sign, of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one from another, only by the addition, or subtraction, of one unit. 2. That it retains in memory the names, or marks, of the several combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order, that the numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.

Number measures all measurables.

§ 8. THIS farther is observable in number, that it is that which the mind makes use of, in measuring all things, that by us are measurable, which principally are expansion and duration; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of eternity, and immensity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity of number, in which we can come to no end of addition? For such an inexhaustible stock,

\* Historie d'un voyage, fait en la terre du Brasil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20.  $\frac{427}{1000}$ .

number,

number, of all other our ideas, most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases, this multitude, how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number, where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endless addition, or addibility (if any one like the word better) of numbers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.

CHAP.  
XVI.

## C H A P. XVII.

### Of infinity.

§ 1. **H**E, that would know what kind of idea it is, to which we give the name of infinity, cannot do it better, than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed, and then how the mind comes to frame it.

CHAP.  
XVII.

Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to space, duration, and number.

**FINITE** and infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase, or diminution, by the addition, or subtraction, of any the least part: and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number, which we have considered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite: but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes, which are properly inexhaustible, and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity, but what carries with it some reflection on, and intimation of that number, or extent, of the acts, or objects, of God's power, wisdom, and goodness, which can never be suppos'd so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts, as far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all possible perfection: but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our ideas of their infinity.

§ 2. **FINITE** then, and infinite, being by the mind look'd on as modifications of expansion and duration, the next thing to be considered, is, how the mind comes by them. As for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of extension, that affect our senses, carry with them into the mind the idea of finite: and the ordinary periods of succession, whereby we measure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless ideas of eternity and immensity; since the objects, which we converse with, come so much short of any approach, or proportion, to that largeness.

The idea of finite easily got.

§ 3. **EVERY** one, that has any idea of any stated lengths of space, as a foot, finds that he can repeat that idea; and joining it to the former, make the idea of two feet; and by the addition of a third, three feet; and so on; without ever coming to an end of his additions, whether of the same idea of a foot, or, if he pleases, of doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth, or of the orbis magnus: for whichever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds that, after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition, than he was at first setting out. The power

How we come by the idea of infinity.

BOOK II. of enlarging his idea of space, by farther additions, remaining still the same, he hence takes the idea of infinite space.

Our idea of space boundless.

§ 4. THIS, I think, is the way, whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite space. 'Tis a quite different consideration, to examine, whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually existing, since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things; but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think, that space in itself is actually boundless; to which imagination, the idea of space, or expansion, of itself, naturally leads us. For it being considered by us, either as the extension of body, or as existing by itself, without any solid matter taking it up, (for of such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the motion of body, its necessary existence) it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find, or suppose, any end of it, or be stopped any where, in its progress in this space, how far soever it extends its thoughts. Any bounds made with body, even adamant walls, are so far from putting a stop to the mind, in its farther progress, in space and extension, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it; for so far as that body reaches, so far no one can doubt of extension: and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body, what is there that can there put a stop, and satisfy the mind, that it is at the end of space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For, if it be necessary for the motion of body, that there should be an empty space, tho' ever so little, here amongst bodies; and if it be possible for body to move in, or thro' that empty space; nay, it is impossible for any particle of matter to move, but into an empty space: the same possibility of a body's moving into a void space, beyond the utmost bounds of body, as well as into a void space interspersed amongst bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the idea of empty pure space, whether within, or beyond, the confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in nature, tho' in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself, by any thought, either amongst, or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of space no-where find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

And so of duration.

§ 5. As by the power we find in ourselves of repeating, as often as we will, any idea of space, we get the idea of immensity; so by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds, with all the endless addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity. For we find in ourselves, we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas, than we can come to the end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again it is another question, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know, whether there were any real being, whose duration has been eternal. And as to this, I say, he that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed to some other considerations of our idea of infinity.

Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.

§ 6. If it be so, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves, of repeating without end our own ideas; it may be demanded, "why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas, as well as those of space and duration?" since they may be as easily, and as often repeated in our minds, as the other: and yet no body ever thinks of infinite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, tho' he can repeat the idea of sweet, or white, as frequently as those of a yard, or a day. To which I answer: all the ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase, by the addition of any equal, or less parts, afford us, by their repetition, the idea of infinity; because, with this endless repetition, there is continued an enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other ideas it is not so; for to the largest idea of extension, or duration, that I at present have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but to the perfectest idea I have of the whitest whiteness, if I add another of a less,

or



or equal whiteness (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the idea) it makes no increase, and enlarges not my idea at all: and therefore the different ideas of whiteness, &c. are called degrees. For those ideas that consist of parts, are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part; but, if you take the idea of white, which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to your sight, and another idea of white from another parcel of snow you see to-day, and put them together in your mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased; and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those ideas that consist not of parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses; but space, duration, and number, being capable of increase by repetition, leave in the mind an idea of an endless room for more: nor can we conceive any where a stop to a farther addition, or progression, and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.

§ 7. THO' our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases; yet, I guess, we cause great confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse, or reason, about an infinite quantity, viz. an infinite space, or an infinite duration. For, our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless growing idea, but the idea of any quantity the mind has, being, at that time, terminated in that idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk; and, therefore, I think, it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite: the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space, which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

§ 8. THIS, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number. Whatsoever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space, duration, or number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but, when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought, without ever completing the idea, there we have our idea of infinity, which, tho' it seems to be pretty clear, when we consider nothing else in it but the negation of an end, yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space, or duration, that idea is very obscure and confused, because it is made up of two parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space, or number, as great as he will; it is plain the mind rests and terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a supposed endless progression. And, therefore, I think it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue and reason about infinite space, or duration, &c. because the parts of such an idea not being perceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one side, or other, always perplexes whatever consequences we draw from the other; as an idea of motion not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such an idea, which is not better than an idea of motion at rest: and such another seems to me to be the idea of a space, or (which is the same thing) a number infinite, i. e. of a space, or number, which the mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a space, or number, which, in a constant and endless enlarging and progression, it can, in thought

never



## BOOK II.

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Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.

Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expansion.

Infinite divisibility.

never attain to. For how large soever an idea of space I have in my mind, it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it, tho' I be capable the next instant to double it, and so on in infinitum: for that alone is infinite, which has no bounds; and that the idea of infinity, in which our thoughts can find none.

§ 9. BUT of all other ideas, it is number, as I have said, which, I think, furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions of millions of miles, or years, which are so many distinct ideas, kept best by number from running into a confused heap, wherein the mind loses itself; and when it has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleases, of known lengths of space, or duration, the clearest idea it can get of infinity, is the confus'd, incomprehensible remainder of endless, addible numbers, which affords no prospect of stop, or boundary.

§ 10. IT will perhaps give us a little farther light, into the idea we have of infinity, and discover to us that it is nothing but the infinity of number, apply'd to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas, if we consider, that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence, that in number we are at one end as it were: for there being in number nothing less than an unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of number, we can set no bounds: and so it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards, beyond all that we can conceive; but in space, and duration, it is otherwise. For in duration we consider it, as if this line of number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else, but the turning this infinity of number both ways, à parte ante, and à parte post, as they speak. For when we would consider eternity, à parte ante, what do we but, beginning from our selves and the present time we are in, repeat in our minds the ideas of years, or ages, or any other assignable portion of duration past, with a prospect of proceeding in such addition, with all the infinity of number? And, when we would consider eternity, à parte post, we just after the same rate begin from our selves, and reckon by multiply'd periods yet to come, still extending that line of number, as before. And these two being put together, are that infinite duration we call eternity; which, as we turn our view either way forwards or backwards, appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite end of number, i. e. the power still of adding more.

§ 11. THE same happens also in space, wherein, conceiving ourselves to be as it were in the center, we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number; and reckoning any way from ourselves, a yard, mile, diameter of the earth, or orbis magnus, by the infinity of number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas than we have to set bounds to number, we have that indeterminable idea of immensity.

§ 12. AND since, in any bulk of matter, our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost divisibility, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also, in that which has the infinity also of number; but with this difference, that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration, we only use addition of numbers; whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind also can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the former additions, it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers: tho' in the addition of the one, we can have no more the positive idea of a space, infinitely great, than in the division of the other, we can have the idea of a body infinitely little; our idea of infinity being, as I may so say, a growing and fugitive idea, still in a boundless progression, that can stop nowhere.

§ 13. THO'

§ 13. THO' it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has the positive idea of an actual, infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like also being in the infinity of space and duration, which power leaves always to the mind room for endless additions; yet there be those, who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite, to ask him that has it, "whether he could add to it or no?" which would easily shew the mistake of such a positive idea. We can, I think, have no positive idea of any space, or duration, which is not made up of, and commensurate to repeated numbers of feet, or yards, or days, and years, which are the common measures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities. And therefore, since an idea of infinite space, or duration, must needs be made up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than that of number, capable still of farther addition, but not an actual, positive idea of a number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we have the positive ideas) can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite, than as number does; which, consisting of additions of finite units one to another, suggests the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression.

CHAP. XVII.
No positive idea of infinite.

§ 14. THEY who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive, seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation of it is positive. He that considers that the end is, in body, but the extremity or superficies of that body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black, or white, will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure negation. Nor is it, when apply'd to duration, the bare negation of existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence, I am sure they cannot deny but that the beginning is the first instant of being, and is not by any body conceiv'd to be a bare negation; and therefore by their own argument, the idea of eternal, à parte ante, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.

§ 15. THE idea of infinite has, I confess, something of positive, in all those things we apply it to. When we would think of infinite space, or duration, we at first step usually make some very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which possibly we double, and multiply, several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space, or duration. But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a positive distinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the sea; where having let down a large portion of his sounding-line, he reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms, and more; but how much that more is, he hath no distinct notion at all: and could he always supply new line, and find the plummet always sink, without ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind, reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity. In which case let this line be ten, or ten thousand fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confus'd and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. So much space, as the mind takes a view of, in its contemplation of greatness, is a clear picture and positive in the understanding: but infinite is still greater.

1. Then, the idea of so much, is positive and clear.
2. The idea of greater is also clear, but it is but a comparative idea.
3. The idea of so much greater, as cannot be comprehended; and this is plainly negative, not positive.

For

Book II. he has no positive, clear idea of the largeness of any extension (which is that fought for, in the idea of infinite) that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it: and such no body, I think, pretends to in what is infinite. For to say a man has a positive, clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, he has the positive, clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea-shore, who knows not how many they be; but only that they are more than twenty. For just such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space, or duration, who says, it is larger than the extent, or duration of ten, a hundred, or a thousand, or any other number of miles, or years, whereof he has, or can have a positive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity, lies in obscurity; and has the undeterminate confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do, nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: and that cannot but be very far from a positive, complete idea, wherein the greatest part, of what I would comprehend, is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater: for to say, that having, in any quantity, measur'd so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at an end, is only to say, that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity, is in other words, only to say, that it is bigger: and a total negation of an end, is but the carrying this bigger still with you, in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity; and adding this idea of still greater to all the ideas you have, or can be suppos'd to have, of quantity. Now, whether such an idea, as that, be positive, I leave any one to consider.

We have no positive idea of an infinite duration.

§ 16. I ASK those, who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it succession, or not? If it does not, they ought to shew the difference of their notion of duration, when apply'd to an eternal being, and to a finite: since perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point; and acknowledge, that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If to avoid succession in eternal existence, they recur to the punctum stans of the schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter, help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession. Besides that punctum stans, if it signify any thing, being not quantum, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has, or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number; I leave him to consider, till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it, a little too scanty for positive infinity.

§ 17. I THINK it unavoidable, for every considering rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other existence, to have the notion of an eternal, wise being, who had no beginning: and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have. But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a positive thing, scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity; which, whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to, I confess myself at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

No positive idea of infinite space.

§ 18. HE that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space, will, when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest, than he has of the least space. For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea. All our positive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; tho' our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no bounds: for that which remains, either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have,

lies

lies in obscurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminishing the other, without ceasing. A pebble and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility, as the acuteſt thought of a mathematician: and a ſurveyor may as ſoon with his chain meaſure out infinite ſpace, as a philoſopher by the quickeſt flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a poſitive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and poſitive idea of it in his mind, and ſo can frame one of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, and ſo on till he has the idea in his thoughts of ſomething very little; but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehenſible littleneſs which diviſion can produce. What remains of ſmallneſs, is as far from his thoughts as when he firſt began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and poſitive idea of that ſmallneſs, which is conſequent to infinite diviſibility.

§ 19. EVERY one that looks towards infinity, does, as I have ſaid, at firſt glance make ſome very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be ſpace or duration; and poſſibly he wearies his thoughts, by multiplying in his mind that firſt large idea: but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a poſitive, clear idea, of what remains to make up a poſitive infinite, than the country-fellow had of the water, which was yet to come and paſs the channel of the river where he ſtood:

Ruflicus expectat dum tranſeat amnis; at ille

Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

§ 20. THERE are ſome I have met with, that put ſo much difference between infinite duration and infinite ſpace, that they perſuade themſelves that they have a poſitive idea of eternity; but that they have not, nor can have, any idea of infinite ſpace. The reaſon of which miſtake I ſuppoſe to be this, that finding, by a due contemplation of cauſes and effects, that it is neceſſary to admit ſome eternal being, and ſo to conſider the real exiſtence of that being, as taking up and commenfurate to their idea of eternity; but, on the other ſide, not finding it neceſſary; but on the contrary, apparently abſurd, that body ſhould be infinite; they forwardly conclude, they can have no idea of infinite ſpace, becauſe they can have no idea of infinite matter. Which conſequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; becauſe the exiſtence of matter is no ways neceſſary to the exiſtence of ſpace, no more than the exiſtence of motion, or the ſun, is neceſſary to duration, tho' duration uſes to be meaſured by it: and I doubt not but a man may have the idea of ten thouſand miles ſquare, without any body ſo big, as well as the idea of ten thouſand years, without any body ſo old. It ſeems as eaſy to me, to have the idea of ſpace, empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a buſhel, without corn, or the hollow of a nutſhel, without a kernel in it: it being no more neceſſary that there ſhould be exiſting a ſolid body, infinitely extended, becauſe we have an idea of the infinity of ſpace, than it is neceſſary that the world ſhould be eternal, becauſe we have an idea of infinite duration. And why ſhould we think our idea of infinite ſpace requires the real exiſtence of matter to ſupport it, when we find, that we have as clear an idea of infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration paſt? Tho', I ſuppoſe, no body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has exiſted in that future duration. Nor is it poſſible to join our idea of future duration, with preſent or paſt exiſtence, any more than it is poſſible to make the ideas of yeſterday, to-day, and to-morrow, to be the ſame; or bring ages paſt and future together, and make them contemporary. But, if theſe men are of the mind, that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration, than of infinite ſpace; becauſe it is paſt doubt, that God has exiſted from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite ſpace: yet thoſe philoſophers, who are of opinion, that infinite ſpace is poſſeſſ'd by God's infinite omnipreſence, as well as infinite duration by his eternal exiſtence, muſt be allow'd to have as clear an idea of infinite ſpace as of infinite duration; tho' neither of them, I think, has any poſitive idea of infinity in either caſe. For whatſoever poſitive ideas a man has in his mind, of any quantity, he can repeat

Book II. peat it, and add it to the former, as easily as he can add together the ideas of two days, or two paces; which are positive ideas of lengths he has in his mind, and so on, as long as he pleases: whereby, if a man had a positive idea of infinite, either duration, or space, he could add two infinities together; nay, make one infinite infinitely bigger than another: absurdities too gross to be confuted!

Supposed positive ideas of infinity, cause of mistakes.

§ 21. BUT yet, after all this, there being men, who persuade themselves that they have clear, positive, comprehensive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege: and I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable difficulties, which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities. For whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space, or duration, as if they had as compleat and positive ideas of them, as they have of the names they use for them, or as they have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate quantity: it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing, they discourse of, or reason about, leads them into perplexities and contradictions; and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be surveyed and managed by them.

All these ideas from sensation and reflection.

§ 22. IF I have dwelt pretty long on the considerations of duration, space, and number, and what arises from the contemplation of them, infinity; it is possibly no more than the matter requires, there being few simple ideas, whose modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men than these do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude; it suffices to my design, to shew how the mind receives them, such as they are, from sensation and reflection; and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense, or operation of our mind, has nevertheless, as all our other ideas, its original there. Some mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themselves, as well as all other men, got the first ideas, which they had of infinity, from sensation and reflection, in the method we have here set down.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of other simple modes.

Modes of motion.

§ 1. **T**H O' I have in the foregoing chapters shewn, how, from simple ideas, taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself, even to infinity; which, however, it may, of all others, seem most remote from any sensible perception; yet, at last, hath nothing in it, but what is made out of simple ideas, received into the mind by the senses, and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas: tho', I say, these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation, and suffice to shew how the mind comes by them; yet I shall, for method's sake, tho' briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex ideas.

§ 2. To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no sooner heard, but every one, who understands English, has presently in his mind distinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion. Modes of motion answer those of extension: swift and slow are two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the distances of time, and space, put together; so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion.

§ 3. THE like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of sound : by which we see, that from the sense of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number. Sounds also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes, of different length, put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a musician may have in his mind, when he hears, or makes, no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds so put together silently in his own fancy.

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XVIII.
Modes of
sounds.

§ 4. THOSE of colours are also very various : some we take notice of, as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, shades of the same colour. But since we very seldom make assemblages of colours, either for use, or delight, but figure is taken in also, and has its part in it ; as in painting, weaving, needle-works, &c. those which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour ; such as beauty, rainbow, &c.

Modes of
colours.

§ 5. ALL compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses. But they being such as generally we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing ; and, therefore, must be left without enumeration to the thoughts, and experience of my reader.

Modes of

§ 6. IN general it may be observed, that those simple modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea, tho' they are in themselves, many of them, very distinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no distinct names, nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men have neglected these modes, and given no names to them, as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them ; or because, when they were so distinguished, that knowledge would not be of general, or necessary use, I leave it to the thoughts of others : it is sufficient to my purpose to shew, that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection ; and that, when the mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex ideas. But tho' white, red, or sweet, &c. have not been modified, or made into complex ideas, by several combinations so as to be named, and thereby ranked into species ; yet some others of the simple ideas, viz. those of unity, duration, motion, &c. above instanced in, as also power and thinking, have been thus modified, to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them.

Some simple
modes have
no names.

§ 7. THE reason whereof, I suppose, has been this, that the great concernment of men being with men, one amongst another, the knowledge of men and their actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary ; and, therefore, they made ideas of actions, very nicely modified, and gave those complex ideas, names, that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions ; and that the things, they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men, in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another) is evident in the names, which in several arts have been found out, and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions, belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction, or discourses, about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men, not conversant about these operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the same language, are not understood : v. g. colshire, drilling, filtration, cohobation, are words standing for certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any, but those few, whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts, those names of them are not generally understood, but by smiths and chymists ; who having framed the complex ideas, which these words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hear-

Why some
modes have,
and others
have not
names.

BOOK II. ing of these names in communication, readily conceive those ideas in their minds; as by cohobation all the simple ideas of distilling, and the pouring the liquor distilled from any thing back upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see, that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names; and of modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of, in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the modes of thinking.

CHAP. XIX.

Sensation,
remem-
brance, con-
templation,
&c.

§ 1. **W**HEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding, by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs, without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation. When ideas float in our mind, without any reflection, or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it. When the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas, succeeding one another, in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention. When the mind, with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off, by the ordinary sollicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention, or study: sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these: and dreaming itself, is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects, with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion, nor under any choice, or conduct, of the understanding at all. And whether that, which we call extasy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§ 2. **T**HESE are some few instances of those various modes of thinking, which the mind may observe in itself, and so have as distinct ideas of, as it hath of white, and red, a square, or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, which are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It suffices to my present purpose to have shewn here, by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially, since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

The various
attention of
the mind in
thinking.

§ 3. **B**UT, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some, or other, always present, in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, tho' the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides, remarks their

their relations and circumstances, and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses, which, at another season, would produce very sensible perceptions: at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no impression.

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XIX.

§ 4. THIS difference of intention, and remission of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study, and very near minding nothing at all; every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses; and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking: but in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming; and last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation, without difficulty, leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes, even in a waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and, at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact, and constant experience, I ask, whether it be not probable, that thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul? since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission, but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.

Hence it is probable, that thinking is the action, not essence of the soul.

CHAP. XX.

Of modes of pleasure and pain.

§ 1. **A**MONGST the simple ideas, which we receive, both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For, as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain, or pleasure; so the thought, or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them, is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For to define them by the presence of good, or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to, or considered by us.

CHAP.
XX.

Pleasure and pain simple ideas.

§ 2. THINGS then are good, or evil, only in reference to pleasure, or pain. Good and That we call good, which is apt to cause, or increase pleasure, or diminish pain evil, what, in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce, or increase, any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body, or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; tho', in truth, they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts in the mind.

BOOK II.

Our passions
mov'd by
good and
evil.

Love.

Hatred.

Desire.

Joy.

Sorrow.

Hope.

Fear.

Despair.

§ 3. PLEASURE and pain, and that which causes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn : and, if we reflect on ourselves and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us ; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions.

§ 4. THUS any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in spring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him ; let an alteration of health, or constitution, destroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer.

§ 5. ON the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my business here to enquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our passions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I should remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate, insensible beings, is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain, which we receive from their use and application, any way, to our senses, tho' with their destruction : but hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness, or misery, is often the uneasiness or delight, which we find in ourselves, arising from a consideration of their very being, or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children, or friends, producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general, however caus'd in us.

§ 6. THE uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call desire ; which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action, is uneasiness. For, whatever good is propos'd, if its absence carries no displeasure nor pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it ; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual, or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopp'd or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good propos'd, as far as the uneasiness is cur'd or allay'd by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.

§ 7. JOY is a delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present, or assur'd, approaching possession of a good ; and we are then possess'd of any good, when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a man, almost starv'd, has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it : and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the possession of that good ; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

§ 8. SORROW is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer ; or the sense of a present evil.

§ 9. HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable, future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

§ 10. FEAR is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us.

§ 11. DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes producing uneasiness, or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.

§ 12. **ANGER** is uneasiness, or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge. CHAP. XX.

§ 13. **ENVY** is an uneasiness of mind, caus'd by the consideration of a good we desire, obtain'd by one we think should not have had it before us. Anger.
Envy.
What passions all men have.

§ 14. **THESE** two last, envy and anger, not being caus'd by pain and pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mix'd considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men; because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the rest, terminated purely, in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately: in fine, all these passions are mov'd by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure, or pain, some way or other annex'd to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least if a sensible, or voluntary agent) which has produc'd pain in us; because the fear it leaves, is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again. But this by the by.

§ 15. **BY** pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful, or unacceptable sensation or reflection. Pleasure and pain what.

§ 16. 'TIS farther to be consider'd, that in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is consider'd, and operates as a pleasure; and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

§ 17. **THE** passions too, have most of them in most persons operations on the body, and cause various changes in it, which, not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion. For shame, which is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem, which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it. Shame,

§ 18. I **WOULD** not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a discourse of the passions; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate discourse. I have only mention'd these here, as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain, resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanc'd in other modes of pleasure and pain, more simple than these; as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of musick; pain from captious, uninstruative wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study, in the search and discovery of truth. But the passions, being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and shew how the ideas we have of them are deriv'd from sensation and reflection. These instances do shew how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.

C H A P. XXI.

Of power.

§ 1. **T**HE mind being every day inform'd, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observ'd to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like CHAP. XXI.
This idea how got.

Book II. agents, and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas chang'd, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted: that the sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanch'd by the sun, whereby the yellowness is destroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like cases, the power, we consider, is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas: for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the observable change of its sensible ideas: nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas.

Power active
and passive.

§ 2. POWER, thus considered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: the one may be called active, and the other passive power. Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power, as its author, God is truly above all passive power; and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that, alone, which is capable of both active and passive power, may be worth consideration. I shall not now enter into that enquiry; my present business being not to search into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But since active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural substances, (as we shall see hereafter) and I mention them, as such, according to common apprehension; yet they being not perhaps so truly active powers, as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amiss, by this intimation, to direct our minds to the consideration of God and spirits, for the clearest idea of active powers.

Power in-
cludes rela-
tion.

§ 3. I CONFESS power includes in it some kind of relation, (a relation to action or change) as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively consider'd, does not? For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them, much more visibly: and sensible qualities, as colours, and smells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception, &c? And, if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include some kind of relation in them. Our idea, therefore, of power, I think, may well have a place among other simple ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of those, that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe.

The clearest
idea of ac-
tive power,
had from
spirit.

§ 4. WE are abundantly furnish'd with the idea of passive power, by almost all sorts of sensible things. In most of them we cannot avoid observing their sensible qualities; nay, their very substances to be in a continual flux: and therefore, with reason, we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have we of active power (which is the more proper signification of the word power) fewer instances; since whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power, somewhere, able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action, whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion; let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers, which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion, than an action in it. For, when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion: also, when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses

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in itself so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure idea of power, which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the passion. For so is motion, in a body impelled by another: the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion, being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the same blow, is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in our selves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest. So that it seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of bodies, by our senses, but a very imperfect obscure idea of active power, since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action, either motion, or thought. But if, from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it serves as well to my purpose, sensation being one of those ways, whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to consider here, by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation.

§ 5. THIS at least I think evident, that we find in our selves a power to be- Will and un-
gin, or forbear, continue, or end, several actions of our minds, and motions of derstanding,
our bodies, barely by a thought, or preference, of the mind, ordering, or, as two powers.
it were, commanding the doing, or not doing, such or such a particular action. This power, which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition, or willing. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order, or command, of the mind, is called voluntary: and whatsoever action is performed, without such a thought of the mind, is called involuntary. The power of perception is that, which we call the understanding. Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The perception of the signification of signs. 3. The perception of the connexion, or repugnancy, agreement, or disagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All these are attributed to the understanding, or perceptive power, tho' it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.

§ 6. THESE powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are Faculties.
usually called by another name: and the ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used, as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul, that performed those actions of understanding and volition. For, when we say, the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c. tho' these, and the like expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts, more by the evidence of things, than the sound of words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense; yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of faculties, has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them.

§ 7. EVERY one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin, or forbear, continue, or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind, over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity. Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.

§ 8. ALL

Book II.

Liberty,
what.

§ 8. ALL the actions, that we have any idea of, reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion; so far as a man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference, or direction, of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance, or forbearance, are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing, or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, tho', perhaps, the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty, is the idea of a power in any agent to do, or forbear, any particular action, according to the determination, or thought, of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him, according to his volition, there he is not at liberty, that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be, where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little confideration of an obvious instance or two, may make this clear.

Supposes the
understand-
ing and will.

§ 9. A TENNIS ball, whether in motion, by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not, by any one, taken to be a free agent. If we enquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and, consequently, not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice versa; and, therefore, has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and rest, come under our idea of necessary, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For tho' he has volition, tho' he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop, or cessation, of that motion, follows not upon his volition; and, therefore, therein he is not free. So a man striking himself, or his friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition, or the direction of his mind, to stop, or forbear, no body thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by necessity and constraint.

Belongs not
to volition.

§ 10. AGAIN, suppose a man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. prefers his stay to going away: I ask, is not this stay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it; and yet being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall chuse, or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther. For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting; there liberty, and our notion of it, presently ceases.

Voluntary
opposed to
involuntary,
not to ne-
cessary.

§ 11. WE have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power, by any thought, or volition, to stop; and, therefore, in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that, tho' he wills it ever so much, he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion, (as in that odd disease called chorea sancti viti) but he is perpetually dancing: he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving, as a stone that falls, or a tennis-ball struck with a racket. On the other side, a palsy, or the stocks, hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom; tho' the fitting still even of a paralytick, whilst he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer

fer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the state he is in, to its absence or change, tho' necessity has made it in itself unalterable.

§ 12. As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body shall touch any other, or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is, in respect of his ideas, as much at liberty, as he is in respect of bodies he rests on: he can, at pleasure, remove himself from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations: and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop, or continue, begin, or forbear, any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again.

§ 13. WHEREVER thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act, or necessity, forbear, according to the direction of thought, there necessity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning, or continuation, of any action, is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called compulsion; when the hindering, or stopping, any action, is contrary to his volition, it is called restraint. Agents, that have no thought, no volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents.

§ 14. If this be so, (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long-agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible, question, viz. whether man's will be free, or no? For, if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask, whether man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question, as either of these; because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue: and, when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute, or modification of the will, which is also but a power.

§ 15. SUCH is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds, that I must here warn my reader, that ordering, directing, chusing, preferring, &c. which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express volition, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills. For example, preferring, which seems, perhaps, best to express the act of volition, does it not precisely. For tho' a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it? Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this? And is that faculty any thing more in effect than a power, the power of the mind to determine its thought, to the producing, continuing, or stopping any action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be denied, that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their doing, or omission, either to other, has that faculty called will? Will then is nothing but such a power. Liberty, on the other side, is the power a man has to do, or forbear doing, any particular action, ac-

BOOK II. cording as its doing, or forbearance, has the actual preference in the mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he himself wills it.

Powers belong to agents.

§ 16. IT is plain then, that the will is nothing but one power, or ability, and freedom another power, or ability; so that to ask, whether the will has freedom, is to ask, whether one power has another power, one ability another ability? a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves? So that this way of putting the question, viz. whether the will be free? is, in effect, to ask, whether the will be a substance, and agent? or, at least, to suppose it, since freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else. If freedom can with any propriety of speech be applied to power, it may be attributed to the power that is in a man to produce, or forbear producing motion in parts of his body, by choice, or preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is freedom itself. But if any one should ask, whether freedom were free, he would be suspected not to understand well what he said; and he would be thought to deserve Midas's ears, who knowing that rich was a denomination from the possession of riches, should demand whether riches themselves were rich?

§ 17. HOWEVER, the name faculty, which men have given to this power, called the will, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will, as acting, may, by an appropriation that disguises its true sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity; yet the will in truth signifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer, or chuse: and when the will, under the name of a faculty, is considered as it is, barely as an ability to do something, the absurdity in saying it is free, or not free, will easily discover itself. For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties, as distinct beings that can act, (as we do, when we say the will orders, and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which those actions are produced, which are but several modes of motion; as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties, by which the actions of chusing and perceiving are produced, which are but several modes of thinking: and we may as properly say, that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances; as that the will chuses, or that the understanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys, or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say, that the power of speaking directs the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys, or disobeys, the power of speaking.

§ 18. THIS way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion. For these being all different powers in the mind, or in the man, to do several actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the power to do one action, is not operated on by the power of doing another action. For the power of thinking operates not on the power of chusing, nor the power of chusing on the power of thinking; no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing, or the power of singing on the power of dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will easily perceive: and yet this is it which we say, when we thus speak, that the will operates on the understanding, or the understanding on the will.

§ 19. I GRANT, that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition, or exercising the power a man has to chuse; or the actual choice of the mind, the cause of actual thinking on this, or that thing: as the actual singing of such a tune, may be the occasion of dancing such a dance, and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune. But in all these it is not one power that operates on another: but it is the mind that operates, and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do. For powers are relations, not agents: and that which has the power, or not the power, to operate, is that alone which is, or is not free, and not the power itself. For freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not, a power to act.

§ 20. THE

§ 20. THE attributing to faculties, that which belonged not to them, has given an occasion to this way of talking: but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves, as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, has helped us in the knowledge of physick. Not that I deny there are faculties, both in the body and mind: they both of them have their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate. Nor do I deny, that those words, and the like, are to have their place in the common use of languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and philosophy itself, tho' it likes not a gaudy dress, yet, when it appears in publick, must have so much complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity. But the fault has been, that faculties have been spoken of, and represented as so many distinct agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer, to say, that it was the digestive faculty. What was it that made any thing come out of the body? the expulsive faculty. What moved? the motive faculty. And so in the mind, the intellectual faculty, or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded. Which is in short to say, that the ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to understand, understood. For faculty, ability, and power, I think, are but different names of the same things: which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will I think amount to thus much; that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest, motion by something able to move, and understanding by something able to understand. And in truth it would be very strange if it should be otherwise; as strange as it would be, for a man to be free without being able to be free.

§ 21. To return then to the enquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free. Thus, I think, But to the agent or man.

1. THAT so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa make it to exist, or not exist, so far he is free. For if I can by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa; it is evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words, or silence, I am at liberty to speak, or hold my peace; and as far as this power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it; and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. So that in respect of actions, within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free, as it is possible for freedom to make him.

§ 22. BUT the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, tho' it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this: freedom, unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this farther question, whether a man be free to will? which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine, In respect of willing, a man is not free.

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§ 23. 2. THAT willing, or volition, being an action and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable, that the action, depending on his will, should exist, or not exist; and its existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not existence, of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other, i.e. prefer the one to the other; since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing, or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts; a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

§ 24. THIS then is evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing: liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it. But, if a man, sitting still, has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; so likewise a man falling down a precipice, tho' in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no: He must necessarily prefer one, or the other of them, walking or not walking; and so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment, that we are awake, in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on, or proposed to the will, till the time they are to be done: and in all such actions, as I have shewn, the mind in respect of willing, has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to, or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

The will determined by something without it.

§ 25. SINCE then it is plain, that in most cases a man is not at liberty, whether he will or no; the next thing demanded, is, whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced, that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases; is to ask, whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleas'd with what he is pleas'd with? A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and so on in infinitum.

§ 26. To avoid these, and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use, than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in our understandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions that

that are raised about them ; I suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much easier resolved ; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity.

§ 27. FIRST then, it is carefully to be remembered, that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action upon our volition of it ; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do ; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case ; because the doing, or forbearance, of that particular action, is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room, twenty foot square, being at the north-side of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot southward, because he can walk, or not walk it ; but is not, at the same time, at liberty to do the contrary, i. e. to walk twenty foot northward.

IN this then consists freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall chuse or will.

§ 28. SECONDLY, we must remember, that volition, or willing, is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action proposed ; sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are proposed, tho' mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being often as weighty in their consequences, as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for actions too : but this I say, that I may not be mistaken, if for brevity sake I speak thus.

§ 29. THIRDLY, the will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction : to the question, what is it determines the will ? the true and proper answer is, the mind. For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way. If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, what determines the will ? is this, what moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion, or rest ? And to this I answer, the motive for continuing in the same state, or action, is only the present satisfaction in it ; the motive to change, is always some uneasiness : nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness sake we will call determining of the will ; which I shall more at large explain.

§ 30. BUT in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that tho' I have above endeavoured to express the act of volition by chusing, preferring, and the like terms, that signify desire as well as volition, for want of other words, to mark that act of the mind, whose proper name is willing, or volition ; yet it being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it, by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does, when it wills, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions, that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary ; because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other ; and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter ; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his

Book II. thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will, or power of volition, is conversant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any action, which it takes to be in its power. This well considered, plainly shews that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire; which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary. A man, who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doze of pain in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet, or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it) tho' yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action, that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident, that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

Uneasiness
determines
the will.

§ 31. To return then to the enquiry, what is it that determines the will, in regard to our actions? And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain, or uneasiness felt, and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire, no body feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent, positive good; and here also the desire, and uneasiness is equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire equal to itself: because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on, and considered without desire. But so much as there is any where of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

Desire is uneasiness.

§ 32. THAT desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope (which is not much different from it) that it being deferred, makes the heart sick? and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire; which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, give me children, give me the thing desired, or I die? Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

The uneasiness of desire determines the will.

§ 33. GOOD and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good; either negative, as indolence to one in pain, or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness, that determines the will, to the successive, voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends; I shall endeavour to shew, both from experience, and the reason of the thing.

This the spring of action.

§ 34. WHEN a man is perfectly content with the state he is in, which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness, what industry, what action, what will

will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our all-wise maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their species. For, I think, we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps, in this world, little, or no pain at all. "It is better to marry than to burn," says St. Paul; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt, pushes us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw, or allure.

§ 35. It seems so established and settled a maxim, by the general consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first published my thoughts on this subject, I took it for granted; and, I imagine, that by a great many I shall be thought more excusable, for having then done so, than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion. But yet, upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, tho' apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. Convince a man ever so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own, that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury; yet, as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not: his will never is determined to any action, that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man, who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life; yet, till he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed, greater good; but any other uneasinesses he feels in himself, shall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other side, let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the course he follows; yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the habitual thirst after his cups, at the usual time, drives him to the tavern, tho' he has in his view the loss of health and plenty, and, perhaps, of the joys of another life: the least of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glass of wine, or the idle chat of a soaking club. It is not for want of viewing the greater good; for he sees and acknowledges it, and, in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take resolutions to pursue the greater good; but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns, the greater, acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action; which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion, tho' he at the same time makes secret promises to himself, that he will do so no more; this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods. And thus he is, from time to time, in the state of that unhappy complainer, "*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*:" which sentence, allowed for true, and made good by constant experience, may this, and, possibly, no other way, be easily made intelligible.

§ 36. If we enquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident in fact, and examine why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will, and determines its choice, we shall find, that we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once; the present uneasiness, that we are under, does naturally determine the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions; so far as whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend our selves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and uneasiness

The greatest positive good determines not the will, but uneasiness.

Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to happiness.

BOOK II. *ness being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconsistent with happiness, spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have; a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And therefore that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards happiness.*

Because uneasiness alone is present. § 37. ANOTHER reason, why it is uneasiness alone determines the will, may be this; because that alone is present, and it is against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not. It may be said, that absent good may, by contemplation, be brought home to the mind, and made present. The idea of it, indeed, may be in the mind, and viewed as present there; but nothing will be in the mind as a present good, able to counter-balance the removal of any uneasiness which we are under, till it raises our desire; and the uneasiness of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then, the idea in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other ideas, the object of bare unactive speculation, but operates not on the will, nor sets us on work; the reason whereof I shall shew by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively representations set before their minds of the unspeakable joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both possible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their happiness here? And so the prevailing uneasiness of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills; and all that while they take not one step, are not one jot moved towards the good things of another life, considered as ever so great.

Because all, who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not. § 38. WERE the will determined by the views of good, as it appears, in contemplation, greater or less to the understanding, which is the state of all absent good, and that which in the received opinion the will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not see how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed and considered as possible. For all absent good, by which alone, barely proposed and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible, but not infallibly certain; it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs: and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever standing still, or directing our actions to any other end. The eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches, or honour, or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to our selves, tho' we should grant these the more probable to be attained: for nothing future is yet in possession, and so the expectation, even in these, may deceive us. If it were so, that the greater good in view determines the will, so great a good once proposed could not but seize the will, and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever letting it go again: for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

But any great uneasiness is never neglected. THIS would be the state of the mind, and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations, were it determined by that which is considered, and in view the greater good; but that it is not so, is visible in experience: the infinitely greatest, confessed good being often neglected, to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles. But tho' the greatest allowed, even everlasting, unspeakable good, which has sometimes moved and affected the mind, does not steadfastly hold the will, yet we see any very great and prevailing uneasiness, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not go: by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the will. Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love, or the impatient desire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent; and the will, thus determined, never lets the understanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind, and powers of the body are uninterruptedly employed that way, by the determinations of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness.

finess as long as it lasts; whereby it seems to me evident, that the will, or power, of setting us upon one action in preference to all other, is determined in us by uneasiness. And whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.

§ 39. I HAVE hitherto chiefly instanced in the uneasiness of desire, as that which determines the will; because that is the chief and most sensible, and the will seldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action performed, without some desire accompanying it; which, I think, is the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness, which makes up, or, at least, accompanies most of the other passions, as wholly excluded in the case. Aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, &c. have each their uneasiness too, and thereby influence the will. These passions are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others; tho' usually in discourse and contemplation, that carries the name which operates strongest, and appears most in the present state of the mind: nay there is, I think, scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it. I am sure, wherever there is uneasiness, there is desire: for we constantly desire happiness; and whatever we feel of uneasiness, so much it is certain we want of happiness, even in our own opinion, let our state and condition otherwise be what it will. Besides, the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight, and that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the desire to continue it, and fear to lose it: and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to some new action, and the present delight neglected.

Desire accompanies all uneasiness.

§ 40. BUT we being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency, in determining the will, to the next action; and, to that, the answer is, that ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will, being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to suppose an intelligent being, designedly, to act for an end, only to lose its labour, for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and, therefore, very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they, in that case, put us not upon endeavours. But these set a-part, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that, which ordinarily determines the will successively, in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action, that is constantly felt, and, for the most part, determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of our's, and nothing else: for we producing nothing, by our willing it, but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no farther.

The most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will.

§ 41. IF it be farther asked, what it is moves desire? I answer, happiness, All desire and that alone. Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; "it is what eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions, made by several instances of delight and joy, on the one side, and torment and sorrow, on the other; which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain; there being pleasure and pain of the mind, as well as the body: "with him is fulness of joy, and pleasure for evermore." Or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind; tho' some have their rise in the mind, from thought, others in the body, from certain modifications of motion.

§ 42. HAPPINESS then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain: and the lowest degree of what can be

Happiness, called what.

BOOK II. called happiness, is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now, because pleasure and pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds, or our bodies, and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us, is that we call good; and what is apt to produce pain in us, we call evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and misery. Farther, tho' what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil: yet it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because, when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. So that, if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison: for the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and vice versa.

What good
is desired,
what not.

§ 43. THO' this be that which is called good and evil; and all good be the proper object of desire in general; yet all good, even seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man's desire, but only that part, or so much of it, as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness. All other good, however great in reality, or appearance, excites not a man's desires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness, wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon, without desire, pass by, and be content without. There is no body, I think, so senseless, as to deny, that there is pleasure in knowledge: and, for the pleasures of sense, they have too many followers to let it be questioned, whether men are taken with them, or no. Now, let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge: tho' each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in what the other pursues; yet neither of them, making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it. But yet, as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst makes him uneasy, he, whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good cheer, poignant sauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, tho', possibly, with great indifference, what wholesome food comes in his way. And, on the other side, the epicure buckles to study, when shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress, shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of knowledge. Thus, how much soever men are in earnest, and constant in pursuit of happiness, yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confessed good, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness without it. Tho' as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneasiness without being moved. And, therefore, being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their happiness, as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they begin to desire it.

Why the
greatest good
is not al-
ways desired.

§ 44. THIS, I think, any one may observe in himself, and others, that the greater visible good does not always raise men's desires, in proportion to the greatness, it appears, and is acknowledged to have: tho' every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pain, whatever it be; makes a part of our present misery: but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our misery. If it did, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which are not in our possession. All uneasiness, therefore, being removed; a moderate portion of good serves at present to content men; and some few degrees of pleasure, in
a suc-

a succession of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness, wherein they can be satisfy'd. If this were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions, to which our wills are so often determin'd, and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives; which remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination of will, or desire, to the greatest apparent good. That this is so, I think few people need go far from home to be convinc'd. And indeed, in this life, there are not many, whose happiness reaches so far, as to afford them a constant train of moderate, mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness; and yet they could be content to stay here for ever: tho' they cannot deny, but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys, after this life, far surpassing all the good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but see, that it is more possible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches or pleasure, which they pursue, and for which they neglect that eternal state: but yet, in full view of this difference, satisfy'd of the possibility of a perfect, secure, and lasting happiness in a future state, and under a clear conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilst they bound their happiness within some little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of it; their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determin'd to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

§ 45. THE ordinary necessities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneasiness of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weariness with labour, and sleepiness, in their constant returns, &c. To which, if, besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness (as itch after honour, power, or riches, &c.) which acquired habits, by fashion, example, and education, have settled in us, and a thousand other irregular desires, which custom has made natural to us; we shall find, that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter, absent good. We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the sollicitation of our natural, or adopted desires; but a constant succession of uneasinesses, out of that stock, which natural wants, or acquired habits, have heap'd up, take the will in their turns: and no sooner is one action dispatch'd, which, by such a determination of the will, we are set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work. For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at present press'd with, being the getting out of misery, and consequently the first thing to be done, in order to happiness, absent good, tho' thought on, confess'd, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappiness in its absence, is juttled out, to make way for the removal of those uneasinesses we feel; till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind, given some relish of it, and rais'd in us some desire: which then, beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness, stands upon fair terms with the rest, to be satisfy'd; and so, according to its greatness and pressure, comes in its turn to determine the will.

§ 46. AND thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good propos'd, it is in our power to raise our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby, in its turn and place, it may come to work upon the will, and be pursu'd. For good, tho' appearing, and allowed ever so great, yet till it has rais'd desires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the sphere of its activity; our wills being under the determination only of those uneasinesses, which are present to us, which (whilst we have any) are always solliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination; the ballancing, when there is any in the mind, being only which desire shall be next satisfy'd, which uneasiness first removed. Whereby it comes to pass, that, as long as any uneasiness, any desire remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as such, to come at the will, or at all to determine it. Because, as has been said, the first step, in our endeavours after happiness, being to get wholly out of the confines of misery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leisure for nothing else, till every uneasiness we feel, be perfectly removed: which, in the multitude of

wants

Why, not
being desir-
ed, it moves
not the will.

Due consid-
eration raises
desire.

BOOK II. wants and desires, we are beset with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

The power; to suspend the prosecution of any desire, makes way for consideration.

§ 45. THERE being in us a great many uneasinesses, always soliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does, for the most part, but not always. For the mind having, in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right, comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults, which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this, or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For, during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good, or evil, of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination.

To be determined by our own judgment, is no restraint to liberty.

§ 48. THIS is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it; it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty: and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good, or evil, that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of an intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet: he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head, or eyes, from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing, but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we chuse. And therefore, every man is put under a necessity, by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing, by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do: else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills, and acts for it. For, if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it's plain, he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will and not will it at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted!

The freest agents are so determined.

§ 49. IF we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free than we are. And if it were fit, for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do,

I think

I think we might say, that God himself cannot chuse what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. CHAP. XXI.

§ 50. BUT, to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask, "would any one be a changeling, because he is less determined by wise considerations than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self?" If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, which keeps us from chusing, or doing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are only the freemen: but yet, I think, no body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already. The constant desire of happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no body, I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is so, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That in this state of ignorance we short-sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way: examination, is consulting a guide. The determination of the will upon enquiry, is following the direction of that guide: and he, that has a power to act or not to act, according as such determination directs, is a free agent; such determination abridges not that power wherein liberty consists. He that has his chains knocked off, and the prison-doors set open to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes; tho' his preference be determined to stay, by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather, or want of other lodging. He ceases not to be free, tho' the desire of some convenience to be had there absolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his prison.

§ 51. As therefore, the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so the care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty. The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which, as such, our desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance with our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing, preferable good, till we have duly examined, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness: and therefore, till we are as much informed upon this enquiry as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the case demands; we are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire, in particular cases.

§ 52. THIS is the hinge, on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their constant endeavours after, and steady prosecution of true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution, in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves, whether that particular thing, which is then proposed, or desired, lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good: for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness, is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to mistake or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss, the same necessity, with the same force, establishes suspense, deliberation, and scrutiny of each successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness, and mislead us from it. This, as seems to me, is the great privilege of finite, intellectual beings; and I desire it may be well considered, whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can suspend their desires, and stop them

A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness, no abridgment of liberty.

The necessity of pursuing true happiness, the foundation of all liberty.

The reason of it.

BOOK II. *them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs. For since the will supposes knowledge, to guide its choice, all that we can do, is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good, and evil, of what we desire. What follows, after that, follows in a chain of consequences linked one to another, all depending on the last determination of the judgment; which, whether it shall be, upon a hasty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power: experience shewing us, that, in most cases, we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire.*

Govern-
ment of our
passions, the
right im-
provement
of liberty.

§ 53. BUT if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of our own minds, to consider thoroughly, and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was, and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful father. But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our passions, so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavour. In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true, intrinsic good, or ill, that is in things, and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire of itself there, till by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's power, by making resolutions to himself, such as he may keep, is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince, or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.

How men
come to pur-
sue different
counsels.

§ 54. FROM what has been said, it is easy to give account, how it comes to pass, that tho' all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry them so contrarily, and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices, that men make in the world, do not argue that they do not all pursue good; but that the same thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of pursuits shews, that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing, or chuse the same way to it. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life, why one followed study and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting; why one chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches; would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own happiness, but because their happiness was placed in different things. And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes: if you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.

§ 55. THE mind has a different relish, as well as the palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with riches, or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in) as you would to satisfy all men's hunger with cheese, or lobsters; which, tho' very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: and many people would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to those dishes which are a feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the philosophers of old did in vain enquire whether *summum bonum* consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation. And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plumbs, or nuts; and have divided them-
selves

selves into sects upon it. For as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things, which produce the greatest pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different men, are very different things. If, therefore, men in this life only have hope, if in this life they can only enjoy, it is not strange, nor unreasonable, that they should seek their happiness, by avoiding all things that displease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety, and difference. For if there be no prospect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right, let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to-morrow we shall die. This, I think, may serve to shew us the reason, why, tho' all men's desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the same object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right; supposing them only, like a company of poor insects, whereof some are bees, delighted with flowers and their sweetness; others beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands; which, having enjoyed for a season, they should cease to be, and exist no more for ever.

§ 56. THESE things duly weighed, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the state of human liberty. Liberty, it is plain, consists in a power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we will. This cannot be denied. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a man consecutive to volition, it is farther enquired, "whether he be at liberty to will, or no." And to this it has been answered, that in most cases a man is not at liberty to forbear the act of volition; he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing, and that is the chusing of a remote good as an end to be pursued. Here a man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for, or against, the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be really of a nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy, or no. For, when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice, on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a man may justly incur punishment, tho' it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does will that, which he then judges to be good. For, tho' his will be always determined by that, which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not: because, by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil; which, however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it. The eternal law and nature of things must not be altered, to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If the neglect, or abuse, of the liberty he had, to examine what would really and truly make for his happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages, that follow on it, must be imputed to his own election. He had a power to suspend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived, than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment.

WHAT has been said, may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet, since men are always constant, and in earnest, in matters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, how men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to chuse that, which, by their own confession, has made them miserable?

§ 57. To account for the various and contrary ways men take, tho' all aim at being happy, we must consider whence the various uneasinesses, that determine the will in the preference of each voluntary action, have their rise.

I. SOME

How men
come to
chuse ill.

BOOK II.

From bodily
pains.

1. SOME of them come from causes not in our power; such as are often the pains of the body from want, disease, or outward injuries, as the rack, &c. which, when present and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will, and turn the courses of men's lives from virtue, piety, and religion, and what before they judged to lead to happiness; every one not endeavouring, or, thro' disuse, not being able, by the contemplation of remote and future good, to raise in himself desires of them, strong enough to counter-balance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily torments, and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness. A neighbour country has been of late a tragical theatre, from which we might fetch instances, if there needed any, and the world did not, in all countries and ages, furnish examples enough to confirm that received observation, "necessitas cogit ad turpia"; and therefore there is great reason for us to pray, "lead us not into temptation."

From wrong
desires arising from
wrong judgment.

Our judgment of present good, or evil, always right.

2. OTHER uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good; which desires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we make, and the relish we have of any absent good: in both which we are apt to be variously misled, and that by our own fault.

§ 58. IN the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their desires are misled. For, as to present happiness and misery, when that alone comes in consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a man never chuses amiss; he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their present enjoyment are what they seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same. For the pain, or pleasure, being just so great, and no greater than it is felt, the present good, or evil, is really so much as it appears. And, therefore, were every action of our's concluded within itself, and drew no consequences after it, we should, undoubtedly, never err in our choice of good; we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest industry, and of starving with hunger and cold, set together before us, no body would be in doubt which to chuse: were the satisfaction of a lust, and the joys of heaven, offered at once to any one's present possession, he would not balance, or err in the determination of his choice.

§ 59. BUT since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery, that depend on them, along with them, in their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to absent good, according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making, or increase, of our happiness. It is our opinion of such a necessity, that gives it its attraction: without that, we are not moved by absent good. For in this narrow scantling of capacity, which we are accustomed to, and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once, which, when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us think our selves happy; it is not all remote, and even apparent good, that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment we have, sufficing for our present happiness, we desire not to venture the change; since we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new uneasiness comes, this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness.

From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness.

§ 60. THEIR aptness, therefore, to conclude, that they can be happy without it, is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest, absent good. For whilst such thoughts possess them, the joys of a future state move them not; they have little concern, or uneasiness about them; and the will, free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses, which it then feels, in its want of, and longings after them. Change but a man's view of these things; let him see, that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness; let him look into the future state of bliss, or misery, and see there God, the

the righteous judge, ready to render every man according to his deeds; to them who, by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto every soul that doth evil, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish: to him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different state of perfect happiness, or misery, that attends all men after this life, depending on their behaviour here, the measures of good and evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For since nothing of pleasure and pain, in this life, can bear any proportion to endless happiness, or exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter; actions, in his power, will have their preference, not according to the transient pleasure, or pain, that accompanies, or follows them, here, but as they serve to secure that perfect, durable happiness hereafter.

§ 61. BUT to account more particularly for the misery, that men often bring on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue happiness, we must consider how things come to be represented to our desires, under deceitful appearances: and that is by the judgment, pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far this reaches, and what are the causes of wrong judgment, we must remember that things are judged good, or bad, in a double sense.

FIRST, That which is properly good, or bad, is nothing but barely pleasure, or pain.

SECONDLY, But because not only present pleasure and pain, but that also, which is apt, by its efficacy, or consequences, to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper object of our desires, and apt to move a creature that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain, are considered as good and evil.

§ 62. THE wrong judgment that misleads us, and makes the will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these. The wrong judgment I am here speaking of, is not what one man may think of the determination of another, but what every man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness; it is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his satisfaction, and the compleating of his happiness, but only by wrong judgment. I shall not here speak of that mistake, which is the consequence of invincible error, which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment; but of that wrong judgment, which every man himself must confess to be so.

§ 63. I. THEREFORE as to present pleasure and pain, the mind, as has been said, never mistakes that which is really good, or evil; that which is the greater pleasure, or the greater pain, is really just as it appears. But tho' present pleasure and pain shew their difference and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet, when we compare present pleasure, or pain, with future, (which is usually the case in the most important determinations of the will) we often make wrong judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different positions of distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote: and so it is with pleasures and pains; the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus most men, like spend-thrift heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come; and so for small matters in possession, part with great ones in reversion. But that this is a wrong judgment, every one must allow, let his pleasure consist in whatever it will: since that which is future, will certainly come to be present; and then having the same advantage of nearness, will shew itself in its full dimensions, and discover his wilful mistake, who judged of it by unequal measures. Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glass, with that sick stomach and aking head, which, in some men, are sure to follow

Book II. not many hours after; I think no body, whatever pleasure he had in his cups, would, on these conditions, ever let wine touch his lips; which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But, if pleasure, or pain, can be so lessened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be so by a farther distance, to a man that will not by a right judgment do what time will, i. e. bring it home upon himself, and consider it as present, and there take its true dimensions? This is the way we usually impose on our selves, in respect of bare pleasure and pain, or the true degrees of happiness, or misery: the future loses its just proportion, and what is present obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong judgment, whereby the absent are not only lessened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when men enjoy what they can at present, and make sure of that, concluding amiss, that no evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the greatness of future good and evil, which is that we are here speaking of; but in another sort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good, or evil, as it is considered to be the cause and procurement of pleasure, or pain, that will follow from it.

Causes of
this.

§ 64. THE cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present pleasure, or pain, with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow constitution of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, much less any pleasure almost, whilst pain possesses us. The present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent: or if among our pleasures, there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures: a little bitter mingled in our cup, leaves no relish of the sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because, under the present pain, we find not our selves capable of any the least degree of happiness. Men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this: the pain that any one actually feels, is still of all other the worst; and it is with anguish they cry out, "any rather than this; nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer." And, therefore, our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil, before all things, as the first necessary condition to our happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us. And because the abstinence from a present pleasure, that offers itself, is a pain, nay, oftentimes, a very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does, and lessens in our thoughts what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

§ 65. ADD to this, that absent good, or which is the same thing, future pleasure, especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with, seldom is able to counter-balance any uneasiness, either of pain, or desire, which is present. For its greatness being no more, than what shall be really tasted when enjoyed, men are apt enough to lessen that, to make it give place to any present desire; and conclude with themselves, that, when it comes to trial, it may possibly not answer the report, or opinion, that generally passes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themselves have enjoyed, with great pleasure and delight, at one time, has proved insipid, or nauseous, at another; and, therefore, they see nothing in it, for which they should forego a present enjoyment. But that this is a false way of judging, when applied to the happiness of another life, they must confess; unless they will say, "God cannot make those happy he designs to be so." For that being intended for a state of happiness, it must certainly be agreeable to every one's wish and desire: could we suppose their relishes as different there, as they are here, yet the manna in heaven will suit every one's palate. Thus much of the

wrong

wrong judgment we make of present and future pleasure, and pain, when they are compared together, and so the absent considered as future. CHAP. XXI.

§ 66. II. As to things good, or bad, in their consequences, and by the aptness is in them to procure us good, or evil, in the future, we judge amiss several ways. In considering consequences of actions.

I. WHEN we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them, as in truth there does.

2. WHEN we judge, that, tho' the consequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out, or else by some means be avoided, as by industry, address, change, repentance, &c. That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to shew in every particular, if I would examine them at large singly: but I shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less, upon uncertain guesses, and before a due examination be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every one must confess, especially if he considers the usual causes of this wrong judgment, whereof these following are some.

§ 67. I. IGNORANCE: he that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss. Causes of this.

II. INADVERTENCY: when a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and present ignorance, which misleads our judgments, as much as the other. Judging is as it were ballancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lie. If therefore, either side be huddled up in haste, and several of the sums, that should have gone into the reckoning, be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment, as if it were a perfect ignorance. That, which most commonly causes this, is the prevalence of some present pleasure, or pain, heightened by our feeble, passionate nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search and see, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty the understanding would be to no purpose: and without understanding, liberty (if it could be) would signify nothing. If a man sees what would do him good, or harm, what would make him happy, or miserable, without being able to move himself one step towards, or from it, what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better, than if he were driven up and down, as a bubble, by the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulse from without, or from within, is little odds. The first therefore, and great use of liberty, is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exercise of freedom is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires. How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion, the prevalence of fashion, or acquired indispositions, do severally contribute on occasion to these wrong judgments, I shall not here farther enquire. I shall only add one other false judgment, which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, tho' of great influence.

§ 68. ALL men desire happiness, that's past doubt; but, as has been already observed, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endeared to them, to rest satisfy'd in that; and so being happy, till some new desire, by making them uneasy, disturbs that happiness, and shews them that they are not so, they look no farther; nor is the will determined to any action, in pursuit of any other known, or apparent good. For since we find, that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our desires on every apparent, greater good, unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occasion to men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be necessary to their happiness, which really is so. This mistake misleads us, both in the choice of the good

BOOK II. good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not necessary to it; when a man misses his great end, happiness, he will acknowledge he judged not right. That which contributes to this mistake, is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the actions, which are the way to this end; it seeming so preposterous a thing to men, to make themselves unhappy in order to happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

We can change the agreeableness, or disagreeableness, in things.

§ 69. THE last enquiry, therefore, concerning this matter is, “whether it be in a man’s power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompany any sort of action?” And as to that, it is plain, in many cases, he can. Men may, and should correct their palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think, that men cannot change the displeasingness, or indifferency, that is in actions, into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice, application, and custom in most. Bread, or tobacco, may be neglected, where they are shewn to be useful to health, because of an indifferency, or distrelish to them; reason and consideration at first recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant. That this is so in virtue too, is very certain. Actions are pleasing, or displeasing, either in themselves, or considered as a means to a greater and more desirable end. The eating of a well-seasoned dish, suited to a man’s palate, may move the mind, by the delight itself that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end: to which the consideration of the pleasure there is in health and strength (to which that meat is subservient) may add a new gusto, able to make us swallow an ill-relished potion. In the latter of these, any action is rendered more or less pleasing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to it, or necessary connection with it: but the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired, or increased, by use and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on with aversion; and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what possibly, in the first essay, displeased us. Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure, into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us. Tho’ this be very visible, and every one’s experience shews him he can do so: yet it is a part in the conduct of men, towards their happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox, if it be said, that men can make things, or actions, more or less pleasing to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits change our pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary, or conducive to our happiness. This every one must confess he can do, and when happiness is lost, and misery overtakes him, he will confess he did amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it: and I ask every one, whether he has not often done so?

Preference of vice to virtue, a manifest wrong judgment.

§ 70. I SHALL not now enlarge any farther, on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power, whereby men mislead themselves. This would make a volume, and is not my business. But whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is in their power, may put men out of their way to happiness, and distract them, as we see, into so different courses of life, this yet is certain, that morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice, in any one that will but consider: and he, that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his understanding

standing he should. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established, as the enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine the choice, against whatever pleasure or pain this life can shew, when the eternal state is considered, but in its bare possibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He, that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one; must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which it is very possible may overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible, uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently so, tho' the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure: which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession: nay, all things rightly considered, have, I think, even the worst part here. But, when infinite happiness is put in one scale against infinite misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can, without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery, which if he mis, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass. If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment, that does not presently see, to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given? I have forbore to mention any thing of the certainty, or probability, of a future state, designing here to shew the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes, upon his own principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at least possible.

§ 71. To conclude this enquiry into human liberty, which as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, tho' he could not particularly shew it me, I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I have made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another, that discovery opened to me this present view, which here, in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which in short is this: "Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs." A power to direct the operative faculties to motion, or rest, in particular instances, is that which we call the will. That, which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is some present uneasiness; which is, or at least is always accompanied with, that of desire. Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it; because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness: but every good, nay, every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness. For all that we desire, is only to be happy. But, tho' this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good, which we then desire, makes a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment, upon that examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were determined by any thing but his own desire, guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty, by some, is placed in an indifference of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish they, who lay so much stress on such an antecedent indifference, as they call it, had told us plainly,

BOOK II. whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to state it between them, i. e. immediately after the judgment of the understanding, and before the determination of the will, because the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding: and to place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see, nor say, any thing of it; at least it places it in a subject, incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, but in consequence of thought and judgment. I am not nice about phrases, and therefore, consent to say, with those that love to speak so, that liberty is placed in indifferency: but it is an indifferency, which remains after the judgment of the understanding; yea, even after the determination of the will: and that is an indifferency not of the man (for after he has once judged which is best, viz. to do, or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an indifferency of the operative powers of the man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the decree of the will, are in a state, which, if one pleases, may be called indifferency; and as far as this indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no farther: v. g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it rest, that operative power is indifferent to move, or not to move my hand: I am then in that respect perfectly free. My will determines that operative power to rest, I am yet free, because the indifferency of that my operative power to act, or not to act, still remains; the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which at present orders rest; the indifferency of that power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before, as will appear, if the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary. But if, during the rest of my hand, it be seized by a sudden palsy, the indifferency of that operative power is gone, and with it my liberty; I have no longer freedom in that respect, but am under a necessity of letting my hand rest. On the other side, if my hand be put into motion, by a convulsion, the indifferency of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion, and my liberty in that case is lost: for I am under a necessity of having my hand move. I have added this, to shew in what sort of indifferency, liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§ 72. TRUE notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty, are of so great importance, that I hope I shall be pardoned this digression, which my attempt to explain it, has led me into. The ideas of will, volition, liberty, and Necessity, in this chapter of power, came naturally in my way. In a former edition of this treatise I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had: and now, as a lover of truth, and not a worshipper of my own doctrines, I own some change of my opinion, which, I think, I have discovered ground for. In what I first writ, I with an unbiassed indifferency followed truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility, nor so dissingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes, for fear of blemishing my reputation, I have, with the same sincere design, for truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a severer enquiry has suggested. It is not impossible but that some may think my former notions right, and some (as I have already found) these latter, and some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this variety in men's opinions; impartial deductions of reason in controverted points being so very rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy, especially if of any length. And, therefore, I should think myself not a little beholden to any one, who would, upon these, or any other grounds, fairly clear this subject of liberty from any difficulties, that may yet remain.

BEFORE I close this chapter, it may, perhaps, be to our purpose, and help to give us clearer conceptions about power, if we make our thoughts take a little more exact survey of action. I have said above, that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion and thinking. These, in truth, tho' called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly

so. For, if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due consideration, will be found rather passions than actions, and consequently so far the effects barely of passive powers in those subjects, which; yet, on their account, are thought agents. For, in these instances, the substance that hath motion, or thought, receives the impression, whereby it is put into that action purely from without, and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent; and such a power is not properly an active power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Sometimes the substance, or agent, puts itself into action by its own power, and this is properly active power. Whatsoever modification a substance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called action, v. g. a solid substance, by motion, operates on; or alters the sensible ideas of another substance, and, therefore, this modification of motion we call action. But yet this motion in that solid substance is, when rightly considered, but a passion, if it received it only from some external agent. So that the active power of motion is in no substance, which cannot begin motion in it self, or in another substance, when at rest. So likewise in thinking, a power to receive ideas, or thoughts, from the operation of any external substance, is called a power of thinking: but this is but a passive power, or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas, out of sight, at one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions, which grammar, and the common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into; since what is signified by verbs that grammarians call active, does not always signify action: v. g. this proposition, I see the moon, or a star, or I feel the heat of the sun, tho' expressed by a verb active, does not signify any action in me, whereby I operate on those substances; but the reception of the ideas of light, roundness, and heat, wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and cannot in that position of my eyes, or body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove my body out of the sun-beams, I am properly active; because of my own choice, by a power within myself, I put myself into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.

§ 73. AND thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up; which, if I would consider, as a philosopher, and examine on what causes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones, viz. Extension, Solidity, Mobility, or the power of being moved; which by our senses we receive from body: Perceptivity, or the power of perception, or thinking; Motivity, or the power of moving; which, by reflection, we receive from our minds. I crave leave to make use of these two new words, to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal. To which if we add, Existence, Duration, Number; which belong both to one and the other; we have, perhaps, all the original ideas, on which the rest depend. For, by these, I imagine, might be explained the nature of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and all other ideas we have, if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified extensions, and motions of these minute bodies, which produce those several sensations in us. But my present purpose being only to enquire into the knowledge the mind has of things, by those ideas and appearances, which God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the mind comes by that knowledge, rather than into their causes, or manner of production; I shall not, contrary to the design of this essay, set myself to enquire philosophically into the peculiar constitution of bodies, and the configuration of parts, whereby they have the power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities: I shall not enter any farther into that disquisition, it sufficing to my purpose to observe, that gold, or saffron, has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow; and snow, or milk, the idea of white; which we can only have by our sight, without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies, or the particular figures, or motion, of
the

BOOK. II. the particles, which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular sensation: tho', when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds, and would enquire into their causes, we cannot conceive any thing else, to be in any sensible object, whereby it produces different ideas in us, but the different bulk, figure, number, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

C H A P. XXII.

Of mixed modes.

CHAP.
XXII.

Mixed
modes,
what.

§ 1. **H**AVING treated of simple modes in the foregoing chapters, and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to shew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to consider those we call mixed modes: such are the complex ideas we mark by the names Obligation, Drunkenness, a Lye, &c. which, consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds, I have called mixed modes, to distinguish them from the more simple modes, which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind. These mixed modes, being also such combinations of simple ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteristic marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.

Made by the
mind.

§ 2. **T**HAT the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as sensation, or reflection, offers them, without being able to make any one idea, experience shews us: but, if we attentively consider these ideas I call mixed modes, we are now speaking of, we shall find their original quite different. The mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations: For it being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence, I think, it is that these ideas are called notions, as if they had their original and constant existence, more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed, that the mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding, without considering whether they had any real being: tho' I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined, as they are put together in the understanding. For the man, who first framed the idea of hypocrisy, might have either taken it at first from the observation of one, who made shew of good qualities which he had not, or else have framed that idea in his mind, without having any such pattern to fashion it by: For it is evident, that in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of men, before they existed any where else; and that many names, that stood for such complex ideas, were in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for, ever existed.

Sometimes
got by the
explication
of their
names.

§ 3. **I**NDEED, now that languages are made, and abound with words, standing for such combinations, an usual way of getting these complex ideas, is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For, consisting of a company of simple ideas combined, they may by words, standing for those simple ideas, be represented to the mind of one who understands those words, tho' that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind, by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of sacrifice, or murder, by enumerating to him the simple ideas, which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.

§ 4. EVERY mixed mode, consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to enquire, " whence it has its unity, and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea, since that combination does not always exist together in nature?" To which I answer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind, combining those several simple ideas together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one name given to that combination. For it is by their names, that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing, or considering, any number of simple ideas, to make one complex one, but such collections as there be names for. Thus, tho' the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man's father; yet there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of parricide to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.

§ 5. IF we should enquire a little farther, to see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled modes, and neglect others which, in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined and make distinct ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language; which being to mark, or communicate men's thoughts to one another, with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of, in their way of living, and conversation; leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that tie them together; they rather chusing to enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories, by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they shall seldom, or never, have any occasion to make use of.

The cause of making mixed modes.

§ 6. THIS shews us how it comes to pass, that there are in every language many particular words, which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another. For the several fashions, customs and manners of one nation, making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another people have never had occasion to make, or, perhaps, so much as take notice of; names come of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation, and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus *εὐφρανισμός* amongst the Greeks, and *proscriptio* amongst the Romans, were words, which other languages had no names that exactly answered; because they stood for complex ideas, which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no such custom, there was no notion of any such actions; no use of such combinations of ideas as were united, and, as it were, tied together by those terms: and, therefore, in other countries there were no names for them.

Why words in one language, have none answering in another.

§ 7. HENCE, also, we may see the reason why languages constantly change, take up new, and lay by old terms; because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them, and so they become new species of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either reprove, or appeal, stands for; and instead of either of those names, use a periphrasis, to make any one understand their meaning.

And languages change.

§ 8. THO' I shall have occasion to consider this more at large, when I come to treat of words and their use; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed modes; which being fleeting, and transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short existence any where, but

Mixed modes, where they exist.

BOOK II. in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any existence, than whilst they are thought on, have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence, as in their names: which are therefore, in these sort of ideas, very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves. For, if we should enquire where the idea of a triumph, or apotheosis, exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things themselves, being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together: and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain existence; and, therefore, we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

How we get
the ideas of
mixed
modes.

§ 9. THERE are, therefore, three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes. 1. By experience and observation of things themselves. Thus by seeing two men wrestle, or fence, we get the idea of wrestling, or fencing. 2. By invention, or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds: so he that first invented printing, or etching, had an idea of it in his mind, before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting before our imaginations all those ideas, which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For, having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those names represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive, so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has with us the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas, of which they are compounded and originally made up, tho', perhaps, their immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex ideas. Thus the mixed mode, which the word lie stands for, is made of these simple ideas: 1. Articulate sounds. 2. Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those ideas. 4. Those signs put together by affirmation, or negation, otherwise than the ideas they stand for, are in the mind of the speaker. I think, I need not go any farther in the analysis of that complex idea, we call a lie: What I have said, is enough to shew, that it is made up of simple ideas: and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded and decomposed, may, at last, be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge, or thought, we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes, number and figure alone affords us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that before we have done, we shall see that no body need be afraid, he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, tho' they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas, received from sensation, or reflection, and their several combinations.

Motion,
thinking,
and power,
have been
most modi-
fied.

§ 10. IT is worth our observing, which of all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed modes made out of them, with names given to them: and those have been these three; thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them; without which, laws could

could be but ill made, or vice and disorder repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without such complex ideas, with names to them: and, therefore, men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas, in their minds, of modes of actions distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; and also of their powers fitted for those actions: v. g. boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear, or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking, by a peculiar name, *εὐφροσύνη*: which power, or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it disposition. Thus testiness is a disposition, or aptness, to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v. g. consideration and assent, which are actions of the mind; running and speaking, which are actions of the body: revenge and murder, which are actions of both together: and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which, together, make up the complex ones signified by those names.

§ 11. POWER being the source, from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes; and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas, which are introduced into any subject, by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy, whereby the new substance, or idea, is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, action; but in the subject, wherein any simple idea is changed, or produced, it is called passion: which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say, I think, we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: for whatever sort of action, besides these, produces any effects, I confess myself to have no notion, nor idea of; and so it is quite remote from my thoughts; apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man: and, therefore, many words, which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action, or *modus operandi*, at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action, or manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, tho' the word freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water, that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

§ 12. I THINK I shall not need to remark here, that tho' power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes, which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethicks, law, and politicks, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is, to shew what sort of ideas those are, which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compositions, made up of simple ideas, got from sensation and reflection; which, I suppose, I have done.

Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect.

Mixed modes, made also of other ideas.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of our complex ideas of substances.

CHAP. § I.
XXIII.

Ideas of substances, how made.

THE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or, by reflection, on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and consider as one simple idea, which, indeed, is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves to suppose some substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which, therefore, we call substance.

Our idea of substance in general.

§ 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, "what is the subject, wherein colour, or weight inheres?" he would have nothing to say, but the solid, extended parts: and if he were demanded, "what is it that solidity and extension inhere in?" he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before-mentioned, who saying, that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked, "what the elephant rested on?" to which his answer was, "a great tortoise." But being again pressed to know, "what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise?" replied, "something, he knew not what." And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned, what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something: which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children, or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist "fine re substance," without something to support them, we call that support, substantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under, or upholding.

Of the sorts of substances.

§ 3. An obscure and relative idea of substance, in general, being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of simple ideas, as are by experience and observation of men's senses taken notice of, to exist together, and are, therefore, supposed to flow from the particular, internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain simple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith, or a jeweller, commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas, which are to be found in them: only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist. And, therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such, or such qualities; as body is a thing

thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, tho' we know not what it is.

§ 4. HENCE, when we talk, or think, of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication, or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, tho' it be certain we have no clear, or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.

No clear idea of substance in general.

§ 5. THE same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea, or notion of matter, but something, wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses, do subsist; by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body: the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain then, that the idea of corporeal substance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of spiritual substance, or spirit: and therefore from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter; as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.

As clear an idea of spirit as body.

§ 6. WHATEVER, therefore, be the secret, abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, tho' unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves; such are the ideas we have of their several species in our minds; and such only do we, by their specifick names, signify to others, v.g. man, horse, sun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one, who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas, which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be as it were adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing else. Tho' in the mean time it be manifest, and every one upon enquiry into his own thoughts will find, that he has no other idea of any substance, v.g. let it be gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of those sensible qualities, which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a substratum, as gives as it were a support to those qualities, or simple ideas, which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the idea of the sun, what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some other? As he who thinks and discourses of the sun, has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the sun.

Of the sorts of substances.

§ 7. FOR he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances, Power, a great part of which has gathered and put together most of those simple ideas, which do exist in our

BOOK II.
our complex
ideas of sub-
stances.

it, among which are to be reckoned its active powers, and passive capacities; which tho' not simple ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing iron, is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a loadstone; and a power to be so drawn, is a part of the complex one we call iron: which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects. Because every substance being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible qualities, introduced into other subjects, discover to us those powers, which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately: v.g. we immediately, by our senses, perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in us: we also, by our senses, perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of wood. By the former, fire immediately, by the latter, it mediately discovers to us these several powers, which, therefore, we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and so make them a part of the complex ideas of it. For all those powers, that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects, on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas; therefore it is, that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas, which make the complex ones of the sorts of substances; tho' these powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex ideas. And, in this looser sense, I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these potentialities amongst the simple ideas, which we recollect in our minds, when we think of particular substances. For the powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances.

And why,

§ 8. NOR are we to wonder, that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances; since their secondary qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them. For our senses failing us, in the discovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities, as the characteristic notes and marks, whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taste of opium are, as well as its soporifick, or anodyne virtues, mere powers depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.

Three sorts
of ideas
make our
complex
ones of sub-
stances.

§ 9. THE ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances, are of these three sorts. First, the ideas of the primary qualities of things, which are discovered by our senses, and are in them, even when we perceive them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion of the parts of bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. Secondly, the sensible, secondary qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses; which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its cause. Thirdly, the aptness we consider in any substance to give, or receive, such alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered, should produce in us different ideas from what it did before; these are called active and passive powers: all which powers, as far as we have any notice or notion of them, terminate only in sensible, simple ideas. For, whatever alteration a load stone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron, we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its sensible motion discover it: and I doubt not, but there are a thousand changes, that

that bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects.

§ 10. POWERS therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances. He that will examine his complex idea of gold, will find several of its ideas, that make it up, to be only powers: as the power of being melted, but of not spending itself in the fire; of being dissolved in aqua regia; are ideas as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly considered, are also nothing but different powers. For to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold, but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light: and the heat, which we cannot leave out of our idea of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than the white colour it introduces into wax. These are both equally powers in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its insensible parts, so on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat: and so on wax, as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.

§ 11. HAD we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution, on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us; and that, which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size and figure. This, microscopes plainly discover to us: for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus sand, or pounded glass, which is opaque, and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; and a hair, seen this way, loses its former colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours, such as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood to the naked eye appears all red; but by a good microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few globules of red, swimming in a pellucid liquor: and how these red globules would appear, if glasses could be found that yet could magnify them a thousand, or ten thousand times more, is uncertain.

§ 12. THE infinitely wise contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to the conveniences of life, and the business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our uses, and several ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life. We have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power, and goodness of their author. Such a knowledge as this, which is suited to our present condition, we want not faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being. We are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the creatures to lead us to the knowledge of the creator, and the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with abilities, to provide for the conveniences of living: these are our business in this world. But were our senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our being, or at least well-being in this part of the universe, which we inhabit. He that considers how little our constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reason to be satisfied, that in this globe of earth, allotted for our mansion, the all-wise architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract us? And we should in the quietest retirement be less able to sleep, or meditate, than in the middle of a sea-fight.

Nay,

CHAP.
XXIII.

Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances.

The now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts.

Our faculties of discovery suited to our state.

BOOK II. *Nay, if that most instructive of our senses, seeing, were in any man a thousand, or a hundred thousand times more acute, than it is now by the best microscope, things several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now, would then be visible to his naked eyes, and so he would come nearer the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get ideas of their internal constitutions. But then he would be in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear the same to him, and others; the visible ideas of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication about colours, their appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sun-shine, or so much as open daylight; nor take in but a very small part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if, by the help of such microscopical eyes (if I may so call them) a man could penetrate further, than ordinary, into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid, at a convenient distance, nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastick motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: but if eyes so framed could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what a clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him lose its use.*

Conjecture
about spirits.

§ 13. *AND here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine, viz. that since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things, that our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure and conformation of parts; whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they would consider. For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge, who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes, that one sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision, which the assistance of glasses (casually at first lit on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects, as to see, when he pleased, the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us, in our present state, unalterable organs so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made them so, as is best for us in our present condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us, and we have to do with: and tho' we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader's pardon, for laying before him so wild a fancy, concerning the ways of perception in beings above us: but how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels, but after this manner, some way or other, in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And tho' we cannot but allow, that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures, with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have; yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from*

from our own sensation and reflection. The supposition at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies, needs not startle us; since some of the most ancient and most learned fathers of the church seemed to believe, that they had bodies: and this is certain, that their state and way of existence is unknown to us.

§ 14. BUT to return to the matter in hand: the ideas we have of substances, and the ways we come by them; I say, our specifick ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing. These ideas of substances, tho' they are commonly called simple apprehensions, and the names of them simple terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea, which an Englishman signifies by the name swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise; and perhaps, to a man, who has long observed those kind of birds, some other properties, which all terminate in sensible, simple ideas, all united in one common subject.

Complex ideas of substances.

§ 15. BESIDES the complex ideas we have of material, sensible substances, of which I have last spoken, by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c. co-existing in some substance; we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and power of moving themselves, and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances, as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent, solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas, as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all in both; it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think, that our senses shew us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For, whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial, thinking being.

Idea of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily substances.

§ 16. BY the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor, after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive, and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

No idea of abstract substance.

§ 17. THE primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as contra-distinguished to spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable, parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse. These, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the consequence of finite extension.

The cohesion of solid parts and impulse, the primary ideas of body.

§ 18. THE ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to spirit, are thinking and will, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, and, which is consequent to it, liberty. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body, which it meets with at rest; so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The ideas of existence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both.

Thinking and motivity the primary ideas of spirit.

BOOK II.

Spirits capable of motion.

§ 19. THERE is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make mobility belong to spirit: for having no other idea of motion, but change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest; and finding, that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits; (for of the infinite spirit I speak not here.) For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body, or being, as body itself; and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points; one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance between two spirits: and so conceive their motion, their approach, or removal, one from another.

§ 20. EVERY one finds in himself, that his soul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a body, or in a place an hundred miles distant from it. No body can imagine, that his soul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach, or horse, does that carries him, and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in motion: or, if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will; for to consider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.

§ 21. IF it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for spirits are not in loco, but ubi; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by, such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reason to shew, that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God; not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit.

Idea of soul and body compared.

§ 22. LET us compare then our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other, and in which most. Our idea of body, as I think, is an extended, solid substance, capable of communicating motion by impulse: and our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. These, I think, are our complex ideas of soul and body, as contra-distinguished; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that people, whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

Cohesion of solid parts in body, as hard to be conceived, as thinking in a soul.

§ 23. IF any one say, he knows not what it is thinks in him: he means, he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: no more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, neither knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extension. For, tho' the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air; yet the weight, or pressure of the air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the aether, or any subtler matter than the air, may unite, and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts, that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis. So that

that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by shewing, that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external, insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of the æther itself: and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the æther, and can have no other, conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the æther itself; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies.

§ 24. BUT in truth the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter. For, tho' such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never, in the least, hinder the separation by a motion, in a line parallel to those surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body, were it on all sides invironed by that fluid, and touched no other body: and therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral, sliding motion. For, if the pressure of the æther be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation, (as has been shewn) therefore in every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion, than of two polished surfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as easy for him to have a clear idea, how the soul thinks, as how body is extended. For since body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§ 25. I ALLOW it is usual for most people to wonder, how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly together? is there any thing more common? and what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning thinking, and voluntary motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there I think we are at a loss, both in the one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or brass, (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them: a considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfy his own, or another man's understanding.

§ 26. THE little bodies, that compose that fluid we call water, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who by a microscope (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to ten thousand; nay, to much above a hundred thousand times) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion: and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little

atoms

BOOK II. atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement, that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great, and yet unknown secret: and yet, when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those bonds, or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible, as any thing belonging to our minds, and a solid, extended substance as hard to be conceived, as a thinking, immaterial one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

§ 27. FOR, to extend our thoughts a little farther, that pressure, which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the cohesion itself. For, if matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a pressure together; from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If matter be finite, it must have its extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter, let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other: so far is our extension of body (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer, or more distinct, when we would enquire into the nature, cause, or manner, of it, than the idea of thinking.

Communi-
cation of
motion by
impulse, or
by thought,
equally intel-
ligible.

§ 28. ANOTHER idea we have of body, is the power of communication of motion by impulse; and of our souls, the power of exciting motion by thought. These ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day's experience clearly furnishes us with: but, if here again we enquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinary case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and unconceivable, as how our minds move, or stop our bodies by thought; which we every moment find they do. The increase of motion by impulse, which is observed, or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have, by daily experience, clear evidence of motion, produced both by impulse and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. So that however we consider motion, and its communication, either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to spirit, is at least as clear, as that which belongs to body. And, if we consider the active power of moving, or, as I may call it, motivity, it is much clearer in spirit than body; since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind, every day, affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But, be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear ideas belonging to spirit, as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally unknown to us, and the idea of thinking in spirit, as clear as of extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe

ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both of these, tho' our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For, when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation, or reflection, and penetrate into their causes, and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing, but its own short-sightedness.

§ 29. To conclude, sensation convinces us, that there are solid, extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us of the existence of such beings; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas, both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance, we know not, should by thought set body into motion, than how a substance we know not, should by impulse set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection, are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

§ 30. So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body, stands thus: the substance of spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities, or properties of body, viz. solid, coherent parts and impulse, we have distinct, clear ideas of: so, likewise, we know, and have distinct, clear ideas of two primary qualities, or properties, of spirit, viz. thinking, and a power of action; i. e. a power of beginning, or stopping several thoughts, or motions. We have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear, distinct ideas of them: which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering, solid parts, and their motion. We have, likewise, the ideas of the several modes of thinking, viz. believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the ideas of willing, and moving the body consequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shewn, spirit is capable of motion.

§ 31. LASTLY, if this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it, not easy to be explained, we have, therefore, no more reason to deny, or doubt, the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt, the existence of body; because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of spirit, more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension, involving us, whether we grant, or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences, that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial, knowing substance.

§ 32. WHICH we are not at all to wonder at, since we, having but some few, superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses, from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And, therefore, experimenting and discovering in our selves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies; we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial

BOOK. II. spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist, separate and independent from solidity, than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist, separate and independent from thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking, as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, i. e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think. For, whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties; and can discover nothing farther, but our own blindness and ignorance. But which ever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from sensation, or reflection; and so is it of all our other ideas of substances, even of God himself.

Idea of God. § 33. FOR, if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible, supreme being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God, and separate spirits, are made up of the simple ideas we receive from reflection; v. g. having from what we experiment in our selves got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an idea, the most suitable we can, to the supreme being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from sensation and reflection, has been already shewn.

§ 34. IF I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehension to all things existing, or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known, that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea of infinite, or boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence, without beginning, or end; and so frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees, or extent, wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that sovereign being, which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our senses, from exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

§ 35. FOR it is infinity, which joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme being. For tho' in his own essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say, we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct ideas, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea, or notion, we have of God.

No ideas in our complex one of spirits, but those got from § 36. THIS farther is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas, belonging to any thing

thing but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other, but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents, and degrees, of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits, as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection, is evident from hence; that, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another: tho' we must necessarily conclude, that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs and particular sounds; which are, therefore, of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in our selves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less, how spirits, that have no bodies, can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate, or conceal them at pleasure, tho' we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.

§ 37. AND thus we have seen, what kind of ideas we have of substances of several kinds, wherein they consist, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident, CHAP. XXIII. from sensation, or reflection.

FIRST, That all our ideas of the several sorts of substances, are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; tho' of this supposed something, we have no clear distinct idea at all.

SECONDLY, That all the simple ideas, that, thus united in one common substratum, make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation, or reflection. So that even in those, which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And even in those, which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing we can perceive in our selves by reflection, or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation, or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.

THIRDLY, That most of the simple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities; v. g. the greatest part of the ideas, that make our complex idea of gold, are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility in aq. regia, &c. all united together in an unknown substratum: all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances, and are not really in the gold, considered barely in it self, tho' they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of collective ideas of substances.

§ 1. BESIDES these complex ideas of several, single substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath also complex collective ideas of substances; which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular substances, considered together, as united into one idea, and which so joined are looked on as one: v. g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army, tho' consisting of a great number of distinct substances, CHAP. XXIV. One idea.

BOOK II. is as much one idea, as the idea of a man : and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever, signified by the name world, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it ; it sufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one representation, or picture, tho' made up of ever so many particulars.

Made by
the power of
composing
in the mind.

§ 2. THESE collective ideas of substances, the mind makes by its power of composition, and uniting severally, either simple, or complex ideas into one, as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers, simple ideas united in one substance : and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as a score, or a gross, &c. so by putting together several particular substances, it makes collective ideas of substances, as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet ; each of which every one finds, that he represents to his own mind by one idea, in one view ; and so, under that notion, considers those several things as perfectly one, as one ship, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea, than how a man should make one idea ; it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular, all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all together as one.

All artificial
things are
collective
ideas.

§ 3. AMONGST such kind of collective ideas, are to be counted most part of artificial things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances : and, in truth, if we consider all these collective ideas aright ; as army, constellation, universe, as they are united into so many single ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind ; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one conception, and signified by one name. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one idea ; as is visible in that signified by the name universe.

C H A P. XXV.

Of relation.

CHAP. § I.
XXV.

Relation,
what.

BESIDES the ideas, whether simple, or complex, that the mind has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise object : it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself, or, at least, look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other : this is, as the words import, relation and respect ; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives ; and the things so brought together, related. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exists in Caius ; v. g. when I consider him as man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man. So, likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name, husband, I intimate some other person ; and when I give him the name, whiter, I intimate some other thing : in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea, whether simple, or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, tho' still considered as distinct ; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation

of

of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia, is the occasion of the denomination, or relation of husband; and the colour white, the occasion why he is said whiter than freestone.

§ 2. THESE, and the like relations, expressed by relative terms, that others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and son, bigger and less, cause and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at first sight perceives the relation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named; and no body overlooks, or doubts of, a relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But, where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of. Concubine is, do doubt, a relative name, as well as wife: but in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some idea, which is either in the thing, to which the name is applied; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the thing, to which the denomination is given: or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it includes a relation.

§ 3. ANOTHER sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance, of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, tho' less observable relation. Such are the seemingly positive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

§ 4. THIS farther may be observed, that the ideas of relation may be the same in men, who have far different ideas of the things that are related, that are thus compared; v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father: which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

§ 5. THE nature therefore of relation consists in the referring, or comparing two things, one to another; from which comparison, one, or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed, or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, tho' the other receive in itself no alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I consider to day as a father, ceases to be so to morrow, only by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object, to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations, at the same time: v. g. Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

§ 6. WHATSOEVER doth, or can exist, or be considered as one thing, positive: and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also, are positive beings; tho' the parts, of which they consist, are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing; which idea is in our minds, as one picture, tho' an aggregate of divers parts; and, under one name, it is a positive, or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, tho' the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a positive, absolute idea. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c. for there can be no relation, but between two things, considered as two things. There must always be in relation

Book II. tion two ideas, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

All things capable of relation.

§ 7. CONCERNING relation in general these things may be considered :

FIRST, that there is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations, in reference to other things ; and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words : v. g. one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son, grand-father, grand-son, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superiour, inferiour, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almost infinite number : he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For, as I said, relation is a way of comparing, or considering two things together, and giving one, or both of them some appellation from that comparison ; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

The ideas of relations, clearer often than of the subjects related.

§ 8. SECONDLY, this farther may be considered concerning relation, that tho' it be not contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and super-induced ; yet the ideas, which relative words stand for, are often clearer and more distinct, than of those substances, to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father, or brother, is a great deal clearer and more distinct, than that we have of a man ; or, if you will, paternity is a thing, whereof it is easier to have a clear idea, than of humanity : and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what God. Because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation : but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them : so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds, than those of substances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for : v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For significant, relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas ; and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that, which is the foundation of the relation ; which may be done, without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion, that one laid the egg, out of of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two cassowaries in St. James's park ; tho', perhaps, I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves.

Relations all terminate in simple ideas.

§ 9. THIRDLY, tho' there be a great number of considerations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations ; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection : which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall shew it in the most considerable relations, that we have any notion of, and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense, or reflection ; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past doubt, that the notions we have of them, are but certain simple ideas, and so originally derived from sense, or reflection.

Terms leading the mind beyond the subject.

§ 10. FOURTHLY, that relation being the considering of one thing with another, which is extrinsic to it, it is evident, that all words, that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas, than are supposed really to exist in that thing,

thing, to which the word is applied, are relative words: v. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify, nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated: But father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing.

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subject denominated, are relative.

§ 11. HAVING laid down these premises concerning relation in general, I shall now proceed to shew, in some instances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of simple ideas; and that they all, how refined, or remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do, or can exist, are concerned; and that is, the relation of cause and effect: the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation and reflection, I shall in the next place consider.

Conclusion.

C H A P. XXVI.

Of cause and effect, and other relations.

§ 1. IN the notice, that our senses take, of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation, we get our ideas of cause and effect. That, which produces any simple, or complex idea, we denote by the general name cause; and that which is produced, effect. Thus finding that in that substance, which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple idea, that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat; we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So also finding that the substance wood, which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called, by the application of fire, is turned into another substance called ashes; i. e. another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, quite different from that complex idea, which we call wood; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes as effect. So that whatever is considered by us to conduce, or operate, to the producing any particular simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.

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Whence their ideas got.

§ 2. HAVING thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect, viz. that a cause is that, which makes any other thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that, which had its beginning from some other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts.

Creation, generation, making alteration.

FIRST, when the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist, in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.

SECONDLY, when a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exist, but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles, which considered all together, make up such a collection of simple ideas, had not any existence before; as this man, this egg, rose or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a substance, produced in the ordinary course of nature, by an internal principle, but set on work by, and received from some external agent, or cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call generation: when the cause is extrinsecal, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or juxta-position of discernible parts, we call it making; and such are all artificial things. When any simple idea is produced, which was not in that

that

BOOK II. that subject before, we call it alteration. Thus a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new sensible quality, or simple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are effects; and those things, which operated to the existence, causes. In which, and all other cases, we may observe, that the notion of cause and effect, has its rise from ideas, received by sensation and reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the idea of cause and effect, it suffices to consider any simple idea, or substance, as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

Relations of
time.

§ 3. TIME and place are also the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings, at least, are concerned in them. But having already shewn, in another place, how we get these ideas, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus when any one says, that queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all words answering, how long? Again, William the conqueror invaded England about the year 1070, which means this; that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it shews at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes: and so do all words of time, answering to the question, when? which shew only the distance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

§ 4. THERE are yet, besides those, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas, which yet will, when considered, be found to be relative; such as are young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus, having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when we say a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that, which usually men attain to: and, when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed. And so it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this, or that man, to the idea of that duration, which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals: which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at seven years old: but yet a horse we call old at twenty, and a dog at seven years; because in each of these, we compare their age to different ideas of duration, which are settled in our minds, as belonging to these several sorts of animals, in the ordinary course of nature. But the sun and stars, tho' they have outlasted several generations of men, we call not old, because we do not know what period God hath set to that sort of beings. This term belonging properly to those things, which we can observe, in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and so have in our minds, as it were, a standard to which we can compare the several parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a ruby, or a diamond, things whose usual periods we know not.

Relations of
place and ex-
tension.

§ 5. THE relation also that things have to one another, in their places and distances, is very obvious to observe; as above, below, a mile distant from Charing-Cross, in England, and in London. But as in duration, so in extension and bulk, there are some ideas that are relative, which we signify by names that are thought positive; as great and little are truly relations. For here also having, by observation, settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things, from those we have been most accustomed to, we make

make them as it were the standards, whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a little horse, such a one as comes not up to the size of that idea, which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses: and that will be a great horse to a Welshman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken several sized ideas, to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

§ 6. So, likewise, weak and strong are but relative denominations of power, compared to some ideas we have, at that time, of greater, or less, power. Thus when we say a weak man, we mean one that has not so much strength, or power, to move, as usually men have, or usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength of men, or men of such a size. The like, when we say the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And so abundance of words, in ordinary speech, stand only for relations (and, perhaps, the greatest part) which, at first sight, seem to have no such signification: v. g. the ship has necessary stores. Necessary and stores are both relative words; one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended, and the other to future use. All which relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in, ideas derived from sensation, or reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

CHAP.
XXVI.

Absolute
terms often
stand for re-
lations.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of identity and diversity.

§ 1. ANOTHER occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when considering any thing as existing, at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists identity, when the ideas, it is attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For, we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things, of the same kind, should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where, at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When, therefore, we demand, "whether any thing be the same, or no?" it refers always to something that existed such a time, in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be, or exist, in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that, which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used, in having precise notions of the things, to which it is attributed.

§ 2. WE have the ideas but of three sorts of substances. 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and, therefore, concerning his identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists. Thirdly, the same

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Qq

CHAP.
XXVII.

Wherein
identity con-
sists.

Identity of
substances.

BOOK II. will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition, or subtraction, of matter being made, it is the same. For tho' these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinction of substances, or any thing else one from another. For example: could two bodies be in the same place, at the same time, then those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great, or little; nay, all bodies must be one and the same.

Identity of
modes.

For by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of identity, and diversity, of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction, that two, or more, should be one, identity and diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the understanding. All other things being but modes, or relations, ultimately terminated in substances, the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be, by the same way, determined: only as to things, whose existence is in succession; such as are the actions of finite beings, v. g. motion and thought, both which consist in a continued train of succession, concerning their diversity, there can be no question: because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places; and, therefore, no motion, or thought, considered as at different times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence.

Principium
individuationis.

§ 3. FROM what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much enquired after, the principium individuationis; and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind. This, tho' it seems easier to conceive in simple substances, or modes, yet, when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied: v. g. let us suppose an atom, i. e. a continued body, under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place; it is evident that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue, as long as its existence is continued; for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two, or more, atoms be joined together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule: and whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled. But, if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass, or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity: an oak, growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse: tho', in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, tho' they be truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, that in these two cases, of a mass of matter, and a living body, identity is not applied to the same thing.

Identity of
vegetables.

§ 4. WE must, therefore, consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter, any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts, as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant, which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant, as long

as

as it partakes of the same life, tho' that life be communicated to new particles of matter, vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization, conformable to that sort of plants. For this organization, being at any one instant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, which existing constantly from that moment, both forwards and backwards, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity, which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united.

§ 5. THE case is not so much different in brutes, but that any one may hence see what makes an animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain, it is nothing but a fit organization, or construction of parts, to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, or diminished, by a constant addition, or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, that in an animal the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines, the force coming sensibly from without, is often away, when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

6. THIS also shews, wherein the identity of the same man consists, viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in any thing else, but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Immanuel, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Cæsar Borgia, to be the same man. For, if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter, why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be, from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea, out of which body and shape is excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers, who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detrued into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet, I think, no body, could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say, that hog were a man, or Heliogabalus.

§ 7. IT is not, therefore, unity of substance, that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case: but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what idea the word it is applied to, stands for; it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if person, man, and substance, are three names, standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would, possibly, have prevented a great deal of that confusion, which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning personal identity, which, therefore, we shall in the next place a little consider.

§ 8. AN animal is a living, organized body; and, consequently, the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life, communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen, successively, to be united to that organized,

BOOK II.

ganized, living body. And, whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious observation puts it past doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the sound, man, in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form: since, I think, I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, tho' it had no more reason all its life than a cat, or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat, or a parrot, discourse, reason, and philosophise, would call, or think, it nothing but a cat, or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull, irrational man, and the other a very intelligent, rational parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot. His words^a are:

"I HAD a mind to know, from prince Maurice's own mouth, the account of a common, but much credited story, that I had heard so often from many others, of an old parrot he had in Brasil, during his government there, that spoke, and asked, and answered common questions, like a reasonable creature: so that those of his train there generally concluded it to be witchery, or possession; and one of his chaplains, who lived long afterwards in Holland, would never, from that time, endure a parrot, but said, they all had a devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this story, and assevered by people hard to be discredited, which made me ask prince Maurice, what there was of it? He said, with his usual plainness, and dryness in talk, there was something true, but a great deal false, of what had been reported. I desired to know of him, what there was of the first? He told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an old parrot, when he came to Brasil; and tho' he believed nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for it: that it was a very great and a very old one, and when it came first into the room where the prince was, with a great many Dutchmen about him, it said presently, what a company of white men are here? They asked it what he thought that man was, pointing at the prince? It answered, some general or other; when they brought it close to him, he asked it, *b* D'ou venez vous? It answered, De Marinnan. The prince, A qui estes vous? The parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, *Que fais tu la?* Parrot, Je garde les poules. The prince laughed, and said, Vous gardez les poules? The parrot answered, Ouy moy, & je s'ay bien faire; and made the chuck, four or five times, that people use to make to chickens when they call them. I set down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as prince Maurice said them to me. I asked him in what language the parrot spoke, and he said, in Brasilian; I asked whether he understood Brasilian, he said, no, but he had taken care to have two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke Brasilian, and the other a Brasilian that spoke Dutch; that he asked them separately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the parrot said. I could not but tell this odd story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this prince at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious man. I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe as they please upon it; how ever, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve, or enliven, a busy scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose, or no."

Same man.

I HAVE taken care that the reader should have the story at large, in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince, in whom he acknowledges very great

^a Memoirs of what passed in Christendom from 1672 to 1679, p. 322.

^b Whence come ye? It answered, from Marinnan. The prince, To whom do you belong? The parrot, To a Portugeze. Prince, What do you there? Parrot, I look after the chickens? The prince laughed, and said, You look after the chickens? The parrot answered, Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it.

honesty

honesty and piety, a story which, if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot; and I ask any one else, who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it, as this one did, whether I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational animals: but yet, whether for all that they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots? For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking, or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man, in most people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and, if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.

§ 9. THIS being premised to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions; and, by this every one is to himself that which he calls self; it not being considered in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same, or divers substances. For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i. e. the sameness of a rational being: and, as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards, to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now, it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

§ 10. BUT it is farther enquired, "whether it be the same identical substance?" This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives, wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part, whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep, having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness, which remarks our waking thoughts: I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised, whether we are the same thinking thing, i. e. the same substance, or no? which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all: the question being, what makes the same person, and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person; which in this case matters not at all: different substances, by the same consciousness, (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodies, by the same life, are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved, in that change of substances, by the unity of one continued life. For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For, as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action, with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts

Book II. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to every body determine the man in this case; wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to every one, besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed, every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet, when we will enquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds; and having resolved with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

Conscious-
ness makes
the same per-
son.

§ 16. BUT tho' the same immaterial substance, or soul, does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, unites existences and actions, very remote in time, into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self, placed that self in what substance you please, than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same, or other substances; I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

Self depends
on conscious-
ness.

§ 17. SELF is that conscious thinking thing (whatever substance made up of, whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of itself, as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self; so it is in reference to substances remote in time. That, with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it self, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther: as every one who reflects, will perceive.

Objects of
reward and
punishment.

§ 18. IN this personal identity, is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making a part of it self, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Tho' if the same body should still live, and immediately

mediately, from the separation of the little finger, have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may shew us wherein personal identity consists, not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness; wherein, if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their out-sides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.

§ 20. But yet, possibly, it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that, perhaps, I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of, tho' I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to: which, in this case, is the man only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousnesses at different times, it is past doubt the same man would, at different times, make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind, in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did, thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or is besides himself; in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or, at least, first used them, thought that self was changed, the self-same person was no longer in that man.

§ 21. But yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the same individual man, should be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual man.

FIRST, it must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance; in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.

SECONDLY, or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.

THIRDLY, or the same immaterial spirit, united to the same animal.

Now take which of these suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in any thing but consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

FOR, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible, that a man, born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the second and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the same man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making human identity to consist in the same thing, wherein we place personal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. But then they, who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and consequently the same individual man, wherein, perhaps, few are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call self) without involving us in great absurdities.

BOOK. II. we look on as our selves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting, animal spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its operations, of thinking and memory, out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any, but one such body, upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend; we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark, concerning these matters) the soul of a man, for an immaterial substance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can, from the nature of things, be no absurdity at all to suppose, that the same soul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man: as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's body yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow, and, in that union, make up a vital part of Melibæus himself, as well as it did of his ram.

The difficulty from ill use of names.

§ 28. To conclude, whatever substance begins to exist, it must, during its existence, necessarily be the same: whatever compositions of substances begin to exist during the union of those substances, the concrete must be the same: whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence, it is the same: and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes, the same rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty, or obscurity, that has been about this matter, rather rises from the names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For, whatever makes the specific idea, to which the name is applied, if that idea be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the same, and divers, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt about it.

Continued existence makes identity.

§ 29. FOR, supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a man, it is easy to know what is the same man, viz. the same spirit, whether separate, or in a body, will be the same man. Supposing a rational spirit, vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts, to make a man, whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts, tho' continued in a fleeting, successive body, remains, it will be the same man. But if, to any one, the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be the same man. For, whatever be the composition, whereof the complex idea is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing, under any denomination, the same existence continued, preserves it the same individual, under the same denomination.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Of other relations.

CHAP. XXVIII.
Proportional

§ 1. BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and causality, of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

FIRST, the first I shall name, is some one simple idea; which being capable of parts, or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects, wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, v. g. Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, &c. These relations, depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea, in several subjects, may be called, if one will, Proportional; and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas, received from sensation, or reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

Natural.

§ 2. SECONDLY, another occasion of comparing things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origin, or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; v. g. father and son, brothers, cousin-germans, &c. which have their

their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in several CHAP. degrees; country-men, i. e. those who were born in the same country, or XXVIII. tract of ground; and these I call natural relations: wherein we may observe that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the several races of other animals as well as men: but yet it is seldom said, this bull is the grandfather of such a calf; or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct names these relations should be observed, and marked out in mankind; there being occasion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations: from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little, or no cause to mind these relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages; which being suited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality, or extent of things, nor to the various respects might be found among them, nor the different abstract considerations might be framed about them. Where they had no philosophical notions, there they had no terms to express them: and it is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things, they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine, why, as in some countries, they may not have so much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred one to another.

§ 3. THIRDLY, sometimes the foundation of considering things, with reference to one another, is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do something. Thus a general is one that hath power to command an army; and an army under a general is a collection of armed men, obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this, or that place. All this sort depending upon men's wills, or agreement in society, I call instituted, or voluntary; and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the persons, to whom they have sometimes belonged, tho' neither of the substances so related, be destroyed. Now, tho' these are all reciprocal, as well as the rest, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men usually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations, but a constable or dictator are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such; because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator, or constable, expressing a relation to either of them; tho' it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

§ 4. FOURTHLY, there is another sort of relation which is the conformity, Moral. or disagreement, men's voluntary actions have to a rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called moral relation, as being that, which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge, wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obscurity and confusion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct, complex ideas, are, as has been shewn, so many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one

BOOK II. at once; when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas. We have a further and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether such actions so made up are morally good or bad.

Moral good and evil. § 5. GOOD and evil, as hath been shewn, b. ii. ch. 20. § 2. and ch. 21. § 42. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions, or procures pleasure, or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us, by the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and punishment.

Moral rules. § 6. OF these moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude, or pravity of their actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward, or punishment, annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action it self. For that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of it self, without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all law, properly so called.

Laws. § 7. THE laws, that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude, or obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

Divine law, the measure of sin and duty. § 8. FIRST, the divine law, whereby I mean that law, which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule, whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is no body so brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it, we are his creatures: he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude, and by comparing them to this law it is, that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness, or misery, from the hands of the Almighty.

Civil law, the measure of crimes and innocence. § 9. SECONDLY, the civil law, the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is another rule, to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal, or no. This law no body overlooks; the rewards and punishments, that enforce it, being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it, which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from him who disobeys: which is the punishment of offences committed against this law.

Philosophical law, the measure of virtue and vice. § 10. THIRDLY, the law of opinion, or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended, and supposed every where, to stand for actions, in their own nature right or wrong; and, as far as they really are so applied, they so far are co-incident with the divine law above-mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names virtue and vice, in the particular in-

stances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each country and society are in reputation, or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that men every where should give the name of virtue to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise-worthy; and call that vice, which they account blameable: since otherwise, they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation; any thing wrong, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed virtue and vice, is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a secret and tacit consent, establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit, or disgrace, amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place. For, tho' men uniting into politick societies have resigned up to the publick the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens, any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain still the power of thinking well, or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: and, by this approbation and dislike, they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice.

§ II. THAT this is the common measure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who considers, that tho' that passes for vice in one country, which is counted a virtue, or at least not vice in another; yet every where virtue and praise, vice and blame go together. Virtue is every where that, which is thought praise-worthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem, is called virtue*. Virtue and praise are so united, that they are

* OUR author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men have been to mistake him, added what here follows. Of this the ingenious author of the discourse concerning the nature of man, has given me a late instance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expressions, and the candor that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have closed his preface with an insinuation, as if in what I had said, book ii. chap. 28. concerning the third rule, which men refer their actions to, I went about to make virtue vice, and vice virtue, unless he had mistaken my meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himself the trouble to consider, what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief design of that chapter, plainly enough set down in the fourth section, and those following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but shewing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, whether those rules were true, or false: and pursuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language of that place answers to virtue and vice in our's, which alters not the nature of things, tho' men do generally judge of, and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place, or sect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, b. i. c. 3. § 18. and in this present chapter, § 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice: and, if he had observed, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as matter of fact, what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For, I think, I am not much out in saying, that one of the rules, made use of in the world, for a ground or measure of a moral relation, is that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, according to which they are there called virtues or vices: and whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his old English dictionary, I dare say it no where tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue in one place, which being in disrepute, passes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men bestow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice virtue, and virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in such points, and to take the alarm, even at expressions, which standing alone by themselves might sound ill, and be suspected.

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, these words of mine, in § 11. of this chapter: the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute; "whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise," &c. Phil. iv. 8. without taking notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: whereby, in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved; so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers, &c. by which words, and the rest of that section, it is plain that I brought that passage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general measure of what men call virtue and vice, throughout the world, was the reputation and fashion of each particular society, within itself; but to shew, that tho' it were so, yet, for reasons I there

BOOK II. are called often by the same name. "Sunt sua præmia laudi," says Virgil; and so Cicero, "*nihil habet natura præstantius, quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus,*" which, he tells you, are all names for the same thing, *Tusc. lib. ii.* This is the language of the heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein the notions of virtue and vice consisted. And tho' perhaps by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what was thought praise-worthy in one place, escaped not censure in another; and so in different societies, virtues and vices were changed; yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with esteem and reputation that, wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable rule of right or wrong, which the law of God hath established: there being nothing, that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has set them; and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their commendation and blame on that side that really deserved it not. Nay, even those men whose practice was otherwise, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves were guilty of: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: "whatsoever" "is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be" "any praise," &c. *Phil. iv. 8.*

there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not for the most part much vary from the law of nature; which is that standing and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde considered this, he would have found it little to his purpose, to have quoted that passage in a sense I used it not; and would, I imagine, have spared the explication he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this second edition will give him satisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now so expressed, as to shew him there was no cause of scruple.

Tho' I am forced to differ from him in those apprehensions he has expressed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had said about virtue and vice; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he says in his third chapter, p. 78. concerning natural inscription and innate notions. I shall not deny him the privilege he claims, p. 52. to state the question as he pleases, especially when he states it so, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have said. For, according to him, innate notions being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances, in order to the soul's exerting them; all that he says for innate, imprinted, impressed notions (for of innate ideas he says nothing at all) amounts at last only to this; that there are certain propositions, which, tho' the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of: which is no more than what I have affirmed in my first book. For I suppose, by the soul's exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or else the soul's exerting of notions will be to me a very unintelligible expression; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this case, it misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind, before the soul exerts them, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, but a capacity to know them, when the concurrence of those circumstances, which this ingenious author thinks necessary, in order to the soul's exerting them, brings them into our knowledge.

P. 52. I FIND him express it thus; these natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation. Here he says they exert themselves, as p. 78. that the soul exerts them. When he has explained to himself, or others, what he means by the soul's exerting innate notions, or their exerting themselves, and what that previous cultivation and circumstances, in order to their being exerted, are; he will, I suppose, find there is so little of controversy between him and me in the point, hating that he calls that exerting of notions, which I in a more vulgar stile call knowing, that I have reason to think he brought in my name upon this occasion, only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me; which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a title I have no right to.

§ 12. If any one shall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing else but the consent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law; especially wanting that, which is so necessary and essential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think I may say, that he, who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives on men, to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the nature, or history of mankind: the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magistrate. The penalties, that attend the breach of God's laws, some, nay, perhaps most men seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many, whilst they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. And, as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought, and been reconciled to: but no body, that has the least thought, or sense, of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

CHAP.
XXVIII.
Its infor-
ments, com-
mendation
and discre-
dit.

§ 13. THESE three then, first, the law of God; secondly, the law of politick societies; thirdly, the law of fashion, or private censure, are those to which men variously compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of these laws that they take their measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

These three
laws the rules
of moral
good and evil.

§ 14. WHETHER the rule, to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the mark of the value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that rule from the fashion of the country, or the will of a law-maker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees, or disagrees with the rule; and so hath a notion of moral goodness or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas, belonging to it, may correspond to those which the law requires. And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in these simple ideas, we have received from sensation or reflection. For example, let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word murder; and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas derived from reflection, or sensation, viz. first, from reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, considering, purposing before-hand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. Secondly, from sensation we have the collection of those simple, sensible ideas, which are to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree, or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I

Morality is
the relation
of actions to
these rules.

BOOK II. have the will of a supreme invifible law-maker for my rule; then, as I fup-
 pofed the action commanded, or forbidden by God, I call it good, or evil, fin,
 or duty: and, if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legislative
 power of the country, I call it lawful, or unlawful, a crime, or no crime. So
 that, whencefoever we take the rule of moral actions; or by what ftandard
 foever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues, or vices, they confift only,
 and are made up of collections, of fimple ideas, which we originally received
 from fenfe, or reflection; and their rectitude, or obliquity, confifts in the agree-
 ment, or difagreement, with thofe patterns prefcribed by fome law.

§ 15. To conceive rightly of moral actions, we muft take notice of them
 under this two-fold confideration. Firft, as they are in themfelves each made
 up of fuch a collection of fimple ideas. Thus drunkennefs, or lying, fignify
 fuch or fuch a collection of fimple ideas, which I call mixed modes: and in
 this fenfe they are as much pofitive, abfolute ideas, as the drinking of a horfe, or
 fpeaking of a parrot. Secondly, our actions are confidered as good, bad, or in-
 different; and in this refpect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or
 difagreement with fome rule, that makes them to be regular, or irregular, good,
 or bad: and fo, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon deno-
 minated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a
 man, as it is a certain, pofitive mode, or particular fort of action, by parti-
 cular ideas, diftinguifhed from all others, is called duelling: which, when con-
 fidered, in relation to the law of God, will deferve the name fin; to the law
 of fafhion, in fome countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws
 of fome governments, a capital crime. In this cafe, when the pofitive mode
 has one name, and another name as it ftands in relation to the law, the
 diftinction may as eafily be obferved, as it is in fubftances, where one name,
 v. g. Man, is ufed to fignify the thing; another, v. g. Father, to fignify the
 relation.

The deno-
 minations of
 actions often
 miflead us.

§ 16. BUT, becaufe, very frequently the pofitive idea of the action, and its
 moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the fame
 word made ufe of to exprefs both the mode, or action, and its moral recti-
 tude, or obliquity; therefore the relation itfelf is lefs taken notice of, and there
 is often no diftinction made between the pofitive idea of the action, and the
 reference it has to a rule. By which confufion of thefe two diftinct confidera-
 tions under one term, thofe who yield too eafily to the impreffions of founds,
 and are forward to take names for things, are often mifled in their judgment
 of actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge,
 or allowance, is properly called ftealing; but that name, being commonly un-
 derftood to fignify alfo the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its
 contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn, whatever they hear called
 ftealing, as an ill action, difagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the pri-
 vate taking away his fword from a madman, to prevent his doing mifchief, tho'
 it be properly denominated, ftealing, as the name of fuch a mixed mode; yet
 when compared to the law of God, and confidered in its relation to that fu-
 preme rule, it is no fin, or tranfgreffion, tho' the name, ftealing, ordinarily
 carries fuch an intimation with it.

Relations in-
 numerable.

§ 17. AND thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which,
 therefore, I call moral relations.

It would make a volume to go over all forts of relations; it is not, therefore,
 to be expected, that I fhould here mention them all. It fuffices to our prefent
 purpofe, to fhew by thefe, what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive
 confideration, called relation: which is fo various, and the occafions of it fo
 many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is
 not very eafy to reduce it to rules, or under juft heads. Thofe I have men-
 tioned, I think, are fome of the moft confiderable, and fuch as may ferve to
 let us fee, from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are
 founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been faid, give me
 leave to obferve;

§ 18. FIRST,

All relations
terminate in
simple ideas.

§ 18. FIRST, that it is evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on those simple ideas, we have got from sensation, or reflection: so that all we have in our thoughts our selves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would signify to others, when we use words standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, or collections of simple ideas, compared one with another. This is so manifest in that sort called proportional, that nothing can be more: for when a man says, "honey is sweeter than wax," it is plain that his thoughts, in this relation, terminate in this simple idea, sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; tho' where they are compounded, or decompounded, the simple ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of. V. g. when the word, father, is mentioned; First, there is meant that particular species, or collective idea, signified by the word man. Secondly, those sensible, simple ideas, signified by the word generation. And, Thirdly, the effects of it, and all the simple ideas signified by the word child. So the word friend, being taken for a man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all these following ideas to the making of it up: First, all the simple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. Secondly, the idea of love. Thirdly, the idea of readiness, or disposition. Fourthly, the idea of action, which is any kind of thought, or motion. Fifthly, the idea of good, which signifies any thing that may advance his happiness, and terminates at last, if examined, in particular simple ideas; of which the word good in general signifies any one, but if removed from all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus, also, all moral words terminate at last, tho', perhaps, more remotely, in a collection of simple ideas: the immediate signification of relative words, being very often other supposed, known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in simple ideas.

§ 19. SECONDLY, that in relations, we have, for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of those simple ideas, wherein it is founded. Agreement, or disagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I have too, of equal, or more or less of each of these: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman, Sempronia; and so have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and, perhaps, clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia dug Titus out of the parsley-bed (as they use to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she dug Caius out of the parsley-bed; I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill of a midwife: the notion that the same woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births (tho' I were ignorant, or mistaken in the manner of it) being that, on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then, in their descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my notion of their having, or not having the relation of brothers. But tho' the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of mixed modes, and more determinate than those of substances; yet the names belonging to relation, are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification, as those of substances, or mixed modes, and much more than those of simple ideas; because relative words, being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an idea only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others, using the same names.

§ 20. THIRDLY, that in these I call moral relations, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. The notion of the relation is the same.

We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a notion of the relation, as of its foundation.

Book. II. false. For if I measure any thing by a yard, I know, whether the thing I measure, be longer, or shorter, than that supposed yard; tho', perhaps, the yard I measure by, be not exactly the standard; which, indeed, is another inquiry. For tho' the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the agreement, or disagreement, observable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the relation. Tho' measuring by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it, by that which is not the true rule; but I am not mistaken in the relation, which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement, or disagreement.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of clear and obscure, distinct and confused ideas.

CHAP.
XXIX.

Ideas, some
clear and
distinct,
others ob-
scure and
confused.

§ 1. HAVING shewn the original of our ideas, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, substances and relations; all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are clear, and others obscure; some distinct, and others confused.

Clear and
obscure, ex-
plained by
sight.

§ 2. THE perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight, we shall best understand what is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of obscure to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it, and which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner our simple ideas are clear, when they are such as the objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did, or might, in a well-ordered sensation, or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want any thing of that original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded, or tarnished by time, so far are they obscure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are clear, when the ideas that go to their composition are clear; and the number and order of those simple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

Causes of
obscurity.

§ 3. THE cause of obscurity in simple ideas, seem to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions, made by the objects, or else a weakness in the memory, not able to retain them as received. For, to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter; if the organs, or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well, when well imprinted; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression: in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be obscure. This, I suppose, needs no application to make it plainer.

Distinct and
confused,
what.

§ 4. As a clear idea is that, whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object, operating duly on a well-disposed organ; so a distinct idea is that, wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confused idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.

§ 5. If no idea be confused, but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different; it will be hard, may any one say, to find any where a confused idea. For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be so. No idea, therefore, can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for from all other it is evidently different.

CHAP.
XXIX.
Objection.

§ 6. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is, that makes the confusion, ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must consider, that things, ranked under distinct names, are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each sort, by its peculiar name, may be marked, and discoursed of apart, upon any occasion: and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now, every idea a man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other ideas but itself; that which makes it confused is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another name, as that which it is expressed by: the difference, which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out; and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different names, is quite lost.

Confusion of
ideas, is in
reference to
their names.

§ 7. THE defaults, which usually occasion this confusion, I think, are chiefly these following:

Defaults,
which make
confusion.

FIRST, when any complex idea (for it is complex ideas, that are most liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number of simple ideas, and such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he, that has an idea, made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused idea of a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted. So that such an idea, tho' it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx, or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx, as leopard. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms, contributes to make the ideas, we would express by them, confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that confused ideas are such, as render the use of words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct names. When the ideas, for which we use different terms, have not a difference, answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

First, complex ideas,
made up of
too few simple ones.

§ 8. SECONDLY, another default, which makes our ideas confused, is, when tho' the particulars, that make up any idea, are in number enow; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures, usually shewn as surprising pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil, on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This draught, thus made up of parts, wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein, tho' there be as little order of colours, or figures, to be found, yet no body thinks it a confused picture. What is it then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? as it is plain it does not; for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confused. I answer, that, which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to some name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other: v. g. when it is said to be the picture of a man, or Cæsar, than any one with reason counts it confused: because it is not discernible, in that state, to belong more to the name man, or Cæsar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey; which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by

Secondly, or
its simple
ones jumbled
disorderly
together.

Book II. man, or Cæsar. But, when a cylindrical mirrour, placed right, hath reduced those irregular lines, on the table, into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or Cæsar, i. e. that it belongs to those names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey, i. e. from the ideas signified by those names. Just thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be ranked under some ordinary name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.

Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.

§ 9. THIRDLY, a third defect, that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined. Thus we may observe men, who, not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their precise signification, change the idea they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his idea of church, or idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas, that makes it up, is said to have a confused idea of idolatry, or the church: tho' this be still for the same reason that the former, viz. because a mutable idea, (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot belong to one name, rather than another; and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for.

Confusion, without reference to names, hardly conceivable.

§ 10. BY what has been said, we may observe how much names, as supposed, steady signs of things, and by their difference to stand for, and keep things distinct that in themselves are different, are the occasion of denominating ideas distinct, or confused, by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes, of its ideas to such names. This, perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of words, in the third book, has been read and considered. But, without taking notice of such a reference of ideas, to distinct names, as the signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say, what a confused idea is. And, therefore, when a man designs, by any name, a sort of things, or any one particular thing, distinct from all others; the complex idea he annexes to that name, is the more distinct, the more particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all ideas, belonging to other names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confusion with them is avoided.

Confusion concerns always two ideas.

§ 11. CONFUSION, making it a difficulty to separate two things, that should be separated, concerns always two ideas; and those most, which most approach one another. Whenever, therefore, we suspect any idea to be confused, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from: and that will always be found an idea, belonging to another name, and so should be a different thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and so keeps not that difference from that other idea, which the different names import.

Causes of confusion.

§ 12. THIS, I think, is the confusion proper to ideas, which still carries with it a secret reference to names. At least, if there be any other confusion of ideas, this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses: ideas, as ranked under names, being those, that for the most part men reason of, within themselves, and always those, which they commune about with others. And, therefore, where there are supposed two different ideas, marked by two different names, which are not as distinguishable, as the sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be confusion: and, where any ideas are distinct, as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confusion. The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex idea, as precisely as is possible, all those ingredients, whereby it is differenced from others; and to them,

them, so united, in a determinate number and order, apply steadily the same name. But this neither accommodating men's ease, or vanity, or serving any design but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, such exactness is rather to be wished, than hoped for. And, since the loose application of names to undetermined, variable, and almost no ideas, serves both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge, it is no wonder, that most men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Tho' I think, no small part of the confusion, to be found in the notions of men, might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some ideas are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas, under one name; much less are we able constantly to divine, for what precise complex idea such a name stands, in another man's use of it. From the first of these, follows confusion in a man's own reasonings and opinions, within himself; from the latter, frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others. But, having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuses, in the following book, I shall here say no more of it.

§ 13. OUR complex ideas, being made up of collections, and so variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. In a man, who speaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thousand sides, the idea of the figure may be very confused, tho' that of the number be very distinct; so that, he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea, which depends upon the number of a thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain, he has no precise idea of its figure, so as to distinguish it by that, from one that has but nine hundred, ninety nine sides; the not observing whereof, causes no small error in men's thoughts, and confusion in their discourses.

§ 14. HE that thinks he has a distinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron, let him, for trial-sake, take another parcel of the same uniform matter, viz. gold, or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of nine hundred, ninety nine sides: he will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two ideas one from another, by the number of sides; and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas, which is contained in their numbers; as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, &c. But, when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold; as he could, if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five sides. In which incompleat ideas, we are very apt to impose on ourselves, and wrangle with others, especially, where they have particular and familiar names. For, being satisfied in that part of the idea, which we have clear; and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure; we are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obscure part of its signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

§ 15. HAVING frequently in our mouths the name eternity, we are apt to think we have a positive, comprehensive idea of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that duration, which is not clearly contained in our idea. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so, may have a clear idea of duration; he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one with still a greater; but, it not being possible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole extent together of a duration, where he supposes no end, that part of his idea, which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration, he represents to his own thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined.

Complex ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.

This, if not heeded, causes confusion in our arguings.

Influence in eternity.

BOOK II. terminated. And hence it is, that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.

Divisibility
of matter.

§ 16. IN matter we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts, much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses: and therefore, when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum, tho' we have clear ideas of division, and divisibility, and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a whole, by division; yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles, or minute bodies so to be divided, when, by former divisions, they are reduced to a smallness, much exceeding the perception of any of our senses; and so all, that we have clear and distinct ideas of, is of what division in general, or abstractly, is, and the relation of totum and pars: but of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided, after certain progressions, I think, we have no clear nor distinct idea at all. For I ask any one, whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw, he has any distinct idea (bating still the number, which concerns not extension) betwixt the 100,000th, and the 1000,000th part of it? Or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed, since a division carried on so far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division, into two halves, does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear, distinct ideas of the different bulk, or extension of those bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of division of bodies in infinitum, our idea of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes after a little progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in obscurity. For that idea, which is to represent only bigness, must be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number; so that we have clear, distinct ideas, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain from hence, that, when we talk of infinite divisibility of body, or extension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers; but the clear, distinct ideas of extension, after some progress of division, is quite lost: and of such minute parts we have no distinct ideas at all; but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual, infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts, in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned number we have: endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endless addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number; they both being only in a power still of increasing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein consists the infinity) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused idea; from, or about, which we can argue or reason with no certainty, or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetick, about a number, of which we have no such distinct idea, as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other, it is still bigger: and we have no more a clear, positive idea of it, when we say, or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And so likewise, in eternity, he that has an idea of but 4 years, has as much a positive compleat idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: for what remains of eternity, beyond either of these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other; i. e. neither of them has any clear, positive idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on; shall as soon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on, or if he please

please, doubles the increase, as often as he will: the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions, as it is from the length of a day, or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is also in our idea of extension, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by division, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space. After a few doublings of those ideas of extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear, distinct idea of that space: it becomes a confusedly great one, with a surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue, or reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss; confused ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them, which is confused, always leading us into confusion.

C H A P. XXX.

Of real and fantastical ideas.

§ 1. **B**ESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other considerations belong to them, in reference to things, from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and are,

FIRST, either real or fantastical.

SECONDLY, adequate or inadequate.

THIRDLY, true or false.

Real ideas
are conform-
able to their
archetypes.

FIRST, by real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical, I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being, to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of ideas before-mentioned, we shall find that,

§ 2. FIRST, our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images, or representations, of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shewn. But tho' whiteness and coldness are no more in snow, than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several appearances being designed to be the marks, whereby we are to know and distinguish things, which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real, distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But, whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes, or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things, which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shewn) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it has received.

Simple ideas
all real.

§ 3. THO' the mind be wholly passive, in respect of its simple ideas; yet, I think, we may say, it is not so in respect of its complex ideas: for those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty, in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass, that one man's idea of gold, or justice, is different from another's? but because he has put in, or left out

Complex i-
deas are vo-
luntary com-
binations.

BOOK II. of his, some simple idea, which the other has not. The question then is, which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That,

§ 4. SECONDLY, mixed modes and relations having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to those kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing, conformable to them. These ideas themselves being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he, that has them in his mind, would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical; as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea, which common use calls liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas: for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action, which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Tho' the first of these having the name courage given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea: but the other, whilst it has not a common received name, of any known language, assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself.

§ 5. THIRDLY, our complex ideas of substances being made all of them in reference to things, existing without us, and intended to be representations of substances, as they really are, are no farther real, than as they are such combinations of simple ideas, as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical, which are made up of such collections of simple ideas, as were really never united, never were found together in any substance; v. g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the centaurs are described: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances being made conformable to no pattern existing, that we know, and consisting of such collections of ideas, as no substance ever shewed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.

C H A P. XXXI.

Of adequate and inadequate ideas.

CHAP. § 1. OF our real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes, which the mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are such, which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those archetypes, to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes.
Simple ideas are all adequate.

§ 2. FIRST, that all our simple ideas are adequate. Because being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar

sugar produce in us the ideas, which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power, that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple idea;) and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those ideas were real beings in them. For, tho' fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire, more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in, or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in us, I must, in that sense, be understood, when I speak of secondary qualities, as being in things; or of their ideas, as being in the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensations, or ideas in us: since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs, to receive the ideas of light and heat, by those impressions from the fire, or the sun, there would yet be no more light, or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no sensible creature to feel it, tho' the sun should continue just as it is now, and mount *Ætna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world, as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them, or no: and therefore, we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But, this being an enquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to shew what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

§ 3. SECONDLY, our complex ideas of modes, being voluntary collections of simple ideas, which the mind puts together, without reference to any real archetypes, or standing patterns, existing any where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Because they not being intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind, to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection, which the mind intended they should: so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure, with three sides, meeting in three angles, I have a compleat idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea, is plain, in that it does not conceive, that any understanding hath, or can have a more compleat, or perfect idea, of that thing it signifies by the word triangle, supposing it to exist, than itself has in that complex idea of three sides, and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be essential to it, or necessary to compleat it, wherever, or however it exists. But, in our ideas of substances, it is otherwise. For there, desiring to copy things as they really do exist, and to represent to ourselves that constitution, on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend: we find they still want something we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But mixed modes and relations, being archetypes without patterns, and so, having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to itself. He that at first put together the idea of danger perceived, absence of disorder from fear, sedate consideration of what was justly to be done, and executing of that, without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea, made up of that combination;

Book II. nation; and intending it to be nothing else, but what it is, nor to have in it any other simple ideas, but what it hath, it could not also but be an adequate idea: and laying this up in his memory, with the name courage annexed to it, to signify it to others, and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea, thus made, and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be adequate, being referred to nothing else but itself, nor made by any other original, but the good-liking and will of him that first made this combination.

Modes, in reference to settled names may be inadequate.

§ 4. INDEED another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word courage, may make an idea, to which he gives that name courage, different from what the first author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs that his idea in thinking should be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his, from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate: because in this case, making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's word, or sound, is the pattern of his in speaking, his idea is so far defective and inadequate, as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it; which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's idea (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5. THEREFORE these complex ideas of modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being, expressed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong and inadequate; because they agree not to that, which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which respect only, any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking, than knowing right.

Ideas of substances, as referred to real essences, not adequate.

§ 6. THIRDLY, what ideas we have of substances, I have above shewn. Now those ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations, in the mind, of things that do exist, by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these copies of those originals and archetypes, are imperfect and inadequate.

FIRST, it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things, as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of this, or that species: and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds, they must consequently refer their ideas to such real essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specifick essences of substances, which each individual, in its several kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is so far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange, if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specifick names, they rank particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specifick, real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whether he called himself man, with any other meaning, than as having the real essence of a man? and yet, if you demand what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of substances, are, as it has been shewn, certain collections of simple ideas, that have been observed, or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of

of any substance; for then the properties we discover in that body, would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a space. But it is plain, that in our complex ideas of substances, are not contained such ideas, on which all the other qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common idea men have of iron, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardness; and a property that they look on, as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connection with that complex idea, or any part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour, weight and hardness, than that that colour, or that weight, depends on its malleableness. And yet, tho' we know nothing of these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by most men, supposed to have a real essence, whereby it is gold; and from whence those qualities flow, which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury, &c. This essence, from which all these properties flow, when I enquire into it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover; the farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but body, its real essence, or internal constitution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, size, and connection of its solid parts; of neither of which, having any distinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its essence, which is the cause that it has that particular, shining yellowness, a greater weight than any thing I know, of the same bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quick-silver. If any one will say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement, or connection, of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular form; I am farther from having any idea of its real essence, than I was before; for I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid parts in general, tho' I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that something, besides the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of that body, is its essence, something called, substantial form; of that, I confess, I have no idea at all, but only of the found, form, which is far enough from an idea of its real essence, or constitution. The like ignorance, as I have of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences, I confess I have no distinct ideas at all; and I am apt to suppose others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§ 7. Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general name, already in use, and denominate it gold, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name, as belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real, internal essence; by having of which essence, this particular substance comes to be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that essence, must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the idea, to which that name is given, must be referred also to that essence, and be intended to represent it. Which essence, since they, who so use the names, know not, their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect, as not containing in them that real essence, which the mind intends they should.

§ 8. SECONDLY, those who, neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the substances that Ideas of substances, as collections of their

BOOK. II.
 { their quali-
 ties, are all
 inadequate.

that exist in the world, by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities, which are found co-existing in them, tho' they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those, who imagine they know not what, real, specifick essences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances, they would thus copy into their minds; nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities, and powers of substances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are so many and various, that no man's complex idea contains them all. That our abstract ideas of substances do not contain in them all the simple ideas, that are united in the things themselves, is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance, all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it. Because, endeavouring to make the signification of their specifick names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specifick ideas of the sorts of substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple ideas, which are to be found in them: but these, having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specifick idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate. The simple ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of substances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers, which being relations to other substances, we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to, or receive, from other substances, in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§ 9. WHOEVER first lit on a parcel of that sort of substance, we denote by the word gold, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real essence, or internal constitution. Therefore, those never went into his idea of that species of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal scales, one against another. Another, perhaps, added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and solubility in aq. regia, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure, or separation of it into insensible parts. These, or part of these, put together, usually make the complex idea in men's minds, of that sort of body we call gold.

§ 10. BUT no one, who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties, not contained in that complex idea. Some, who have examined this species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution, as its colour, or weight: and, it is probable, if any one knew all the properties, that are by divers men known of this metal, there would an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold, as any one man yet has in his: and yet, perhaps, that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes, which that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one, who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a triangle; tho' it be no small number, that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.

Ideas of sub-
 stances, as
 collections
 of

§ 11. So that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be so also in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex ideas of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other

other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas, having in our plain idea the whole essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

CHAP. XXXI.

of their qualities, are all inadequate.

§ 12. THUS the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas, or nominal essences: FIRST, simple ideas, which are *εἰδωτα*, or copies; but yet certainly adequate. Because, being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light (I speak according to the common notion of light) to produce in me the sensation, which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of such a power, in something without the mind; since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in itself, and being meant for nothing else, but the effect of such a power, that simple idea is real and adequate: the sensation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power; which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that power; or else, that power would produce a different idea.

Simple ideas *εἰδωτα*, and adequate.

§ 13. SECONDLY, the complex ideas of substances are ectypes, copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the mind, in that it plainly perceives that, whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance: since, not having tried all the operations, of all other substances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cause in other substances, it cannot have an exact, adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities: and so not have an adequate, complex idea of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations, which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have. And, after all, if we could have, and actually had in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities, or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an idea of the essence of that thing. For since the powers, or qualities, that are observable by us, are not the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities, cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of substances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no idea of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.

Ideas of substances are *εἰδωτα*, inadequate.

§ 14. THIRDLY, complex ideas of modes and relations, are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such collections of simple ideas, that the mind itself puts together, and such collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends it should, they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist, and so are designed only for, and belong only to such modes, as when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex ideas. The ideas, therefore, of modes and relations cannot but be adequate.

Ideas of modes and relations, are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and false ideas.

§ 1. THO' truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to propositions; yet ideas are oftentimes termed true, or false, (as what words are there, that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) tho', I think, that when ideas themselves are termed true, or false, there is still some secret, or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions, wherein they come to be called true, or false. In all which,

CHAP. XXXII.

Truth and falsehood properly belong to propositions.

BOOK II. which, we shall find some kind of affirmation, or negation, which is the reason of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances, or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true, or false, no more than a single name of any thing can be said to be true, or false.

Metaphysical truth contains a tacit proposition.

§ 2. INDEED both ideas and words may be said to be true in a metaphysical sense of the word truth, as all other things, that any way exist, are said to be true; i. e. really to be such as they exist. Tho' in things called true, even in that sense, there is, perhaps, a secret reference to our ideas, looked upon as the standards of that truth, which amounts to a mental proposition, tho' it be usually not taken notice of.

No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true, or false.

§ 3. BUT it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth, which we enquire here, when we examine whether our ideas are capable of being true, or false; but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say, that the ideas in our minds being only so many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper. For truth, or falsehood, lying always in some affirmation, or negation, mental, or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms, or denies, something of them.

Ideas, referred to any thing, may be true, or false.

§ 4. WHENEVER the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable of being called true, or false. Because the mind, in such a reference, makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing: which supposition, as it happens to be true, or false, so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases, wherein this happens, are these following:

Other men's ideas, real existence, and supposed real essences, are what men usually refer their ideas to.

§ 5. FIRST, when the mind supposes any idea it has, conformable to that in other men's minds, called by the same common name; v. g. when the mind intends, or judges its ideas of justice, temperance, religion, to be the same with what other men give those names to.

SECONDLY, when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself, to be conformable to some real existence. Thus the two ideas, of a man and a centaur, supposed to be the ideas of real substances, are the one true, and the other false; the one having a conformity to what has really existed, the other not.

THIRDLY, when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution and essence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend; and thus the greatest part, if not all our ideas of substances are false.

The cause of such references.

§ 6. THESE suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make, concerning its own ideas. But yet, if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abstract, complex ideas. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge: and finding that, if it should proceed by, and dwell upon only particular things, its progress would be very slow, and its work endless: therefore, to shorten its way to knowledge, and make each perception more comprehensive; the first thing it does, as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themselves, that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby, with assurance, extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that, which is its great business, knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shewed, is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas, with names annexed to them, into genera and species, i. e. into kinds and sorts.

§ 7. IF, therefore, we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and observe what course it usually takes, in its way to knowledge; we shall, I think, find that the mind, having got any idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in contemplation, or discourse, the first thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its store-house, the memory, as contain-

ing the essence of a sort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new thing of a kind, that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that enquiry nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species, or the essence of it: whereof it is, indeed, used as the mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.

§ 8. BUT this abstract idea, being something in the mind between the thing that exists, and the name that is given to it; it is in our ideas, that both the rightness of our knowledge, and the propriety or intelligibleness of our speaking, consists. And hence it is, that men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract ideas they have in their minds, are such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are referred; and are the same also, to which the names they give them, do by the use and propriety of that language belong. For, without this double conformity of their ideas, they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§ 9. FIRST then, I say, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of, by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly signify by the same name, they may be any of them false. But yet simple ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken; because a man, by his senses, and every day's observation, may easily satisfy himself, what the simple ideas are, which their several names, that are in common use, stand for; they being but few in number, and such, as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify, by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes, in his names of simple ideas; or applies the name red, to the idea green; or the name sweet, to the idea bitter: much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas, belonging to different senses; and call a colour by the name of a taste, &c. whereby it is evident, that the simple ideas, they call by any name, are commonly the same that others have, and mean when they use the same names.

§ 10. COMPLEX ideas are much more liable to be false, in this respect; and the complex ideas of mixed modes, much more than those of substances: because in substances (especially those, which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) some remarkable, sensible qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any care in the use of their words, from applying them to sorts of substances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes, we are much more uncertain; it being not so easy to determine of several actions, whether they are to be called justice or cruelty, liberality or prodigality. And so, in referring our ideas to those of other men, called by the same names, ours may be false; and the idea in our minds, which we express by the word justice, may perhaps be that, which ought to have another name.

§ 11. BUT whether or no, our ideas of mixed modes are more liable, than any sort, to be different from those of other men, which are marked by the same names; this at least is certain, that this sort of falshood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes, than to any other. When a man is thought to have a false idea of justice, or gratitude, or glory, it is for no other reason, but that his agrees not with the ideas, which each of those names are the signs of in other men.

§ 12. THE reason whereof seems to me to be this, that the abstract ideas of mixed modes, being men's voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas; and so the essence of each species being made by men alone, whereof we have no other sensible standard, existing any where, but the name itself, or the definition of that name: we have nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to, as a standard, to which we would conform them, but the ideas of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations; and so, as our ideas conform or differ from them, they pass for true

BOOK II. or false. And thus much concerning the truth and falshood of our ideas, in reference to their names.

As referred to real existences, none of our ideas can be false, but those of substances.

First, simple ideas in this sense not false, and why.

First, simple ideas in this sense not false, and why.

§ 13. SECONDLY, as to the truth and falshood of our ideas, in reference to the real existence of things, when that is made the standard of their truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our complex ideas of substances.

§ 14. FIRST, our simple ideas being barely such perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us, by established laws and ways, suitable to his wisdom and goodness, tho' incomprehensible to us, their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those powers he has placed in external objects, or else they could not be produced in us: and thus answering those powers, they are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falshood, if the mind (as in most men I believe it does) judges these ideas to be in the things themselves. For God, in his wisdom, having set them as marks of distinction in things, whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another, and so chuse any of them for our uses, as we have occasion; it alters not the nature of our simple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object, by a regular and constant operation, producing the same idea of blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that distinguishing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or else that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that idea: since the name blue notes properly nothing, but that mark of distinction that is in a violet, discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, if we had faculties to discern.

Tho' one man's idea of blue should be different from another's.

§ 15. NEITHER would it carry any imputation of falshood to our simple ideas, if, by the different structure of our organs, it were so ordered, that the same object should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the same time; v. g. if the idea, that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes, were the same that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice versa. For since this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded, or any falshood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing constantly the idea which he called blue; and those which had the texture of a marigold, producing constantly the idea which he has constantly called yellow; whatever those appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use, by those appearances, and understand and signify those distinctions, marked by the names blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from those two flowers, were exactly the same with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible ideas, produced by any object, in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

First, simple ideas in this sense not false, and why.

§ 16. FROM what has been said concerning our simple ideas, I think it evident, that our simple ideas can none of them be false, in respect of things existing without us. For the truth of these appearances, or perceptions in our minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our senses such appearances in us; and each of them

them being in the mind, such as it is, suitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it represents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to such a pattern, be false. Blue or yellow, bitter or sweet, can never be false ideas; these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there, answering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied; but that in this respect makes no falshood in the ideas: as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple, scarlet.

§ 17. SECONDLY, neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the essence of any thing really existing, be false. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern existing, and made by nature: it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to represent any thing but such a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself such meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniences of life as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply, and his station requires, I have no false idea; but such an one as represents an action, either as I find, or imagine it; and so is capable of neither truth or falshood. But when I give the name frugality, or virtue to this action, then it may be called a false idea, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the standard of virtue and vice.

§ 18. THIRDLY, our complex ideas of substances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition, and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of simple ideas, existing together constantly in things, of which patterns they are the supposed copies: and in this reference of them, to the existence of things, they are false ideas. 1. When they put together simple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the shape and size, that exist together in a horse, is joined in the same complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a false idea of an horse. 2. Ideas of substances are, in this respect, also false, when from any collection of simple ideas, that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other simple idea, which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if to extension, solidity, fusibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be said to have a false, complex idea, as well as when he joins, to those other simple ones, the idea of perfect, absolute fixedness. For either way, the complex idea of gold, being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed false. But, if he leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea rather than a false one; since, tho' it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

§ 19. THO', in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have shewed in what sense, and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called true or false; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cases, where any idea is called true or false, it is from some judgment that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is true or false. For truth or falshood, being never without some affirmation or negation, express or tacit, it is not to be found but where signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use are either ideas, or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions. Truth

lies

Thirdly, ideas of substances, when false.

Truth or falshood always supposes affirmation or negation.

BOOK II. lies in so joining, or separating these representatives, as the things, they stand for, do in themselves agree or disagree; and falsehood in the contrary, as shall be more fully shewed hereafter.

Ideas, in themselves, neither true nor false.

§ 20. ANY idea then, which we have in our minds, whether conformable, or not, to the existence of things, or to any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called false. For these representations, if they have nothing in them, but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought false, being exact representations of something: nor yet, if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not represent. But the mistake and falsehood is,

But are false,
1. When judged agreeable to another man's idea, without being so.

§ 21. FIRST, when the mind, having any idea, it judges and concludes it the same that is in other men's minds, signified by the same name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary, received signification, or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes, tho' other ideas also are liable to it.

2. When judged to agree to real existence, when they do not.

§ 22. SECONDLY, when it having a complex idea, made up of such a collection of simple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a species of creatures, really existing; as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of gold.

3. When judged adequate, without being so.

§ 23. THIRDLY, when, in its complex idea, it has united a certain number of simple ideas, that do really exist together in some sort of creatures, but has also left out others, as much inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect, compleat idea of a sort of things, which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex idea to be the compleat idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in aqua regia are as inseparable from those other ideas, or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

4. When judged to represent the real essence.

§ 24. FOURTHLY, the mistake is yet greater, when I judge that this complex idea, contains in it the real essence of any body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those properties, which flow from its real essence and constitution. I say, only some few of those properties; for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, and of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a man, that has several ways tried and examined it, knows of that one sort of things; and all that the most expert man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal, or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few ideas; three lines, including a space, make up that essence: but the properties, that flow from this essence, are more than can be easily known, or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances, their real essences lie in a little compass; tho' the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.

Ideas, when false.

§ 25. To conclude, a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases) he may, indeed, make an idea neither answering the reality of things, nor agreeing to the ideas commonly signified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong, or false idea of a thing, which is no otherwise known to him, but by the idea he has of it: v. g. when I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a false idea of any thing; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a man, or Tartar, and imagine it either to represent some real being without me, or to be the same idea that others call by the same name; in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a false idea; tho' indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit, mental proposition, wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an

an idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name man, or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it man, or Tartar, I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the idea any way false.

§ 26. UPON the whole matter, I think, that our ideas, as they are considered by the mind, either in reference to the proper signification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may very fitly be called right, or wrong ideas, according as they agree, or disagree, to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true, or false, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though in propriety of speech, truth, or falsehood, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas, that are in a man's mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

More properly to be called right, or wrong.

C H A P. XXXIII.

Of the association of ideas.

§ 1. THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will, by the authority of reason, forwardly condemn, tho' he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

Something unreasonable in most men.

§ 2. THIS proceeds not wholly from self-love, tho' that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the over-weening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it: and, in many cases, one with amazement hears the arguing, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, tho' laid before him as clear as day-light.

Nor wholly from self-love.

§ 3. THIS sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, tho' that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew, whence this flaw has its original, in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

Not from education.

§ 4. I SHALL be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness, when it is considered, that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that, if he should always, on all occasions, argue, or do, as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam, than civil conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion, but in the steady, calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind, is that enquiring a little by the by into the nature of madness, B. ii. c. xi. § 13. I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause, we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time when I thought not the least on the subject, which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness, to which all men are so liable; if this be a taint, which so universally infects mankind, the greater care should be taken

A degree of madness.

BOOK II. to lay it open, under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

From a
wrong con-
nection of
ideas.

§ 5. SOME of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connection one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together, in that union and correspondence, which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to chance, or custom: ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, shew themselves together.

This con-
nection, how
made.

§ 6. THIS strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself, either voluntarily, or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, &c. Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which seems to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set a going, continue in the same steps they have been used to; which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and, as it were, natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another, in an habitual train, when once they are put into that track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another, orderly in his understanding, without any care, or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, tho' his unattentive thoughts be elsewhere a wandering. Whether the natural cause of these ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers, be the motion of his animal spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears to be so: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas.

Some antipa-
thies, an
effect of it.

§ 7. THAT there are such associations of them, made by custom in the minds of most men, I think no body will question, who has well considered himself, or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects, as if they were natural, and are therefore called so, tho' they at first had no other original but the accidental connection of two ideas, which either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I say most of the antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us; but a great part of those, which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, tho', perhaps, early impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person surfeiting with honey, no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach, and he cannot bear the very idea of it; other ideas of dislike, and sickness, and vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed, but he knows from whence to date this weakness, and can tell how he got this indisposition. Had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey, when a child, all the same effects would have followed, but the cause would have been mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

§ 8. I MENTION this, not out of any great necessity there is in this present argument, to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, (viz. that those who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch,
and

and carefully to prevent the undue connection of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions; and tho' those, relating to the health of the body, are by discreet people minded and fenced against; yet I am apt to doubt, that those, which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the understanding, or passions, have been much less heeded than the thing deserves: nay, those relating purely to the understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly overlooked.

§ 9. THIS wrong connection in our minds, of ideas, in themselves, loose and independent one of another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings and notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is not any one thing, that deserves more to be looked after.

§ 10. THE ideas of goblins and sprights, have really no more to do with darkness, than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives: but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§ 11. A MAN receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over; and by ruminating on them strongly, or much in his mind, so cements those two ideas together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure, he suffered, comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten, from slight and almost innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

§ 12. A MAN has suffered pain, or sickness, in any place, he saw his friend die in such a room; tho' these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet, when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§ 13. WHEN this combination is settled, and whilst it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumstances; and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, tho' in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those, who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child, that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case, and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses, the pain of his joints tearing asunder. Till time has, by disuse, separated the sense of that enjoyment, and its loss, from the idea of the child returning to her memory, all representations, tho' ever so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some, in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

§ 14. A FRIEND of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation. The gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment, owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received; but, whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony, which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§ 15. MANY children imputing the pain, they endured at school, to their books they were corrected for, so join those ideas together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise, possibly,

BOOK II. sibly, they might have made the great pleasure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels, which, tho' ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that, by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive, and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person, not otherwise superior to him, but because having once, on some occasion, got the ascendant, the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person, and he, that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them?

§ 16. INSTANCES of this kind are so plentiful every where, that, if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room, where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff, had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances, that, tho' in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that, or some such other trunk, had its due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances, a little beyond precise nature; I answer for my self, that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I report it: and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive persons, who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples of this nature, that may parallel, or, at least justify this.

Its influence
on intel-
lectual ha-
bits.

§ 17. INTELLECTUAL habits and defects this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, tho' less observed. Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined, either by education, or much thought, whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings, will there be about separate spirits? Let custom, from the very childhood, have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to, about the deity?

LET the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind; and then one body, in two places at once, shall, unexamined, be swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined, infallible person dictates, and demands assent without inquiry.

Observable
in different
sects.

§ 18. SOME such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth, offered by plain reason. Interest, tho' it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them, to a man, should knowingly maintain falsehood: some, at least, must be allowed to do what all pretend to, i. e. to pursue truth sincerely; and, therefore, there must be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That, which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity, blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be, what we are speaking of: some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said, of all the errors in the world; or, if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united; if the eye sees these things riveted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas, that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds, as to substitute one for the other,

other, and, as I am apt to think, often, without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when, indeed, they are contending for error; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connection of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

CHAP.
XXXIII.

§ 19. HAVING thus given an account of the original, sorts and extent of our ideas, with several other considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments, or materials of our knowledge; the method I at first proposed to myself, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to shew what use the understanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connection between ideas and words; and our abstract ideas, and general words have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering, first, the nature, use and signification of language; which therefore must be the business of the next book.

Conclusion.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of words, or language in general.

§ 1. GOD, having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds, distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language.

CHAP.
I.

Man fitted to
form articu-
late sounds.

§ 2. BESIDES articulate sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas, within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

To make
them signs of
ideas.

§ 3. BUT neither was this sufficient to make words so useful, as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name, to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement, in the use of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences: which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only, by the difference of the ideas, they were made signs of; those names becoming general, which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining particular, where the ideas, they are used for, are particular.

To make ge-
neral signs.

§ 4. BESIDES these names, which stand for ideas, there be other words which men make use of, not to signify any idea, but the want, or absence of

Book III.

some ideas, simple or complex, or all ideas together; such as are nihil in Latin, and in English, ignorance and barrenness. All which negative, or privative words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify, no ideas: for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds; but they relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence.

Words, ultimately derived from such as signify sensible ideas.

§ 5. IT may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark, how great a dependance our words have on common, sensible ideas; and how those, which are made use of, to stand for actions and notions, quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious, sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas, that come not under the cognizance of our senses; v. g. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, insil, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, &c. are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. Spirit, in its primary signification, is breath; angel, a messenger: and I doubt not, but, if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names, which stand for things, that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds, who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge: whilst, to give names, that might make known to others, any operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas, that came not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary, known ideas of sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations, they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed names, to signify those internal operations of their own minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their other ideas; since they could consist of nothing, but either of outward, sensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about them: we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but what originally come either from sensible objects without, or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which we are conscious to ourselves within.

Distribution.

§ 6. BUT to understand better the use and force of language, as subservient to instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

FIRST, to what it is that names, in the use of language, are immediately applied.

SECONDLY, since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly, for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things; it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, what the species and genera of things are; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies, that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniencies of obscurity, or uncertainty in the signification of words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness, or order, concerning knowledge: which, being conversant about propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connection with words than perhaps is suspected.

THESE considerations therefore shall be the matter of the following chapters.

C H A P. II.

Of the signification of words.

CHAP. II.

§ 1. **M**AN, tho' he has great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can
of

of themselves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external, sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty, or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connection that there is between particular, articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use, then, of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification.

Words are sensible signs, necessary for communication.

§ 2. THE use men have of these marks, being either to record their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory, or as it were to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others; words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing, but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things, which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood, and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of, are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them, as marks, immediately to any thing else, but the ideas, that he himself hath. For this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs, and not signs, of his ideas, at the same time; and so, in effect, to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs, imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Until he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But, when he represents to himself other men's ideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

Words are the sensible signs of his ideas, who uses them.

§ 3. THIS is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and unlearned, use the words they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth, stand for the ideas he has, and which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright, shining, yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail, gold. Another, that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow, great weight: and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining, yellow, and very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities, fusibility: and then the word gold to him, signifies a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability: each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea, which they have applied it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex ideas as he has not.

§ 4. BUT tho' words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing, but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet they, in their thoughts, give them a secret reference to two other things.

Words often secretly referred, first, to the ideas in other men's minds.

FIRST, they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea, were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. But

BOOK III. in this, men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they, and those they discourse with, have in their minds, be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose, that the idea they make it a sign of, is precisely the same, to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.

Secondly, to the reality of things.

§ 5. **SECONDLY**, because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things, as really they are: therefore they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things. But, this relating more particularly to substances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words, more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and substances in particular: tho' give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for any thing, but those ideas we have in our own minds.

Words, by use, readily excite ideas.

§ 6. **CONCERNING** words also it is farther to be considered: first, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that means the instruments, whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations, they have within their own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a connection between certain sounds, and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themselves; which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious, sensible qualities; and in all substances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

Words often used without signification.

§ 7. **SECONDLY**, that tho' the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas, in the mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their significations perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words, than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned, before the ideas are known, for which they stand; therefore some, not only children, but men, speak several words, no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connection between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one stand for the other; without which application of them they are nothing, but so much insignificant noise.

Their signification, perfectly arbitrary.

§ 8. **WORDS**, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain ideas, so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connection between them. But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be the signs of: and every man has so inviolable a liberty, to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds, that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And therefore, the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new, Latin word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas, in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that, unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But, whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.

C H A P. III.

Of general terms.

§ 1. **A**LL things that exist being particulars, it may, perhaps, be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too; I mean, in their signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect, or chance, but of reason and necessity.

CHAP.
III.

The greatest part of words, general.

§ 2. **FIRST**, it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For the signification and use of words, depending on that connection, which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame, and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every foldier in their army by his proper name; we may easily find a reason, why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand, that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

For every particular thing to have a name, is impossible.

§ 3. **SECONDLY**, if it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done, when, by use, or consent, the sound I make, by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant, or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular things, which had fallen under my notice.

And useless.

§ 4. **THIRDLY**, but yet granting this also feasible (which I think is not) yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use, for the improvement of knowledge: which, tho' founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which, things reduced into sorts under general names, are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires: and, therefore, in these, men have, for the most part, stopped; but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And, therefore, in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct denominations.

§ 5. **BESIDES** persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like distinctions of place, have usually found peculiar names, and that for the same reason; they being such, as men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others, in their discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use, as

What things have proper names.

Book III. Alexander. And therefore we see that amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names, to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants; because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this, or that particular horse, when he is ought of fight.

How general words are made.

§ 6. THE next thing to be considered, is, how general words come to be made. For since all things that exist, are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this, or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction, they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.

§ 7. BUT to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not, perhaps, be amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas, from our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are like the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse, and the mother, are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them, are confined to these individuals; and the names of nurse and mamma, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other things in the world that in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man, for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea, they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8. BY the same way, that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily advance to more general names and notions. For observing that several things, that differ from their idea of man, and cannot, therefore, be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities, wherein they agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and a more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehensive extension: which new idea is made; not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other properties, signified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.

General natures are nothing but abstract ideas.

§ 9. THAT this is the way, whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures, or notions, are any thing else, but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out something, that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much of those particular, complex ideas of several, particular existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas, signified by the names, man and horse, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct, complex idea, and giving the name animal to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, sense and spontaneous motion; and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple

simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term vivens. And, not to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the mind proceeds to body, substance, and, at last, to being, thing, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more, or less, comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, that every more general term stands for such an idea, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

§ 10. THIS may shew us the reason, why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several, simple ideas, which the next general word, or genus, stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But tho' defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to use these terms of art, tho' originally latin, since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to) I say, tho' defining by the genus be the shortest way, yet, I think, it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For, definition being nothing but making another understand by words, what idea the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas, that are combined in the signification of the term defined: and if, instead of such an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term; it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one, who desired to know what ideas the word man stood for, if it should be said, that man was a solid, extended substance, having life, sense, spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term man, would be as well understood, and the idea, it stands for be, at least, as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational animal: which, by the several definitions of animal, vivens, and corpus, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed here the ordinary definition of the schools: which tho', perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the rule, that a definition must consist of genus and differentia: and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a rule, or advantage, in the strict observing of it. For definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one word, by several others, so that the meaning, or idea, it stands for, may be certainly known; languages are not always so made, according to the rules of logick, that every term can have its signification, exactly and clearly, expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those, who have made this rule, have done ill, that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

§ 11. TO return to general words, it is plain, by what has been said, that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things: but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words, or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general, when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence; even those words and ideas, which in their signification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of signifying, or representing, many particulars. For the signification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them.

BOOK III. § 12. THE next thing, therefore, to be considered, is, what kind of signification it is, that general words have. For as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names: so on the other side it is as evident, they do not signify a plurality; for man and men would then signify the same, and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That then, which general words signify, is a sort of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind, to which idea, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the essences of the sorts, or (if the Latin word pleases better) species of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being that which makes any thing to be of that species, and the conformity to the idea, to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that species, is all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have right to the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the essence of a man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species, it follows that the abstract idea, for which the name stands, and the essence of the species is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the workmanship of the understanding, that abstracts and makes those general ideas.

They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.

§ 13. I WOULD not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature, in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet, I think, we may say the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns, or forms (for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification) to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say, this is a man, that a horse; this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else but rank things under different, specifick names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the essences of those species, set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under? And, when general names have any connection with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are, nor can be any thing, but those precise, abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore, the supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of species, we rank things into. For two species may be one as rationally, as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations may, or may not be, in a horse, or lead, without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things, by our abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein, by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss; and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the species of a horse, or lead.

Each distinct, abstract idea is a distinct essence.

§ 14. NOR will any wonder, that I say these essences, or abstract ideas, (which are measures of name, and the boundaries of species) are the workmanship of the understanding, who considers, that, at least, the complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas: and therefore, that

that is covetousness to one man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that species, which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the fœtus, born of a woman, were a man, even so far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were, or were not to be nourished and baptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea of essence, to which the name man belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the understanding puts together, and then abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth every distinct, abstract idea is a distinct essence; and the names, that stand for such distinct ideas, are the names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval, as a sheep from a goat: and rain is as essentially different from snow, as water from earth; that abstract idea which is the essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if you please, species, as essentially different as any two the most remote, or opposite in the world.

§ 15. BUT since the essences of things are thought, by some (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word essence. Real and nominal essence.

FIRST, essence may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real, internal, but generally in substances unknown, constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence. This is the proper, original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; *essentia*, in its primary notation, signifying properly being. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of particular things, without giving them any name.

SECONDLY, the learning and disputes of the schools having been much busy'd about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its primary signification: and, instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas, co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names; the essence of each genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which the general, or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as I do general from genus) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that, which the word essence imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other the nominal essence.

§ 16. BETWEEN the nominal essence, and the name, there is so near a connection, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being, but what has this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea, whereof that name is the sign. Constant connection between the name and nominal essence.

§ 17. CONCERNING the real essences of corporeal substances (to mention those only) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those, who using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this, or that species. The other and more rational opinion, is of those, who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common denominations. The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences, as a certain number of forms, or molds, wherein all natural things, that exist, Supposition, that species are distinguished by their real essences, useless.

Book III. are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issues of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this hypothesis: since it is as impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, should have different properties, as that the two figures, partaking in the same real essence of a circle, should have different properties. But were there no other reason against it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known, and the making them nevertheless to be that, which distinguishes the species of things, is so wholly useless, and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts, or species of things, as come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else, but those abstract, complex ideas, to which we have annexed distinct general names.

Real and nominal essence, the same in simple ideas and modes, different in substances.

§ 18. ESSENCES being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may farther observe, that in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are always the same; but in substances always quite different. Thus a figure, including a space between three lines, is the real, as well as nominal, essence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea, to which the general name is annexed, but the very essentia or being of the thing itself, that foundation, from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise, concerning that parcel of matter, which makes the ring on my finger, wherein these two essences are apparently different. For it is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which is therefore its nominal essence: since nothing can be called gold, but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract, complex idea, to which that name is annexed. But this distinction of essences, belonging particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.

§ 19. THAT such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we have been speaking of, are essences, may farther appear, by what we are told concerning essences, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things, which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their author, are all liable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under distinct names or enigms. Thus that, which was grass to-day, is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and within few days, after, becomes part of a man: in all which, and the like changes, it is evident their real essence, i.e. that constitution, whereon the properties of these several things depended, is destroyed, and perishes with them. But essences being taken for ideas, established in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the ideas, to which man and horse are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain in the same: and so the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of those species. By this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle existing, any where in the world, (as perhaps that figure exists not any where, exactly marked out) yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a pattern to determine which, of the particular figures we meet with, have or have not a right to the name circle, and so to shew which of them, by having that essence, was of that species. And tho' there neither were, nor had been, in nature such a beast as an unicorn, or such a fish as a mermaid, yet supposing those names to stand for complex, abstract ideas that contained no inconsistency in them, the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn as certain, steady, and permanent,

as that of a horse. From what has been said it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation established between them, and certain sounds, as signs of them; and will always be true, as long as the same name can have the same signification.

§ 20. To conclude, this is that which in short I would say, viz. that all the great business of general and species, and their essences, amounts to no more but this, that men, making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds, with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but slowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

C H A P. IV.

Of the names of simple ideas.

§ 1. **T**HOU' all words, as I have shewn, signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shall find, that the names of simple ideas, mixed modes, (under which I comprise relations too) and natural substances, have each of them something peculiar and different from the other. For example:

§ 2. **FIRST**, the names of simple ideas and substances, with the abstract ideas in the mind, which they immediately signify, intimate also some real existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

§ 3. **SECONDLY**, the names of simple ideas, and modes, signify always the real, as well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural substances signify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal essences of those species, as we shall shew in the chapter, that treats of the names of substances, in particular.

§ 4. **THIRDLY**, the names of simple ideas are not capable of any definitions; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet observed by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst some demand definitions of terms, that cannot be defined: and others think they ought to rest satisfied in an explication, made by a more general word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of art, by a genus and difference) when even after such definition, made according to rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This, at least, I think, that the shewing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and, perhaps, will afford so much light to the nature of these signs, and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular consideration.

§ 5. **I WILL** not here trouble myself, to prove that all terms are not definable from that progress, in infinitum, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For, if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the signification of our words, shew, why some names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

§ 6. **I THINK**, it is agreed, that a definition is nothing else, but the shewing the meaning of one word, by several other not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for, by him that uses them; the meaning of any term is then shewed, or the word is defined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to, in the mind of the

C H A P. III.

Recapitulation.

C H A P. IV.

Names of simple ideas, modes, and substances, have each something peculiar.

1. Names of simple ideas, and substances, intimate real existence.

2. Names of simple ideas, and modes, signify always both real and nominal essence.

3. Names of simple ideas, undefinable.

If all were definable, it would be a process in infinitum.

What a definition is.

BOOK III. the speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained: this is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good definition.

Simple ideas, why undefinable. § 7. THIS being premised, I say, that the names of simple ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined. The reason whereof is this, that the several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can all together, by no means, represent an idea, which has no composition at all: and, therefore, a definition, which is properly nothing but the shewing the meaning of one word, by several others, not signifying each the same thing, can, in the names of simple ideas, have no place.

Instances; motion. § 8. THE not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us, of some few of these simple ideas. For as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition. "The act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?" which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known, by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully asking a Dutchman what "beweegeing" was, should have received this explication in his own language, that it was, "actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia;" I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word "beweegeing" signified, or have guessed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another when he used that sound.

§ 9. NOR have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or any otherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be a passage from one place to another, what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is passage, other than motion? And if they were asked what passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is it not, at least, as proper and significant to say, passage is a motion from one place to another, as to say, motion is a passage, &c. This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; but is very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word in the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that motion is a definition of motus. Nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body, to those of another, which the Cartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

Light.

§ 10. "THE act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous," is another peripatetic definition of a simple idea; which, tho' not more absurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly, because experience will easily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word light (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind man; but the definition of motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this way of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch, as well as sight, it is impossible to shew an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Those who tell us, that light is a great number of little globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than the schools; but yet these words, ever so well understood, would make the idea, the word light stands for, no more known, to a man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that light was nothing but a company of little tennis balls, which faries all day long struck with rackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the idea of the cause of light, if we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, than the

the idea of the figure, and motion of a sharp piece of steel, would give us the idea of that pain, which it is able to cause in us. For the cause of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant one from another, that no two can be more so. And, therefore, should Des Cartes's globules strike ever so long, on the retina of a man, who was blind by a gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or any thing approaching it, tho' he understood what little globules were, and what striking on another body was, ever so well. And, therefore, the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light, which is the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea, which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

§ 11. SIMPLE ideas, as has been shewn, are only to be got by those impressions, objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets, appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world made use of to explain, or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For words being sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas, than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection, which is known to be between them, and those simple ideas, which common use has made them signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try, if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated, delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas, by their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing; for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of light, or redness, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the sound, light, or red, by itself. For to hope to produce an idea of light, or colour, by a sound however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see, by the ears; a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pancha, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay. And, therefore, he, that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea, which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words, or sounds whatsoever, put together, according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A studious, blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours, which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon which his friend demanding, what scarlet was? the blind man answer'd, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

§ 12. THE case is quite otherwise in complex ideas; which consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind, which were never there before, and so make their names be understood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name, definition, or the teaching the signification of one word by several others, has place, and may make us understand the names of things, which never came within the reach of our senses: and frame ideas suitable to those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas, which he, to whom the explication is made, has never yet had in his thought. Thus the

Simple ideas,
why undefi-
nable, far-
ther ex-
plained.

The con-
trary shew'd
in complex
ideas, by in-
stances of a
statue, and
rainbow.

BOOK III. word statue may be explained to a blind man, by other words, when picture cannot; his senses having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary; each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had lost their eyes, could yet perceive the excellency of it; the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c. as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the least distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to them all those parts, where he could neither feel, nor perceive any thing.

§ 13. HE that should use the word rainbow to one, who knew all those colours, but yet had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well define that word, that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one, being such, as he never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

The names of complex ideas, when to be made intelligible by words.

§ 14. SIMPLE ideas, as has been shewed, can only be got by experience, from those objects, which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When, by this means, we have our minds stored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple idea, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it, there another name, of the same idea, which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple idea, capable of a definition.

4. Names of simple ideas, least doubtful.

§ 15. FOURTHLY, but tho' the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition, to determine their signification, yet that hinders not, but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed modes and substances: because they standing only for one simple perception, men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour, he has observed in snow, or milk, will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which, when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof are also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of its name be obscure, or uncertain.

5. Simple ideas have few ascents in linea prædicamentali.

§ 16. FIFTHLY, this farther may be observed concerning simple ideas, and their names, that they have but few ascents in linea prædicamentali (as they call it) from the lowest species to the summum genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that so, the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both; which having one name, is the genus of the other

other two : v. g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name ; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal : and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name ; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only thro' the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense : and so the general term quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more senses than one.

§ 17. SIXTHLY, the names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes, have also this difference ; that those of mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary ; those of substances are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, tho' with some latitude ; and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

THE names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.

CH A P. V.

Of the names of mixed modes and relations.

§ 1. THE names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shewn, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes, have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas : but, if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our attention.

§ 2. THE first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstract ideas, or, if you please, the essences of the several species of mixed modes are made by the understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple ideas : in which sort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it.

§ 3. In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes, are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But, in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specifick ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names, or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex ideas of substances, examine them by the real existence of things ; or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery, or incest, be right, will a man seek it any where amongst things existing ? Or is it true, because any one has been witness to such an action ? No : but it suffices here, that men have put together such a collection into one complex

They stand for abstract ideas, as other general names.

1. The ideas they stand for, are made by the understanding.

2. Made arbitrarily, and without patterns.

BOOK III. complex idea, that makes the archetype and specifick idea, whether ever any such action were committed in *rerum natura*, or no.

How this is done.

§ 4. To understand this aright, we must consider, wherein this making of these complex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those, which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: first, it chuses a certain number: secondly, it gives them connection, and makes them into one idea: thirdly, it ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe, how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind, and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.

Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the existence.

§ 5. No body can doubt, but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect, that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the ideas of sacrilege, or adultery, might be framed in the mind of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well discoursed of, and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a being as subvenient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence, but in their own minds. And I think no body can deny, but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.

Instances; murder, incest, stabbing.

§ 6. To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several, scattered, independent ideas into one complex one, and, by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature. For what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word murder, and the other not? Or, what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a son, or neighbour; that those are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species parricide, whilst the other makes no distinct species at all? But, tho' they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct species from killing his son, or daughter; yet in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind, in mixed modes, arbitrarily unites into complex ideas, such as it finds convenient; whilst others, that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind, by its free choice, gives a connection to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: Why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct species called stabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that, therefore, these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident, than that for the most part, in the framing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas, it makes, to the real existence

existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.

§ 7. BUT tho' these complex ideas, or essences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it, with great liberty; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Tho' these complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end, for which abstract ideas are made: and, tho' they be combinations made of ideas; that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other to which the mind never gives a connection, that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The use of language is, by short sounds, to signify, with ease and dispatch, general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations, as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct, complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For, to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct, abstract ideas of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices, that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing, the idea of father, or mother, and so make a distinct species, from killing a man's son, or neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime; and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and, therefore, they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that distinct combination. But, tho' the ideas of mother and daughter are so differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a distinct abstract idea with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet in respect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in, under incest: and that still, for the same convenience of expressing under one name, and reckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures, as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions, and tedious descriptions.

But still subservient to the end of language.

§ 8. A MODERATE skill, in different languages will easily satisfy one of the truth of this; it being so obvious to observe great store of words in one language, which have not any that answer them in another. Which plainly shews, that those of one country, by their customs and manner of life, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and give names to them, which others never collected into specifick ideas. This could not have happened, if these species were the steady workmanship of nature, and not collections, made and abstracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty sounds, will hardly find words, that answer them in the Spanish, or Italian, no scanty languages; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the Caribees or Westoe tongues; and the Versura of the Romans, or Corban of the Jews, have no words in other languages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we shall find, that tho' they have words, which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer one another; yet there is scarce one of ten amongst the names of complex ideas, especially of mixed modes, that stands for the same precise idea, which the word does, that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no ideas more common, and less compounded, than the measures of time, extension, and weight, and the Latin names, hora, pes, libra, are without difficulty rendered by the English names, hour, foot, and pound; but yet there is nothing more evident, than that

Whereof the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof.

BOOK III. the ideas a Roman annexed to these Latin names, were very far different from those, which an Englishman expresses by those English ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures, that those of the other language designed by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas; such as are the greatest part of those, which make up moral discourses: whose names, when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations.

This shews
species to be
made for
communi-
cation.

§ 9. THE reason, why I take so particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about genera and species, and their essences, as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a real existence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier signifying such collections of ideas, as it should often have occasion to communicate, by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract idea, might be comprehended. And, if the doubtful signification of the word, species, may make it sound harsh to some, that I say, "the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding;" yet, I think, it can by no body be denied, that it is the mind makes those abstract, complex ideas, to which specifick names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered, who makes the boundaries of the sort of species; since with me, species and sort have no other difference, than that of a Latin and English idiom.

In mixed
modes, it is
the name
that ties the
combination
together,
and makes it
a species.

§ 10. THE near relation that there is between species, essences, and their general name, at least in mixed modes, will farther appear, when we consider, that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences, and give them their lasting duration. For the connection, between the loose parts of those complex ideas, being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were there not something, that did as it were hold it together, and keep the parts from scattering. Tho', therefore, it be the mind, that makes the collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them fast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does the word triumphus hold together, and deliver to us as one species! Had this name been never made, or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descriptions of what passed in that solemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds those different parts together, in the unity of one complex idea, is that very word annexed to it; without which, the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other shew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex idea, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mixed modes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annexed to it; I leave to be considered by those, who look upon essences and species as real, established things in nature.

§ 11. SUITABLE to this, we find, that men, speaking of mixed modes, seldom imagine, or take any other for species of them, but such as are set out by name: because they being of man's making only, in order to naming, no such species are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a name be joined to it, as the sign of man's having combined into one idea several loose ones; and, by that name, giving a lasting union to the parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea, and ceased actually to think on it. But, when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have a settled and permanent union; then is the essence as it were established, and the species looked on as compleat. For, to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general names, for the convenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see, that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet,

are

are looked on as no distinct species of action: but, if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes for a distinct species, where it has a distinct name; as in England, in whose language it is called stabbing: but in another country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it passes not for a distinct species. But in the species of corporeal substances, tho' it be the mind that makes the nominal essence; yet, since those ideas, which are combined in it, are supposed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct species, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting, or giving a name to that complex idea.

§ 12. CONFORMABLE also to what has been said, concerning the essences of the species of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding, rather than the works of nature: conformable, I say, to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther. When we speak of justice, or gratitude, we frame to our selves no imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look no farther: as they do, when we speak of a horse, or iron, whose specifick ideas we consider not, as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the original patterns as being in the mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is, that these essences, of the species of mixed modes, are, by a more particular name, called notions; as by a peculiar right, appertaining to the understanding.

For the originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind, which also shews them to be the workmanship of the understanding.

§ 13. HENCE, likewise, we may learn, why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decomposed, than those of natural substances. Because they being the workmanship of the understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short those ideas, it would make known to another, does, with great liberty, unite often into one abstract idea, things, that in their nature have no coherence; and so, under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decomposed ideas. Thus the name of procession, what a great mixture of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereas the complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two, viz. shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence.

Their being made by the understanding, without patterns, shews the reason why they are so compounded.

§ 14. ANOTHER thing we may observe, from what has been said, is, that the names of mixed modes always signify (when they have any determined signification) the real essences of their species. For these abstract ideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that name, but barely that complex idea, the mind itself has formed, which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that, on which all the properties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth we shall see hereafter.

Names of mixed modes stand always for their real essences.

§ 15. THIS also may shew us the reason, why, for the most part, the names of mixed modes are got, before the ideas they stand for, are perfectly known. Because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have names, and those species, or rather their essences, being abstract, complex ideas, made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not necessary to know the names, before one endeavour to frame these complex ideas: unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract, complex ideas, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the idea, before one gave it the name: and so it is still, where making a new complex idea, one

Why their names are usually got before their ideas.

also,

BOOK III. also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas, which men have frequent occasion to have and communicate: and in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes, before they have their ideas? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract idea of glory and ambition, before he has heard the name of them? In simple ideas of substances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such ideas as have a real existence and union in nature, the ideas, or names, are got one before the other, as it happens.

Reason of
my being so
large on this
subject.

§ 16. WHAT has been said here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable also to relations; which, since every man himself may observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on: especially, since what I have here said, concerning words, in this third book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more, than what so slight a subject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compass: but I was willing to stay my reader on an argument, that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am sure it is one I thought not of, when I began to write) that by searching it to the bottom, and turning it on every side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and give occasion to the most averse, or negligent, to reflect on a general miscarriage; which, tho' of great consequence, is little taken notice of. When it is considered what a pudder is made about essences, and how much all sorts of knowledge, discourse, and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless and confused use and application of words, it will, perhaps, be thought worth while thorowly to lay it open. And I shall be pardoned, if I have dwelt long on an argument, which, I think, therefore, needs to be inculcated; because the faults, men are usually guilty of, in this kind, are not only the greatest hindrances of true knowledge, but are so well thought of, as to pass for it. Men would often see, what a small pittance of reason and truth, or, possibly, none at all, is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with; if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what ideas are, or are not comprehended under those words, with which they are so armed at all points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning, if, by any enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use of language; and give them reason to suspect, that, since it is frequent for others, it may also be possible for them, to have sometimes very good and approved words, in their mouths and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no signification. And, therefore, it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this design, therefore, I shall go on with what I have farther to say concerning this matter.

C H A P. VI.

Of the names of substances.

CHAP. § I. THE common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts; which is nothing else, but the being made signs of such complex ideas, wherein several particular substances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. I say, do, or might agree: for tho' there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it being abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) might each agree in it; it is as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there are stars. They want not their reasons, who think there are, and that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, to one who were placed in a due distance; which, by the way, may shew us how much the sorts, or, if you please, genera and species of things

CHAP. VI.
The common names
of substances
stand for
sorts.

things (for those Latin terms signify to me no more, than the English word CHAP. VI. fort) depend on such collections of ideas, as men have made, and not on the real nature of things; since it is not impossible, but that, in propriety of speech, that might be a fun to one, which is a star to another.

§ 2. THE measure and boundary of each fort, or species, whereby it is constituted that particular fort, and distinguished from others, is that we call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed: so that every thing, contained in that idea, is essential to that fort. This, tho' it be all the essence of natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into forts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal essence, to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances, upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the properties of that fort; which, therefore, as has been said, may be called the real essence: v. g. the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea, the word gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body, on which those qualities, and all the other properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, tho' they are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover.

The essence of each fort is the abstract idea.

§ 3. FOR tho', perhaps, voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I, and others, annex the name man, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called; yet nobody will say that that complex idea is the real essence, and source of all those operations, which are to be found in any individual of that fort. The foundation of all those qualities, which are the ingredients of our complex idea, is something quite different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man, from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow; and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and, it is certain, his maker has: we should have a quite other idea of his essence, than what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it now is, as is his, who knows all the springs, and wheels, and other contrivances within, of the famous clock at Strasburgh, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances.

The nominal and real essence, different.

§ 4. THAT essence, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to forts; and that it is considered in particular beings, no farther than as they are ranked into forts, appears from hence: that take but away the abstract ideas, by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of any thing essential to any of them, instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly shews their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me so: but there is nothing, I have is essential to me. An accident, or disease, may very much alter my colour, or shape; a fever, or fall, may take away my reason, or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither sense, nor understanding, nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more, and better, or fewer, and worse faculties than I have: and others may have reason and sense, in a shape and body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any individual whatsoever, till the mind refers it to some sort, or species, of things; and then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find that, as soon as he supposes, or speaks of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea, signified by some general name, comes into his mind: and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is said to be essential. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me, or any other particular, corporeal being, to have reason? I say no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort man, and to have the name man given it, then reason is essential to it, supposing reason to be a

Nothing essential to individuals.

BOOK III. part of the complex idea, the name man stands for: as it is essential to this thing
 I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name treatise, and rank it under that species. So that essential, and not essential, relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which amounts to no more but this, that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities, which are contained in the abstract idea, which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name, since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species.

§ 5. THUS, if the idea of body, with some people, be bare extension, or space, then solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea, to which they give the name body, to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to body. That, therefore, and that alone is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex idea, the name of a fort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of matter, that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the load-stone: and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it, would any one question, whether it wanted any thing essential? It would be absurd to ask, whether a thing, really existing, wanted any thing essential to it. Or could it be demanded, whether this made an essential, or specific difference, or no; since we have no other measure of essential, or specific, but our abstract ideas? And to talk of specific differences in nature, without reference to general ideas and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, what is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such patterns and standards, being quite laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally essential; and every thing, in each individual, will be essential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For tho' it may be reasonable to ask, whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter, I cut my pen with, without considering it under the name iron, or as being of a certain species? And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but what is contained in those ideas.

§ 6. IT is true, I have often mentioned a real essence, distinct in substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal essence. By this real essence, I mean that real constitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all those properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with, the nominal essence; that particular constitution, which every thing has within itself, without any relation to any thing without it. But essence, even in this sense, relates to a fort, and supposes a species: for being that real constitution, on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals: v. g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be body of such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter, on which these qualities, and their union, depend; and is also the foundation of its solubility in aqua regia, and other properties accompanying that complex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition of a fort, or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of these qualities are so annexed, as to be essential to it, or inseparable from it, that which is essential belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this, or that sort: but take away the consideration of its being ranked, under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real essences of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely knowing what they are, but that, which annexes them still to the species, is the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and cause.

§ 7. THE next thing to be considered, is, by which of those essences it is that substances are determined into sorts, or species; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore, that any thing should determine the sorts of things, which we rank under general names, but that idea, which that name is designed as a mark for; which is that, as has been shewn, which we call the nominal essence. Why do we say, this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this, or that sort, but because it has that nominal essence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears, or speaks any of those, or other names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for.

The nominal essence bounds the species.

§ 8. AND that the species of things to us are nothing, but the ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us; and not according to precise, distinct, real essences in them, is plain from hence, that we find many of the individuals, that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one species, have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chymists especially are often, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For tho' they are bodies of the same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chymists. But, if things were distinguished into species, according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties, in any two individual substances of the same species, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to us, which determines every particular to this, or that class; or, which is the same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but that abstract idea, to which that name is annexed? and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

§ 9. NOR, indeed can we rank, and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real essences, because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas, which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true, internal constitution, from which those qualities flow, than, as I said, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions. There is not so contemptible a plant, or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things about us, take off our wonder; yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their make, and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal constitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, what is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead and antimony fusible; wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron malleable; antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances, and unconceivable real essences of plants, or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wise and powerful God, in the great fabrick of the universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend

Not the real essence, which we know not.

BOOK III. pretend to range things into sorts, and dispose them into certain classes, under names, by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery, or comprehension. A blind man may as soon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell, as well distinguish a lily and a rose, by their odours, as by those internal constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in those species, called cassiowary and querechinchio; and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of these species, without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities, that each of those names stand for, in the countries where those animals are to be found.

Not substantial forms, which we know less.

§ 10. THOSE, therefore, who have been taught, that the several species of substances had their distinct, internal, substantial forms; and that it was those forms, which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera, were led yet farther out of the way by having their minds set upon fruitless enquiries after substantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confused conception in general.

That the nominal essence is that whereby we distinguish species, farther evident from spirits.

§ 11. THAT our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species, consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves, is farther evident from our ideas of spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it hath, or can have no other notion of spirit, but by attributing all those operations, it finds in itself, to a sort of beings, without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple ideas, which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on our selves, the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy being. And tho' we are told, that there are different species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct, specifick ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of more species, than one, of spirits is impossible, but because having no more simple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several species of spirits, one from another, but by attributing those operations and powers, we find in our selves, to them in a higher, or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specifick ideas of spirits, except only of God, to whom we attribute both duration, and all those other ideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation. Nor, as I humbly conceive, do we, between God and them in our ideas, put any difference, by any number of simple ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an idea of the first being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraph, is from the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him.

Whereof there are probably, numberless species.

§ 12. IT is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties, whereof we have no ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities, which we know and observe in them. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above

above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that in all the visible, corporeal world, we see no chafins, or gaps. All quite down from us, the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, that are not strangers to the airy region; and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh is so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts, that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatick together; seals live at land and at sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes, that seem to have as much knowledge and reason, as some that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganic parts of matter, we shall find every where, that the several species are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And, when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the maker, we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the architect, that the species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which, if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, that there are far more species of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of God, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct species, for the reasons above said, we have no clear distinct ideas.

§ 13. BUT to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one, whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied, but he that says they are two distinct species, is in the right. But if an Englishman, bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water, he put in his basin at night, in a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water: I ask, whether this would be a new species to him different from water? And, I think, it would be answered here, it would not be to him a new species, no more than congealed gelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species from the same gelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold, in the furnace, is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be so, it is plain, that our distinct species are nothing but distinct, complex ideas, with distinct names annexed to them. It is true, every substance, that exists, has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of things into species, which is nothing but sorting them under several titles, is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them: which tho' sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able to discourse of them, when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real, internal constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.

§ 14. To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise essences, or forms of things, whereby all the individuals existing, are by nature distinguished into species, these things are necessary:

§ 15. FIRST, to be assured that nature, in the production of things, always designs them to partake of certain, regulated, established essences, which are

The nominal-
essence
that of the
species prov-
ed from
water and
ice.

Difficulties
against a cer-
tain number
of real es-
sences.

BOOK III. to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication, before it can fully be assented to.

§ 16. SECONDLY, it would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one, or both of these.

§ 17. THIRDLY, it ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be really a distinct species, according to the scholastick notion of the word species; since it is certain, that every thing, that exists, has its particular constitution: and yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few, or none of those qualities, which are supposed to result from, and accompany the essence of that species, from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong.

§ 18. FOURTHLY, the real essences of those things, which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i. e. we ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, the supposed real essences of things stand us not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species.

Our nominal essences of substances, not perfect collections of properties.

§ 19. FIFTHLY, the only imaginable help in this case would be, that having framed perfect, complex ideas of the properties of things, flowing from their different, real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that species. We can never know what are the precise number of properties, depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that determined that species. By the word gold here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter; v. g. the last guinea that was coined. For if it should stand here in its ordinary signification for that complex idea, which I or any one else calls gold; i. e. for the nominal essence of gold, it would be jargon: so hard is it to shew the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but words to do it by.

§ 20. BY all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances into species by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according to the internal, essential differences.

But such a collection as our name stands for.

§ 21. BUT since, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, tho' we know not the real essences of things; all we can do is to collect such a number of simple ideas, as by examination we find to be united together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea. Which, tho' it be not the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet, the specific essence, to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences. For example, there be that say, that the essence of body is extension: if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the essence of any thing for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put extension for body; and when we would say that body moves, let us say that extension moves, and see how it will look. He that should say that one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by the bare expression, sufficiently shew the absurdity of such a notion. The essence of any thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex idea, comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the several distinct, simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always a part: and, therefore, the essence of body is not bare extension, but an extended, solid thing: and so to say an extended, solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, body moves or impels.

Likewise

Likewise to say, that a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one as to say a man. But no one will say, that rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole essence, to which we give the name man. CHAP. VI.

§ 22. THERE are creatures in the world, that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is said ("fit fides penes authorem", but there appears no contradiction that there should be such) that with language, and reason, and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be asked, whether these be all men or no, all of human species; it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those of them, to whom the definition of the word man, or the complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other not. But, if the inquiry be made, concerning the supposed real essence, and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specifick idea; only we have reason to think, that where the faculties, or outward frame, so much differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the internal, real constitution makes a specifick difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilst our measures of species be, as they are, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internal constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, be a mark of a different, internal, specifick constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that the distinction of species, or sorts, is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.

Our abstract ideas are to us the measures of species; instance in that of man.

§ 23. NOR let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals, by the mixture of male and female, and in plants, by seeds, keeps the supposed, real species distinct and entire. For, granting this to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, women have conceived by drills; and what real species, by that measure, such a production will be in nature, will be a new question: and we have reason to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous productions, that are so frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine, by the pedigree, of what species every animal's issue is; and be at a loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the specifick name. But farther, if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the seed was gathered, that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger, or that tea?

Species, not distinguished by generation.

§ 24. UPON the whole matter, it is evident, that it is their own collections of sensible qualities, that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances; and that their real, internal structures are not considered, by the greatest part of men, in the sorting them. Much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any, but those, who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet those ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another, by their sensible qualities, are often

Not by substantial forms.

BOOK III. often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their uses, and better know what they may expect from each, than those learned, quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

The specific essences are made by the mind.

§ 25. BUT, supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable, by those that would severely apply themselves to that enquiry, yet we could not reasonably think, that the ranking of things under general names, was regulated by those internal, real constitutions, or any thing else, but their obvious appearances: since languages, in all countries, have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers, or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences, that have made the general names, that are in use amongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensive terms have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them; thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a sort, or a particular thing.

Therefore very various and uncertain.

§ 26. SINCE then it is evident, that we sort and name substances, by their nominal, and not by their real essences; the next thing to be considered is, how and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence, of any one species of substances, in all men the same; no not of that, which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract idea, to which the name man is given, should be different in several men, if it were of nature's making; and that to one it should be "animal rationale", and to another "animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus." He that annexes the name man, to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the species man; and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the species he calls man: by which means, the same individual will be a true man to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the species, man; and yet, how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape, than descent, is very visible: since it has been more than once debated, whether several human fetuses should be preserved, or received to baptism, or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason, as infants cast in another mold: some whereof, tho' of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant; and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which no body could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human species: the learned divine and lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of "animal rationale", and substitute some other essence of the human species. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an example, worth the taking notice of on this occasion. When the abbot of St. Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of the figure of a man, that it bespoke him rather a monster. It was for sometime under deliberation, whether he should be baptized, or no? However, he was baptized, and declared a man provisionally (till time should shew what he would prove.) Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was called all his life the abbot Malotrué, i. e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen. Menagiana $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{1}{3}$. This child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the species of man barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was, and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a man.

man. And yet there can be no reason given, why, if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have been lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

§ 27. WHEREIN then, would I gladly know, consists the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no such thing made by nature, and established by her amongst men. The real essence of that, or any other sort of substances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we make our selves, that if several men were to be asked, concerning some oddly-shaped fetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man, or no? it is past doubt, one should meet with different answers: which could not happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances, were not made by man, with some liberty; but were exactly copied from precise boundaries, set by nature, whereby it distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake to resolve, what species that monster was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, lib. 1. c. 3. with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other, which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c. if any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human shape; and all below swine; had it been murder to destroy it? or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font, or no? as, I have been told, it happened in France some years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from certainly knowing what a man is; tho', perhaps, it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say, that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple ideas, which make the nominal essence, so far from being settled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may still arise about it. And, I imagine, none of the definitions of the word man, which we yet have, nor descriptions of that sort of animal, are so perfect and exact, as to satisfy a considerate, inquisitive person, much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that, which men would every where stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of life and death, baptism, or no baptism, in productions that might happen.

§ 28. BUT, tho' these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal essence, it is necessary, First, that the ideas whereof it consists, have such an union as to make but one idea, how compounded soever. Secondly, that the particular ideas so united be exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract, complex ideas differ either in number, or sorts, of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first of these, the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not supposed to have an union in nature. No body joins the voice of a sheep, with the shape of a horse; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real substances: unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men, observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied nature; and of ideas so united, made their complex ones of substances. For, tho' men may make what complex ideas they please, and give what names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of: or else men's language will be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life, if the

But not so
arbitrary, as
mixed
modes.

BOOK III. ideas they stand for, be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances, as they really exist.

Tho' very imperfect.

§ 29. SECONDLY, tho' the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of substances, never puts any together, that do not really, or are not supposed, to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines, depends upon the various care, industry, or fancy, of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some few, sensible, obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible substances there are two sorts; one of organized bodies, which are propagated by seed; and in these, the shape is that, which to us is the leading quality, and most characteristic part that determines the species. And, therefore, in vegetables and animals, an extended, solid substance, of such a certain figure, usually serves the turn. For, however, some men seem to prize their definition, of animal rationale, yet should there a creature be found, that had language and reason, but partook not of the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a man, how much soever it were animal rationale. And if Baalam's ass had, all his life, discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, I doubt yet, whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables and animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by seed, it is the colour we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus, where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities, comprehended in our complex idea, to be there also: and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. shape and colour, for so presumptive ideas of several species, that, in a good picture, we readily say this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver goblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil.

Which yet serve for common converse.

§ 30. BUT, tho' this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions, and unaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple ideas, or qualities, belonging to any sort of things, signified by its name. Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what, and how many, those simple ideas are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the same subject. Most men, wanting either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life: and so, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, tho' in common conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few, obvious qualities, co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled signification, a precise number of simple ideas; much less all those, which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so much stir about genus and species, and such a deal of talk of specific differences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may with reason imagine that those forms, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only chimera's, which give us no light into the specific natures of things. And he, that shall consider, how far the names of substances are from having significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have reason to conclude, that tho' the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex ideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore, that these boundaries of species are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate species, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the species of things: or if it

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be so, our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we, having need of general names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities, which would best shew us their most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide them, by certain, obvious appearances, into species, that we may the easier, under general names, communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any substance, but of the simple ideas that are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with others, in several of those simple ideas, we make that collection our specifick idea, and give it a general name; that, in recording our own thoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short word design all the individuals, that agree in that complex idea, without enumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new sort of things, they have not yet a name for.

§ 31. But, however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation, it is plain that this complex idea, wherein they observe several individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex idea contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and so is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow, shining colour makes gold to children: others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; and others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow colour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility: for in all these and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance, wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore, different men leaving out, or putting in, several simple ideas, which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or observation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which must, therefore, be of their own, and not of nature's making.

Essences of species, under the same name, very different.

§ 32. If the number of simple ideas, that make the nominal essence of the lowest species, or first sorting of individuals, depends on the mind of man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so, in the more comprehensive classes, which by the masters of logick are called genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it is visible at first sight, that several of those qualities, that are to be found in the things themselves, are purposely left out of generical ideas. For as the mind, to make general ideas, comprehending several particulars, leaves out those of time, and place, and such other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new collection, only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The same convenience, that made men express several parcels of yellow matter, coming from Guinea and Peru, under one name, sets them also upon making of one name, that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other bodies of different sorts. This is done, by leaving out those qualities which are peculiar to each sort; and retaining a complex idea, made up of those that are common to them all. To which the name metal being annexed, there is a genus constituted; the essence whereof being that abstract idea, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with certain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of several kinds agree, leaves out the colour, and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver, and the other sorts, comprehended under the name metal, whereby it is plain, that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since there is no body to be found, which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it, without other qualities, as inseparable as those. But men, in making their general ideas, seeing more the convenience of language and quick dispatch, by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract ideas, chiefly pursued that end, which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names. So that, in this whole business of genera

The more general our ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.

and

Book III. and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the species, and the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think, that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, &c. are distinguished by real essences, made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences, and making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few syllables, great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that each genus is but a partial conception of the species comprehended under it. So that if these abstract, general ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be, in respect of a certain, established relation between them and certain names, which are made use of to signify them; and not in respect of any thing existing, as made by nature.

This, all accommodated to the end of speech.

§ 33. THIS is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he, that would discourse of things, as they agreed in the complex idea, of extension and solidity, needed but use the word body, to denote all such. He that to these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, and spontaneous motion, needed but use the word animal, to signify all which partook of those ideas; and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a certain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable man, to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This is the proper business of genus and species: and this men do, without any consideration of real essences, or substantial forms, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of those things; nor within the signification of our words, when we discourse with others.

Instance in casuaris.

§ 14. WERE I to talk with any one, of a sort of birds I lately saw in St. James's park, about three or four foot high, with a covering of something, between feathers and hair, of a dark, brown colour, without wings, but, in the place thereof, two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so may make others understand me: but when I am told, that the name of it is casuaris, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex idea, mentioned in that description; tho' by that word, which is now become a specifick name, I know no more of the real essence; or constitution, of that sort of animals, than I did before; and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds, before I learned the name, as many Englishmen do of swans, or herons, which are specifick names, very well known, of sorts of birds common in England.

Men determine the sorts; instance, gold.

§ 35. FROM what has been said, it is evident, that men make sorts of things. For it being different essences alone, that make different species, it is plain that they, who make those abstract ideas, which are the nominal essences, do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableness, it would no doubt be made a question, whether it were gold, or no, i. e. whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that abstract idea, to which every one annexed the name gold: so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included not malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound gold; and on the other side, it would not be true gold, or of that species to him, who included malleableness in his specifick idea. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but men, that make two different abstract ideas, consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to imagine, that a body may exist, wherein the other ob-

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vious qualities of gold may be, without malleableness; since it is certain, that gold itself, will be sometimes so eager (as artists call it) that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said, of the putting in, or leaving malleableness out of, the complex idea, the name gold is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the like qualities: for whatsoever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex idea, to which that name is annexed, that makes the species; and, as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species. And thus any thing is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination of the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex idea.

§ 36. THIS then, in short, is the case: nature makes many particular things, which do agree one with another, in many sensible qualities, and, probably too, in their internal frame and constitution: but it is not this real essence, that distinguishes them into species; it is men, who taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in order to their naming; for the convenience of comprehensive signs; under which individuals, according to their conformity to this, or that abstract idea, come to be ranked, as under ensigns; so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in this, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species.

§ 37. I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men: since the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things, they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.

§ 38. ONE thing, I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine; which is, that from what has been said it will follow, that each abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it, if truth will have it so? For so it must remain, till some body can shew us the species of things, limited and distinguished by something else; and let us see, that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know, why a flock and a hound are not as distinct species, as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a flock and a hound; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to which we have given those different names.

§ 39. How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names, and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above, concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one species to those, who have but one name for them: but he that has the name watch for one, and clock for the other, and distinct, complex ideas, to which those names belong, to him they are different species. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two, which the watch-maker has a clear idea of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one species to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species? There are some watches, that are made with four wheels, others with five: is this a specific difference to the workman? Some have strings and phyfies, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs-bristles: are any, or all, of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of these, and several other different contrivances, in the internal constitutions

BOOK III. of watches? It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be an essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea, to which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea, which that name stands for, and that name does not, as a generic name, comprehend different species under it, they are not essentially, nor specifically different. But, if any one will make minuter divisions, from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such, precise, complex ideas, give names, that shall prevail: they will then be new species to them, who have those ideas, with names to them; and can, by those differences, distinguish watches into these several sorts, and then watch will be a generic name. But yet, they would be no distinct species to men, ignorant of clock-work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them, all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus, I think, it is in natural things. No body will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say) within, are different, in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one or both these differences be essential, or specific, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea, that the name man stands for: for by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man, or no.

Species of artificial things less confused than natural.

§ 40. FROM what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty, than in natural. Because an artificial thing, being a production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea, or essence, of the several sorts of artificial things, consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts; and sometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof, and so settle the signification of the names, whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished with less doubt, obscurity and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries.

Artificial things of distinct species.

§ 41. I MUST be excused here, if I think artificial things are of distinct species, as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by different, abstract ideas, with the general names annexed to them, as distinct one from another, as those of natural substances. For, why should we not think a watch and pistol, as distinct species one from another, as a horse and a dog, they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?

Substances alone have proper names.

§ 42. THIS is farther to be observed concerning substances, that they alone, of all our several sorts of ideas, have particular, or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is signified. Because, in simple ideas, modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this, or that particular, when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions, which perish in their birth, are not capable of a lasting duration, as substances, which are the actors; and wherein the simple ideas, that make up the complex ideas, designed by the name, have a lasting union.

Difficulty to treat of words, with words.

§ 43. I MUST beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt so long upon this subject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may be considered how difficult it is to lead another, by words, into the thoughts of things, stripped of those specific differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the usual, abstract idea of that species, and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary

dinary signification of the name man, which is our complex idea, usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others, in his internal constitution, or real essence, that is, by something, he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do, who would speak of the supposed, real essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the general names, which substances are called by. But because it is difficult, by known familiar names, to do this, give me leave to endeavour, by an example, to make the different consideration, the mind has of specifick names and ideas, a little more clear; and to shew how the complex ideas of modes are referred, sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to shew how the mind always refers its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the signification of their names as to the archetypes; and also to make plain the nature of species, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge, than we at first imagine.

§ 44. LET us suppose Adam in the state of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholly than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take care that Adah commit not folly: and, in these discourses with Eve, he makes use of these two new words, Kinneah and Niouph. In time Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names, Kinneah and Niouph; the one standing for suspicion, in a husband, of his wife's disloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing disloyalty, lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then, that here were two distinct, complex ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of actions, essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of action? And it is plain, it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called Kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name Kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype, which it was supposed to represent.

§ 45. THESE words, Kinneah and Niouph, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased, in their own minds, to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two, who would communicate their thoughts, and discourse together. Those therefore of Adam's children, that found these two words, Kinneah and Niouph, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain ideas, abstract ideas, they being general names, which abstract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those names. If, therefore, they would use these words, as names of species, already established and agreed

Instance of
mixed
modes, in
Kinneah
and Niouph.

BOOK III. agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by these names, to the ideas, that they stood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then, indeed, their ideas of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using the same names: tho' for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery (which I think answer קנאה and נאוף) stand for, in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what Kinneah and Niouph stood for, in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary signs in every one.

Instance of
substances in
Zahab.

§ 46. LET us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances in their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance, which pleases his eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it finds it to be hard, to have a bright, yellow colour, and exceeding great weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it: and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance, having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name Zahab, to denominate and mark all substances, that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now that, in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in forming those ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the name Kinneah and Niouph. For there he put ideas together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of any thing; and to them he gave names, to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract ideas, without considering whether any such thing, did exist, or no: the standard there was of his own making. But, in the forming his idea of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard made by nature; and therefore, being to represent that to himself, by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of, from the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.

§ 47. THIS piece of matter, thus denominated Zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before, no body, I think, will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name Zahab is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things, partaking in that essence. But here it is plain, the essence, Adam made the name Zahab stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the essence of the species, that name Zahab stands for? Farther trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason, that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea, signified by the name Zahab? If not, what reason will there be shewn more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other properties, which any farther trials shall discover in this matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea, which the name Zahab stands for, and so be the essences of the species, marked by that name. Which properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the idea made, after this fashion, by this archetype, will be always inadequate.

Their ideas
imperfect,
and

§ 48. BUT this is not all, it would also follow, that the names of substances would not only have (as in truth they have) but would also be supposed to have different

different significations, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality, that were discovered in any matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea, signified by the common name given it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men; since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.

§ 49. To avoid this, therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species, from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they not having any idea of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name, or sound, in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing what the real essence is; and this is that which men do, when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.

Therefore to
fix their spe-
cies, a real
essence is
supposed.

§ 50. For let us consider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, all gold is fixed, contains nothing but the signification of the term gold. Or else it means, that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the word gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case, it is plain, that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having the real essence of a species of things, made by nature. In which way of substitution, it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that, tho' this proposition, gold is fixed, be in that sense an affirmation of something real, yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and so is of no real use, nor certainty. For let it be never so true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real essence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not in this sense what is, or is not gold? For, if we know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence, and so whether it be true gold or no.

Which sup-
position is of
no use.

§ 51. To conclude: what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of mixed modes, by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas of substances to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam had of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still (especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such) but only with this difference, that in places, where men in society have already established a language amongst them, the significations of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered: because, men being furnished already with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriated known names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions, will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new terms to express them: but men think it a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary, that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for, to their known, proper significations (which I have explained at large already) or else to make known that new signification, we apply them to.

Conclusion.

C H A P. VII.

Of particles.

C H A P.
VII.

Particles
connect
parts, or
whole sen-
tences to-
gether.

In them
consists the
art of well-
speaking.

They shew
what rela-
tion the
mind gives
to its own
thoughts.

Infance in
But.

§ 1. **B**ESIDES words, which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the connection that the mind gives to ideas, or propositions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also, to shew or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does several ways; as is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falshood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

§ 2. **T**HE words, whereby it signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning, or narration, are generally called particles; and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good stile. To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement, or disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings one upon another. And to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to shew what connection, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that those words, which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas, are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.

§ 3. **T**HIS part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines. In these, and the like, there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great shew of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But, tho' prepositions and conjunctions, &c. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet, he who would shew the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

§ 4. **N**EITHER is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue, which come nearest to their signification: for what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another language. They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles, that most languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered, that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle consisting but of one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty several significations.

§ 5. **B**UT is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers *sed* in Latin, or *mais* in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several

several relations, the mind gives to the several propositions, or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable. CHAP. VII.

FIRST, but to say no more: here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

SECONDLY, I saw but two plants: here it shews, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

THIRDLY, you pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion.

FOURTHLY, but that he would confirm you in your own. The first of these Buts intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shews, that the mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.

FIFTHLY, all animals have sense; but a dog is an animal: here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism.

§ 6. To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found, which if one should do, I doubt, whether, in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of discriptive, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The instances I have given, in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others, by these particles; some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them. This matter but lightly touched here.

C H A P. VIII.

Of abstract and concrete terms.

§ 1. **T**HE ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shewn, has a power to abstract its ideas, and so they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now, each abstract idea being distinct, so that of any two, the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions, no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at first hearing perceives the falshood of these propositions; humanity is animality, or rationality, or whiteness: and this is as evident, as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to another; which abstract ideas, in substances, may be of any sort; in all the rest, are little else but of relations; and in substances the most frequent are of powers: v. g. a man is white, signifies, that the thing, that has the essence of a man, has also in it the essence of whiteness, which is nothing, but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one, whose eyes can discover ordinary objects; or a man is rational, signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man, hath also in it the essence of rationality, i. e. a power of reasoning. CHAP. VIII.
Abstract terms, not predicable one of another, and why.

§ 2. THIS distinction of names shew us also the difference of our ideas: for, if we observe them, we shall find, that our simple ideas have all abstract, as well as concrete names; the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) They shew the difference of our ideas.

BOOK III. *marians*) a substantive, the other an adjective; as *whiteness*, white; *sweetness*, sweet. The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations; as *justice*, just; equality, equal; only with this difference, that some of the concrete names of relations, amongst men chiefly, are substantives; as *paternitas*, pater; whereof it were easy to render a reason. But, as to our ideas of substances, we have very few, or no, abstract names at all. For, tho' the schools have introduced *animalitas*, *humanitas*, *corporeitas*, and some others; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones: and those few that the schools forged, and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the licence of publick approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas: which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves, of their ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an attempt. And therefore, tho' they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a stone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorously ventured on such terms, as *aurietas* and *saxietas*, *metallietas* and *lignietas*, or the like names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of those substances, whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only the doctrine of substantial forms, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined, and then introduced *animalitas*, and *humanitas*, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed, *humanitas* was a word familiar amongst the Romans, but in a far different sense, and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance; but was the abstract name of a mode, and its concrete *humanus*, not *homo*.

C H A P. IX.

Of the imperfection of words.

CHAP. IX.

Words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts.

Any words will serve for recording.

Communication by words, civil or philosophical.

§ 1. FROM what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection, or imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end: for, as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have, in the former part of this discourse, often upon occasion mentioned a double use of words.

FIRST, one for the recording of our own thoughts.

SECONDLY, the other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.

§ 2. AS to the first of these, for the recording our own thoughts, for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For, since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases, to signify his own ideas to himself: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language.

§ 3. SECONDLY, as to communication of words, that too has a double use.

I. CIVIL.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL.

FIRST, by their civil use, I mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another.

SECONDLY,

SECONDLY, by the philosophical use of words, I mean such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express, in general propositions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with; in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.

§ 4. THE chief end of language, in communication, being to be understood, The imper- words serve not well for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, fection of when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for words, is the in the mind of the speaker. Now since sounds have no natural connection with doubtfulness of their sig- our ideas, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men, nification.

THE doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification, which is the imperfection we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the ideas they stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one sound, more than in another, to signify any idea: for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

THAT then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than other words, is the difference of ideas they stand for.

§ 5. WORDS having naturally no signification, the idea, which each stands for, must be learned and retained by those, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this is hardest to be done, where, Causes of their imper- fection.

FIRST, the ideas, they stand for, are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

SECONDLY, where the ideas, they stand for, have no certain connection in nature; and so no settled standard, any where in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

THIRDLY, where the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not easy to be known.

FOURTHLY, where the signification of the word, and the real essence of the thing, are not exactly the same.

THESE are difficulties that attend the signification of several words, that are intelligible. Those, which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple ideas, which another has not organs, or faculties to attain; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man; need not here be mentioned.

IN all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas: for if we examine them, we shall find that the names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two first of these reasons; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter.

§ 6. FIRST, the names of mixed modes are many of them liable to great The names of mixed modes doubtful.

I. BECAUSE of that great composition, these complex ideas are often made up of. To make words serviceable, to the end of communication, it is necessary (as has been said) that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea, they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of discourse and language. But, when a word stands for a very complex idea, that is compounded and decomposed, it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly, as to make the name, in common use, stand for the same precise idea, without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass, that men's names of very compound ideas, such as for the most part are moral words, have seldom, in two different men, the same precise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow.

§ 7. II. BECAUSE the names of mixed modes, for the most part, want Secondly, because they have no standards.

BOOK III. therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of ideas, put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word *tham*, wheedle, or banter in use, put together, as he thought fit, those ideas he made it stand for: And, as it is with any new names of modes, that are now brought into any language; so was it with the old ones, when they were first made use of. Names, therefore, that stand for collections of ideas, which the mind makes at pleasure, must needs be of doubtful signification; when such collections are no where to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shewn, whereby men may adjust them. What the word murder, or sacrilege, &c. signifies, can never be known from things themselves: there be many of the parts of those complex ideas, which are not visible in the action itself: the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder, or sacrilege, have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either: and the pulling the trigger of the gun, with which the murder is committed, and is all the action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connection with those other ideas, that make up the complex one, named murder. They have their union and combination only from the understanding, which unites them under one name: but uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be but that the signification of the name, that stands for such voluntary collections, should be often various in the minds of different men, who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by, in such arbitrary ideas.

Propriety
not a sufficient
remedy.

§ 8. It is true, common use, that is the rule of propriety, may be supposed here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language; and it cannot be denied, but that in some measure it does. Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation; but no body having an authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them, common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses; there being scarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others) which in common use has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of far different ideas. Besides, the rule and measure of propriety itself being no where established, it is often matter of dispute, whether this or that way of using a word, be propriety of speech, or no. From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification; and even in men, that have a mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer. Tho' the names glory and gratitude be the same in every man's mouth, thro' a whole country; yet the complex, collective idea, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men using the same language.

The way of
learning
these names
contributes
also to their
doubtfulness.

§ 9. THE way also, wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that to make them understand what the names of simple ideas, or substances, stands for, people ordinarily shew them the thing, whereof they would have them have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stand for it, as white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog. But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually learned first; and then to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own observation and industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds; or, when they have any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused signification. And even those

those themselves, who have with more attention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them stand for complex ideas, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, concerning honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c. wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words, nor have in their minds the same complex ideas, which they make them stand for: and so all the contests, that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a word. And hence we see, that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications: and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral words, there is no end. These ideas of men's making, are, by men, still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man, who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of scripture, or clause in the code, at first reading, has by consulting commentators quite lost the sense of it, and by those elucidations given rise, or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think commentators needless; but to shew how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those, who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking, as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts.

§ 10. WHAT obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men, who have lived in remote ages and different countries, it will be needless to take notice; since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to shew what attention, study, sagacity, and reasoning are required, to find out the true meaning of ancient authors. But there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us, when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors; who writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore, in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and, without any injury done them, resolve thus with ourselves,

“Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.”

§ 11. If the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain, because there are no real standards existing in nature, to which those ideas are referred, and by which they may be adjusted, the names of substances are of a doubtful signification, for a contrary reason, viz. because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to standards made by nature. In our ideas of substances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the characteristic notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be the signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain: for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas, they stand for, be referred to standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

§ 12. The names of substances have, as has been shewed, a double reference in their ordinary use.

FIRST, sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification is supposed to agree to, the real constitution of things, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all center. But this real constitution, or (as it is

Hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors.

Names of substances referred, 1. To real essences that cannot be apt known.

BOOK III. apt to be called) essence, being utterly unknown to us, any found that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impossible to know what things are, or ought to be called an horse, or antimony, when those words are put for real essences, that we have no ideas of at all. And therefore, in this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards.

2. To co-existing qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

§ 13. SECONDLY, the simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, are the proper standards to which their names are referred, and by which their significations may best be rectified. But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose, as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations. Because these simple ideas that co-exist, and are united in the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex, specifick idea, which the specifick name is to stand for, men, tho' they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame very different ideas about it; and so the name, they use for it, unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different significations. The simple qualities, which make up the complex ideas, being most of them powers, in relation to changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations, any one of the baser metals is apt to receive, from the different application only of fire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive, in the hands of a chymist, by the application of other bodies, will not think it strange, that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected, and compleatly known, by the ways of enquiry, which our faculties are capable of. They being, therefore, at least so many, that no man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discovered by different men, according to their various skill, attention, and ways of handling; who therefore cannot chuse but have different ideas of the same substance, and therefore, make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the complex ideas of substances, being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex idea, those qualities he has found to be united together. For tho' in the substance, gold, one satisfies himself with colour and weight, yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to be joined with that colour, in his idea of gold, as any one does its fusibility; solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight, as fusibility, or any other; others put in its ductility, or fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by tradition, or experience. Who of all these has established the right signification of the word gold? or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks, he has the same right to put into his complex idea, signified by the word gold, those qualities, which upon trial he has found united; as another, who has not so well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex idea, who can say, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex ideas of substances, in men using the same name for them, will be very various; and so the significations of those names very uncertain.

3. To co-existing qualities, which are known but imperfectly.

§ 14. BESIDES, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this case, which are those that are to make up the precise collection, that is to be signified by the specifick name; or can with any just authority prescribe, which obvious, or common qualities are to be left out; or which more secret, or more particular, are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance? All which, together, seldom or never

never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them.

§ 15. IT is true, as to civil and common conversation, the general names of substances, regulated in their ordinary signification, by some obvious qualities (as by the shape and figure, in things of known, seminal propagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour, joined with some other sensible qualities) do well enough to design the things men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually conceive well enough the substances, meant by the word gold, or apple, to distinguish the one from the other. But in philosophical enquiries and debates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down; there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found, not only not to be well established, but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make malleableness, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complex idea of gold, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from gold taken in such a signification: but yet such as another man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that complex idea, that the name gold, in his use of it, stands for.

With this imperfection they may serve for civil, but not well for philosophical use.

§ 16. THIS is a natural, and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easily find, when once passing from confused, or loose notions, they come to more strict and close enquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose a question, "whether any liquor passed thro' the filaments of the nerves?" The debate having been managed a good while by variety of arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words, than a real difference in the conception of things) desired, that before they went any farther on in this dispute, they would first examine, and establish among them, what the word liquor signified. They at first were a little surprized at the proposal; and had they been persons less ingenious, they might, perhaps, have taken it for a very frivolous, or extravagant one: since there was no one there, that thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for; which I think too none of the most perplexed names of substances. However, they were pleased to comply with my motion, and upon examination found, that the signification of that word was not so settled and certain, as they had all imagined; but that each of them made it a sign of a different, complex idea. This made them perceive, that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differed very little in their opinions, concerning some fluid and subtle matter, passing thro' the conduits of the nerves; tho' it was not so easy to agree, whether it was to be called liquor, or no; a thing which, when considered, they thought it not worth the contending about.

Instance, liquor of nerves.

§ 17. How much this is the case, in the greatest part of disputes, that men are engaged so hotly in, I shall, perhaps, have an occasion in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the forementioned instance of the word, gold, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its signification. I think all agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow, shining colour; which being the idea, to which children have annexed that name, the shining, yellow part of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others, finding fusibility joined with that yellow colour, in certain parcels of matter, make of that combination a complex idea, to which they give the name gold, to denote a sort of substances; and so exclude from being gold all such yellow, shining bodies, as by fire will be reduced to ashes; and admit to be of that species, or to be comprehended under that name gold,

Instance, gold.

Book III. only such substances, as having that shining, yellow colour will by fire be reduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, adds the weight, which, being a quality as straitly joined with that colour, as its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its idea, and to be signified by its name: and therefore, the other made up of body of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on of all the rest: wherein no one can shew a reason, why some of the inseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put into the nominal essence, and others left out: or why the word gold, signifying that sort of body, the ring on his finger is made of, should determine that sort rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and solubility in aqua regia: since the dissolving it, by that liquor, is as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation, which that substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it, that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence, signified by the word gold, and solubility but a property of it? or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property? That which I mean is this, that these being all but properties depending on its real constitution, and nothing but powers, either active or passive, in reference to other bodies; no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas, to be found in that body, than to another: whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain; since, as has been said, several people observe several properties in the same substance; and, I think, I may say no body all. And therefore, have but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have very uncertain significations.

The names of simple ideas, the least doubtful.

§ 18. FROM what has been said, it is easy to observe, what has been before remarked, viz. that the names of simple ideas are, of all others, the least liable to mistakes, and that for these reasons. First, because the ideas they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty, which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes, in which the precise number of simple ideas, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the mind. And, secondly, because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify: which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many disputes. Men, that do not perversely use their words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any language, which they are acquainted with, the use and signification of the names of simple ideas: white and sweet, yellow and bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection of simple ideas, modesty or frugality stand for, in another's use, is not so certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by gold, or iron; yet the precise complex idea, others make them the signs of, is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection. Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use of in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions, and would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the consequences that follow from them.

And next to them, simple modes.

§ 19. BY the same rule, the names of simple modes, are, next to those of simple ideas, least liable to doubt and uncertainty, especially those of figure and number, of which men have so clear and distinct ideas. Who ever, that had a mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary meaning of seven, or a triangle? And in general, the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names.

§ 20. MIXED modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But the names of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of simple ideas, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been shewn. The names of substances, being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncertainty, especially when we come to a philosophical use of them.

CHAP.
IX.

The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances.

Why this imperfection charged upon words.

§ 21. THE great disorder, that happens in our names of substances, proceeding for the most part from our want of knowledge, and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably be wondered, why I charge this as an imperfection, rather upon our words than understandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice, that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method. I must confess then, that when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought, that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas; I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words, that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And tho' it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men put upon themselves, as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain, or mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken notice of, as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have been made the business of men's study; and obtained the reputation of learning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies, that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§ 22. SURE I am, that the signification of words in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and country. This is so evident in the Greek authors, that he that shall peruse their writings will find, in almost every one of them, a distinct language, tho' the same words. But when, to this natural difficulty in every country there shall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c. every one of which influenced the signification of their words then, tho' to us now they are lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations, or misunderstanding of those antient writings: which, tho' of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the name of simple ideas, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms, of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the hearer. And in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.

This should teach us moderation, in imposing our own sense of old authors.

§ 23. THE

BOOK III. § 23. THE volumes of interpreters and commentators on the old and new testament, are but too manifest proofs of this. Tho' every thing said in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay cannot chuse but be, very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance; when even his son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and providence, and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they, to whom this written word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter.

C H A P. X.

Of the abuse of words.

CHAP. X.
Abuse of words.

§ 1. BESIDES the imperfection, that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion, that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful faults and neglects, which men are guilty of, in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification, than naturally they need to be.

First, words without any, or without clear ideas, § 2. FIRST, in this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts:

I. ONE may observe, in all languages, certain words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first original, and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most part, the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting something singular and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words, and such, as when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant terms. For having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishing characters of their church, or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances; every one's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him: or if he wants to be better stored, the great mint-masters of these kind of terms, I mean the school-men and metaphysicians (under which, I think, the disputing, natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§ 3. II. OTHERS there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take so little care to lay by words, which, in their primary notation, have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by an unpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct meaning at all. Wisdom, glory, grace, &c. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many

many, of those who use them, should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that tho' they have learned those sounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.

§ 4. MEN having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words, which are easily got and retained, before they knew, or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things, they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words other people use: as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. This, tho' men make a shift with, in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to be understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this insignificance in their words, when they come to reason, concerning either their tenets, or interest, manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty, unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words, for the most part, standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or, at least, very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use, amongst their neighbours, and, that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain, fixed meaning: whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that, as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced, that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

§ 5. SECONDLY, another great abuse of words, is, inconstancy in the use of them. It is hard to find a discourse, written of any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of units (v. g. this character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his discourse, or reasoning, make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas. If men should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus, in the affairs and business of the world, and call 8 sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him one of the two names men constantly are disgusted with. And yet, in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for wit and learning: but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

§ 6. THIRDLY, another abuse of language is, an affected obscurity, by either applying old words to new and unusual significations, or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the peripatetick philosophy has

Occasioned
by learning
names, be-
fore the ideas
they belong
to.

2. Unsteady
application
of them.

3. Affected
obscurity, by
wrong appli-
cation.

BOOK III. been most eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce any of them, that are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection of human knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with obscurity of terms, and to confound the signification of words, which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That body and extension, in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain, to any one that will but reflect a little. For, were their signification precisely the same, it would be proper, and as intelligible to say, the body of an extension, as the extension of a body; and yet there are those, who find it necessary to confound their signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the signification of words, logick, and the liberal sciences, as they have been handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired art of disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst it has been made use of, and fitted, to perplex the signification of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he, that will look into that sort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary conversation.

Logick and dispute has much contributed to this.

Calling it subtilty.

§ 7. THIS is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning are estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words; it is no wonder if the wit of men so employed, should perplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as never to want something to say, in opposing, or defending any question; the victory being adjudged, not to him who had truth on his side, but the last word in the dispute.

§ 8. THIS, tho' a very useless skill, and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of subtilty and acuteness; and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old (the disputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes) and the schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could not be understood: whilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their neighbours; and brought but small advantage to human life, or the societies wherein they lived: unless the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing, or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.

This learning very little benefits society.

§ 9. FOR, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing doctors, it was to the unscholastick statesman, that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanick (a name of disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men of business, and ignorant with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle, in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth: besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words: which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and

the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity, but obscurity.

§ 10. THUS learned ignorance, and this art of keeping, even inquisitive men, from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see that other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired that acuteness, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But tho' unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black, &c. and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words; yet there were philosophers found, who had learning and subtilty enough to prove, that snow was black; i. e. to prove, that white was black. Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction and society; whilst, with great art and subtilty, they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render language less useful, than the real defects of it had made it; a gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication.

§ 11. THESE learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, and profit their lives, as he, who should alter the signification of known characters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate, dull and vulgar, should, in his writing, shew that he could put A for B, and D for E, &c. to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader. It being as senseless to put black, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary idea, i. e. to call snow black, as to put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for B; which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain motion of the organs of speech.

As useful as to confound the sound of the letters.

§ 12. NOR hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious, empty speculations, it hath invaded the great concerns of human life and society, obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity, brought confusion, disorder and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in great measure rendered useless, those two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes, upon the laws of God and man, served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied, curious distinctions and acute niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands, are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text, or a law, that he reads, till he consults an expositor, or goes to council; who, by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

This art has perplexed religion and justice.

§ 13. WHETHER any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would not be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talking about them, or tossing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of words were made plain and direct, and that language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge, and bond of society, should not be employed to darken truth, and unsettle people's rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that, at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning, or knowledge to do so?

And ought not to pass for learning.

§ 14. FOURTHLY, another great abuse of words is, the taking them for things. This, tho' it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men are most subject,

4. Taking them for things.

BOOK III. subject, who confine their thoughts to any one system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis; whereby they come to be persuaded, that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the peripatetic philosophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that school, that is not persuaded, that substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional species, &c. are something real? These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them; and therefore, they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their soul of the world, and the Epicureans their endeavour towards motion in their atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms, that others understand not; but yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes by familiar use, among those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant. And should aerial and aetherial vehicles come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as peripatetic forms and intentional species have heretofore done.

Instance, in
matter.

§ 15. How much names, taken for things, are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one: how many intricate disputes have there been about matter, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from body; as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas these two terms stood for, were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we see, that tho' it be proper to say, there is one matter of all bodies, one cannot say, there is one body of all matters: we familiarly say, one body is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say, one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? viz. from hence, that tho' matter and body be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For body stands for a solid, extended, figured substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception, it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure: and therefore it is, that speaking of matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is every where the same, every where uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive, or speak of different matters in the world, than we do of different solidities; tho' we both conceive and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But since solidity cannot exist, without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something, really existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers, concerning *materia prima*; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms, I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only, and not for things themselves. For when we argue about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree to any thing really existing in nature, or no. And, if men would tell what

what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that obscurity, or wrangling, in the search, or support of truth, that there is.

CHAP.
X.

§ 16. BUT, whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions, far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any one, that the words which his father, or schoolmaster, the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in nature; which, perhaps, is none of the least causes, that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions, annexed to them, should not be removed.

This makes errors lasting.

§ 17. FIFTHLY, another abuse of words, is the setting them in the place of things, which they do, or can by no means signify. We may observe, that in the general names of substances, whereof the nominal essences are only known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that what I call gold is malleable (tho' truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, viz. that gold, i. e. what has the real essence of gold is malleable; which amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. But a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connection in his mind of malleableness, is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound, gold, he puts for it. Thus when we say, that "animal rationale" is, and "animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus", is not, a good definition of a man; it is plain, we suppose the name man, in this case, to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify, that a rational animal better described that real essence, than a two-legged animal, with broad nails, and without feathers. For else, why might not Plato as properly make the word *ἄνθρωπος*, or man, stand for his complex idea, made up of the ideas of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape, and other outward appearances, as Aristotle, make the complex idea, to which he gave the name *ἄνθρωπος*, or man, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together, unless the name *ἄνθρωπος*, or man, were supposed to stand for something else, than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing, than the idea a man professes he would express by it.

5. Setting them for what they cannot signify.

§ 18. IT is true, the names of substances would be much more useful, and propositions, made in them, much more certain, were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds, which those words signified. And it is for want of those real essences, that our words convey so little knowledge, or certainty, in our discourses about them: and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection, as much as it can, makes them, by a secret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For tho' the word man, or gold, signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties, united together in one sort of substances: yet there is scarce any body, in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing, having the real essence, on which those properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of.

v. g. Putting them for the real essences of substances.

§ 19. THIS shews us the reason, why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one, being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i. e. to be of another species, as is plain in chance-medly, manslaughter, murder, parricide, &c. The reason whereof is, because the complex idea, signified by that name, is the real, as well as nominal, essence; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. But in substances,

Hence we think every change of our idea in substances, not to change the species.

Book III. it is not so. For tho', in that called gold, one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice versa; yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that name, and suppose it annexed to, a real, immutable essence of a thing existing, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold, that of fixedness, or solubility in aqua regia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former, complex idea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For, by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies, the word gold (which by standing for a more, or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse) comes to have no signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself is away. For, however, it may be thought all one; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing, to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel of the body itself, v. g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before us; tho' in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the thing.

The cause of the abuse, a supposition of nature's working always regularly.

§ 20. THAT which, I think, very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of species, is the supposition before-mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those species, by giving exactly the same real, internal constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one, who observes their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different one from another, as several of those, which are ranked under different, specific names, this supposition however, that the same precise, internal constitution goes always with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences, tho', indeed, they signify nothing, but the complex ideas they have in their minds, when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially in those, who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished.

This abuse contains two false suppositions.

§ 21. BUT, however preposterous and absurd it be, to make our names stand for ideas we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this, or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous foetus, be a man or no; it is evident, the question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea, expressed by the name man: but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things, which he supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of using the names of substances, there are these false suppositions contained.

FIRST, that there are certain, precise essences, according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into species. That every thing has a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt: but I think it has been proved, that this makes not the distinction of species, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of their names.

SECONDLY, this tacitly also insinuates, as if we had ideas of these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it to enquire, whether this, or that thing have the real essence of the species man, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known? which yet is utterly false: and, therefore, such application of names, as would make them stand for ideas, which we have not, must needs

needs cause great disorder, in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words. CHAP. X.

§ 22. SIXTHLY, there remains yet another more general, tho' perhaps less observed, abuse of words; and that is, that men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connection between the names and the signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore, one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common, received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas: whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term, they have thereby, as it were set before others, the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise and wrangling without improvement or information; whilst men take words to be the constant, regular marks of agreed notions, which, in truth, are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yet men think it strange, if in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms: tho' the arguings one may every day observe in conversation, make it evident, that there are few names of complex ideas, which any two men use for the same just, precise collection. It is hard to name a word, which will not be a clear instance of this. Life is a term, none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the seed, have life; whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense, or motion, be alive or no; it is easy to perceive that a clear distinct settled idea does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is. Some gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language; and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical enquiries. Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And tho' men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the words, they receive from them: yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words, whose sense seems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance, in what sense another man uses his words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This abuse, of taking words upon trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill use of words. For, tho' it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies, the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the contending, learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same; tho' perhaps what they would have, be different.

§ 23. To conclude this consideration, of the imperfection and abuse of language; the ends of language, in our discourse with others, being chiefly these three: first, to make known one man's thoughts, or ideas to another: secondly, to do it, with as much ease and quickness, as is possible: and, thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things. Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these three. The ends of language: 1. To convey your ideas.

FIRST,

BOOK III. FIRST, words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths, without any determined ideas in their minds, whereof they are the signs: or, 2. When they apply the common, received names of any language to ideas, to which the common use of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another idea.

2. To do it with quickness. § 24. SECONDLY, men fail of conveying their thoughts, with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex ideas, without having distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would shew another.

3. Therewith to convey the knowledge of things. § 25. THIRDLY, there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Tho' it be a defect, that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the nature of things, as attention, study, and application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality, or existence.

How men's words fail in all these. § 26. FIRST, he that hath words of any language, without distinct ideas in his mind, to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise, without any sense, or signification; and how learned soever he may seem, by the use of hard words, or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his study, but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else.

§ 27. SECONDLY, he that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better a case than a bookfeller, who had, in his warehouse, volumes, that lay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by shewing the loose sheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse, for want of words, to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known, by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express what another man signifies in one.

§ 28. THIRDLY, he that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea, but uses the same words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another signification, ought to pass, in the schools and conversation, for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several things under the same name.

§ 29. FOURTHLY, he that applies the words of any language, to ideas different from those, to which the common use of that country applies them, however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not, by such words, be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however, the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the ears of those, who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other ideas, than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses them.

§ 30. FIFTHLY, he that hath imagined to himself substances, such as never have been, and filled his head with ideas, which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and, perhaps, another man's head, with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

§ 31. HE that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath complex ideas, without names for them, wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to use periphrases.

periphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies his names to ideas, different from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he, that hath the ideas of substances, disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath instead thereof chimera's.

§ 32. IN our notions concerning substances, we are liable to all the former inconveniencies: v. g. he that uses the word, tarantula, without having any imagination, or idea, of what it stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new discovered country shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of a horse, or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himself. 3. He that uses the word body, sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very fallaciouly. 4. He that gives the name horse to that idea, which common usage calls mule, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the name, centaur, stands for some real being, imposes on himself, and mistakes words for things.

§ 33. IN modes and relations, generally, we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniencies; viz. 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes, as gratitude, or charity, and yet not have any precise ideas, annexed in my thoughts to those names. 2. I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them; v. g. I may have the idea of a man's drinking, till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called drunkenness. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues, or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss: v. g. when I apply the name frugality to that idea, which others call and signify by this sound, covetousness. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure; and relation being but my way of considering, or comparing two things together, and so also an idea of my own making; these ideas can scarce be found to disagree with any thing existing, since they are not in the mind, as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties, inseparably flowing from the internal constitution, or essence of any substance; but as it were patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes, or relations, any inconsistent ideas together, I fill my head also with chimera's; since such ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the mind, much less any real being be ever denominated from them.

§ 34. SINCE wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches, and allusion in language, will hardly be admitted, as an imperfection, or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses, where we seek rather pleasure and delight, than information and improvement, such ornaments, as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words, eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else, but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so, indeed, are perfect cheat: and therefore, however laudable, or allowable, oratory may render them, in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform, or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language, or person, that makes use of them. What, and how various they are

BOOK III. will be superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric, which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to be informed: only I cannot but observe, how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge, is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive, and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.

C H A P. XI.

Of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses.

CHAP. § I.
XI.

They are
worth seek-
ing.

THE natural and improved imperfections of languages, we have seen above at large; and speech being the great bond that holds society together, and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man, and one generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious thoughts, to consider what remedies are to be found for these inconveniences above-mentioned.

Are not easy.

§ 2. I AM not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of his own country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing, but what they have clear and distinct ideas of: which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing, or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that men's talking much, or little, shall hold proportion only to their knowledge.

But yet necessary to
philosophy.

§ 3. BUT, tho' the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking, and gossipings not be robbed of their antient privilege; tho' the schools and men of argument would, perhaps, take it amiss, to have any thing offered to abate the length, or lessen the number of their disputes: yet, methinks, those, who pretend seriously to search after, or maintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.

Misuse of
words, the
cause of
great errors.

§ 4. FOR he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will find some reason to doubt, whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement, or hindrance of knowledge, amongst mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially, when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such contemplations, and reasonings, about little more than sounds, whilst the ideas, they annexed to them, are very confused, or very unsteady, or, perhaps, none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing, but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment, or knowledge?

Obstinacy.

§ 5. THIS inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders, which follow from

from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, tho' he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break, or stop the pipes, whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words, without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so over-charged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted, very little or not at all the more knowing, or orthodox; since subtilty, in those, who make profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which consisting for the most part in nothing, but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and obstinate in their errors.

§ 6. LET us look into the books of controversy of any kind; there we shall see, that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing, or bettering a man's understanding. For if the idea be not agreed on betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about things, but names. As often as such a word, whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no other object, wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite different.

§ 7. WHETHER a bat be a bird or no, is not a question; whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of: but the question is, 1. Either between those, that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one, or both of those sort of things, for which these names are supposed to stand; and then it is a real enquiry, concerning the nature of a bird, or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more compleat, by examining, whether all the simple ideas, to which, combined together, they both give the name bird, be all to be found in a bat: but this is a question only of enquirers (not disputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a question between disputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a bat is a bird. And then the question is, barely, about the signification of one, or both these words; in that they not having both the same complex ideas, to which they give these two names, one holds, and the other denies, that these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute about them: for they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted between them) whether all the simple ideas, of the more general name bird, were found in the complex idea of a bat, or no; and so there could be no doubt, whether a bat were a bird, or no. And here I desire it may be considered and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must be, where they signify any thing) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do, or should stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves, or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds; i. e. those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity (which every one may do, in the words he uses himself) I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.

BOOK III.

§ 8. To remedy the defects of speech before-mentioned, to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till some body better able shall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

1. Remedy, to use no word without an idea.

FIRST, a man should take care to use no word without a signification, no name without an idea, for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless, to any one, who shall take the pains to recollect, how often he has met with such words, as instinct, sympathy, and antipathy, &c. in the discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those, that used them, had no ideas in their minds, to which they applied them; but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations, in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words, and any ideas, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men, who have no ideas in their minds, to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly, even to themselves alone.

2. To have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes.

§ 9. SECONDLY, it is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas: those ideas he annexes them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, i. e. the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words; which having no settled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. Justice is a word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification: which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of; and if it be decomposed, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for example, or any other. I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect and make this analysis at large, every time the word justice comes in his way: but this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it, when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex idea of justice, to be such a treatment of the person, or goods of another, as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is, which makes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered, that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourses with others.

And distinct and conformable in substances.

§ 10. IN the names of substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined ideas. In these the names must also be conformable to things, as they exist: but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary, in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about truth. And tho' it would be well too, if it extended itself to common conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is scarce to be expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses; and both, tho' confused enough, yet serve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words, wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs; and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.

Propriety.

§ 11. THIRDLY, it is not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make these signs stand; but they must also take care to apply their

their words, as near as may be, to such ideas, as common use has annexed them to. For words, especially of languages already framed, being no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleasure, to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be, without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds, with the greatest ease and advantage; and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in the names of moral words. The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those, who in their writings and discourses appear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words, according to the propriety of the language, tho' it have not always the good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is so unskilful in the language he speaks, as not to understand it, when made use of as it ought to be.

§ 12. FOURTHLY, but because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always, certainly, what they precisely stand for; and because men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new words (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty) or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore, after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of words, to declare their meaning, where either common use has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most names of very complex ideas) or where the term, being very material in the discourse, and that, upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulness, or mistake.

§ 13. As the ideas, men's words stand for, are of different sorts; so the way of making known the ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For tho' defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words; yet there are some words that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise meaning cannot be made known, but by definition; and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes and substances.

§ 14. FIRST, when a man makes use of the name of any simple idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged by the laws of ingenuity, and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shewn, cannot be done by definition; and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. First, sometimes the naming the subject, wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name be understood, by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So, to make a countryman understand what fucille morte colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple idea, is by presenting to his senses that subject, which may produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea, that word stands for.

§ 15. SECONDLY, mixed modes, especially those belonging to morality, being most of them such combinations of ideas, as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing; the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any shewing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of several ideas, that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the ideas that go to each composition, and so

4. To make known their meaning.

And that three ways.

1. In simple ideas, by synonymous terms, or shewing.

2. In mixed modes, by definition.

BOOK III. both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those, who make not their discourses, about moral things, very clear and distinct. For, since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each species is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things, with uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by,

Morality,
capable of
demonstra-
tion.

§ 16. UPON this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematicks: since the precise, real essence of the things moral words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the congruity, or incongruity, of the things themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers natures are not so much enquired into, as supposed; v. g. when we say, that a man is subject to law, we mean nothing by man, but a corporeal, rational creature: what the real essence, or other qualities, of that creature are, in this case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a child, or changeling, be a man in a physical sense, may, amongst the naturalists, be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable, unchangeable idea, a corporeal, rational being. For were there a monkey, or any other creature to be found, that had the use of reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a man, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral, than they do mathematical discourses: where, if the mathematician speaks of a cube, or globe of gold, or any other body, he has his clear, settled idea, which varies not, tho' it may by mistake be applied to a particular body, to which it belongs not.

Definitions
can make
moral dis-
courses clear.

§ 17. THIS I have here mentioned by the by, to shew of what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their words, when there is occasion; since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuity (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: since a definition is the only way, whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known; and yet a way, whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore, the negligence, or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much more clear, than those in natural philosophy: since they are about ideas in the mind, which are none of them false, or disproportionate; they having no external beings for the archetypes, which they are referred to, and must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea, which shall be the standard to which they will give the name justice, with which pattern so made all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an idea, that shall in all things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know the combination of ideas, that are put together, within in their own minds; for the other, they must enquire into the whole nature, and abstruse, hidden constitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them.

And is the
only way.

§ 18. ANOTHER reason, that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary, especially of moral words, is what I mentioned a little before, viz. that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty. For the ideas, they stand for, being for the most part such whose

whose component parts nowhere exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words, enumerating the several simple ideas, which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names stand for; the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible objects, to shew the ideas which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas, and also to some degree in those of substances.

CHAP.
XI.

§ 19. THIRDLY, for the explaining the signification of the names of substances, as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct species, both the fore-mentioned ways, viz. of shewing and defining, are requisite in many cases to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideas, which make up our complex idea of that species, annexed; we forwardly give the specific name to that thing, wherein that characteristic mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species. These leading, or characteristic (as I may so call them) ideas, in the sorts of animals, and vegetables, is (as has been before remarked, ch. vi. § 29. and ch. ix. § 15.) mostly figure, and in inanimate bodies, colour, and in some both together. Now,

3. In substances, by shewing and defining.

§ 20. THESE leading, sensible qualities are those, which make the chief ingredients of our specific ideas, and, consequently, the most observable and unvariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as attributed to sorts of substances, coming under our knowledge. For tho' the found, man, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex idea, made up of animality and rationality united in the same subject, as to signify any other combination; yet used as a mark to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex idea, signified by the word, man, as any other we find in it: and, therefore, why Plato's "animal implume, bipes, latis unguibus," should not be a good definition of the name, man, standing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to shew: for it is the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that species, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from murder, who kill monstrous births, (as we call them) because of an extraordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a rational soul, or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed, than ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it that has informed us, that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece, or can join itself to, and inform no sort of body, but one that is just of such an outward structure?

Ideas of the leading qualities of substances are best got by shewing.

§ 21. Now these leading qualities are best made known by shewing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of an horse, or casuary, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better: and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight; where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise, nice idea of that peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any substance; for which precise ideas there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing found there is in gold, distinct from the sound of other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow, that belongs to that metal.

§ 22. BUT because many of the simple ideas, that make up our specific ideas of substances, are powers, which lie not obvious to our senses in the things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our names of substances, some part of the signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple ideas, than in shewing the substance itself. For he that, to the

The ideas of their powers, best by definition.

BOOK III. the yellow, shining colour of gold, got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fusibility, fixedness, and solubility in aqua regia, will have a perfecter idea of gold, than he can have by seeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But, if the former constitution of this shining, heavy, ductil thing (from whence all these its properties flow) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution, or essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word, gold, might as easily be ascertained, as that of triangle.

A reflection
on the
knowledge
of spirits.

§ 23. HENCE we may take notice how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate from bodies (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than our's) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our knowledge, or imagination, reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception. Tho' yet it be not to be doubted that spirits, of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh, may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances, as we have of a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions.

Ideas also of
substances
must be con-
formable to
things.

§ 24. BUT tho' definitions will serve to explain the names of substances, as they stand for our ideas; yet they leave them not without great imperfection, as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things, as well as with men's ideas. And, therefore, in substances we are not always to rest in the ordinary, complex idea, commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas, as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea, in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for: therefore, to define their names right, natural history is to be enquired into; and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences, in discourses and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned from the propriety of the language, the common, but confused, or very imperfect idea, to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them: but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex idea belonging to each specifick name; and in discourse with others (if we find them mistake us) we ought to tell what the complex idea is, that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done, by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical verity, in that children, being taught words whilst they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas, to be signified by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions, to which they apply those words, afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men, speaking the proper language of their country, i. e. according to grammar-rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themselves; and by their arguing one with another, make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called.

Not easy to
be made so.

§ 25. IT were therefore to be wished, that men, versed in physical enquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down those simple

simple ideas, wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion, which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller, or greater, number of sensible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things, which come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a natural history, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, and sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances, as explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done; but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that the signification of common words are certainly established, and the precise ideas, they stand for, perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false: no names of complex ideas having so settled, determined significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no discredit not to know, what precise idea any sound stands for, in another man's mind, without he declare it to me, by some other way than barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary conversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas, which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar to him. But common use, being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itself at last to the ideas of particular men, proves often but a very variable standard. But tho' such a dictionary, as I have above-mentioned, will require too much time, cost, and pains, to be hoped for in this age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that words standing for things, which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would, perhaps, with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries, or ages, and settle truer ideas in men's minds of several things, whereof we read the names in antient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: and he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer idea of apium, or ibex, from a little print of that herb, or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of strigil and sistrum, if, instead of a curry-comb and cymbal, which are the English names dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the margin, small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the ancients. "Toga, tunica, pallium," are words easily translated by gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the taylors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the by.

§ 26. FIFTHLY, if men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct, or convince another, he should use the same word, constantly, in the same sense: If this were done (which no body can refuse, without great dissimulity) many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; several of those great volumes, swoln with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow

Book III. compass; and many of the philosophers (to mention no other) as well as poets works, might be contained in a nutshell.

When the variation is to be explained.

§ 27. But after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same word, in somewhat different senses. And tho' in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and shew in what sense he there uses that term.

B O O K IV.

C H A P. I.

Of knowledge in general.

CHAP. § 1.
I.

Our knowledge conversant about our ideas.

Knowledge is the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of two ideas.

This agreement four-fold.



SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does, or can contemplate; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.

§ 2. KNOWLEDGE then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, tho' we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For, when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess our selves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?

§ 3. But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this agreement, or disagreement consists, I think, we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

1. Identity, or diversity.
2. Relation.
3. Co-existence, or necessary connection.
4. Real existence.

1. Of identity, or diversity.

§ 4. FIRST, as to the first sort of agreement, or disagreement, viz. identity, or diversity. It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments, or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the other: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And tho' men of art have reduced this into those general rules, "what is, is;" and "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" for ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion

occasion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round, are the very ideas they are, and that they are not other ideas, which he calls red, or square. Nor can any maxim, or proposition in the world, make him know it clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general rule. This then is the first agreement or disagreement, which the mind perceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and diversity will always be perceived, as soon and as clearly as the ideas themselves are, nor can it possibly be otherwise.

§ 5. SECONDLY, the next sort of agreement, or disagreement, the mind perceives in any of its ideas, may, I think, be called relative, and is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas, of what kind soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.

§ 6. THIRDLY, the third sort of agreement, or disagreement, to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co-existence, or non-co-existence in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea, signified by the word gold.

§ 7. FOURTHLY, the fourth and last sort is, that of actual, real existence, agreeing to any idea. Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement, is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of: for all the enquiries, that we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, that it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does, or does not, always co-exist with some other idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation to some other idea; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus blue is not yellow, is of identity: two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal, is of relation: iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions, is of co-existence: God is, is of real existence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads, and not under relation in general; since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this essay. I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge, but that it is necessary first to consider the different acceptations of the word knowledge.

§ 8. THERE are several ways, wherein the mind is possessed of truth, each of which is called knowledge.

1. THERE is actual knowledge, which is the present view the mind has of the agreement, or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have one to another.

2. A MAN is said to know any proposition, which having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, whereof it consists; and so lodged it in his memory, that, whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt, or hesitation, embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This, I think, one may call habitual knowledge: and thus a man may be said to know

Knowledge,
actual or ha-
bitual.

all

Book IV. all those truths, which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof the mind is assured past doubt, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. For our finite understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly but on one thing at once, if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant; and he that knew most would know but one truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

Habitual
knowledge,
twofold.

§ 9. Of habitual knowledge, there are also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees:

FIRST, the one is of such truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the relation is between those ideas. And this is in all those truths, whereof we have an intuitive knowledge; where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with another.

SECONDLY, the other is of such truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction, without the proofs. Thus a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt of the truth of it. In his adherence to a truth, where the demonstration, by which it was at first known, is forgot, tho' a man may be thought rather to believe his memory, than really to know, and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge; a sort of assurance, which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another: yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true knowledge. That, which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter, is, that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived, as it was at first, by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived; but by other intermediate ideas, that shew the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, contained in the proposition, whose certainty we remember. For example, in this proposition, "that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones," one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth, knows it to be true, when that demonstration is gone out of his mind; so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it, in a different way from what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas, joined in that proposition, is perceived, but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced that perception. He remembers, i. e. he knows (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things, is now the idea that shews him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain, "that what was once true in the case, is always true; what ideas once agreed, will always agree; and consequently what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it." Upon this ground it is, that particular demonstrations in mathematicks afford general knowledge. If then the perception, that the same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relations, be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematicks; for no mathematical demonstration would be any other than particular: and when a man had demonstrated any proposition, concerning one triangle, or circle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If he would extend it farther, he must renew his demonstration in another instance, before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, and so on: by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propositions. No body, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly knows any proposition, that he now at any time reads in his book, to be true; tho' he has not in actual view that admirable chain of intermediate

mediate ideas, whereby he at first discovered it to be true. Such a memory as that, able to retain such a train of particulars, may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties; when the very discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connection of ideas, is found to surpass most readers comprehension. But yet it is evident, the author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering he once saw the connection of those ideas, as certainly as he knows such a man wounded another, remembering that he saw him run him through. But because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does in all men, more or less, decay, in length of time, this amongst other differences is one, which shews that demonstrative knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive, as we shall see in the following chapter.

CHAP.
I.

CHAP. II.

Of the degrees of our knowledge.

§ 1. **A**LL our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has, of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For, if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this, the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the mind perceives, that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two. Such kind of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition, without the intervention of any other idea; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge; which certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty, than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shews only that he has a mind to be a sceptick, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition, that in the next degree of knowledge, which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connections of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty.

CHAP.
II.
Intuitive.

§ 2. **T**HE next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately. Tho' wherever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that the mind sees that agreement or disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is discoverable: and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most gets no farther than a probable conjecture. The reason, why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement, or disagreement of two ideas, is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or disagreement the enquiry is made, cannot by the mind be put together as to shew it. In this case then, when the mind cannot

Book IV. not so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxtaposition, or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is vain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call reasoning. Thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness, between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it; because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any one or two angles; and so of this the mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is vain to find out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality; and finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know their equality to two right ones.

Depends on proofs.

§ 3. THOSE intervening ideas, which serve to shew the agreement of any two others, are called proofs; and where the agreement, or disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called demonstration, it being shewn to the understanding, and the mind made to see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas (that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called sagacity.

But not so easy.

§ 4. THIS knowledge by intervening proofs, tho' it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge. For tho', in demonstration, the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers; yet it is not without pains and attention: there must be more than one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit is required to this discovery: and there must be a progression by steps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs, and the use of reason to shew it.

Not without precedent doubt.

§ 5. ANOTHER difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, is, that tho' in the latter, all doubt be removed, when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement, or disagreement is perceived; yet, before the demonstration, there was a doubt, which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind, that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas, no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black) whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be sight in the eyes, it will at first glimpse, without hesitation, perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper: and so, if the mind have the faculty of distinct perceptions, it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing, or the mind of perceiving, we in vain enquire after the quickness of sight in one, or clearness of perception in the other.

Not so clear.

§ 6. IT is true, the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear, yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance, that always accompany that which I call intuitive; like a face reflected by several mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces a knowledge; but it is still in every successive reflection, with a lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness, which is in the first, till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of dimness, and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge, made out by a long train of proofs.

Each step must have intuitive evidence.

§ 7. Now, in every step reason makes, in demonstrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement, it seeks with the next intermediate idea, which it uses as a proof: for, if it were not so, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge; if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea,

as

as a common measure to shew their agreement, or disagreement. By which it is plain, that every step in reasoning, that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty; which, when the mind perceives, there is no more required, but to remember it to make the agreement, or disagreement of the ideas, concerning which we enquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement, or disagreement, of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of the intermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out: which, because in long deductions, and the use of many proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain; therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations.

§ 8. THE necessity of this intuitive knowledge, in each step of scientific, or demonstrative reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken axiom, that all reasoning was “*ex præcognitis & præconceffis*,” which how far it is mistaken, I shall have occasion to shew more at large, when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those propositions which are called maxims; and to shew that it is by a mistake, that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings.

§ 9. IT has been generally taken for granted, that mathematicks alone are capable of demonstrative certainty: but to have such an agreement, or disagreement, as may intuitively be perceived, being, as I imagine, not the privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure alone; it may, possibly, be the want of due method and application in us, and not of sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce so much as aimed at, by any but mathematicians. For whatever ideas we have, wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement, or disagreement, that is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge; and where it can perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, by an intuitive perception of the agreement, or disagreement, they have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable of demonstration, which is not limited to ideas of extension, figure, number, and their modes.

§ 10. THE reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be only in those, I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those sciences; but because, in comparing their equality, or excess, the modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable: and tho’, in extension, every the least excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways, to examine and discover demonstratively the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or figures: and both these, i. e. numbers and figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration are perfectly determined; which, for the most part, they are not, where they are marked only by names and words.

§ 11. BUT in other simple ideas, whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences, as to perceive, or find ways to measure their just equality, or the least differences. For those other simple ideas, being appearances, or sensations, produced in us by the size, figure, number, and motion of minute corpuscles, singly insensible, their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some, or all of those causes; which since it cannot be observed by us in particles of matter, whereof each is too subtle to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas. For, supposing the sensation, or idea, we name whiteness, be produced in us by a certain number of globules, which having a verticity about their own centers, strike upon the retina of the eye, with a certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive

BOOK IV. progressive swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered, as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them that proper rotation, which is fit to produce this sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say, that the nature of light consists in very small round globules, nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts, as gives a certain rotation to these globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of light, or colours. But this, I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive, how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some insensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their different size, figure, and motion, the variety of sensations is produced in us.

§ 12. WHETHER then they be globules, or no; or whether they have a verticity about their own centers, that produce the idea of whiteness in us, this is certain, that the more particles of light are reflected from a body, fitted to give them that peculiar motion, which produces the sensation of whiteness in us; and, possibly, too, the quicker that peculiar motion is, the whiter does the body appear, from which the greater number are reflected, as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sun-beams, in the shade, and in a dark hole; in each of which it will produce in us the idea of whiteness in far different degrees.

§ 13. NOT knowing, therefore, what number of particles, nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness, we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness, because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to distinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have being from our senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference is so great, as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whose differences can be perfectly retained, there these ideas of colours, as we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of demonstration, as ideas of number and extension. What I have here said of whiteness and colours, I think, holds true in all secondary qualities, and their modes.

Sensitive
knowledge
of particular
existence.

§ 14. THESE two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith, or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about the particular existence of finite beings, without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea, we receive from an external object, is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that, whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence, that puts us past doubting: For I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that flavour, or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea, revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects, he may please to dream that I make him this answer; 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple, or no: where all is but dream,

dream, reasoning, and arguments, are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing.
 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet, if he be resolved to appear so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists without us: I answer, that we certainly finding that pleasure, or pain, follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness, or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add, to the two former sorts of knowledge, this also, of the existence of particular, external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty.

§ 15. BUT since our knowledge is founded on, and employed about our ideas only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our ideas; and that, where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, no: for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, its clearness, or obscurity, consists in the clearness, or obscurity, of that perception, and not in the clearness, or obscurity, of the ideas themselves; v. g. a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their agreement, and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. But ideas, which, by reason of their obscurity, or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear, or distinct knowledge; because, as far as any ideas are confused, so far the mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree, or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood: he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make propositions of them, of whose truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the extent of human knowledge.

§ 1. KNOWLEDGE, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of any of our ideas, it follows from
 hence, that, CHAP. III.

FIRST, we can have knowledge no farther than we have ideas.

§ 2. SECONDLY, that we can have no knowledge farther than we can have perception of that agreement, or disagreement. Which perception being, 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas: or, 2. By reason, examining the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, by the intervention of some others: or, 3. By sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things: hence it also follows,

§ 3. THIRDLY, that we cannot have an intuitive knowledge, that shall extend itself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by juxtaposition, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the ideas of an obtuse, and an acute-angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal, or no; because their agreement, or disagreement, in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact, immediate application; and, therefore, there is need of some

1. No farther than we have ideas.

2. No farther than we can perceive their agreement, or disagreement.

3. Intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the relations of all our ideas.

Book IV. intervening quantities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or rational knowledge.

4. Nor demonstrative knowledge.

§ 4. FOURTHLY, it follows also, from what is above observed, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas: because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such mediums, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.

5. Sensitive knowledge, narrower than either.

§ 5. FIFTHLY, sensitive knowledge, reaching no farther than the existence of things, actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

6. Our knowledge therefore, narrower than our ideas.

§ 6. FROM all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Tho' our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection; and tho' these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of all being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some, even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information is to be received from some few, and not very acute ways of perception, such as are our senses; yet it would be well with us, if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor, I believe, ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring, or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, interest, or party, they are once engaged in. But yet, after all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know, concerning those ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but, possibly, shall never be able to know, whether any mere, material being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance, with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the creator. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first, eternal, thinking being should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together, as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: tho', as I think, I have proved, lib. iv. ch. 10. § 14, &c. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently, in its own nature, void of sense and thought,) should be that eternal, first, thinking being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as v. g. pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure, or pain, or the idea of a colour, or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly

wholly to the good pleasure of our maker. For since we must allow he has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a subject, we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject, we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want that evidence, that can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach: for the state we are at present in, not being that of vision, we must, in many things, content our selves with faith and probability; and, in the present question, about the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident, that he, who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible, intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility, in another world, and make us capable, there, to receive the retribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life. And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some over-zealous for, or against, the immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make the world believe. Who, either on the one side, indulging too much their thoughts, immersed altogether in matter, can allow no existence to what is not material: or who, on the other side, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude, that omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a substance, which has the modification of solidity. He that considers how hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable to extended matter; or existence to any thing that hath no extension at all, will confess, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge: and he, who will give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for, or against the soul's materiality. Since, on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended substance, or as a thinking, extended matter; the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way which some men take with themselves: who because of the unconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, tho' altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding. This serves not only to shew the weakness and scantiness of our knowledge, but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments, which, drawn from our own views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the question; but do not at all thereby help us to truth, by running into the opposite opinion, which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountable rubs he meets with, in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something, altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehension? It is past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, tho' we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is: and it is as vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of any thing, because we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not something in it, which manifestly baffles our understandings. Other spirits who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which if we add larger comprehension, which enables them at one glance

BOOK IV. glance to see the connection and agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them the intermediate proofs, which we, by single and slow steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at last find out, and are often ready to forget one, before we have hunted out another; we may guess at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. But, to return to the argument in hand; our knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too, but how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

How far our knowledge reaches.

§ 7. THE affirmations or negations we make, concerning the ideas we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts, viz. identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these.

1. Our knowledge of identity and diversity, as far as our ideas.

§ 8. FIRST, as to identity and diversity, in this way of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves; and there can be no idea in the mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

2. Of co-existence, a very little way.

§ 9. SECONDLY, as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence; in this, our knowledge is very short, tho' in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species of substances being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain collections of simple ideas, united in one subject, and so co-existing together; v. g. our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fusible: these, or some such complex ideas as these in men's minds, do these two names of the different substances, flame, and gold, stand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning these, or any other sort of substances, what do we enquire, but what other qualities, or powers, these substances have, or have not? which is nothing else, but to know what other simple ideas do, or do not co-exist, with those that make up that complex idea?

Because the connection between most simple ideas is unknown.

§ 10. THIS, how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple ideas, whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up, are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own nature, no visible, necessary connection, or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform our selves about.

Especially of secondary qualities.

§ 11. THE ideas, that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about which our knowledge concerning substances is most employed, are those of their secondary qualities: which depending all (as has been shewn) upon the primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our comprehension; it is impossible we should know which have a necessary union, or inconsistency one with another: for not knowing the root they spring from, not knowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those qualities, which make our complex idea of gold, it is impossible we should know what other qualities result from, or are incompatible with the same constitution of the insensible parts of gold; and so consequently, must always co-exist with that complex idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it.

Because all connection between any secondary and primary qualities is undiscoverable.

§ 12. BESIDES this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies, on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co-existence, or in-co-existence (if I may so say) of different ideas in the same subject; and that is, that there is no discoverable connection between any secondary quality, and those primary qualities, which it depends on.

§ 13. THAT the size, figure and motion of one body should cause a change in the size, figure and motion of another body, is not beyond our conception: the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another; and the change

change from rest to motion upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us to have some connection one with another. And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another: but, our minds not being able to discover any connection betwixt these primary qualities of bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the consequences, or co-existence of any secondary qualities, tho' we could discover the size, figure or motion of those invisible parts, which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, size or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour, taste or sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable connection betwixt the one and the other.

§ 14. IN vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substance: since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts, on which their qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary connection between them, and any of the secondary qualities: which is necessary to be done, before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence. So that let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality whatsoever. Our knowledge in all these enquiries reaches very little farther than our experience. Indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependance and visible connection one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension; receiving or communicating motion by impulse, supposes solidity. But tho' these, and perhaps some other of our ideas have, yet there are so few of them, that have a visible connection one with another, that we can by intuition, or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few of the qualities are to be found united in substances: and we are left only to the assistance of our senses, to make known to us what qualities they contain. For of all the qualities that are co-existent in any subject, without this dependance and evident connection of their ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist any farther than experience, by our senses, informs us. Thus, tho' we see the yellow colour, and upon trial find the weight, malleableness, fusibility, and fixedness, that are united in a piece of gold; yet, because no one of these ideas has any evident dependance, or necessary connection with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be; because the highest probability amounts not to certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge. For this co-existence can be no farther known than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or in general, by the necessary connection of the ideas themselves.

§ 15. As to incompatibility, or repugnancy to co-existence, we may know, Of repugnancy to co-existence larger.
that any subject can have, of each sort of primary qualities, but one particular at once; v. g. each particular extension, figure, number of parts, motion, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible ideas, peculiar to each sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort; v. g. no one subject can have two smells, or two colours at the same time. To this perhaps will be said, has not an opall, or an infusion of lignum nephriticum, two colours at the same time? To which I answer, that these bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different colours: but I take liberty also to say, that to eyes differently placed, it is different parts of the object, that reflect the particles of light: and therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impossible that the

BOOK IV. very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify, or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time.

Of the co-existence of powers a very little way.

§ 16. BUT as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies, which make a great part of our enquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether our knowledge reaches much farther than our experience; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be certain that they are in any subject, by the connection with any of those ideas, which to us make its essence. Because the active and passive powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a texture and motion of parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover; it is but in very few cases, we can be able to perceive their dependance on, or repugnance to any of those ideas, which make our complex one of that sort of things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible explication of the qualities of bodies; and I fear the weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connection and co-existence of the powers, which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever hypothesis be clearest and truest (for of that it is not my business to determine) our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and powers of bodies have a necessary connection, or repugnancy one with another; which, in the present state of philosophy, I think we know but to a very small degree: and I doubt whether, with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (I say not particular experience) in this part much farther. Experience is that which in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished that it were more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others, especially the philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their observations, and sincere in their reports, as those, who call themselves philosophers, ought to have been; our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations, had been yet much greater.

Of spirits, yet narrower.

§ 17. If we are at a loss, in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is easy to conclude, we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas, but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how inconsiderable a rank, the spirits that inhabit our bodies, hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us; is what by a transient hint, in another place, I have offered to my reader's consideration.

3. Of other relations it is not easy to say how far.

§ 18. As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. the agreement, or disagreement of any of our ideas, in any other relation: this, as it is the largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine, how far it may extend; because the advances, that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that may shew the relations and habitudes of ideas, whose co-existence is not considered, it is a hard matter to tell, when we are at an end of such discoveries; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of proofs, or examining the agreement, or disagreement of remote ideas. They, that are ignorant of algebra, cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it: and what farther improvements and helps, advantageous to other parts of knowledge, the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not those alone, that are capable of demonstration and knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation,

plation, would afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose, or menace such endeavours. CHAP. III.

THE idea of a supreme being, infinite in power, goodness and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of our selves, as understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place morality amongst the sciences, capable of demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematicks, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same indifference and attention to the one, as he does to the other of these sciences. The relation of other modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of number and extension: and I cannot see, why they should not also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. Where there is no property, there is no injustice, is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to any thing; and the idea, to which the name injustice is given, being the invasion, or violation of that right; it is evident, that these ideas being thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again, no government allows absolute liberty: the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules, or laws, which require conformity to them: and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematicks.

Morality capable of demonstration.

§ 19. THAT, which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration, is,

Two things have made moral ideas thought incapable of demonstration:

FIRST, that they can be set down and represented by sensible marks, which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words, or sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification. An angle, circle or square, drawn in lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mistaken: it remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered and examined, and the demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone over, more than once, without any danger of the least change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral ideas, we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down; we have nothing but words to express them by: which tho', when written, they remain the same, yet the ideas, they stand for, may change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons.

Their complexedness, and want of sensible representation.

SECONDLY, another thing, that makes the greater difficulty in ethicks, is, that moral ideas are commonly more complex, than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematicks. From whence these two inconveniences follow: first, that their names are of more uncertain signification, the precise collection of simple ideas, they stand for, not being so easily agreed on, and so the sign that is used for them in communication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily carry with it the same idea. Upon which the same disorder, confusion and error follows, as would if a man, going to demonstrate something of an heptagon, should in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the angles, or by oversight make the figure with one angle more, than the name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should, when at first he thought of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex, moral ideas, where the same name being retained, one angle, i. e. one simple idea is left out, or put in, in the complex one (still called by the same name) more at one time than another. Secondly, from the complexedness of these moral ideas, there follows another inconvenience, viz. that the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations, so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination

of

BOOK IV. of the habitudes and correspondencies, agreements or disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it is to be judged of, by long deductions, and the intervention of several other complex ideas, to shew the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones.

THE great help against this, which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly, whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by step, to examine their several correspondencies. And tho' in casting up a long sum, either in addition, multiplication, or division, every part be only a progression of the mind, taking a view of its own ideas, and considering their agreement or disagreement; and the resolution of the question be nothing but the result of the whole, made up of such particulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception: yet without setting down the several parts by marks, whose precise significations are known, and by marks that last and remain in view, when the memory had let them go, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different ideas in mind, without confounding or letting slip some parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless. In which case, the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two, or more numbers, their equalities or proportions: that, the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps to the memory, to record and retain the several ideas, about which the demonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive knowledge, in surveying several of the particulars, has proceeded; that so he may, without confusion, go on to what is yet unknown, and at last have in one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.

Remedies of
those diffi-
culties,

§ 20. ONE part of these disadvantages in moral ideas, which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by definitions, setting down that collection of simple ideas, which every term shall stand for, and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection. And what methods algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other difficulties, is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that if men would in the same method, and with the same indifference, search after moral, as they do mathematical truths, they would find them to have a stronger connection one with another, and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect demonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power, makes men espouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments, either to make good their beauty, or varnish over and cover their deformity: nothing being so beautiful to the eye, as truth is to the mind; nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding, as a lie. For tho' many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome wife in his bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow, that he has espoused a falsehood, and received into his breast so ugly a thing as a lie? Whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats, whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their truth, or falsehood, and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it; what improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be hoped for, in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind in most places might, instead thereof, with Egyptian bondage expect Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath, or power of man wholly to extinguish.

4. Of real
existence:
we have an
intuitive
knowledge

§ 21. As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, viz: of the real actual existence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God; of the existence of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive knowledge, which extends not beyond the of objects present to our senses,

§ 22. OUR

§ 22. OUR knowledge being so narrow, as I have shewed, it will, perhaps, give us some light into the present state of our minds, if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our ignorance: which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of useful knowledge; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things, that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness (where we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive any thing) out of a presumption, that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He, that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things, that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the causes of our ignorance; which, from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:

FIRST, for want of ideas.

SECONDLY, want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we have.

THIRDLY, want of tracing and examining our ideas.

§ 23. FIRST, there are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of, for want of ideas.

FIRST, all the simple ideas we have, are confined (as I have shewn) to those we receive from corporeal objects, by sensation, and from the operations of our own minds, as the objects of reflection. But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast, whole extent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those, who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have, by the assistance of senses and faculties, more, or perfecter than we have, or different from our's, it is not for us to determine. But to say, or think, there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us, no more hinders, nor confines the knowledge that is in others, than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quick-sightedness of an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of the creator of all things, will find reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature, as he will find man to be; who, in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things, what ideas they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them, besides those we have, to make discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced, that the ideas, we can attain to, by our faculties, are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of ideas of this kind, being a part, as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be described. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible world, are in this perfectly alike; that that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion with what we see not: and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts, of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the rest.

§ 24. SECONDLY, another great cause of ignorance, is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of ideas, which our faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of things, which it is reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; so the want of

Book IV. ideas, I now speak of, keeps us in ignorance of things, we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and motion, we have ideas of. But tho' we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects, which we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some things, by being too remote; and in others, by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think, that what lies within our ken, is but a small part of the immense universe, we shall then discover an huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabricks of the great masses of matter, which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings, how far they are extended, what is their motion, and how continued, or communicated, and what influence they have one upon another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplation, and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean this system of our sun, and the grosser masses of matter, that visibly move about it; what several sorts of vegetables, animals, and intellectual, corporeal beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this earth; there being no natural means, either by sensation, or reflection, to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge: and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear and distinct ideas of them.

Because of
their mi-
nuteness.

§ 25. If a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe, escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These insensible corpuscles being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations; our want of precise, distinct ideas of their primary qualities, keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not, but if we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute, constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know, without trial, several of their operations one upon another, as we do now the properties of a square, or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, as a watch-maker does those of a watch, whereby it performs its operations, and of a file, which, by rubbing on them, will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we should be able to tell beforehand, that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man sleep, as well as a watch-maker can, that a little piece of paper, laid on the balance, will keep the watch from going, till it be removed; or that some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver in aqua fortis, and gold in aqua regia, and not vice versa, would be then, perhaps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a smith to understand, why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses, acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths, concerning natural bodies: and our reason carries us herein, very little beyond particular matter of fact.

Hence no
science of
bodies.

§ 26. And therefore, I am apt to doubt, that how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scientific will still be out of our reach; because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those
very

very bodies, which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those, which we have ranked into classes under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies, that fall under the examination of our senses, perhaps we may have: but adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And tho' the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet, whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientific knowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonstration are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure, taste, and smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a triangle: but having no ideas of the particular, primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies, which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor when we see those effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having no ideas of the particular, mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations: and of bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions.

§ 27. THIS, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings; to which, if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the father of all spirits, the eternal, independent author of them, and us, and all things; we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery: and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things, whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men, as well as himself, every man has a reason, from their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man, that considers, to be ignorant, that there is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there that, by his own search and ability, can come to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitutions, wherein they agree, or differ from one another, and from us. And, therefore, in what concerns their different species and properties, we are under an absolute ignorance.

§ 28. SECONDLY, what a small part of the substantial beings, that are in the universe, the want of ideas leave open to our knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another cause of ignorance, of no less moment, is a want of a discoverable connection between those ideas we have: for wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge; and are, as in the former case, left only to observation and experiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge, we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion, of several bodies about us, produce in us several sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, &c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connection between any impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a colour, or smell, which we find in our minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations

Much less of
spirits.

Secondly,
want of a
discoverable
connection,
between
ideas we
have.

BOOK IV. tions beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wise agent, which perfectly surpasses our comprehensions. As the ideas of sensible, secondary qualities, which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence, or connection, be found between them and those primary qualities, which (experience shews us) produce them in us: so, on the other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in body, is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, tho' they have a constant and regular connection, in the ordinary course of things; yet that connection being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connection to nothing else, but the arbitrary determination of that all-wise agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive.

Instances. § 29. IN some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and connections, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of these two ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c. by impulse and motion; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural connection with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect. I need not, I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of this globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet by a law that we know not: whereby, tho' causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connections and dependences being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little it is of being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And, therefore, we shall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge; but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect science of natural bodies (not to mention spiritual beings) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.

Thirdly,
want of tra-
cing our
ideas.

§ 30. THIRDLY, where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those ideas which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas, which may shew us what habitude of agreement, or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical

thematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those ideas. That, which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is impossible that men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the agreement, or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians, abstracting their thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge. For, whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This having been the fate, or misfortune of a great part of the men of letters, the increase, brought into the stock of real knowledge, has been very little, in proportion to the schools, disputes, and writings, the world has been filled with; whilst students, being lost in the great wood of words, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material done, as they have in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and disputed; nay, ships built, and fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the line; and the antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared hereby to hold there were any. But, having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.

§ 31. HITHERTO we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in respect of the several sorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, in respect of universality, which will also deserve to be considered; and in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the ideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general ideas, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that essence, i. e. that abstract idea is to be found; and what is once known of such ideas, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general knowledge, we must search and find it only in our minds, and it is only the examining of our own ideas, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to essences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out, by the contemplation only of those essences: as the existence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more to say of this, in the chapters, where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge in general.

CHAP.
III.

Extent, in
respect of
universality.

CH A P. IV.

Of the reality of human knowledge.

§ 1. I Doubt not but my reader, by this time, may be apt to think, that I have been, all this while, only building a castle in the air; and be ready to say to me, "to what purpose all this stir?" Knowledge, say you, is only the "perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the "imaginings of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimera's in "it? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will there be, "by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fan-

CHAP.
IV.

Obj. Know-
ledge, placed
in ideas,
may be all
bare vision.

Vol. I.

4 A

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BOOK IV. "cy in the world? They both have their ideas, and perceive their agreement
 "and disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between
 "them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's side, as having the
 "more ideas, and the more lively: and so, by your rules, he will be the more
 "knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the
 "agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, the visions of an enthusiast, and
 "the reasonings of a sober man, will be equally certain. It is no matter how
 "things are; so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations, and
 "talk conformably, it is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air, will
 "be as strong-holds of truth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an
 "harpy is not a centaur, is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a
 "truth, as that a square is not a circle.
 "But of what use is all this fine knowledge of men's own imaginations, to
 "a man that enquires after the reality of things? It matters not what men's
 "fancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized; it is this
 "alone gives a value to our reasonings, and preference to one man's knowledge
 "over another's, that it is of things as they really are, and not of dreams and
 "fancies."

Anfw. Not
 so, where
 ideas agree
 with things.

§ 2. To which I answer, that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is something farther intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little more use, than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight, than the discourses of a man, who sees things clearly in a dream, and with great assurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than bare imagination: and, I believe it will appear, that all the certainty of general truths a man has, lies in nothing else.

§ 3. It is evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, tho' it seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas, that, we may be assured, agree with things.

As, 1. All
 simple ideas
 do.

§ 4. FIRST, the first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been shewed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things, operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions, which by the wisdom and will of our maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us, and so carry with them all the conformity, which is intended, or which our state requires: for they represent to us things under those appearances, which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power, which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with things without us. And this conformity between our simple ideas, and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge.

2. All com-
 plex ideas,
 except of
 substances,

§ 5. SECONDLY, all our complex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that, which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing, by its dissimilarity to it; and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas: which, as I have shewed in another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its

its free choice, puts together, without considering any connection they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain, concerning these ideas, is real, and reaches things themselves; because in all our thoughts, reasonings and discourses of this kind, we intend things no farther than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these, we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality.

§ 6. I DOUBT not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths, is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not the bare, empty vision of vain, insignificant chimera's of the brain: and yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle, or circle, only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i. e. precisely true, in his life. But yet, the knowledge he has of any truths, or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing; because real things are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever it really exists. Whatever other figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition: and therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas, is real knowledge; because intending things no farther than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those figures, when they have barely an ideal existence in his mind, will hold true of them also, when they have real existence in matter; his consideration being barely of those figures, which are the same, wherever, or however they exist.

§ 7. AND hence it follows, that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematicks. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of our ideas; and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement by the intervention of other ideas, or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and compleat ideas; all the agreement, or disagreement, which we shall find in them, will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

§ 8. FOR the attaining of knowledge and certainty, it is requisite that we have determined ideas; and to make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with so little care and regard (as it may seem) to the real existence of things: since most of those discourses, which take up the thoughts, and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to enquire after truth and certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be general propositions, and notions, in which existence is not at all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians, about the squaring of a circle, conick sections, or any other part of mathematicks, concern not the existence of any of those figures; but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square, or circle, existing in the world, or no. In the same manner, the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world, whereof they treat. Nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is no body in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man, which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i. e. in idea, that murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action, that exists conformable to that idea of murder. As for other actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all

Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge.

And of moral.

Existence not required to make it real.

BOOK IV. all other species of things, which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men.

Nor will it
less true, or
certain, be-
cause moral
ideas are of
our own
making and
naming.

§ 9. BUT it will here be said, that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other modes, be of our own making, what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance? what confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases? No confusion, nor disorder, in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematicks) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles; that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, equilateralum or trapezium, or any thing else, the properties of, and demonstrations about, that idea will be the same, as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what idea it stands for; but as soon as the figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge, let a man have the idea of taking from others, without their consent, what their honest industry has possessed them of, and call this justice, if he please. He that takes the name here, without the idea put to it, will be mistaken, by joining another idea of his own to that name: but strip the idea of that name, or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it injustice. Indeed wrong names in moral discourses, breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematicks, where the figure once drawn and seen, makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for all this, miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not, but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematicks, keep to the same precise ideas, and trace them in their several relations one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea, under consideration, from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes equally on, in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds we make use of.

Misnaming
disturbs not
the certainty
of the know-
ledge.

§ 10. ONE thing more we are to take notice of, that where God, or any other law-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they have made the essence of that species, to which that name belongs; and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise: but in other cases, it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation, and comparing of those even nick-named ideas.

Ideas of sub-
stances have
their archet-
ypes with-
out us.

§ 11. THIRDLY, there is another sort of complex ideas, which being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of substances, which consisting of a collection of simple ideas, supposed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them, by having more, or different ideas united in them, than are to be found united in things themselves. From whence it comes to pass, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.

So far as they
agree with
those, so far
our know-
ledge

§ 12. I SAY then, that to have ideas of substances, which by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together such ideas, as have no inconsistency, tho' they did never before so exist: v. g. the ideas of sacrilege, or perjury, &c. were as real and true ideas before,

before, as after the existence of any such fact. But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from something, that does or has existed; they must not consist of ideas, put together at the pleasure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, tho' we can perceive no inconsistency in such a combination. The reason whereof is, because we not knowing what real constitution it is of substances, whereon our simple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the exclusion of others; there are very few of them, that we can be sure are, or are not inconsistent in nature, any farther than experience and sensible observation reach. Herein, therefore, is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discovered to co-exist in nature. And our ideas, being thus true, tho' not perhaps, very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them. Which (as has been already shewn) will not be found to reach very far: but so far as it does, it will still be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they have with others, will still be knowledge. If those ideas be abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract ideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may be united again.

ledge concerning them is real.

§ 13. THIS, if we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and abstract ideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other sorts of things, than what known names had already determined, and as it were set out, we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falshood, if I should say, that some changelings, who have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, are something between a man and a beast: which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition, that these two names, man and beast, stand for distinct species, so set out by real essences, that there can come no other species between them. Whereas, if we will abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specifick essences made by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these essences, wherein all things, as in molds, were cast and formed, we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life of a man without reason, is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a distinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the shape of an ass with reason, would be different from either that of man, or beast, and be a species of an animal between, or distinct from both.

In our enquiries about substances, we must consider ideas, and not confine our thoughts to names, or species supposed, set out by names.

§ 14. HERE every body will be ready to ask, if changelings may be supposed something between man and beast, pray what are they? I answer, changelings, which is as good a word to signify something different from the signification of man or beast, as the names, man and beast, are to have significations different one from the other. This, well considered, would resolve this matter, and shew my meaning, without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men, which enables them to spin consequences, and to see religion threatened, whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of speaking, as not to foresee what names such a proposition as this is like to be charged with: and without doubt it will be asked, if changelings are something between man and beast, what will become of them in the other world? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know, or enquire. To their own master they stand or fall. It will make their state neither better, nor worse, whether we determine any thing of it, or no. They are in the hands of a faithful creator and a bountiful father, who disposes not of his creatures according to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor distinguishes them according to names and

Objection against a changeling, being something between a man and a beast, answered.

BOOK IV. species of our contrivance. And we, that know so little of this present world, we are in, may, I think, content ourselves without being peremptory in defining the different states, which creatures shall come into, when they go off this stage. It may suffice us, that he hath made known to all those, who are capable of instruction, discourse and reasoning, that they shall come to an account, and receive according to what they have done in this body.

§ 15. BUT, secondly, I answer, the force of these men's question (viz. will you deprive changelings of a future state?) is founded on one of these two suppositions, which are both false. The first is, that all things, that have the outward shape and appearance of a man, must necessarily be designed to an immortal, future being, after this life: or, secondly, that whatever is of human birth must be so. Take away these imaginations, and such questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those, who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and changelings, the essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward shape of the body; the very proposing it, is, I suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever immersed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the gross, sensible, outward parts, as to affirm eternal life due to it, or a necessary consequence of it; or that any mass of matter should, after its dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to an everlasting state of sense, perception, and knowledge, only because it was molded into this, or that figure, and had such a particular frame of its visible parts. Such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a certain, superficial figure, turns out of doors all consideration of soul, or spirit, upon whose account alone some corporeal beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside than inside of things; to place the excellency of a man more in the external shape of his body, than internal perfections of his soul: which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable advantage of immortality and life everlasting, which he has above other material beings; to annex it, I say, to the cut of his beard, or the fashion of his coat. For this, or that, outward make of our bodies no more carries with it the hopes of an eternal duration, than the fashion of a man's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said, that no body thinks that the shape makes any thing immortal, but it is the shape is the sign of a rational soul within, which is immortal. I wonder who made it the sign of any such thing: for barely saying it, will not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it. No figure, that I know, speaks any such language. For it may as rationally be concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance, or action, of life, than there is in a statue, has yet nevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape; as that there is a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of a rational creature, when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them, in the whole course of his life, than what are to be found in many a beast.

[Monsters. § 16. BUT it is the issue of rational parents, and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul. I know not by what logick you must so conclude. I am sure this is a conclusion, that men no where allow of. For if they did, they would not make bold, as every where they do, to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions. Ay, but these are monsters. Let them be so; what will your driveling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster: a defect in the mind (the far more noble, and in the common phrase, the far more essential part) not? Shall the want of a nose or a neck make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men; the want of reason and understanding, not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now: This is to place all in the shape, and to take the measure of a man, only by his outside. To shew that, according to the ordinary way of reasoning in this matter, people do lay the whole stress on the figure, and resolve the whole essence of the species of man (as they make it)

it) into the outward shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it; we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-shaped changeling is a man, has a rational soul, tho' it appear not; this is past doubt, say you. Make the ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a stand: add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal, then presently it is a monster; and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul, and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure of the utmost bounds of that shape, that carries with it a rational soul? For since there have been human fœtus's produced, half beast, and half man; and others three parts one, and one part the other; and so it is possible they may be, in all the variety of approaches to the one, or the other shape, and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man, or a brute; I would gladly know what are those precise lineaments, which, according to this hypothesis, are, or are not, capable of a rational soul to be joined to them? What sort of outside is the certain sign that there is, or is not, such an inhabitant within? For, till that be done, we talk at random of man: and shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds, and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature, we know not what. But, after all, I desire it may be considered, that those, who think they have answered the difficulty, by telling us, that a mis-shaped fœtus is a monster, run into the same fault they are arguing against, by constituting a species between man and beast. For what else, I pray, is their monster in the case (if the word monster signifies any thing at all) but something neither man nor beast, but partaking somewhat of either? And just so is the changeling before mentioned. So necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences, if we will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them, by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless fancies, that have been taken up about them.

§ 17. I HAVE mentioned this here, because, I think, we cannot be too cautious that words and species, in the ordinary notions, which we have been used to of them, impose not upon us. For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge, especially in reference to substances; and from thence has rose a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words, we might, in a great measure, remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts: but yet it would still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as we retained the opinion, that species and their essences were any thing else but our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them, to be the signs of them.

§ 18. WHEREVER we perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge: and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which agreement of our ideas, with the reality of things, having here given the marks, I think I have shewn wherein it is, that certainty, real certainty, consists: which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.

C H A P. V.

Of truth in general.

CHAP. § 1. "WHAT is truth?" was an enquiry many ages since; and it being that, which all mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists, and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood.

What truth is. § 2. TRUTH then seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but the joining, or separating of signs, as the things signified by them, do agree, or disagree, one with another. The joining, or separating, of signs here meant, is what, by another name, we call proposition. So that truth properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, viz. ideas and words.

Which make mental, or verbal propositions. § 3. To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth of thought, and truth of words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words: and then the instances given, of mental propositions, cease immediately to be barely mental, and become verbal. For a mental proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas, as they are in our minds stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions, as soon as they are put into words.

Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of. § 4. AND that, which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately, is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within themselves, make use of words, instead of ideas; at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to shew us, what are those things we have clear and perfect, established ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our mind takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that, when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about white, or black; sweet, or bitter; a triangle, or a circle; we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the names. But, when we would consider, or make propositions about the more complex ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, we usually put the name for the idea: because the ideas, these names stand for, being, for the most part, imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas: and so we make use of these words, instead of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit, mental propositions. In substances, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the imperfection of our ideas: we making the name stand for the real essence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is occasioned by the great number of simple ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier than the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who, tho' they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of their language, yet, perhaps, never troubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for. Some confused or obscure notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of religion and conscience, of church and faith, of power and right, of obstructions and humours, melancholy and choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their thoughts and

and meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves, and lay by those words, with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

§ 5. BUT to return to the consideration of truth: we must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making.

FIRST, mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together, or separated by the mind, perceiving, or judging, of their agreement, or disagreement.

Being nothing but the joining, or separating ideas, without words.

SECONDLY, verbal propositions, which are words, the signs of our ideas, put together, or separated in affirmative, or negative sentences. By which way of affirming, or denying, these signs, made by sounds, are, as it were, put together, or separated one from another. So that proposition consists in joining, or separating signs; and truth consists in the putting together, or separating those signs according as the things, which they stand for, agree, or disagree.

§ 6. EVERY one's experience will satisfy him, that the mind, either by perceiving, or supposing, the agreement, or disagreement, of any of its ideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition, affirmative, or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the terms, putting together and separating. But this action of the mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us, when we affirm, or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his mind the idea of two lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line, into a certain number of equal parts; v. g. into five, ten, an hundred, a thousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch-line being divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes, such a kind of divisibility to agree, or disagree, to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins, or separates, those two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of divisibility; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true, or false, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility into such aliquot parts, does really agree to that line, or no. When ideas are so put together, or separated in the mind, as they, or the things they stand for, do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something more; and that is, the affirming, or denying, of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for, agree, or disagree: and this again is twofold; either purely verbal and trifling, which I shall speak of, chap. viii. or real and instructive; which is the object of that real knowledge, which we have spoken of already.

When mental propositions contain real truth, and when verbal.

§ 7. BUT here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that did about knowledge: and it will be objected, "that, if truth be nothing but the joining, or separating of words in propositions, as the ideas they stand for, agree, or disagree, in men's minds, the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing, as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and time men employ to the search of it; since, by this account, it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains. Who knows not, what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary world in our own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs, as men and horses. For those, and the like, may be ideas in our heads, and have their agreement and disagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition, to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together, according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur,

Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may all be chimerical.

Book IV. " is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal
 " with that of man ; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally
 " certain. But of what use is all such truth to us ?

Answered,
 real truth is
 about ideas,
 agreeing to
 things.

§ 8. THO' what has been said in the foregoing chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or (if you please) barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation ; yet it may be not amiss here again to consider, that tho' our words signify nothing but our ideas, yet being designed by them to signify things, the truth they contain, when put into propositions, will be only verbal, when they stand for ideas in the mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And, therefore, truth, as well as knowledge, may well come under the distinction of verbal and real ; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement, or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when these signs are joined, as our ideas agree ; and when our ideas are such, as we know are capable of having an existence in nature : which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

Falshood is
 the joining
 of names,
 otherwise
 than their
 ideas agree.

§ 9. TRUTH is the marking down in words the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas as it is. Falshood is the marking down in words the agreement, or disagreement of ideas, otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

General propo-
 sitions to
 be treated of,
 more at
 large.

§ 10. But, because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more at large enquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propositions, consists, and where it is to be had ; and endeavour to shew, in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth, or falshood.

I SHALL begin with general propositions, as those which most employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind, as those that most enlarge our knowledge ; and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge.

Moral and
 metaphysical
 truth.

§ 11. BESIDES truth, taken in the strict sense before-mentioned, there are other sorts of truth ; as, 1. Moral truth, which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, tho' the proposition, we speak, agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas, to which we have annexed their names. This, tho' it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with a name to it. But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them.

C H A P. VI.

Of universal propositions, their truth and certainty. C H A P. VI.

§ 1. **T**H O' the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge; yet, thro' the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

Treating of words necessary to knowledge.

§ 2. **A**L L the knowledge we have, being only of particular, or general truths, it is evident that, whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceived and expressed in words. It is not therefore out of our way, in the examination of our knowledge, to enquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions.

General truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal propositions.

§ 3. **B**U T that we may not be misled in this case, by that which is the danger every where, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to observe, that certainty is two-fold; certainty of truth, and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put together in propositions, as exactly to express the agreement, or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is, to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any proposition.

Certainty two-fold, of truth and of knowledge.

§ 4. **N**OW because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of each species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all simple ideas and modes, is not hard to do. For in these, the real and nominal essence being the same; or, which is all one, the abstract idea, which the general term stands for, being the sole essence and boundary, that is, or can be, supposed of the species, there can be no doubt, how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended under each term: which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances, wherein a real essence distinct from the nominal is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is very uncertain: because, not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that species; and consequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus speaking of a man, or gold, or any other species of natural substances, as supposed constituted by a precise, real essence, which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation, or negation made of it. For man, or gold, taken in this sense, and used for species of things, constituted by real essences, different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker, stand for we know not what: and the extent of these species, with such boundaries, are so unknown and undetermined, that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm, that all men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal essence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend the application of any general term no farther than to the particular things, in which the complex idea, it stands for, is to be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any propositions be true, or no. I have chose to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastick way, and have made use of the terms of essences and species, on purpose to shew the absurdity

No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of each species mentioned, is not known.

Book IV. absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other sort of realities, than barely abstract ideas, with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are any thing, but the sorting of them under general names, according as they agree to several abstract ideas, of which we make those names the signs, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions, that can be made about them. Tho' therefore, these things might, to people not possessed with scholastick learning; be perhaps treated of in a better and clearer way; yet those wrong notions of essences, or species, having got root in most people's minds, who have received any tincture from the learning, which has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and removed, to make way for that use of words, which should convey certainty with it.

This more particularly concerns substances.

§ 5. THE names of substances then, whenever made to stand for species, which are supposed to be constituted by real essences, which we know not, are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding: of the truth of general propositions made up of such terms, we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this, or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is, or is not gold? Since, in this way of speaking, nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world, is, or is not, in this sense, gold; being incurably ignorant, whether it has, or has not, that which makes any thing to be called gold, i. e. that real essence of gold, whereof we have no idea at all: this being as impossible for us to know, as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansie is, or is not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansie at all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence, which we know not, is; v. g. in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is; yet could we not be sure, that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold: since it is impossible for us to know, that this or that quality, or idea, has a necessary connection with a real essence, of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that supposed, real essence may be imagined to constitute.

The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances, is to be known.

§ 6. ON the other side, the names of substances, when made use of, as they should be, for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a clear and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions, of whose truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them, but because the complex ideas they stand for, are such combinations of simple ones, as carry not with them any discoverable connection, or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas.

Because co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known.

§ 7. THE complex ideas, that our names of the species of substances properly stand for, are collections of such qualities, as have been observed to co-exist in an unknown substratum, which we call substance: but what other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependance; which in their primary qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their secondary qualities, we can discover no connection at all, for the reasons mentioned, chap. iii. § 11, &c. viz. 1. Because we know not the real constitutions of substances, on which each secondary quality particularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for experimental (not universal) knowledge; and reach with certainty no farther, than that bare instance: because our understandings can discover no conceivable connection between any secondary quality, and any modification whatsoever, of any of the primary ones. And therefore, there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances, which can carry with them undoubted certainty.

Instance in gold.

§ 8. ALL gold is fixed, is a proposition, whose truth we cannot be certain of, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the useless imagination of the schools, any one supposes the term gold to stand for a species of things, set out by nature, by a real essence belonging to it, it is evident he knows not

not what particular substances are of that species; and so cannot, with certainty, affirm any thing universally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species, determined by its nominal essence, let the nominal essence, for example, be the complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known; in this proper use of the word gold, there is no difficulty to know, what is, or is not gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed, or denied, of gold, but what hath a discoverable connection, or inconsistency, with that nominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connection, that we can discover, with the colour, weight, or any other simple idea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together; it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition, that all gold is fixed.

§ 9. As there is no discoverable connection between fixedness; and the colour, weight, and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold; so if we make our complex idea of gold, a body yellow, fusible, ductile, weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in aqua regia, and for the same reason: since we can never, from consideration of the ideas themselves, with certainty affirm, or deny of a body, whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in aqua regia; and so on, of the rest of its qualities. I would gladly meet with one general affirmation, concerning any quality of gold, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently objected, is not this an universal certain proposition, "all gold is malleable?" To which I answer, it is a very certain proposition, if malleableness be a part of the complex idea, the word gold stands for. But then, here is nothing affirmed of gold, but that that found stands for an idea, in which malleableness is contained: and such a sort of truth and certainty as this, it is to say, a centaur is four-footed. But if malleableness makes not a part of the specific essence, the name gold stands for, it is plain, "all gold is malleable," is not a certain proposition. Because, let the complex idea of gold be made up of which soever of its other qualities you please, malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex idea, nor follow from any simple one, contained in it: the connection that malleableness has (if it has any) with those other qualities, being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its insensible parts; which, since we know not, it is impossible we should perceive that connection, unless we could discover that which ties them together.

§ 10. THE more, indeed of these co-existing qualities we unite into one complex idea, under one name, the more precise and determinate we make the signification of that word; but yet never make it thereby more capable of universal certainty, in respect of other qualities, not contained in our complex idea; since we perceive not their connection, or dependance, one on another, being ignorant both of that real constitution, in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the chief part of our knowledge, concerning substances, is not, as in other things, barely of the relation of two ideas, that may exist separately; but is of the necessary connection and co-existence of several distinct ideas in the same subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. Could we begin at the other end, and discover what it was, wherein that colour consisted, what made a body lighter, or heavier, what texture of parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this sort of liquor, and not in another; if (I say) we had such an idea as this of bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities originally consist, and how they are produced; we might frame such abstract ideas of them, as would furnish us with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions, that should carry general truth and certainty with them. But whilst our complex ideas, of the sorts of substances, are so remote from that internal real constitution, on which their sensible qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our senses can discover; there can be very few general propositions concerning substances, of whose real truth we can be certainly assured: since there are but few simple ideas, of whose connection

As far as any such co-existence can be known, so far universal propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,

BOOK IV. and necessary co-existence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine, amongst all the secondary qualities of substances, and the powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessary co-existence, or repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known, unless in those of the same sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere shewed. No one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, can certainly know what smell, taste, sound, or tangible qualities it has, nor what alterations it is capable to make, or receive, on, or from other bodies. The same may be said of the sound, or taste, &c. Our specifick names of substances standing for any collections of such ideas, it is not to be wondered, that we can with them make very few general propositions of undoubted, real certainty. But yet so far as any complex idea, of any sort of substances, contains in it any simple idea, whose necessary co-existence with any other may be discovered, so far universal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it: v. g. could any one discover a necessary connection between malleableness, and the colour, or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea, signified by that name, he might make a certain, universal proposition, concerning gold, in this respect; and the real truth of this proposition, "that all gold is malleable," would be as certain as of this, "the three angles of all right-lined triangles are equal to two right ones."

The qualities, which make our complex ideas of substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes.

§ 11. HAD we such ideas of substances, as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities, we find in them, and how those qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specifick ideas of their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out their properties, and discover what qualities they had, or had not, than we can now by our senses: and to know the properties of gold, it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter; the idea in our minds would serve for the one, as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the substances we meet with, each of them as an entire thing by itself, having all its qualities in itself, and independent of other things; overlooking, for the most part, the operations of those invisible fluids they are encompassed with, and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction, whereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold any where by itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and, perhaps, malleableness too; which, for ought I know, would be changed into a perfect friability. Water, in which to us fluidity is an essential quality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were those bodies, that environ them, removed, it is yet more so in vegetables, which are nourished, grow, and produce leaves, flowers, and seeds, in a constant succession. And, if we look a little nearer into the state of animals, we shall find that their dependance, as to life, motion, and the most considerable qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies, that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a moment without them: tho' yet those bodies, on which they depend, are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex ideas we frame of those animals. Take the air but a minute from the greatest part of living creatures, and they presently lose sense, life, and motion. This the necessity of breathing has forced into our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical, and, possibly, very remote bodies, do the springs of those admirable machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how many are there, which the severest enquiry can never discover? The inhabitants of this spot of the universe, tho' removed so many millions of miles from the sun, yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of particles coming from, or agitated by it

it, that were this earth removed, but a small part of that distance, out of its present situation, and placed a little farther, or nearer, that source of heat, it is more than probable that the greatest part of the animals in it would immediately perish: since we find them so often destroyed by an excess, or defect, of the sun's warmth, which an accidental position, in some parts of this our little globe, exposes them to. The qualities observed in a loadstone must needs have their source far beyond the confines of that body; and the ravage made often on several sorts of animals, by invisible causes, the certain death, (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing the line, or, as it is certain of others, by being removed into a neighbouring country, evidently shew that the concurrence and operation of several bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those qualities, by which we know and distinguish them. We are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain within themselves the qualities that appear to us in them: and we in vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly, or an elephant, upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in them. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sun, or remotest star, our eyes have yet discovered. For how much the being and operation of particular substances, in this our globe, depend on causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the motions, and grosser operations of things here about us; but whence the streams come, that keep all these curious machines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our notice and apprehension: and the great parts and wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendous structure of the universe, may, for ought we know, have such a connection and dependance, in their influences and operations one upon another, that, perhaps, things in this our mansion would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the stars, or great bodies, incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be, or move as it does. This is certain, things however absolute and intire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to other parts of nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable qualities, actions, and powers, are owing to something without them; and there is not so compleat and perfect a part, that we know, of nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the excellencies of it, to its neighbours; and we must not confine our thoughts within the surface of any body, but look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it.

§ 12. If this be so, it is not to be wondered, that we have very imperfect ideas of substances; and that the real essences, on which depend their properties and operations, are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much as that size, figure, and texture, of their minute and active parts, which is really in them; much less the different motions and impulses made in, and upon them, by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is formed, the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up. This consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of ever having the ideas of their real essences; which, whilst we want the nominal essences, we make use of, instead of them, will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge, or universal propositions, capable of real certainty.

§ 13. We are not, therefore, to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few general propositions, made concerning substances: our knowledge of their qualities and properties go very seldom farther than our senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate farther, and on probabilities taken from wary observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right, at what experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty, which is requisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas.

Wherever

Judgment
may reach
farther, but
that is not
knowledge.

BOOK IV. Wherever we perceive any agreement, or disagreement amongst them, there we have general knowledge; and, by putting the names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronounce general truths. But because the abstract ideas of substances, for which their specifick names stand, whenever they have any distinct and determinate signification, have a discoverable connection, or inconsistency with but a very few other ideas; the certainty of universal propositions, concerning substances, is very narrow and scanty in that part, which is our principal enquiry concerning them: and there are scarce any of the names of substances, let the idea, it is applied to, be what it will, of which we can generally and with certainty pronounce, that it has, or has not, this or that other quality belonging to it, and constantly co-existing, or inconsistent with that idea, wherever it is to be found.

What is requisite for our knowledge of substances.

§ 14. BEFORE we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must first know what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, we must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations, or ideas in us. This is in truth no less than to know all the effects of matter, under its divers modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion of parts, motion and rest. Which, I think, every body will allow, is utterly impossible to be known by us, without revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us, what sort of figure, bulk, or motion of corpuscles, would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour, and what sort of figure, bulk and texture of parts, in the superficies of any body were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour; would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty, concerning the several sorts of them, unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk, figure, texture and motion of bodies in those minute parts, by which they operate on our senses, that so we might by those frame our abstract ideas of them. I have mentioned here only corporeal substances, whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings: for, as to the operations of spirits, both their thinking and moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss; tho' perhaps when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies, and their operations, and examined how far our notions, even in these, reach, with any clearness, beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess, that even in these too our discoveries amount to very little, beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity.

Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constitutions, we can make but few, general, certain propositions concerning them.

§ 15. THIS is evident, the abstract, complex ideas of substances, for which their general names stand, not comprehending their real constitutions, can afford us but very little, universal certainty. Because our ideas of them are not made up of that, on which those qualities we observe in them, and would inform our selves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain connection: v. g. let the idea, to which we give the name man, be, as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary motion, and reason joined to it: this being the abstract idea, and consequently the essence of our species man, we can make but very few, general, certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea. Because not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power of motion, and reasoning, with that peculiar shape, depend, and whereby they are united together in the same subject, there are very few other qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connection: and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm, that all men sleep by intervals; that no man can be nourished by wood, or stones; that all men will be poisoned by hemlock: because these ideas have no connection, nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea that name stands for. We must in these and the like appeal to trial in particular subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content ourselves with probability in the rest; but can have no general certainty, whilst our specifick idea of man contains not that real constitution, which is the root, wherein all his inseparable qualities are united, and from whence they flow. Whilst our idea, the word man stands for, is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in

in him, there is no discernible connection, or repugnance, between our specific idea, and the operation of either the parts of hemlock, or stones, upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock, and others, that are nourished by wood and stones: but, as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals, whereon these and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few ideas only, which have a discernible connection with our nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain, general knowledge of substances, as almost none at all.

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VI.

§ 16. To conclude, general propositions, of what kind soever, are then only capable of certainty, when the terms, used in them, stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth, or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas, the terms stand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found, but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment, or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas, that alone is able to afford us general knowledge.

Wherein lies
the general
certainty of
propositions.

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

§ 1. THERE are a sort of propositions, which under the name of maxims and axioms have passed for principles of science; and because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate, altho' no body (that I know) ever went about to shew the reason and foundation of their clearness, or cogency. It may however be worth while to enquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge.

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VII.

They are
self-evident.

§ 2. KNOWLEDGE, as has been shewn, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas: now where that agreement, or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention, or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of those propositions, which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for in all of them he will find, that the reason of his assent is from that agreement, or disagreement, which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation, or negation in the proposition.

Wherein
that self-evidence
consists.

§ 3. THIS being so, in the next place let us consider, whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions, which commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them, in this self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement, or disagreement of ideas, which I have above-mentioned, viz. identity, relation, co-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions, which have had the credit of maxims, are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such.

Self-evidence, not
peculiar to
received axioms.

§ 4. FOR, first, the immediate perception of the agreement, or disagreement of identity, being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas, this affords us as many self-evident propositions, as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas: and it is the first act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distin-

1. As to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self-evident.

Book IV. guish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that, when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and uncon-
 fusedly, one from another. Which always being so (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is, and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made, without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to, as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the proposition stand for. And therefore, wherever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed, or denied one of the other, to be the same, or different; it is presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition, and this equally, whether these propositions be in terms standing for more general ideas, or such are less so, v. g. whether the general idea of being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition, "whatsoever is, is;" or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself, as a man is a man, or whatsoever is white, is white; or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not being, which is the only (if I may so call it) idea different from it, as in this other proposition, "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as "a man is not a horse, red is not blue." The difference of the ideas, as soon as the terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently visible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less, as well as the more general propositions, and all for the same reason, viz. because the mind perceives in any ideas, that it has, the same idea to be the same with itself; and two different ideas to be different, and not the same. And this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas be more, or less general, abstract and comprehensive. It is not, therefore, alone to these two general propositions, "whatsoever is, is; and, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" that this self-evidence belongs, by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by the terms, whatsoever and thing, than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims amounting to no more in short, but this, that the same is the same, and same is not different, are truths known in more particular instances, as well as in these general maxims, and known also in particular instances, before these general maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind, employed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible, than that the mind, without the help of any proof, or reflection on either of these general propositions, perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly that the idea of white is the idea of white, and not the idea of blue; and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind, is there, and is not absent; that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence, or certainty of its knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas, a man has in his mind: he knows each to be itself, and not to be another; and to be in his mind, and not away, when it is there, with a certainty that cannot be greater; and therefore the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty, nor add any thing to this. So that in respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions, as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind, whether this proposition, a circle is a circle, be not as self-evident a proposition, as that consisting of more general terms, whatsoever is, is: and again, whether this proposition, blue is not red, be not a proposition, that the mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; and so of all the like.

§ 5. SECONDLY, as to co-existence, or such necessary connection between two ideas, that in the subject, where one of them is supposed, there the other must necessarily be also: of such agreement, or disagreement, as this, the mind has an immediate perception, but in very few of them, and, therefore, in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge; nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident, tho' some there are; v. g. the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies, being annexed to our idea of body, I think it is a self-evident proposition, that two bodies cannot be in the same place.

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VII.

2. In co-existence we have few self-evident propositions.

§ 6. THIRDLY, as to the relations of modes, mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality. As equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equals; which, with the rest of that kind, however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths; yet, I think, that any one who considers them, will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these, that one and one are equal to two; that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two, and from the five fingers of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will be equal. These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers, which, at the very first hearing, force the assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater clearness, than those mathematical axioms.

3. In other relations we may have.

§ 7. FOURTHLY, as to real existence, since that has no connection with any other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a first being, we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowledge; and, therefore, concerning those there are no maxims.

4. Concerning real existence, we have none.

§ 8. IN the next place let us consider, what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools, that all reasonings are "*ex præcognitis & præconcessis*," seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to suppose them to be præcognita; whereby, I think, are meant these two things: first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind. And, secondly, that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend.

These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.

§ 9. FIRST, that they are not the truths first known to the mind, is evident to experience, as we have shewn in another place, book i. chap. 2. Who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother; that its sucking-bottle is not the rod, long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be? and how many truths are there about numbers, which it is obvious to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians, in their arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the reason is very plain: for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement, or disagreement of its ideas, according as it finds them affirmed, or denied one of another, in words it understands, and every idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same; it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident truths must be first known, which consist of ideas, that are first in the mind: and the ideas first in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things, from whence, by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them; and next to them, the less general, or specific, which are next to particular: for abstract ideas are not so obvious, or easy, to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some

Because they are not the truths we first knew.

BOOK IV. some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea, wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of such ideas and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication, and enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection; at least this is enough to shew, that the most abstract and general ideas are not those, that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about.

Because on
them the
other parts
of our
knowledge
do not de-
pend.

§ 10. SECONDLY, from what has been said, it plainly follows, that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge. For, if there be a great many other truths, which have as much self-evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible they should be the principles, from which we deduce all other truths. Is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, or some such axiom, viz. the whole is equal to all its parts taken together? Many a one knows that one and two are equal to three, without having heard, or thought on that, or any other axiom, by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly, as any other man knows, that the whole is equal to all its parts, or any other maxim, and all from the same reason of self-evidence; the equality of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that, or any other axiom, as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor after the knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he know that one and two are equal to three, better, or more certainly, than he did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and parts are more obscure, or, at least, more difficult to be settled in the mind, than those of one, two, and three. And indeed, I think, I may ask these men, who will needs have all knowledge besides those general principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident principles, what principle is requisite to prove; that one and one are two, that two and two are four, that three times two are six? Which being known without any proof, do evince, that either all knowledge does not depend on certain *præcognita*, or general maxims, called principles, or else that these are principles; and if these are to be counted principles, a great part of numeration will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident propositions, which may be made about all our distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least, innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages; and a great many of these innate principles, they never come to know all their lives. But, whether they come in view of the mind, earlier, or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple, from the more compounded: the more simple, and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But which-ever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this, that a man sees the same idea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas. For, when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he cannot but certainly know, that the idea of one is the idea of one, and not the idea of two; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not the idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind, which he has distinct: that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a contradiction: and to have none distinct, is to have no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And, therefore, what idea soever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two entire, distinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition, as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the terms,

terms, without hesitation, or need of proof, or regarding those made in more general terms, and called maxims. CHAP. VII.

§ II. "WHAT shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use?" By no means; tho' perhaps their use is not that, which it is commonly taken to be, but since doubting in the least, of what hath been by some men ascribed to these maxims, may be apt to be cried out against, as overturning the foundations of all the sciences; it may be worth while to consider them, with respect to other parts of our knowledge, and examine more particularly, to what purposes they serve, and to what not.

What use these general maxims have.

1. IT is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove, or confirm, less general, self-evident propositions.

2. IT is as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon any science hath been built. There is, I know a great deal of talk, propagated from scholastick men, of sciences and the maxims, on which they are built: but it has been my ill luck never to meet with any such sciences; much less any one, built upon these two maxims, "what is, is;" and "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." And I would be glad to be shewn, where any such science, erected upon these, or any other general axioms, is to be found: and should be obliged to any one, who would lay before me the frame, and system of any science so built on these, or any such like maxims, that could not be shewn to stand as firm, without any consideration of them. I ask, whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of divinity, and in theological questions, that they have in the other sciences? They serve here too to silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that no body will therefore say, that the christian religion is built upon these maxims, or that the knowledge, we have of it, is derived from these principles. It is from revelation we have received it, and without revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an idea, by whose intervention we discover the connection of two others, this is a revelation from God to us, by the voice of reason. For we then come to know a truth, that we did not know before. When God declares any truth to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge. But, in neither of these, do we receive our light, or knowledge from maxims. But in the one, the things themselves afford it, and we see the truth in them, by perceiving their agreement, or disagreement. In the other, God himself affords it immediately to us, and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring veracity.

3. THEY are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never-enough-to-be-admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, which are so many new truths, before unknown to the world, and are farther advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discovery of these, it was not the general maxims, "what is, is;" or, "the whole is bigger than a part," or the like, that helped him. These were not the clues, that led him into the discovery of the truth, and certainty of those propositions. Nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations; but by finding out intermediate ideas, that shewed the agreement, or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated. This is the great exercise and improvement of human understanding, in the enlarging of knowledge, and advancing the sciences, wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of these, or the like magnified maxims. Would those who have this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think no step can be made in knowledge, without the support of an axiom, no stone laid in the building of the sciences, without a general maxim, but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and of communicating; between the method of raising any science, and that of teaching it to others, as far as it is advanced; they would see that those general maxims were not the foundations, on which the first discoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the

BOOK IV. the keys, that unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge. Tho' afterwards, when schools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of maxims, i. e. laid down certain propositions, which were self-evident, or to be received for true; which being settled in the minds of their scholars, as unquestionable verities, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of truths, in particular instances, that were not so familiar to their minds, as those general axioms, which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their minds. Tho' these particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding, than the general maxims brought to confirm them: and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims: and so may any one else do, who with attention considers them.

To come therefore to the use that is made of maxims.

1. THEY are of use, as has been observed, in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences, as far as they are advanced; but of little, or none, in advancing them farther.

2. THEY are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate wranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion. Whether a need of them to that end came not in, in the manner following, I crave leave to enquire. The schools, having made disputation the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field: and he that had the last word, was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the cause. But, because by this means there was like to be no decision between skilful combatants, whilst one never failed of a *medius terminus* to prove any proposition; and the other could as constantly, without, or with a distinction, deny the major, or minor; to prevent, as much as could be, the running out of disputes, into an endless train of *fylogisms*, certain general propositions, most of them indeed self-evident, were introduced into the schools; which, being such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and served instead of principles (where the disputants had not laid down any other between them) beyond which there was no going, and which must not be receded from, by either side. And thus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and sources, from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the sciences were built. Because, when in their disputes they came to any of these, they stopped there, and went no farther, the matter was determined. But how much this is a mistake, hath been already shewn.

THIS method of the schools, which have been thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I suppose, the like use of these maxims, into a great part of conversation out of the schools, to stop the mouths of cavillers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self-evident principles received by all reasonable men, who have once thought of them: but yet their use herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach nothing: that is already done by the intermediate ideas, made use of in the debate, whose connection may be seen without the help of those maxims, and so the truth known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give off a wrong argument, before it came to that, if in their disputes they proposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a contest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop to their perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the method of the schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose and resist evident truth, till they are baffled, i. e. till they are reduced to contradict themselves, or some established principle; it is no wonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of that, which in the schools is counted a virtue and a glory; viz. obstinately to maintain that side of the question they have chosen, whether true, or false, to the last extremity; even after conviction. A strange way to attain truth

truth and knowledge: and that, which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by education, could scarce believe should ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of religion, or nature; or introduced into the seminaries of those, who are to propagate the truths of religion, or philosophy, amongst the ignorant and unconvinced. How much such a way of learning is likely to turn young men's minds from the sincere search and love of truth; nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing, or, at least, worth the adhering to, I shall not now enquire. This I think, that bating those places, which brought the peripatetick philosophy into their schools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world any thing but the art of wrangling; these maxims were no where thought the foundations, on which the sciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement of knowledge.

As to these general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have said, of great use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge. For whoever began to build his knowledge on this general proposition, "what is, is;" or "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be:" and from either of these, as from a principle of science, deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often involving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touch-stone, may serve well to shew whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the absurdity, or mistake, of a man's reasoning, or opinion, they are of very little use for enlightning the understanding: and it will not be found, that the mind receives much help from them, in its progress in knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less certain, were these two general propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, they sometimes serve in argumentation, to stop a wrangler's mouth, by shewing the absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing him to the shame of contradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to shew a man that he is in an error; and another to put him in possession of truth: and I would fain know, what truths these two propositions are able to teach, and by their influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them? Let us reason from them as well as we can, they are only about identical predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such. Each particular proposition concerning identity, or diversity, is as clearly and certainly known in itself, if attended to, as either of these general ones: only these general ones, as serving in all cases, are, therefore, more inculcated and insisted on. As to other, less general maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions; and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another. "The whole is equal to all its parts;" what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim, than what the signification of the word totum, or the whole, does of itself import? And he, that knows that the word whole stands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little less, than that the whole is equal to all its parts. And upon the same ground, I think that this proposition, "a hill is higher than a valley," and several the like, may also pass for maxims. But yet masters of mathematicks, when they would, as teachers of what they know, initiate others in that science, do, not without reason, place this, and some other such maxims, at the entrance of their systems; that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions, made in such general terms, may be used to make such reflections, and have these more general propositions, as formed rules and sayings, ready to apply to all particular cases. Not that, if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more from our custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in our minds, by our often thinking of them, than from the different evidence of the things,

BOOK IV. things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking and reasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular instance, than by this general proposition, "the whole is equal to all its parts;" and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular, than the particular by the general. For in particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself by degrees to generals. Tho' afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn his knowledge into as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them, as to the standards of truth and falsehood. By which familiar use of them, as rules to measure the truth of other propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones, which in discourse and argumentation, are so frequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the reason why, amongst so many self-evident propositions, the most general only have had the title of maxims.

Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may prove contradictions.

§ 12. ONE thing farther, I think, it may not be amiss to observe, concerning these general maxims, that they are so far from improving, or establishing our minds in true knowledge, that if our notions be wrong, loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than fix them on settled, determined ideas of things: I say, these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes; and in such a way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to prove contradictions: v. g. he that, with Des Cartes, shall frame in his mind an idea, of what he calls body, to be nothing but extension, may easily demonstrate, that there is no vacuum, i. e. no space void of body, by this maxim, "what is, is." For the idea, to which he annexes the name body, being bare extension, his knowledge, that space cannot be without body, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, tho' it be called by these three names, extension, body, space. Which three words, standing for one and the same idea, may no doubt, with the same evidence and certainty, be affirmed one of another, as each of itself: and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its signification, that space is body, as this predication is true and identical, that body is body, both in signification and sound.

Instance in vacuum.

§ 13. BUT if another shall come, and make to himself another idea, different from Des Cartes's, of the thing, which yet, with Des Cartes, he calls by the same name body; and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body, to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he will as easily demonstrate, that there may be a vacuum, or space without a body, as Des Cartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea, to which he gives the name space, being barely the simple one of extension; and the idea, to which he gives the name body, being the complex idea of extension and resistibility, or solidity, together, in the same subject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black, or as of corporeity, and humanity, if I may use those barbarous terms: and therefore, the predication of them in our minds, or in words standing for them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another; viz. this proposition, "extension or space, is not body," is as true and evidently certain, as this maxim, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, can make any proposition.

They prove not the existence of things without us.

§ 14. BUT yet though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, viz. that there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot be a vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. "what is, is;" and "the same thing cannot be, and not be:" yet neither of these principles will serve to prove to us, that any, or what, bodies do exist: for that we are left to our senses, to discover to us, as far as they can. Those universal and self-evident principles, being only our constant, clear, and distinct knowledge of our own ideas, more general

neral or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing, that passes without the mind, their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself, and of its distinction from others; about which we cannot be mistaken, whilst they are in our minds, though we may, and often are mistaken, when we retain the names without the ideas; or use them confusedly sometimes for one, and sometimes for another idea. In which cases the force of these axioms reaching only to the sound, and not the signification of the words, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. It is to these men, that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of truth, will not secure them from error, in a careless, loose use of their words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested, concerning the little use for the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying, or intending they should be laid aside, as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and so cannot be laid aside. As far their influence will reach, it is in vain to endeavour, nor would I attempt to abridge it. But yet without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is not answerable to the great stress, which seems to be laid on them; and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming themselves in errors.

§ 15. BUT, let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions, they cannot discover, or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances, as they are found and exist without us, any farther than grounded on experience. And tho' the consequence of these two propositions, called principles, be very clear, and their use not dangerous, or hurtful, in the probation of such things, wherein there is no need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. where our ideas are determined, and known by the names that stand for them: yet when these principles, viz. what is, is; and, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; are made use of in the probation of propositions, wherein are words, standing for complex ideas, v. g. man, horse, gold, virtue; there they are of infinite danger, and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for manifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration: upon which follow error, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs, that can happen from wrong reasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these principles are less true, or of less force in proving propositions, made of terms standing for complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas: but, because men mistake generally, thinking that where the same terms are preserved, the propositions are about the same things, tho' the ideas, they stand for, are in truth different; therefore these maxims are made use of to support those, which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions; as is clear in the demonstrations above-mentioned, about a vacuum. So that, whilst men take words for things, as usually they do, these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions: as shall yet be farther made manifest.

§ 16. FOR instance; let man be that, concerning which you would, by these first principles, demonstrate any thing, and we shall see, that, so far as demonstration is by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge of any being existing without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, it is probable that his idea is just like that picture, which the painter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a complication of ideas together in his understanding, makes up the single, complex idea, which he calls man, whereof white, or flesh-colour in England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man, because white colour was one of the constant, simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man: and therefore he can demonstrate, by the principle, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, that a negro is not a man; the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition, which perhaps he never heard, nor thought of, but the clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas, of black and white, which he cannot be persuaded to take,

BOOK IV. nor can ever mistake one for another, whether he knows that maxim, or no: and to this child, or any one who hath such an idea, which he calls man, can you never demonstrate, that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no such notion, or idea in it. And therefore to him, the principle of what is, is, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.

§ 17. SECONDLY, another, that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the idea he calls man, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse, may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men, by this maxim, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be: and I have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied that they are men.

§ 18. THIRDLY, perhaps another makes up the complex idea, which he calls man, only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reason, and leaves out the shape wholly: this man is able to demonstrate, that a man may have no hands, but be quadrupes, neither of those being included in his idea of man; and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined, that was a man: because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that what is, is.

Little use of these maxims, in proofs, where we have clear and distinct ideas.

§ 19. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations, there is little need, or no use at all, of these maxims, to prove the agreement, or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth, or falsehood of such propositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be helped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this ground it is, that intuitive knowledge neither requires, nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty: and he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this proposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him, that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, &c. or any other two determined, distinct ideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to convince him, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.

Their use dangerous where our ideas are confused.

§ 20. AND, as these maxims are of little use, where we have determined ideas; so they are, as I have shewed, of dangerous use, where our ideas are not determined; and where we use words, that are not annexed to determined ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another idea: from which follows mistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish propositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CH A P. VIII.

Of trifling propositions.

CHAP. § 1. WHETHER the maxims, treated of in the foregoing chapter, be of that use to real knowledge, as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, that there are universal propositions, which, tho' they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are,

Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge.

§ 2. FIRST, all purely identical propositions. These, obviously and at first blush, appear to contain no instruction in them. For, when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shews us nothing, but what we must certainly know before, whether

As first, identical propositions,

ther such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us. Indeed that most general one, what is, is, may serve sometimes to shew a man, the absurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would in particular instances, deny the same thing of itself; because no body will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words: or if he does, a man is excused, if he breaks off any farther discourse with him. But yet, I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical proposition teaches us any thing: and tho', in such kind of propositions, this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be, and often is made use of to confirm them; yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, that the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition, and let me add also, without any real knowledge.

§ 3. FOR at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a proposition, and knows what he means when he says, ay or no, may make a million of propositions, of whose truths he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v. g. what is a soul, is a soul; or a soul is a soul; a spirit is a spirit; a fetiche is a fetiche, &c. these all being all equivalent to this proposition, viz. what is, is, i. e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul, hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other; and had he had but words, might, no doubt, have said, "oyster in right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate:" and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster, i. e. oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter, would much at one have satisfied the monkey's hunger, or a man's understanding; and they two would have improved in knowledge and bulk together.

I KNOW there are some, who, because identical propositions are self-evident, shew a great concern for them, and think they do great service to philosophy, by crying them up, as if in them was contained all knowledge, and the understanding were led into all truth, by them only. I grant, as forwardly as any one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant farther, that the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the same idea to be the same, and of discerning it from those that are different, as I have shewn in the foregoing chapter. But how that vindicates the making use of identical propositions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the imputation of trifling, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the will is the will, or lay what stress on it he thinks fit; of what use is this, and an infinite the like propositions, for the enlarging our knowledge? Let a man abound as much as the plenty of words, which he has, will permit him, in such propositions as these; "a law is a law, and obligation is obligation; right is right, and wrong is wrong;" will these and the like ever help him to an acquaintance with ethics? or instruct him, or others, in the knowledge of morality? Those, who know not, nor perhaps ever will know, what is right and what is wrong, nor the measures of them; can with as much assurance make, and infallibly know the truth of these and all such propositions, as he that is best instructed in morality can do. But what advance do such propositions give in the knowledge of any thing necessary, or useful, for their conduct?

HE would be thought to do little less than trifle, who, for the enlightning the understanding, in any part of knowledge, should be busy with identical propositions, and insist on such maxims as these: "substance is substance, and body is body; vacuum is a vacuum, and a vortex is a vortex; a centaur is a centaur, and a chimera is a chimera," &c. For these and all such are equally true, equally certain, and equally self-evident. But yet they cannot but be counted trifling, when made use of, as principles of instruction, and stress laid on them, as helps to knowledge: since they teach nothing, but what everyone, who is capable of discourse, knows without being told, viz. that the same term is the same

BOOK IV. same term, and the same idea the same idea. And upon this account it was that I formerly did, and do still think, the offering and inculcating such propositions, in order to give the understanding any new light, or inlet, into the knowledge of things, no better than trifling.

INSTRUCTION lies in something very different; and he, that would enlarge his own, or another's mind, to truths he does not yet know, must find out intermediate ideas, and then lay them in such order, one by another, that the understanding may see the agreement, or disagreement, of those in question. Propositions, that do this, are instructive; but they are far from such as affirm the same term of itself: which is no way to advance one's self, or others, in any sort of knowledge. It no more helps to that, than it would help any one in his learning to read, to have such propositions as these inculcated to him, an A is an A, and a B is a B; which a man may know, as well as any schoolmaster, and yet never be able to read a word, as long as he lives. Nor do these, or any such identical propositions, help him one jot forward in the skill of reading, let him make what use of them he can.

IF those, who blame my calling them trifling propositions, had but read, and been at the pains to understand what I had above writ, in very plain English, they could not but have seen that, by identical propositions, I mean only such, wherein the same term importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself: which I take to be the proper signification of identical propositions; and, concerning all such, I think I may continue safely to say, that to propose them as instructive, is no better than trifling. For no one, who has the use of reason, can misf them, where it is necessary they should be taken notice of; nor doubt of their truth, when he does take notice of them.

BUT if men will call propositions identical, wherein the same term is not affirmed of itself, whether they speak more properly than I, others must judge. This is certain, all that they say of propositions that are not identical in my sense, concerns not me, nor what I have said; all that I have said relating to those propositions, wherein the same term is affirmed of itself. And I would fain see an instance, wherein any such can be made use of, to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge. Instances of other kinds, whatever use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being such as I call identical.

Secondly,
when a part
of any com-
plex idea is
predicated
of the whole.

§ 4. SECONDLY, another sort of trifling propositions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions, wherein the genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive, of less comprehensive terms: for what information, what knowledge carries this proposition in it, viz. lead is a metal, to a man who knows the complex idea the name, lead, stands for? All the simple ideas, that go to the complex one signified by the term, metal, being nothing, but what he before comprehended, and signified by the name, lead. Indeed, to a man, that knows the signification of the word, metal, and not of the word, lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word, lead, by saying it is a metal, which at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fusible and malleable.

As part of
the defini-
tion of the
term de-
fined.

§ 5. A LIKE trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea; as, all gold is fusible. For fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound, gold, stands for, what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name, gold, which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any jot more material to say, it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the sound, gold, is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one, that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before?

For

For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, it will not much instruct me, to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions can only serve to shew the dissingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him sometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the signification of words, however certain they be.

§ 6. EVERY man is an animal, or living body, is as certain a proposition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things, than to say, a palfry is an ambling horse, or a neighing, ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this; that body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas, that I always comprehend and signify by the word, man; and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing; and so of the other, that body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas, which I always comprehend, and signify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas, that altogether make up that complex idea which is called a man, is affirmed of the term man: v. g. suppose a Roman, signified by the word homo, all these distinct ideas, united in one subject, "corporietas, sensibilitas, potentia se movendi, rationalitas, risibilitas;" he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its signification all these ideas. Much like a romance-knight, who by the word palfry signified these ideas; body of a certain figure, four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back; might with the same certainty universally affirm also any, or all, of these of the word palfry: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his, or romance language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed an instructive proposition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word, man, stands for; and therefore the knowledge contained in it, is more than verbal.

Instance,
man and pal-
fry.

§ 7. BEFORE a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learnt of others; but not, as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas, which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore, he trifles with words, who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed to know before; v. g. a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a man goes to explain his terms, to one who is supposed, or declares himself not to understand him: and then it teaches only the signification of that word, and the use of that sign.

For th^e
teaches but
the significa-
tion of
words.

§ 8. WE can know, then, the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty; the one is, of those trifling propositions, which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise, complex idea, but not contained in it: as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles; which relation of the outward angle

But no real
knowledge.

BOOK IV. to either of the opposite, internal angles, making no part of the complex idea, signified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge.

General propositions, concerning substances, are often trifling.

§ 9. WE having little, or no, knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas, existing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make any universal, certain propositions concerning them, any farther than our nominal essences lead us: which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions, the general propositions, that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they instructive, are uncertain, and are such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing. Hence it come to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that names of substantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may, with great truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined, and propositions, consisting of such terms, may, with the same clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths: and all this, without any knowledge of the nature, or reality of things existing without us. By this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things; v. g. he, that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary, mutually relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really is: and of this sort, a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions, in books of metaphysics, school-divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy, and after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies, as he did before he set out.

And why.

§ 10. HE that hath liberty to define, i. e. determine the signification of his names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them stand for his own ideas) and makes their significations at a venture, taking them from his own, or other men's fancies, and not from an examination, or enquiry, into the nature of things themselves; may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another, according to those several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree, or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon them: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge, than he does his riches, who taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place a penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great sum, according to his counters so placed, and standing for more or less, as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them, in respect of one another, more, or less, or equally comprehensive.

Thirdly, using words variously is trifling with them.

§ 11. THO' yet concerning most words, used in discourses, especially argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their discourses coherent and clear (how little soever it were instructive) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance, or obstinacy, under the obscurity and perplexedness of

of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute. CHAP. VIII.

§ 12. To conclude; barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks.

FIRST, all propositions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may, or ought to be called by that name, or that these two names signify the same idea. Thus, should any one say, that parsimony is frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this, or that action is, or is not temperance; however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms.

§ 13. SECONDLY, all propositions, wherein a part of the complex idea, which any term stands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal; v. g. to say that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions, wherein more comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal. 2. A part of the definition, predicated of any term.

WHEN, by these two rules, we have examined the propositions, that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them, but the use and application of these signs.

THIS, I think, I may lay down for an infallible rule, that wherever the distinct idea any word stands for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed, or denied of it; there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no real truth, or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute, and very much shorten our trouble and wandering, in the search of real and true knowledge.

CHAP. IX.

Of our knowledge of existence.

§ 1. HITHERTO we have only considered the essences of things, which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence, but what it has in the understanding) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions, of whose truth, or falsehood, we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence; and farther, that all particular affirmations, or negations, that would not be certain, if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union, or separation, of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union, or repugnancy. CHAP. IX. General, certain propositions concern not existence.

§ 2. BUT, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of predication, to be considered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to enquire, concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of other things by sensation. A threefold knowledge of existence.

§ 3. As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own existence; I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain; can any of these be more evident to me, than my own existence? If I doubt of

BOOK IV. of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal, infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.

CHAP. X.

Of our knowledge of the existence of a God.

CHAP. X.

We are capable of knowing certainly, that there is a God.

§ 1. **T**HO' God has given us no innate ideas of himself; tho' he has stamp'd no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry our selves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But tho' this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers; and tho' its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To shew, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i. e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than our selves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.

Man knows that he himself is.

§ 2. I THINK it is beyond question, that man has a clear perception of his own being; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince non-entity, that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical, as to deny his own existence (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger, or some other pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think, I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists.

He knows also, that nothing can not produce a being, therefore something eternal.

§ 3. IN the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity, had a beginning; and what had a beginning, must be produced by something else.

That eternal being must be most powerful.

§ 4. NEXT it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to, its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same source. This eternal source then of all being, must also be the source and original of all power; and so this eternal being must be also the most powerful.

And most knowing.

§ 5. AGAIN, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world.

THERE

THERE was a time then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding: I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

§ 6. THUS from the consideration of our selves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and, from this idea, duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal being. If, nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully, l. ii. de leg. to be considered at his leisure. "What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe besides there is no such thing? Or that those things, which, with the utmost stretch of his reason, he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?" "Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea, quæ vix summâ ingenii ratione comprehendat, nullâ ratione moveri putet?"

FROM what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.

§ 7. HOW far the idea of a most perfect being, which a man may frame in his mind, does, or does not, prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine. For, in the different make of men's tempers and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this, upon that sole foundation; and take some men's having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a deity; and, out of an over-fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or, at least, endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own existence, and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it is as certain and clear a truth, as can any where be delivered, that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." Tho' our own being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident and incontestable proof of a deity; and, I believe, no body can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many parts: yet this being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt

BOOK IV. not but I shall be forgiven by my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

Something from eternity. § 8. THERE is no truth more evident, than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence.

Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative. It being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that something has existed from eternity; let us next see what kind of thing that must be. § 9. THERE are but two sorts of beings in the world, that man knows or conceives.

FIRST, such as are purely material, without sense, perception or thought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.

SECONDLY, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be; which, if you please, we will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings: which, to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, better terms than material and immaterial.

Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative. § 10. IF then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking, intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example; let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with, eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together, if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter, by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing. Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it) vary the figure and motion of it, as much as you please, a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c. whose diameters are but 10000000th part of a gry*, will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch, or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest, that do any where exist. They knock, impel and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal; matter can never begin to be: If we suppose bare matter, without motion, eternal; motion can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal: thought can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with, or without motion, could have originally in, and from itself, sense, perception and

* A gry is $\frac{1}{72}$ of a line, a line $\frac{1}{72}$ of an inch, an inch $\frac{1}{72}$ of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot $\frac{1}{2}$ of a pendulum, whose diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one second of time of $\frac{1}{72}$ of a minute. I have affectedly made use of this measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal division, with names to them; because, I think, it would be of general convenience, that this should be the common measure, in the commonwealth of letters.

knowledge,

knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception and knowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter, and every particle of it. Not to add, that tho' our general, or specifick conception of matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing, as one material being, or one single body, that we know, or can conceive. And therefore if matter were the eternal, first, cogitative being, there would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony and beauty, which is to be found in nature. Since therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in it itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first, eternal being cannot be matter.

§ 11. IF therefore, it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should produce a positive being, or matter. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom.

§ 12. THO' this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind, does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hence follow, that all other knowing beings, that have a beginning, must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge, or extent of power, than what he gives them; and therefore, if he made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe, all inanimate beings, whereby his omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all his other attributes necessarily follow: yet to clear up this a little farther, we will see what doubts can be raised against it.

§ 13. FIRST, perhaps it will be said, that tho' it be as clear, as demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal being, and that being must also be knowing; yet it does not follow, but that thinking being may also be material. Let it be so; it equally still follows, that there is a God. For if there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being, it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that being to be material, or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of that supposition: there being no way to avoid the demonstration, that there is an eternal, knowing being, men, devoted to matter, would willingly have it granted, that this knowing being is material; and then letting slide out of their minds, or the discourse, the demonstration, whereby an eternal, knowing being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, an eternal, cogitative being; whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal, cogitative being, they manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary connection of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of an eternal spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative being is unavoidably to be granted. Now if thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative being, and they suppose it to no purpose. Whether material, or no.

§ 14. BUT now let us see how they can satisfy themselves or others, that this eternal, thinking being is material. Not material; i. e. Because every particle of matter is not cogitative.

FIRST, I would ask them, "whether they imagine, that all matter, every particle of matter, thinks?" This, I suppose, they will scarce say; since then there would be as many eternal, thinkings beings, as there are particles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet, if they will not allow matter, as matter, that is, every particle of matter to be as well cogitative, as extended, they

BOOK IV. they will have as hard a task to make out, to their own reasons, a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being, out of unextended parts, if I may so speak.

2. One particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative. § 15. SECONDLY, if all matter does not think, I next ask, "whether it be only one atom that does so?" This has as many absurdities as the other; for then this atom of matter must be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought, or will, made all the rest of matter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at. For if they suppose one single, thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot ascribe that pre-eminency to it, upon any other account, than that of its thinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be, by some other way, which is above our conception, it must be still creation, and these men must give up their great maxim, "ex nihilo nil fit." If it be said, that all the rest of matter is equally eternal, as that thinking atom, it will be to say any thing at pleasure, tho' never so absurd: for to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and power, infinitely above all the rest, is, without any the least appearance of reason, to frame any hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other; and I challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add any thing else, to one above another.

3. A system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative.

§ 16. THIRDLY, if then, neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal, thinking being; nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is some certain system of matter, duly put together, that is this thinking, eternal being. This is that which I imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would have him a material being, as most readily suggested to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves, and other men, which they take to be material, thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: for, to suppose the eternal, thinking being to be nothing else, but a composition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal being, only to the juxtaposition of parts; than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.

Whether in motion, or at rest.

§ 17. BUT farther, this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts, wherein its thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges above one atom.

IF it be the motion of its parts, on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all the particles, that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be regulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the cause of motion (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it) but the consequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wise thinking, or acting, will be quite taken away: so that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser, than pure, blind matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought, depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the same thing; not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge, that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that before-mentioned; since let this thinking system be all, or a part of the matter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle should either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particular; and so regulate its own thoughts, or motions, or indeed have any thoughts resulting from such motion.

§ 18. OTHERS

§ 18. OTHERS would have matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial being. This, tho' it take not away the being of a God, yet since it denies, one and the first great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal; why? because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not also think yourself eternal? You will answer perhaps, because about twenty, or forty years since you began to be. But if I ask you what that you is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter, whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking being, but would have unthinking matter eternal too) therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing, from eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one, who is so void of understanding as to own it. If therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing (as all things that are not eternal must be) why also can you not allow it possible, for a material being to be made out of nothing, by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Tho', when well considered, creation of a spirit will be found to require no less power, than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception, how matter might at first be made, and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal, first being: but to give beginning and being to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions, on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to enquire so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt, that the creation, or beginning, of any one substance, out of nothing, being once admitted, the creation of all other, but the creator himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.

CHAP.

X.

Matter not
co-eternal
with an eter-
nal mind.

§ 19. BUT you will say, is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, no: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being, because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive how any thing, but impulse of body, can move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which are produced in us, only by the free action or thought of our own minds; and are not, nor can be the effects of the impulse, or determination of the motion of blind matter in, or upon, our bodies; for then it could not be in our power, or choice to alter it. For example: my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: what causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right-hand rests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand creation. For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot: to alter the determination of motion, being in this case no easier, nor less, than to give motion itself; since the new determination given to the animal spirits, must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put in their way by thought; which was not in their way

BOOK IV. before, and so must owe its motion to thought; either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, it is an over-valuing ourselves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or God finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal, infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.

CHAP. XI.

Of our knowledge of the existence of other things.

CHAP. § 1. **T**HE knowledge of our own being, we have by intuition. The existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn.

It is to be had only by sensation.

THE knowledge of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by sensation: for there being no necessary connection of real existence with any idea, a man hath in his memory, nor of any other existence, but that of God, with the existence of any particular man; no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For the having the idea of any thing in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.

Instance, whiteness of this paper.

§ 2. IT is therefore, the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time, without us, which causes that idea in us, tho' perhaps we neither know, nor consider how it does it: for it takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas, we receive by them, that we know not the manner, wherein they are produced: v. g. whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which whatever object causes, I call white; by which I know that that quality, or accident (i. e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing, whose testimony I have reason to rely on, as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists, that causes that sensation in me, than that I write, or move my hand: which is a certainty, as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of any thing, but a man's self alone, and of God.

This, tho' not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us.

§ 3. THE notice we have by our senses, of the existing of things without us, tho' it be not altogether so certain, as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason, employed about the clear, abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance, that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right, concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the existence of those things, which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure, I say any thing contrary to his opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough, of the existence of things without me; since by their different application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present

present state. This is certain, the confidence, that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of, concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act any thing, but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is. But besides the assurance we have, from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us, of the existence of things, without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons.

§ 4. FIRST, it is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses; because those, that want the organs of any sense, never can have the ideas belonging to that sense, produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore, we cannot but be assured, that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them; for then the eyes of a man in the dark, would produce colours, and his nose smell roses in the winter: but we see no body gets the relish of a pine-apple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.

1. Because we cannot have them, but by the inter-
meditation of the
senses.

§ 5. SECONDLY, because sometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. For tho', when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I can, at pleasure, recal to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in my memory: so I can at pleasure lay by that idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. But if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas, which the light or sun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference between the ideas, laid up in my memory (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure) and those, which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore, it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is no body, who doth not perceive the difference in himself, between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are more distinguishable, one from another. And therefore, he hath certain knowledge, that they are not both memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without.

2. Because an
idea from ac-
tual sensa-
tion, and ano-
ther from
memory, are
very distinct
perceptions.

§ 6. THIRDLY, add to this, that many of those ideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of heat, or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome, and is again, when actually repeated: which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies, when applied to it. And we remember the pain of hunger, thirst, or the head-ach, without any pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of pleasure, accompanying several actual sensations: and tho' mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself. For it would be very strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram, should be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles, which, by looking on, he makes use of to measure that by.

3. Pleasure,
or pain,
which ac-
companies
actual sensa-
tion, accom-
panies not
the return-
ing of those
ideas, with-
out the ex-
ternal ob-
jects.

§ 7. FOURTHLY, our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report, concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He that sees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which certainly

4. Our sen-
ses assist one
another's tes-
timony of
the existence
of outward
things.

BOOK IV. could never be put into such exquisite pain, by a bare idea, or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too : which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper ; and by designing the letters, tell before-hand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, barely by drawing my pen over it : which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands stand still ; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut : nor when those characters are once made on the paper, can I chuse afterwards but see them as they are ; that is, have the ideas of such letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination, when I find that the characters, that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them ; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my senses constantly and regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we will add, that the sight of those shall, from another man, draw such sounds, as I before-hand design they shall stand for ; there will be little reason left to doubt, that those words I write, do really exist without me, when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which could not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain them in that order.

This certainty is as great as our condition needs.

§ 8. But yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical, as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality ; and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing : I must desire him to consider, that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question ; and so it is not much matter, that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, that the certainty of things existing in *rerum natura*, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple ; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are ; and accommodated to the use of life ; they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient, or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain : which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace, be barely a wandring imagination in a drowsy man's fancy ; by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty, greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great, as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i. e. happiness or misery ; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without us, is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is caused by them ; which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

But reaches no farther than actual sensation.

§ 9. In fine then, when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied, that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually produce that idea, which we then perceive : and we cannot so far distrust their testimony, as to doubt, that such collections of simple ideas, as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a collection of simple ideas, as is wont to be called man, existing together one minute since, and am now alone ;

alone; I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary connection of his existence a minute since, with his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be certain, that the man I saw last to day is now in being, I can less be certain that he is so, who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and much less can I be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And therefore, tho' it be highly probable, that millions of men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that certainty of it, which we strictly call knowledge; tho' the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things, upon the confidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, not knowledge.

§ 10. WHEREBY yet we may observe, how foolish and vain a thing it is, for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him, to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty, in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing, but direct, plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat, or drink, would not give him reason to venture on it: and I would fain know, what it is he could do upon such grounds, as are capable of no doubt, no objection.

§ 11. As when our senses are actually employed about any object, we do know that it does exist; so by our memory we may be assured, that heretofore, things that affected our senses, have existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things, whereof our senses having informed us, our memories still retain the ideas; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this knowledge also reaches no farther than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me, that water doth exist: and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true; and as long as my memory retains it, always an undoubted proposition to me, that water did exist the 10th of July 1688. as it will also be equally true, that a certain number of very fine colours did exist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water: but being now quite out of the sight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that the bubbles, or colours, therein do so; it being no more necessary that water should exist to day, because it existed yesterday, than that the colours, or bubbles, exist to day, because they existed yesterday; tho' it be exceedingly much more probable, because water hath been observed to continue long in existence, but bubbles and the colours on them quickly cease to be.

§ 12. WHAT ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shewn. But, tho' we have those ideas in our minds, and know we have them there, the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know, that any such things do exist without us, or that there are any finite spirits, or any other spiritual beings, but the eternal God. We have ground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with assurance, that there are such creatures: but, our senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular existences. For we can no more know, that there are finite spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies, or centaurs, he can come to know that things, answering those ideas, do really exist.

AND therefore, concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith; but universal, certain propositions, concerning this matter, are beyond our reach. For

Past existence is known by memory.

The existence of spirits not knowable.

CHAP.
XI.

BOOK IV. however true it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent spirits, that God ever created do still exist; yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this state capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters, wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our senses give us in this, or that particular.

Particular propositions concerning existences are knowable.

§ 13. By which it appears, that there are two sorts of propositions. 1. There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or an angle, in my mind, the first and natural enquiry is, whether such a thing does any where exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of any thing without us, but only of God, can certainly be known, farther than our senses inform us. 2. There is another sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement, or disagreement of our abstract ideas, and their dependance one on another. Such propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the idea of God and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain, concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how certain soever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the existence of men in the world, but will be true of all such creatures, whenever they do exist: which certainty of such general propositions, depends on the agreement or disagreement, is to be discovered in those abstract ideas.

And general propositions concerning abstract ideas.

§ 14. IN the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things, producing ideas in our minds by our senses: in the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds producing there general, certain propositions. Many of these are called "æternæ veritates," and all of them indeed are so; not from being written all, or any of them, in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he, having got the abstract ideas, joined, or separated them by affirmation, or negation. But, wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions, that will arise from the agreement, or disagreement, which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore called eternal truths, not because they are eternal propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the understanding, that any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns, that are any where of them out of the mind, and existed before: but because being once made about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past, or to come, by a mind having those ideas, always, actually be true. For, names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another; propositions concerning any abstract ideas, that are once true, must needs be eternal verities.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our knowledge.

CHAP. XII.

Knowledge is not from maxims.

§ 1. **I**T having been the common received opinion, amongst men of letters, that maxims were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences were, each of them, built upon certain præcognita, from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself, in its enquiries into the matters, belonging to that science; the beaten road of the schools has been, to lay down, in the beginning, one, or more, general propositions,

CHAP. XII.
 fitions, as foundations, whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines thus laid down, for foundations of any science, were called principles, as the beginnings, from which we must set out, and look no farther backwards in our enquiries, as we have already observed.

§ 2. ONE thing, which might probably give an occasion to this way of proceeding in other sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success it seemed to have in mathematicks, wherein men, being observed to attain a great certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by pre-eminence to be called *μαθηματικά* and *μαθήματα*, learning, or things learned, thoroughly learned, as having, of all others, the greatest certainty, clearness and evidence in them.

The occasion of the opinion.

§ 3. BUT if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in these sciences, was not owing to the influence of these principles, nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received, from two, or three general maxims, laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, distinct, compleat ideas their thoughts were employed about, and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to discover it in others, and this without the help of those maxims. For I ask, is it not possible for a young lad to know, that his whole body is bigger than his little finger, but by virtue of this axiom, that the whole is bigger than a part; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that maxim? Or cannot a country-wench know, that having received a shilling from one that owes her three, and a shilling also from another, that owes her three, that the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot she know this, I say, without she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim, "that if you take equals from equals, the remainders will be equal," a maxim which possibly she never heard, or thought of? I desire any one to consider, from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most people, the particular instance, or the general rule; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. These general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are the workmanship of the mind made, and names given to them, for the easier dispatch in its reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive terms, and short rules, its various and multiplied observations. But knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on particulars; tho' afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof: it being natural for the mind (forward still to enlarge its knowledge) most attentively to lay up those general notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburden the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I desire it may be considered, what more certainty there is to a child, or any one, that his body, little finger and all, is bigger than his little finger alone, after you have given to his body the name whole, and to his little finger the name part, than he could have had before; or what new knowledge concerning his body, can these two relative terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body was bigger than his little finger, if his language were yet so imperfect, that he had no such relative terms as whole and part? I ask farther, when he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is a whole, and his little finger a part, than he was, or might be certain, before he learned those terms, that his body was bigger than his little finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt, or deny that his little finger is a part of his body, as that it is less than his body. And he that can doubt whether it be less, will as certainly doubt whether it be a part. So that the maxim, the whole is bigger than a part, can never be made use of, to prove the little finger less than the body, but when it is useless, by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter, with another parcel of matter joined to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it, by the help of these two relative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you please.

But from the comparing clear and distinct ideas.

BOOK IV.

Dangerous
to build up-
on precari-
ous princi-
ples.

§ 4. BUT, be it in the mathematicks as it will, whether it be clearer, that, taking an inch from a black line of two inches, and an inch from a red line of two inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal, or that, if you take equals from equals, the remainders will be equal: which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my present occasion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether, if it be the readiest way to knowledge to begin with general maxims, and build upon them, if it be yet a safe way to take the principles, which are laid down in any other science, as unquestionable truths; and so receive them without examination, and adhere to them, without suffering to be doubted of, because mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use none but self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in natural philosophy.

LET that principle of some of the philosophers, "that all is matter, and that "there is nothing else," be received for certain and undubitable, and it will be easy to be seen, by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the world; or with the Stoicks, the æther, or the sun; or with Anaximenes, the air to be God; and what a divinity, religion and worship must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as principles, thus taken up without questioning, or examination; especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and give a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect another kind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure; and in Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity? And he who, with Plato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who looked not beyond this spot of earth, and those perishing things, which are to be had in it. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a principle, that right and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not by nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and pravity, than those, who take it for granted, that we are under obligations, antecedent to all human constitutions.

This is no
certain way
to truth.

§ 5. IF therefore, those that pass for principles, are not certain (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful) but are only made so to us, by our blind assent, we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being guided into truth, we shall, by principles, be only confirmed in mistake and error.

But to com-
pare clear,
complex
ideas under
steadynames.

§ 6. BUT, since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as of all other truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement, or disagreement of our ideas, the way to improve our knowledge, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit faith, to receive and swallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct and complex ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant names. And thus, perhaps, without any other principles, but barely considering those ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their agreement or disagreement, and their several relations and habitudes; we shall get more true and clear knowledge, by the conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles, and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others.

The true
method of
advancing
knowledge is
by consider-
ing our ab-
stract ideas.

§ 7. WE must therefore, if we will proceed, as reason advises, adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine, and the truth we search after. General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas. A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these relations, is the only way to discover all that can be put, with truth and certainty concerning them, into general propositions. By what steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians, who from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of reasonings, proceed to the discovery and demonstration of truths, that appear at first sight beyond human capacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they have invented, for the singling out, and laying

laying in order those intermediate ideas, that demonstratively shew the equality, or inequality of unapplicable quantities, is that which has carried them so far, and produced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries: but whether something like this, in respect of other ideas, as well as those of magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if other ideas, that are the real as well as nominal essences of their species, were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians, they would carry our thoughts farther, and with greater evidence and clearness, than possibly we are apt to imagine.

§ 8. THIS gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I suggested, ch. iii. § 18. viz. that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics. For the ideas, that ethicks are conversant about, being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connection and agreement one with another; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real and general truths: and I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics, which have been demonstrated to him.

By which morality, also, may be made clearer.

§ 9. IN our search after the knowledge of substances, our want of ideas, that are suitable to such a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different method. We advance not here as in the other (where our abstract ideas are real, as well as nominal essences) by contemplating our ideas, and considering their relations and correspondencies; that helps us very little, for the reasons, that, in another place, we have at large set down. By which, I think it is evident, that substances afford matter of very little general knowledge; and the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas, will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and certainty. What then are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course; the want of ideas of their real essences, sends us from our own thoughts, to the things themselves, as they exist. Experience here must teach me, what reason cannot; and it is by trying alone, that I can certainly know, what other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea, v. g. whether that yellow, heavy, fusible body, I call gold, be malleable, or no; which experience (which way ever it prove, in that particular body, I examine) makes me not certain, that it is so in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fusible bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it is no consequence, one way or the other, from my complex idea; the necessity, or inconsistency, of malleability hath no visible connection with the combination of that colour, weight and fusibility in any body. What I have said here, of the nominal essence of gold, supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour, weight and fusibility, will hold true, if malleableness, fixedness, and solubility in aqua regia be added to it. Our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but a little way, in the certain discovery of the other properties, in those masses of matter, wherein all these are to be found. Because the other properties of such bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown, real essence, on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no farther than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal and useful truths. For upon trial having found that particular piece (and all others of that colour, weight and fusibility that I ever tried) malleable, that also makes now perhaps a part of my complex idea, part of my nominal essence of gold: whereby tho' I make my complex idea, to which I affix the name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before; yet still, it not containing the real essence of any species of bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I say, to know, perhaps it may to conjecture) the other remaining properties of that body, farther than they have a visible connection with some, or all of the simple ideas, that make up my nominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain, from this complex idea, whether gold be fixed, or no; because, as

But knowledge of bodies is to be improved, only by experience.

BOOK IV. before, there is no necessary connection, or inconsistency to be discovered betwixt a complex idea of a body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable; betwixt these, I say, and fixedness: so that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever body these are found, there fixedness is sure to be. Here again for assurance, I must apply myself to experience; as far as that reaches, I may have certain knowledge, but no farther.

This may procure us convenience, not science.

§ 10. I DENY not but a man, accustomed to rational and regular experiments, shall be able to see farther into the nature of bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown properties, than one that is a stranger to them: but yet, as I have said, this is but judgment and opinion, not knowledge and certainty. This way of getting, and improving our knowledge in substances, only by experience and history, which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity, which we are in in this world, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general knowledge, concerning the species of bodies, and their several properties. Experiments and historical observations we may have, from which we may draw advantages of ease and health, and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life; but beyond this I fear our talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I guess, able to advance.

We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improvements.

§ 11. FROM whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabrick, and real essences of bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God, and the knowledge of our selves, enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty, and great concernment; it will become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have, about what they are most adapted to, and follow the direction of nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper employment lies in those enquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i. e. the condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that morality is the proper science, and business of mankind in general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out their summum bonum) as several arts, conversant about several parts of nature, are the lot and private talent of particular men, for the common use of human life, and their own particular subsistence in this world. Of what consequence the discovery of one natural body, and its properties may be to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing instance: whose ignorance in useful arts; and want of the greatest part of the conveniences of life, in a country that abounded with all sorts of natural plenty, I think, may be attributed to their ignorance, of what was to be found in a very ordinary, despicable stone, I mean the mineral of iron. And whatever we think of our parts, or improvements, in this part of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie each with other; yet to any one, that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will appear past doubt, that, were the use of iron lost among us, we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the antient, savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions came no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. So that he, who first made known the use of that one contemptible mineral, may be truly styled "the father of arts, and "author of plenty."

But must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles.

§ 12. I WOULD not, therefore, be thought to disesteem, or dissuade the study of nature. I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire, revere, and glorify their author: and, if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to mankind, than the monuments of exemplary charity, that have, at so great charge, been raised by the founders of hospitals and almshouses. He that first invented printing, discovered the use of the compass, or made publick the virtue and right use of Kin Kina, did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supplying and increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave, than those who built colleges, work-houses and hospitals. All that I would say, is, that we should not to be too forwardly pos-

essed

possession with the opinion, or expectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had; or by ways that will not attain to it: that we should not take doubtful systems for compleat sciences, nor unintelligible notions for scientific demonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to glean what we can, from particular experiments: since we cannot, from a discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves; and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together. Where our inquiry is concerning co-existence, or repugnancy to co-exist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover; there experience, observation, and natural history, must give us, by our senses, and by retail, an insight into corporeal substances. The knowledge of bodies we must get by our senses, warily employed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what we hope to know of separate spirits in this world, we must, I think, expect only from revelation. He that shall consider how little general maxims, precarious principles, and hypotheses laid down at pleasure, have promoted true knowledge, or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational men after real improvements; how little, I say, the setting out at that end has, for many ages together, advanced men's progress, towards the knowledge of natural philosophy, will think we have reason to thank those, who in this latter age have taken another course, and have trod out to us, tho' not an easier way to learned ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable knowledge.

§ 13. NOT that we may not, to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of any probable hypothesis whatsoever: hypotheses, if they are well made, are, at least, great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new discoveries. But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the causes of things, and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined particulars, and made several experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether our principles will carry us quite thro', and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care, that the name of principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy.

The true use of hypotheses.

§ 14. BUT whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty, or no, the ways to enlarge our knowledge, as far as we are capable, seem to me, in short, to be these two:

FIRST, the first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things, whereof we have general, or specifick names; at least of so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, or reason about. And, if they be specifick ideas of substances, we should endeavour also to make them as compleat as we can, whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple ideas, as being constantly observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the species: and each of those simple ideas, which are the ingredients of our complex ones, should be clear and distinct in our minds. For it being evident, that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

Clear and distinct ideas, with settled names, and the finding of those, which shew their agreement, or disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our knowledge.

SECONDLY, the other is the art of finding out those intermediate ideas, which may shew us the agreement, or repugnancy, of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

§ 15. THAT these two (and not the relying on maxims, and drawing consequences from some general propositions) are the right method of improving our knowledge, in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity, the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where first we shall find, that he that has not a perfect and clear idea of those angles, or figures, of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any

Mathematicks, an instance of it.

BOOK IV. any knowledge about them. Suppose but a man, not to have a perfect, exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium; and there is nothing more certain, than that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them. Farther, it is evident, that it was not the influence of those maxims, which are taken for principles in mathematicks, that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims, generally made use of in mathematicks, never so perfectly, and contemplate their extent and consequences, as much as he pleases, he will, by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the hypotenuse in a right-angled triangle, is equal to the squares of the two other sides. The knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, and if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equal, &c. helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration: and a man may, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by the thoughts otherwise applied: the mind had other objects, other views before it, far different from those maxims, when it first got the knowledge of such kind of truths in mathematicks, which men, well enough acquainted with those received axioms, but ignorant of their method, who first made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what methods, to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science, may, hereafter, be invented, answering that of algebra in mathematicks, which so readily finds out ideas of quantities, to measure others by; whose equality, or proportion, we could, otherwise, very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

C H A P. XIII.

Some farther considerations concerning our knowledge.

C H A P. § 1.
XIII.

Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.

OUR knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has a great conformity with our fight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men's knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable: and, if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard, or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men, that have senses, cannot chuse but receive some ideas by them; and, if they have memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of some of them, one with another: as he, that has eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a difference in them. But tho' a man, with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see; yet there be certain objects, which he may chuse whether he will turn his eyes to: there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capable to delight and instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.

The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.

§ 2. THERE is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, tho' he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may chuse whether he will curiously survey it, and, with an intent application, endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to see that black, which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself, that what actually scalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding; all that is voluntary in our knowledge, is the employing, or with-holding, any of our faculties, from this, or that sort of objects, and a more, or less, accurate survey

survey of them: but they being employed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; that is done only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And, therefore, as far as men's senses are conversant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas, which are presented by them, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so far as men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the agreement, and disagreement, that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge: and if they have names for those ideas, which they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions, which express that agreement, or disagreement, they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

§ 3. THUS, he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare one, two, and three, to six, cannot chuse but know that they are equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure its angles, and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this truth, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." Instance, in numbers.

HE also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being, made by, and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the sun shines, when he sees it. For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependant, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that three, four, and seven, are less than fifteen, if he will consider and compute those numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen, if he will but open his eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being never so certain, never so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties, as he should, to inform himself about them. In natural religion.

CHAP. XIV.

Of judgment.

§ 1. THE understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat, till he has demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir, till he infallibly knows the business, he goes about, will succeed; will have little else to do, but sit still and perish. CHAP. XIV.
Our knowledge being short, we want something else.

§ 2. THEREFORE, as God has set some things in broad day-light; as he has given us some certain knowledge, tho' limited to a few things in comparison, probably, as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the greatest part of our concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence, and presumption, we might, by every day's experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness, and liableness to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, in the search and following of that way, which might lead us to a state of greater perfection: it being highly rational to think, even What use to be made of this twilight state.

BOOK IV. were revelation silent in the case, that as men employ those talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards, at the close of the day, when their fun shall set, and night shall put an end to their labours.

Judgment supplies the want of knowledge.

§ 3. THE faculty, which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment, whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree, or disagree; or, which is the same, any proposition to be true, or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs, and certain knowledge, are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, which they are desirous, or concerned to know; but either incapable of such attention, as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by the proofs; and so without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, as it were by a view of them, as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This faculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is called judgment; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called assent, or dissent: which being the most usual way, wherein the mind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall under these terms treat of it, as least liable in our language to equivocation.

Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it.

§ 4. THUS the mind has two faculties, conversant about truth and falsehood.

FIRST, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement, or disagreement, of any ideas.

SECONDLY, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement, or disagreement, is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so, before it certainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates them, as in reality things are, it is right judgment.

C H A P. XV.

Of probability.

CHAP. § 1.
XV.

Probability is the appearance of agreement, upon fallible proofs.

A S demonstration is the shewing the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, by the intervention of one, or more proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connection one with another; so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement, or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary. For example: in the demonstration of it, a man perceives the certain, immutable connection there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle, and those intermediate ones, which are made use of, to shew their equality to two right ones; and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement, or disagreement, of the intermediate ideas, in each step of the progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shews the agreement, or disagreement, of those three angles, in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, i.e. receives it for true. In which case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing, the proof being such as for the most part carries

carries truth with it: the man, on whose testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of this kind. So that that which causes his assent to this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these ideas to agree, without knowing them to do so, is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity in this.

CHAP.
XV.

§ 2. OUR knowledge, as has been shewn, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain truth, in every thing which we have occasion to consider; most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, say, act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act, according to that assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeliness, even to the confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt and distrust; I shall come now (having, as I think, found out the bounds of human knowledge and certainty) in the next place, to consider the several degrees and grounds of probability, and assent, or faith.

It is to supply the want of knowledge.

§ 3. PROBABILITY is likeliness to be true; the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments, or proofs, to make it pass, or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting, or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments, or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between probability, and certainty, faith and knowledge, that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition; each immediate idea, each step has its visible and certain connection; in belief, not so. That, which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly shewing the agreement, or disagreement of, those ideas that are under consideration.

Being that, which makes us presume things to be true, before we know them to be so.

§ 4. PROBABILITY, then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us, where that fails, is always conversant about propositions, whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two following.

The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of other's experience.

FIRST, the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation, and experience.

SECONDLY, the testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others is to be considered, 1. The number. 2. The integrity. 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies.

§ 5. PROBABILITY wanting that intuitive evidence, which infallibly determines the understanding, and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against any proposition, before it assents to, or dissents from it; and upon a due ballancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability, on one side or the other. For example:

In this all the agreements pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.

If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability, it is knowledge; but if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold; this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed, by the nature of the thing itself, to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But, if the same thing be told to one born between the tropicks, who never saw, nor heard of, any such thing before, there the whole

BOOK IV. whole probability relies on testimony : and, as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth ; so that matter of fact is like to find more, or less belief. Tho' to a man, whose experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there. To which the king replied, " hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man, but now I am sure you lie."

They being capable of great variety.

§ 6. UPON these grounds depends the probability of any proposition : and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies, do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition, in itself, more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which tho' by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith, more than any thing else, and that is the opinion of others : tho' there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one ; since there is much more falshood and error among men, than truth and knowledge. And, if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent, I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place.

C H A P. XVI.

Of the degrees of assent.

CHAP. § I. XVI.

Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability.

THE grounds of probability we have laid down, in the foregoing chapter ; as they are the foundations, on which our assent is built, so are they also the measure, whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated ; only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind, which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear, at least in the first judgment, or search, that the mind makes. I confess, in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to, in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them : it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those, who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs, which, upon a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter, as far they could ; and that they have searched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the question ; and, with the best of their skill, cast up the account, upon the whole evidence : and thus, having once found, on which side the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an enquiry, as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories, as a truth they have discovered ; and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion, that by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their assent, as they afford it.

These cannot always be actually in view, and then we must con-

§ 2. THIS is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments ; unless a man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs, concerning any probable truth, and that too in the same order, and regular deduction of consequences in

in which they have formerly placed or seen them ; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume, upon one single question : or else they must require a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs : both which are impossible. It is unavoidable therefore, that the memory be relied on, in the case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts ; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this, the greatest part of men must be either very scepticks, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments ; which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.

content ourselves with the remembrance, that we once saw ground for such a degree of assent.

§ 3. I CANNOT but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is, not that they rely on their memories, for what they have before well judged ; but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men, that think they have formed right judgments of several matters, and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise ? who imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined their own opinions ? Which is, indeed, to think they judged right, because they never judged at all : and yet these of all men hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness ; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so ; and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But in matters of probability, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the question ; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means, to collect together all the proofs, concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view ; and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information ? And yet we are forced to determine our selves on the one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay ; for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment, in points, wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side, or the other.

The ill consequence of this, if our former judgment were not rightly made.

§ 4. SINCE therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have several opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs of their truths ; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently, upon the offer of an argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and shew the insufficiency of : it would methinks become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendship, in the diversity of opinions ; since we cannot reasonably expect, that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an authority, which the understanding of man acknowledges not. For, however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your sentiments, be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and recalling what is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side the advantage lies : and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him a-new in so much pains, it is but what we do often ourselves in the like case ; and we should take it amiss, if others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And, if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets, which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty ;

The right use of it, is mutual charity and forbearance.

BOOK IV. or which he takes to be impressions, he has received from God himself, or from men sent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions, thus settled, should be given up to the arguments, or authority of a stranger, or adversary; especially, if there be any suspicion of interest, or design, as there never fails to be, where men find themselves ill-treated? We should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it, in all the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treat others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when it is more than probable, that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has uncontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falshood of all he condemns; or can say, that he has examined to the bottom, all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing without knowledge, nay, often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves, than constrain others. At least, those who have not thorowly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth, on other men's belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive, or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt, in all the doctrines they profess, and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason to think, that if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.

Probability is either of matter of fact, or speculation.

§ 5. BUT, to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it: We are to take notice, that the propositions we receive, upon inducements of probability, are of two sorts; either concerning some particular existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which, falling under observation, is capable of human testimony; or else concerning things, which, being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable of any such testimony.

The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces assurance, approaching to knowledge.

§ 6. CONCERNING the first of these, viz. particular matter of fact.

FIRST, where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation of our selves, and others, in the like case, comes attested, by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon, with as little doubt, as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in England the last winter, or that there were swallows seen there in the summer; I think a man could almost as little doubt of it, as that seven and four are eleven. The first therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, when the general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact, attested by fair witnesses: such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call an argument from the nature of things themselves. For what our own and other men's constant observation has found always to be after the same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effects of steady and regular causes, tho' they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus, that fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed the colour, or consistency in wood, or charcoal; that iron sunk in water, and swam in quicksilver: these, and the like propositions about particular facts, being agreeable to our constant experience, as often as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by any body; we are put past doubt, that a relation, affirming any such thing to have

have been true, or any predication that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These probabilities rise so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded, rises to assurance.

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§ 7. *SECONDLY*, the next degree of probability is, when I find by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be, the most part so; and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses, v. g. history giving us such an account of men in all ages; and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the publick: if all historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And, in this case, our assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree, which we may call confidence.

Unquestionable testimony and experience part produce confidence.

§ 8. *THIRDLY*, in things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this, or that way; that it should thunder on a man's right, or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouched, by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a city in Italy as Rome; that about seventeen hundred years ago, there lived in it a man, called Julius Cæsar; that he was a general; and that he won a battle against another, called Pompey: this, tho' in the nature of the thing there be nothing for, nor against it, yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.

Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing in different, produces also confident belief.

§ 9. *THUS* far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe, or disbelieve, as a demonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness is required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing; which rises and falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favour, or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees, wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater, or less degree, to preponderate on either side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainment, as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c.

Experience and testimonies clashing, infinitely vary the degrees of probability.

§ 10. *THIS* is what concerns assent, in matters wherein testimony is made use of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule, observed in the law of England; which is, that tho' the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy never so well attested, and by never so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our enquiry after material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, viz. that any testimony, the farther off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has. The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it, is a good proof: but if another, equally

Traditional testimonies, the farther removed, the less their proof.

BOOK IV. equally credible, do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the hear-say of an hear-say, is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed thro', the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find, amongst some men, the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man, cotemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain, beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground, propositions, evidently false, or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for authentick truths; and those which found, or deserved, little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable.

Yet history
is of great
use.

§ 11. I WOULD not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history: it is all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say, that no probability can arise higher than its first original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness, must stand, or fall, by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and tho' cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or capricio's, men's minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered) may make one man quote another man's words, or meaning, wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve, where the originals are wanting; and, consequently, how much less, quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages, by being often repeated. But the farther still it is from the original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth, or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he received it.

In things,
which sense
cannot disco-
ver, analogy
is the great
rule of pro-
bability.

§ 12. THE probabilities, we have hitherto mentioned, are only such as concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of observation and testimony. There remains that other sort, concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of assent, tho' the things be such, that falling not under the reach of our senses, they are not capable of testimony. Such are, 1. The existence, nature, and operations of finite, immaterial beings without us; as spirits, angels, devils, &c. or the existence of material beings; which, either for their smallness in themselves, or remoteness from us, our senses cannot take notice of: as whether there be any plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants in the planets, and other mansions of the vast universe. 2. Concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature: wherein, tho' we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We see animals are generated, nourished, and move; the loadstone draws iron; and the parts of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give us both light and heat. These and the like effects we see and know: but the causes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming not within the scrutiny of human senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attested by any body; and therefore can appear, more, or less probable, only as they more, or less agree to truths, that are established in our minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation. Analogy in these matters is the only help we have, and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability. Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very

very often fire itself, we have reason to think, that what we call heat and fire, consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible, minute parts of the burning matter: observing likewise that the different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours; and also, that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies, as of velvet, watered silk, &c. does the like, we think it probable that the colour and shining of bodies, is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus finding in all parts of the creation, that fall under human observation, that there is a gradual connection of one with another, without any great, or discernable gaps between, in all that great variety of things we see in the world, which are so closely linked together, that in the several ranks of beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them; we have reason to be persuaded, that by such gentle steps things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to say, where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end: and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely, which is the lowest species of living things, and which the first of those, which have no life? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as the quantity does in a regular cone; where tho' there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance, yet the difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discernable. The difference is exceeding great between some men, and some animals: but if we will compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that it will be hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer, or larger. Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards, in those parts of the creation, that are beneath men, the rule of analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in things above us, and our observation; and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in several degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the creator, by gentle steps and differences, that are every one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and the rise of hypotheses, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoning from analogy, leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful productions, which would otherwise lie concealed.

§ 13. THO' the common experience, and the ordinary course of things, have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give, or refuse credit to any thing proposed to their belief; yet there is one case, wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by him, who has the power to change the course of nature, there, under such circumstances, they may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary observation. This is the proper case of miracles, which, well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other truths, which need such confirmation.

§ 14. BESIDES those, we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort of propositions, that challenge the highest degree of our assent, upon bare testimony, whether the thing proposed agree, or disagree, with common experience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof is, because the testimony is of such an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God himself. This carries with it assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, Revelation; and our assent to it, Faith: which as absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can, whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt, or hesitation. Only we must be sure, that it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right: else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we

One case, where contrary experience lessens not the testimony.

The bare testimony of revelation is the highest certainty.

BOOK IV. have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation. And, therefore, in those cases our assent can be rationally no higher, than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance, or diffidence, arising from the more, or less, apparent probability of the proofs. But of faith, and the precedency it ought to have before other arguments of persuasion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason; tho' in truth it be nothing else but an assent founded on the highest reason.

C H A P. XVII.

Of reason.

CHAP.
XVII.

Various significations
of the word
reason.

Wherein
reasoning
consists.

§ 1. **T**HE word reason, in the English language, has different significations; sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles; and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration, I shall have of it here, is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty, whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

§ 2. If general knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of our own ideas; and the knowledge of the existence of all things without us (except only of a God, whose existence every man may certainly know, and demonstrate to himself, from his own existence) be had only by our senses: what room then is there for the exercise of any other faculty, but outward sense and inward perception? what need is there of reason? Very much; both, for the enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our assent: for it hath to do, both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and, indeed, contains two of them, viz. sagacity and illation. By the one, it finds out; and by the other, it so orders the intermediate ideas, as to discover what connection there is in each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is that we call illation, or inference, and consists in nothing but the perception of the connection there is between the ideas, in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in which it arrives at knowledge; or their probable connection, on which it gives, or with-holds its assent, as in opinion. Sense and intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas: and in those cases, where we are fain to substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both these cases, the faculty, which finds out the means, and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is that which we call reason. For as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connection of all the ideas, or proofs, one to another, in each step of any demonstration, that produces knowledge; so it likewise perceives the probable connection of all the ideas, or proofs, one to another, in every step of a discourse, to which it will think assent due. This is the lowest degree of that, which can be truly called reason. For, where the mind does not perceive this probable connection, where it does not discern whether there be any such connection, or no; there men's opinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason, but the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all adventures, without choice, and without direction.

§ 3. So

§ 3. So that we may, in reason, consider these four degrees: the first and highest, is the discovering and finding out of proofs; the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make their connection and force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their connection; and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed, in any mathematical demonstration; it being one thing to perceive the connection of each part, as the demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third, to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something different from all these, to have first found out those intermediate ideas, or proofs, by which it is made.

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its four
parts.

§ 4. THERE is one thing more, which I shall desire to be considered concerning reason; and that is, whether syllogism, as is generally thought, be the proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising this faculty. The causes I have to doubt, are these:

Syllogism,
not the great
instrument
of reason.

FIRST, because syllogism serves our reason, but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it; and that is, to shew the connection of the proofs in any one instance, and no more: but in this it is of no great use, since the mind can perceive such connection where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps, better, without it.

If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the connection of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And, therefore, we may take notice, that there are many men, that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. He, that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism, nor can reduce any one argument to those forms: and, I believe, scarce any one ever makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed syllogism is made use of on occasion, to discover a fallacy, hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningly wrapped up in a smooth period; and, stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language, shew it in its naked deformity. But the weakness, or fallacy, of such a loose discourse, it shews, by the artificial form it is put into, only to those who have thoroughly studied mode and figure, and have so examined the many ways, that three propositions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far considered syllogism, as to see the reason why, in three propositions laid together in one form, the conclusion will be certainly right, but in another, not certainly so; I grant are certain of the conclusion, they draw from the premises, in the allowed modes and figures. But they, who have not so far looked into those forms, are not sure, by virtue of syllogism, that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises; they only take it to be so, by an implicit faith in their teachers, and a confidence in those forms of argumentation; but this is still but believing, not being certain. Now if, of all mankind, those, who can make syllogisms, are extremely few, in comparison of those who cannot; and if of those few, who have been taught logick, there is but a very small number, who do any more than believe that syllogisms, in the allowed modes and figures, do conclude right, without knowing certainly that they do so; if syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before Aristotle, there was not one man, that did, or could know any thing by reason; and that, since the invention of syllogisms, there is not one of ten thousand that doth.

BUT God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational, i. e. those few of them, that he could get so to examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see, that in above threecore ways that three propositions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen, wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right, and upon what ground it is, that in these few the conclusion is certain,

and

BOOK IV. and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to mankind than so. He has given them a mind that can reason, without being instructed in methods of syllogizing: the understanding is not taught to reason by these rules; it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence, or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this any way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men amongst the antients; whose large views, acuteness, and penetration of thought, and strength of judgment, few have equalled: and who, in this very invention of forms of argumentation, wherein the conclusion may be shewn to be rightly inferred, did great service, against those who were not ashamed to deny any thing. And I readily own, that all right reasoning may be reduced to his forms of syllogism. But yet I think, without any diminution to him, I may truly say, that they are not the only, nor the best way of reasoning, for the leading of those into truth, who are willing to find it, and desire to make the best use they may of their reason, for the attainment of knowledge. And he himself, it is plain, found out some forms to be conclusive, and others not, not by the forms themselves, but by the original way of knowledge, i. e. by the visible agreement of ideas. Tell a country gentlewoman, that the wind is south-west, and the weather lowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand, it is not safe for her to go abroad thin clad, in such a day, after a fever: she clearly sees the probable connection of all these, viz. south-west wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters, of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another, quicker and clearer without them; and the probability, which she easily perceives in things, thus in their native state, would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in mode and figure. For it very often confounds the connection: and, I think, every one will perceive, in mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogisms.

INFERENCE is looked on as the great act of the rational faculty, and so it is, when it is rightly made: but the mind, either very desirous to enlarge its knowledge, or very apt to favour the sentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to make inferences, and, therefore, often makes too much haste, before it perceives the connection of the ideas that must hold the extremes together.

To infer, is nothing but, by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, i. e. to see, or suppose, such a connection of the two ideas of the inferred proposition, v. g. let this be the proposition laid down, "men shall be punished in another world," and from thence be inferred this other, "then men can determine themselves." The question now is to know, whether the mind has made this inference right, or no; if it has made it, by finding out the intermediate ideas, and taking a view of the connection of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference. If it has done it, without such a view, it has not so much made an inference, that will hold, or an inference of right reason, as shewn a willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither case is it syllogism, that discovered those ideas, or shewed the connection of them; for they must be both found out, and the connection every where perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in syllogism: unless it can be said, that any idea, without considering what connection it hath with the two other, whose agreement should be shewn by it, will do well enough in a syllogism, and may be taken at a venture for the *medius terminus*, to prove any conclusion. But this no body will say, because it is, by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore each intermediate idea must be such, as in the whole chain hath a visible connection with those two, it is placed between, or else thereby the conclusion cannot be inferred, or drawn in: for wherever any link of the chain is loose, and without connection,

nection, there the whole strength of it is lost, and it hath no force to infer, or draw in any thing. In the instance above-mentioned, what is it shews the force of the inference, and consequently the reasonableness of it, but a view of the connection of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclusion, or proposition inferred? v. g. men shall be punished-----God the punisher-----just punishment-----the punished guilty-----could have done otherwise-----freedom-----self-determination: by which chain of ideas thus visibly linked together in train, i. e. each intermediate idea agreeing on each side with those two, it is immediately placed between, the ideas of men and self-determination appear to be connected, i. e. this proposition, men can determine themselves is drawn in, or inferred from this, that they shall be punished in the other world. For here the mind, seeing the connection there is between the idea, of men's punishment in the other world, and the idea of God punishing; between God punishing and the justice of the punishment; between justice of punishment and guilt; between guilt and a power to do otherwise; between a power to do otherwise and freedom, and between freedom and self-determination; sees the connection between men and self-determination.

Now I ask, whether the connection of the extremes be not more clearly seen, in this simple and natural disposition, than in the perplexed repetitions, and jumble of five, or six syllogisms? I must beg pardon for calling it jumble, till some body shall put these ideas into so many syllogisms, and then say, that they are less jumbled, and their connection more visible, when they are transposed and repeated, and spun out to a greater length, in artificial forms; than in that short, natural, plain order, they are laid down in here, wherein every one may see it; and wherein they must be seen, before they can be put into a train of syllogisms. For the natural order of the connecting ideas, must direct the order of the syllogisms, and a man must see the connection of each intermediate idea, with those that it connects, before he can with reason make use of it in a syllogism. And when all those syllogisms are made, neither those that are, nor those that are not logicians will see the force of the argumentation, i. e. the connection of the extremes, one jot the better. [For those that are not men of art, not knowing the true forms of syllogism, nor the reasons of them, cannot know, whether they are made in right and conclusive modes and figures, or no, and so are not at all helped by the forms they are put into; tho' by them the natural order, wherein the mind could judge of their respective connection, being disturbed, renders the illation much more uncertain, than without them.] And as for logicians themselves, they see the connection of each intermediate idea, with those it stands between (on which the force of the inference depends) as well before, as after the syllogism is made, or else they do not see it at all. For a syllogism neither shews, nor strengthens the connection of any two ideas, immediately put together, but only, by the connection seen in them, shews what connection the extremes have one with another. But what connection the intermediate has, with either of the extremes in that syllogism, that no syllogism does, or can shew. That the mind only doth, or can perceive, as they stand there, in that juxta-position, only by its own view, to which the syllogistical form, it happens to be in, gives no help, or light at all; it only shews, that if the intermediate idea agrees with those it is on both sides immediately applied to, then those two remote ones, or, as they are called, extremes, do certainly agree, and therefore the immediate connection of each idea, to that which it is applied to, on each side, on which the force of the reasoning depends, is as well seen before, as after the syllogism is made, or else, he that makes the syllogism, could never see it at all. This, as has been already observed, is seen only by the eye, or the perceptive faculty of the mind, taking a view of them laid together, in a juxta-position; which view of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any proposition, whether that proposition be placed as a major, or a minor, in a syllogism, or no:

Or what use then are syllogisms? I answer, their chief and main use is in the schools, where men are allowed, without shame, to deny the agreement of

Book IV. ideas, that do manifestly agree; or out of the schools, to those who from thence have learned, without shame, to deny the connection of ideas, which even to themselves is visible. But, to an ingenuous searcher after truth, who has no other aim but to find it, there is no need of any such form, to force the allowing of the inference: the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the ideas, in a simple and plain order: and hence it is, that men, in their own enquiries after truth, never use syllogisms to convince themselves, [or, in teaching others, to instruct willing learners.] Because, before they can put them into a syllogism, they must see the connection, that is between the intermediate idea and the two other ideas, it is set between and applied to, to shew their agreement; and when they see that, they see whether the inference be good or no, and so syllogism comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of the former instance; I ask whether the mind, considering the idea of justice, placed as an intermediate idea between the punishment of men, and the guilt of the punished, (and, till it does so consider it, the mind cannot make use of it, as a *medius terminus*) does not as plainly see the force and strength of the inference, as when it is formed into syllogism? To shew it in a very plain and easy example; let animal be the intermediate idea, or *medius terminus*, that the mind makes use of, to shew the connection of homo and vivens; I ask whether the mind does not more readily and plainly see that connection, in the simple and proper position of the connecting idea in the middle; thus,

Homo———Animal———Vivens,

than in this perplexed one,

Animal———Vivens———Homo———Animal:

which is the position these ideas have in a syllogism, to shew the connection between homo and vivens, by the intervention of animal.

INDEED syllogism is thought to be of necessary use, even to the lovers of truth, to shew them the fallacies, that are often concealed in florid, witty, or involved discourses. But that this is a mistake, will appear, if we consider, that the reason, why sometimes men, who sincerely aim at truth, are imposed upon, by such loose, and as they are called rhetorical discourses, is, that their fancies being struck with some lively, metaphorical representations, they neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive, what are the true ideas, upon which the inference depends. Now, to shew such men the weakness of such an argumentation, there needs no more, but to strip it of the superfluous ideas, which blended and confounded with those, on which the inference depends, seem to shew a connection, where there is none; or, at least, do hinder the discovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked ideas, on which the force of the argumentation depends, in their due order, in which position the mind, taking a view of them, sees what connection they have, and so is able to judge of the inference, without any need of a syllogism at all.

I GRANT that mode and figure is commonly made use of, in such cases, as if the detection of the incoherence of such loose discourses were wholly owing to the syllogistical form; and so I myself formerly thought, till upon a stricter examination I now find, that laying the intermediate ideas naked in their due order, shews the incoherence of the argumentation better than syllogism; not only as subjecting each link of the chain, to the immediate view of the mind in its proper place, whereby its connection is best observed; but also, because syllogism shews the incoherence only to those (who are not one of ten thousand) who perfectly understand mode and figure, and the reason, upon which those forms are established: whereas a due and orderly placing of the ideas, upon which the inference is made, makes every one, whether logician, or not logician, who understands the terms, and hath the faculty to perceive the agreement,

agreement, or disagreement, of such ideas (without which, in or out of syllogism, he cannot perceive the strength, or weakness, coherence, or incoherence of the discourse) see the want of connection in the argumentation, and the absurdity of the inference.

AND thus I have known a man, unskilful in syllogism, who at first hearing could perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness of a long, artificial and plausible discourse, wherewith others, better skilled in syllogism, have been misled. And, I believe, there are few of my readers, who do not know such. And, indeed, if it were not so, the debates of most princes councils, and the business of assemblies, would be in danger to be mismanaged, since those, who are relied upon, and have usually a great stroke in them, are not always such, who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the forms of syllogism, or expert in mode and figure. And, if syllogism were the only, or so much as the surest way to detect the fallacies of artificial discourses; I do not think that all mankind, even princes, in matters that concern their crowns and dignities, are so much in love with falshood and mistake, that they would every where have neglected to bring syllogism, into the debates of moment; or thought it ridiculous so much as to offer them in affairs of consequence: a plain evidence to me, that men of parts and penetration, who were not idly to dispute at their ease, but were to act, according to the result of their debates, and often pay for their mistakes with their heads or fortunes, found those scholastick forms were of little use, to discover truth, or fallacy, whilst both the one and the other might be shewn, and better shewn, without them, to those who would not refuse to see what was visibly shewn them.

SECONDLY, another reason that makes me doubt, whether syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason in the discovery of truth, is, that of whatever use mode and figure is pretended to be, in the laying open of fallacy (which has been above considered) those scholastick forms of discourse are not less liable to fallacies, than the plainer ways of argumentation: and for this I appeal to common observation, which has always found these artificial methods of reasoning more adapted to catch and intangle the mind, than to instruct and inform the understanding. And hence it is, that men, even when they are baffled and silenced in this scholastick way, are seldom or never convinced, and so brought over to the conquering side: they, perhaps, acknowledge their adversary to be the more skilful disputant; but rest nevertheless, persuaded of the truth on their side; and go away, worsted as they are, with the same opinion they brought with them: which they could not do, if this way of argumentation carried light and conviction with it, and made men see where the truth lay. And, therefore, syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining victory in dispute, than for the discovery, or confirmation, of truth in fair enquiries. And, if it be certain, that fallacy can be couched in syllogism, as it cannot be denied, it must be something else; and not syllogism that must discover them.

I HAVE had experience how ready some men are; when all the use, which they have been wont to ascribe to any thing, is not allowed, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and groundless imputations; I tell them; that I am not for taking away any helps to the understanding, in the attainment of knowledge. And if men skilled in, and used to syllogisms; find them assisting to their reason, in the discovery of truth; I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at is; that they should not ascribe more to these forms than belongs to them; and think that men have no use, or not so full a use, of their reasoning faculty, without them. Some eyes want spectacles, to see things clearly and distinctly; but let not those that use them, therefore, say, no body can see clearly without them: those who do so will be thought in favour of art (which, perhaps, they are beholden to) a little too much to depress and discredit nature. Reason, by its own penetration, where it is strong and exercised, usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism. If use of those spectacles has so dimmed its sight, that it cannot without them

see

Book IV. see consequences, or inconsequences in argumentation, I am not so unreasonable as to be against the using them. Every one knows what best fits his own fight. But let him not thence conclude all in the dark, who use not just the same helps that he finds a need of.

Helps little in demonstration, less in probability.

§ 5. BUT however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say, it is of far less, or no use at all, in probabilities. For the assent there, being to be determined by the preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the proofs, with all circumstances, on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that, as syllogism; which running away with one assumed probability, or one topical argument, pursues that, till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration; and forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there, entangled, perhaps, and as it were manacled in the chain of syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps, requisite to shew on which side, all things considered, is the greater probability.

Serves not to increase our knowledge, but fence with it.

§ 6. BUT let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes: (and yet I would fain see the man, that was forced out of his opinion, by dint of syllogism) yet still it fails our reason in that part, which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task, and that, which we most need its help in; and that is the finding out of proofs, and making new discoveries. The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind, with those intermediate ideas, that may shew the connection of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules of common logick. A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a man has little, or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas, that shew the connection of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced. Syllogism at best is but the art of fencing, with the little knowledge, we have, without making any addition to it. And if a man should employ his reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he, who, having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have it beaten up all into swords, and put it into his servants hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the king of Spain employed the hands of his people, and his Spanish iron so, he had brought to light but little of that treasure, that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he, who shall employ all the force of his reason; only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of that mass of knowledge, which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature; and which I am apt to think, native, rustick reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common stock of mankind, rather than any scholastick proceeding, by the strict rules of mode and figure.

Other helps should be sought.

§ 7. I DOUBT not, nevertheless, but there are ways to be found, to assist our reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hooker encourages me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. l. 1. § 6. speaks thus: "If there might be added the right helps of true art and learning (which helps I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard) there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference, in maturity of judgment, between men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as between men that are now, and innocents." I do not pretend to have found, or discovered, here any of those right helps of art, this great man of deep thought mentions; but this is plain, that syllogism, and the logick now in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if, by a discourse, perhaps, something out of the way, I am sure, as to me, wholly new and unborrowed, I shall have given occasion to others, to cast about for new discoveries, and to seek in their own thoughts, for those right helps of art, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those, who servilely confine themselves to the rules and dictates of others.

For

For beaten tracts lead these sort of cattle (as an observing Roman calls them) whose thoughts reach only to imitation, "*non quo eundum est, sed quo itur.*" But I can be bold to say, that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment, and largeness of comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts on this subject, could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of knowledge. CHAP. XVII.

§ 8. HAVING here had an occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use of it in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge; it is fit, before I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism, viz. that no syllogistical reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has, at least, one general proposition in it. As if we could not reason, and have knowledge about particulars: whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular existences; and our knowledge and reasoning about other things, is only, as they correspond with those our particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of our particular ideas, is the whole and utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, that the particular ideas, about which it is, are such, as more than one particular thing can correspond with, and be represented by. But the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, and consequently our knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those ideas be capable of representing more real beings than one, or no. One thing more I crave leave to offer about syllogism, before I leave it, viz. may one not upon just ground enquire, whether the form syllogism now has, is that which in reason it ought to have? For the medius terminus being to join the extremes, i. e. the intermediate ideas by its intervention, to shew the agreement, or disagreement, of the two in question, would not the position of the medius terminus be more natural, and shew the agreement, or disagreement, of the extremes clearer and better, if it were placed in the middle between them? which might be easily done, by transposing the propositions, and making the medius terminus the predicate of the first, and the subject of the second. As thus,

"Omnis homo est animal,
 "Omne animal est vivens,
 "Ergo omnis homo est vivens."

"Omne corpus est extensum & solidum,
 "Nullum extensum & solidum est pura extensio,
 "Ergo corpus non est pura extensio."

I need not trouble my reader with instances in syllogisms, whose conclusions are particular. The same reason holds for the same form in them, as well as in the general.

§ 9. REASON, tho' it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us thro' the vast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabrick, yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal being; and there are many instances wherein it fails us: as, 1. Reason fails us for want of ideas.

FIRST, it perfectly fails us, where our ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend itself farther than they do. And, therefore, wherever we have no ideas, our reasoning stops, and we are at an end of our reckoning: and if at any time we reason about words, which do not stand for any ideas, it is only about those sounds, and nothing else.

§ 10. SECONDLY, our reason is often puzzled, and at a loss, because of the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of the ideas, it is employed about; and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus, not having any perfect idea of the least extension of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a loss 2. Because of obscure and imperfect ideas.

BOOK IV. about the divisibility of matter; but having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought, how the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet, of the operation of God, run into great difficulties about free created agents, which reason cannot well extricate itself out of.

3. For want of intermediate ideas.

4. Because of wrong principles.

5. Because of doubtful terms.

Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning.

The next is demonstration by reasoning.

§ 11. THIRDLY, our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas, which could serve to shew the certain, or probable agreement, or disagreement, of any two other ideas: and in this, some men's faculties far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men, with amazement, looked on several of the demonstrations of antient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human.

§ 12. FOURTHLY, the mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions, without knowing how to free itself: and, in that case, it is in vain to implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the fallshood, and reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties, which the building upon false foundations brings a man into, that, if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in perplexities.

§ 13. FIFTHLY, as obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason; so, upon the same ground, do dubious words, and uncertain signs, often in discourses and arguing, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and bring them to a non-plus. But these two latter are our fault, and not the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious: and the perplexities, or errors, they fill men's minds with, are every where observable.

§ 14. SOME of the ideas, that are in the mind, are so there, that they can be by themselves, immediately, compared one with another: and in these the mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or disagree, as clearly, as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: and this, therefore, as has been said, I call intuitive knowledge; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those maxims, which no body has any doubt about; but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of, and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think, that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have, in a future state, of thousands of things, which now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted reason, having got some faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.

§ 15. BUT tho' we have, here and there, a little of this clear light, some sparks of bright knowledge; yet the greatest part of our ideas are such, that we cannot discern their agreement, or disagreement, by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have need of reasoning, and must, by discourse and inference, make our discoveries. Now of these there are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again.

FIRST, those whose agreement, or disagreement, tho' it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas, which can be compared with them. In this case, when the agreement, or disagreement, of the intermediate idea on both sides, with those which we would compare, is plainly discerned, there it amounts to demonstration, whereby knowledge is produced; which tho' it be certain, yet it is not so easy, nor altogether so clear, as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one

one simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake, or doubt; the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas must be observed, and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory, just as it is; and the mind must be sure, that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration, is omitted, or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed, and too hard for those, who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those, who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review, before they can arrive at certainty. But yet, where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. there the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge, which may be called rational knowledge, as the other is intuitive.

§ 16. SECONDLY, there are other ideas, whose agreement, or disagreement, can no otherwise be judged of, but by the intervention of others, which have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual, or likely one: and in these it is, that the judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable mediums. This, tho' it never amounts to knowledge, no not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the probability is so clear and strong, that assent as necessarily follows it, as knowledge does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the judgment is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability; and then, casting them up all right together, chuse that side which has the over-balance.

To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning.

§ 17. INTUITIVE knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, immediately compared together.

Intuition, demonstration, judgment.

RATIONAL knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, by the intervention of one, or more other ideas.

JUDGMENT is the thinking, or taking two ideas to agree, or disagree, by the intervention of one, or more ideas, whose certain agreement, or disagreement, with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.

§ 18. THO' the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about; yet the principal act of ratiocination is the finding the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together, to measure their equality by juxtaposition. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas: and things agree, or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our ideas.

Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas.

§ 19. BEFORE we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their assent; or, at least, so to awe them, as to silence their opposition.

Four sorts of arguments,

FIRST, the first is, to alledge the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation, in the common esteem, with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men, who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others; and

1. Ad verecundiam.

BOOK IV. and it is looked upon as infolence for a man to fet up, and adhere to his own opinion, againſt the current ſtream of antiquity; or to put it in the ballance againſt that of ſome learned doctor, or otherwiſe approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with ſuch authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cauſe, and is ready to ſtile it impudence in any one, who ſhall ſtand out againſt them. This, I think, may be called argumentum ad verecundiam.

2. Ad ignorantiam. § 20. SECONDLY, another way that men ordinarily uſe to drive others, and force them to ſubmit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adverſary to admit what they alledge as a proof, or to aſſign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam.

3. Ad hominem. § 21. THIRDLY, a third way is, to preſs a man with conſequences drawn from his own principles, or confeſſions. This is already known, under the name of argumentum ad hominem.

4. Ad judicium. § 22. FOURTHLY, the fourth is, the uſing of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge, or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium. This alone, of all the four, brings true inſtruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, becauſe I, out of reſpect, or any other conſideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the ſame with him, becauſe I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, becauſe he has ſhewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeſt, and therefore not oppoſe another man's perſuaſion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and another may ſhew me that I am ſo. This may diſpoſe me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it; that muſt come from proofs and arguments, and light ariſing from the nature of things themſelves, and not from my ſhamefacedneſs, ignorance, or error.

Above, contrary, and according to reaſon. § 23. BY what has been before ſaid of reaſon, we may be able to make ſome gueſs at the diſtinction of things, into thoſe that are according to, above, and contrary to reaſon. 1. According to reaſon are ſuch propoſitions, whoſe truth we can diſcover, by examining and tracing thoſe ideas we have from ſenſation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true, or probable. 2. Above reaſon are ſuch propoſitions, whoſe truth, or probability, we cannot, by reaſon, derive from thoſe principles. 3. Contrary to reaſon are ſuch propoſitions, as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and diſtinct ideas. Thus the exiſtence of one God, is according to reaſon; the exiſtence of more than one God, contrary to reaſon; the reſurrection of the dead, above reaſon. Farther as above reaſon may be taken in a double ſenſe, viz. either as ſignifying above probability, or above certainty; ſo in that large ſenſe alſo, contrary to reaſon, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

Reason and faith not oppoſite. § 24. THERE is another uſe of the word reaſon, wherein it is oppoſed to faith; which, tho' it be in itſelf a very improper way of ſpeaking, yet common uſe has ſo authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppoſe, or hope to remedy it: only, I think, it may not be amiſs to take notice, that however faith be oppoſed to reaſon, faith is nothing but a firm aſſent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good reaſon; and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes, without having any reaſon for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither ſeeks truth, as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning faculties, he has given him, to keep him out of miſtake and error. He that does not this to the beſt of his power, however he ſometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckineſs of the accident will excuſe the irregularity of his proceeding. This, at leaſt, is certain, that he muſt be accountable for whatever miſtakes he runs into: whereas he, that makes uſe of the light and faculties God has given him, and ſeeks ſincerely to diſcover truth by thoſe helps and abilities he has, may have this ſatiſfaction in doing his duty, as a rational creature, that, tho' he ſhould miſs truth, he will not miſs the reward of it.

Faith and reason.

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XVII.

it. For he governs his assent right, and places it, as he should, who, in any case, or matter, whatsoever, believes, or disbelieves, according as reason directs him. He, that does otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties, which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence, and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of faith and reason, and their distinct provinces.

§ 1. **I**T has been above shewn, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want general knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined, specifick ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent, in matters, where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor testimony of other men, to bottom our reason upon.

CHAP.
XVIII.

Necessary to
know their
boundaries.

From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason; the want whereof may, possibly, have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet, at least, of great disputes, and, perhaps, mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.

§ 2. I FIND every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainfayer, who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point, established in all questions, where faith has any thing to do.

Faith and
reason what,
as contra-
distinguish'd.

REASON therefore here, as contra-distinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty, or probability, of such propositions, or truths, which the mind arrives at, by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation, or reflection.

FAITH, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason; but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call revelation.

§ 3. FIRST then I say, that no man inspired by God, can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas, which they had not before from sensation, or reflection. For, whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words, or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no other ideas, but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas, as were there before. For words seen, or heard, recal to our thoughts those ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown, simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs, which cannot signify to us things, of which we have before never had any idea at all.

No new simple
idea can
be conveyed
by tradition-
al revelation.

THUS, whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was wrapped up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place, is only this, that there are such things, as eye hath not seen, nor heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. And supposing God should discover to any one, superna-

BOOK IV. turally a species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter, or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such, no body can deny) which had six senses; and imprint on his mind the ideas, conveyed to theirs, by that sixth sense; he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas, imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour, by the sounds of words, into a man, who having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth, of seeing. For our simple ideas then, which are the foundation and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I say, traditional revelation, in distinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression, which is made immediately by God, on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those impressions, delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions, one to another.

Traditional revelation may make us know propositions, knowable also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason doth.

§ 4. SECONDLY, I say, that the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas, we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of this kind, there is little need, or use of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have, that this revelation came at first from God, can never be so sure, as the knowledge we have, from the clear and distinct perception of the agreement, or disagreement of our own ideas, v. g. if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed: but that would never amount to so great a certainty, as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our senses, v. g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings, which had their original from revelation: and yet no body, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood, as Noah that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses, that it is writ in the book, supposed writ by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance, that Moses writ that book, as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation, is less still than the assurance of his senses.

Revelation cannot be admitted, against the clear evidence of reason,

§ 5. In propositions then, whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement, or disagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations, we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing, unless where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too, our assurance can be no greater, than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or over-rule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive, for a truth, any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge; v. g. the ideas of one body, and one place, do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition, that affirms the same

same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly, that we understand it right; can never be so great, as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear, intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible, in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent, under that, or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of any thing, that contradicts our knowledge. Because, tho' faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lye) revealing any proposition to us; yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation, greater than our own knowledge: since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it, which in this case, where the proposition, supposed to be revealed, contradicts our knowledge, or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us, render all our faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition, wherein he will have less light, less conduct, than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of any thing, to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give place to a proposition, whose revelation has not a greater evidence, than those principles have.

§ 6. THUS far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: but to all those, who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them; reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only, which can induce us to receive them. For, matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else; faith, as we use the word, (called commonly divine faith) has to do with no propositions, but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those, who make revelation alone the sole object of faith, can say that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such, or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed, that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing, or not believing that proposition, or book, to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to, only by the use of my reason, which can never require, or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that, which to it self appears unreasonable.

In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have abovementioned, reason is the proper judge; and revelation, tho' it may in consenting with it confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence, that it is matter of faith; which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.

BOOK IV.

Things
above reason.

§ 7. BUT, thirdly, there being many things, wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state; and that the dead shall rise, and live again: these, and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith; with which reason has directly nothing to do.

Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith.

§ 8. BUT since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation, in any of those matters, wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it, against the probable conjectures of reason. Because the mind, not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony; which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought revelation, which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province: since a man can never have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition, which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly, wherein it is delivered; as he has, that the contrary is true: and so is bound to consider and judge of it, as a matter of reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a matter of faith.

Revelation, in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.

§ 9. FIRST, whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge; that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.

SECONDLY, all propositions, whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that in those, concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth, only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against probability. For, where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true, or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth, and ground of assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination, where reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay.

In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.

§ 10. THUS far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence, or hindrance to reason; which is not injured, or disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new discoveries of truth, coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: but, whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability, in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence, that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as that of the principles of reason; and, therefore, nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged, or assented to, as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to over-rule all our opinions, prejudices, and interests, and hath a right

right to be received with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the land-marks of knowledge: This shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties, for which they were given us. CHAP. XVIII.

§ 11. IF the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct, by these boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world, will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying-up of faith, in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in a good measure ascribe those absurdities, that fill almost all the religions, which possess and divide mankind. For men, having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices, in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that in effect religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts themselves. "Credo, quia impossibile est; I believe, because it is impossible, might in a good man pass for a folly of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to chuse their opinions, or religion by. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted.

CHAP. XIX.

Of enthusiasm.

§ 1. HE, that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought, in the first place, to prepare his mind, with a love of it. For he, that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned, when he misses it. There is no body, in the commonwealth of learning, who does not profess himself a lover of truth; and there is not a rational creature, that would not take it amiss, to be thought otherwise of. And yet, for all this, one may truly say, there are very few lovers of truth, for truth-sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know, whether he be so, in earnest, is worth enquiry: and I think, there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any proposition, with greater assurance, than the proofs, it is built upon, will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth, in the love of it; loves not truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end. For the evidence, that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs, a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it, beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain, all that surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth: it being as impossible, that the love of truth should carry my assent, above the evidence there is to me, that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition, for the sake of that evidence which it has not, that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible, or probable, that it may not be true. In any truth, that gets not possession of our minds, by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or by the force of demonstration, the arguments, that gain it assent, are the vouchers and gage of its probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than such, as they deliver it to our understandings. Whatsoever credit, or authority, we give to any proposition, more than it receives from the principles and proofs, it supports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth, as such: which, as it can receive no evidence from our passions, or interests, so it should receive no tincture from them. CHAP. XIX.
Love of truth necessary.

BOOK IV. § 2. THE assuming an authority, of dictating to others, and a forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is a constant concomitant of this byas and corruption of our judgments. For how, almost, can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others belief, who has already imposed on his own? Who can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from him, in dealing with others, whose understanding is not accustomed to them, in his dealing with himself? Who does violence to his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and usurps the prerogative, that belongs to truth alone, which is to command assent, by only its own authority, i. e. by and in proportion to that evidence, which it carries with it.

Force of enthusiasm. § 3. UPON this occasion, I shall take the liberty to consider a third ground of assent, which, with some men, has the same authority, and is as confidently relied on, as either faith, or reason; I mean enthusiasm: which, laying by reason, would set up revelation without it. Whereby, in effect, it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes, in the room of it, the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation, both of opinion and conduct.

Reason and revelation. § 4. REASON is natural revelation, whereby the eternal father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates, to mankind, that portion of truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason, enlarged by a new set of discoveries, communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God. So that he, that takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much-what the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star, by a telescope.

Rife of enthusiasm. § 5. IMMEDIATE revelation, being a much easier way for men, to establish their opinions, and regulate their conduct, than the tedious and not always successful labour of strict reasoning, it is no wonder, that some have been very apt to pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves, that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven, in their actions and opinions, especially in those of them, which they cannot account for, by the ordinary methods of knowledge, and principles of reason. Hence we see, that in all ages, men, in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance to his favour, than is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the deity, and frequent communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding, by a ray darted into the mind, immediately from the fountain of light: this they understand, he has promised to do, and who then has so good a title to expect it, as those, who are his peculiar people, chosen by him, and depending on him?

Enthusiasm. § 6. THEIR minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the Spirit of God, and presently of divine authority: and, whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call, or direction, from heaven, and must be obeyed; it is a commission from above, and they cannot err, in executing it.

§ 7. THIS I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, tho' founded neither on reason, nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or over-weening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either of those two, or both together: men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they receive, from themselves; and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all easily with it, when got above common sense, and freed from all restraint of reason, and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.

§ 8. Two' the odd opinions, and extravagant actions, enthusiasm has run men into, were enough to warn them, against this wrong principle, so apt to misguide them, both in their belief and conduct; yet the love of something extraordinary, the ease and glory it is to be inspired, and be above the common and natural ways of knowledge, so flatters many men's laziness, ignorance, and vanity, that, when once they are got into this way, of immediate revelation, of illumination without search, and of certainty without proof, and without examination, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the light, infused into their understandings and cannot be mistaken; it is clear and visible there, like the light of bright sun-shine: shews itself, and needs no other proof, but its own evidence: they feel the hand of God, moving them within, and the impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken, in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure, reason hath nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves: what they have a sensible experience of, admits no doubt, needs no probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who should require to have it proved to him, that the light shines, and that he sees it? It is its own proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings light into our minds, it dispels darkness. We see it, as we do that of the sun, at noon, and need not the twilight of reason, to shew it us. This light from heaven is strong, clear, and pure, carries its own demonstration with it: and we may, as rationally, take a glow-worm to assist us to discover the sun, as to examine the celestial ray, by our dim candle, reason.

§ 9. THIS is the way of talking of these men; they are sure, because they are sure: and their persuasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet these similes so impose on them, that they serve them for certainty in themselves, and demonstration to others.

§ 10. BUT to examine, a little soberly, this internal light, and this feeling, on which they build so much. These men have, they say, clear light, and they see; they have an awakened sense, and they feel: this cannot, they are sure, be disputed them. For, when a man says he sees, or he feels, no body can deny it him, that he does so. But here, let me ask: This seeing, is it the perception of the truth of the proposition, or of this, that it is a revelation from God? This feeling, is it a perception of an inclination, or fancy, to do something, or of the Spirit of God, moving that inclination? These are two very different perceptions, and must be carefully distinguished, if we would not impose upon ourselves. I may perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet not perceive, that it is an immediate revelation from God. I may perceive the truth of a proposition in Euclid, without its being, or my perceiving it to be, a revelation: nay, I may perceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural way, and so may conclude it revealed, without perceiving that it is a revelation from God; because there be spirits, which, without being divinely commissioned, may excite those ideas in me, and lay them in such order, before my mind, that I may perceive their connection. So that the knowledge of any proposition, coming into my mind I know not how, is not a perception that it is from God. Much less is a strong persuasion, that it is true, a perception that it is from God, or so much as true. But, however it be called light and seeing, I suppose it is, at most, but belief and assurance: and the proposition, taken for a revelation, is not such as they know to be true, but take to be true. For, where a proposition is known to be true, revelation is needless; and it is hard to conceive, how there can be a revelation, to any one, of what he knows already. If, therefore, it be a proposition, which they are persuaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing. For these are two ways, whereby truth comes into the mind, wholly distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see, I know to be so, by the evidence of the thing itself: what I believe, I take to be so upon the testimony of another: but this testimony, I must know to be given, or else what ground have I

Enthusiasm,
how to be
discovered.

Book IV. of believing? I must see that it is God, that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The question then here is, How do I know, that God is the revealer of this to me; that this impression is made upon my mind, by his Holy Spirit, and that, therefore, I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the assurance is, that I am possessed with, it is groundless; whatever light I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm. For, whether the proposition, supposed to be revealed, be in itself evidently true, or visibly probable, or, by the natural ways of knowledge, uncertain, the proposition, that must be well grounded, and manifested to be true, is this, that God is the revealer of it, and that, what I take to be a revelation, is certainly put into my mind by him, and is not an illusion, dropped in by some other spirit, or raised by my own fancy. For, if I mistake not, these men receive it for true, because they presume God revealed it. Does it not then stand them upon, to examine, on what grounds they presume it to be a revelation from God? or else, all their confidence is mere presumption: and this light, they are so dazzled with, is nothing but an ignis fatuus, that leads them continually round in this circle; it is a revelation, because they firmly believe it; and they believe it, because it is a revelation.

Enthusiasm fails of evidence, that the proposition is from God.

§ 11. In all that is of divine revelation, there is need of no other proof, but that it is an inspiration from God: for he can neither deceive, nor be deceived. But how shall it be known, that any proposition, in our minds, is a truth, infused by God; a truth, that is revealed to us by him, which he declares to us, and, therefore, we ought to believe? Here it is, that enthusiasm fails of the evidence it pretends to. For men, thus possessed, boast of a light, whereby, they say, they are enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this, or that truth. But, if they know it to be a truth, they must know it to be so, either by its own self-evidence to natural reason, or by the rational proofs, that make it out to be so. If they see and know it to be a truth either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be a revelation. For they know it to be true, by the same way, that any other man naturally may know that it is so, without the help of revelation. For thus all the truths, of what kind soever, that men, uninspired, are enlightened with, came into their minds, and are established there. If they say, they know it to be true, because it is a revelation from God; the reason is good: but then, it will be demanded, how they know it to be a revelation from God? If they say, by the light it brings with it, which shines bright in their minds, and they cannot resist: I beseech them to consider, whether this be any more, than what we have taken notice of already, viz. that it is a revelation, because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the light, they speak of, is but a strong, tho' ungrounded, persuasion of their own minds, that it is a truth. For rational grounds from proofs, that it is a truth, they must acknowledge to have none; for then, it is not received as a revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds, that other truths are received: and if they believe it to be true, because it is a revelation, and have no other reason for its being a revelation, but because they are fully persuaded, without any other reason, that it is true, they believe it to be a revelation, only because they strongly believe it to be a revelation; which is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions. And what readier way can there be, to run ourselves into the most extravagant errors and miscarriages, than thus to set up fancy for our supreme and sole guide, and to believe any proposition to be true, any action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The strength of our persuasions is no evidence, at all, of their own rectitude: Crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible, as straight: and men may be as positive and peremptory in error, as in truth. How come else the untractable zealots, in different and opposite parties? For, if the light, which every one thinks he has in his mind, which in this case is nothing but the strength of his own persuasion, be an evidence that it is from God, contrary opinions may have the same title to be inspirations; and God will be not only the father of lights, but of opposite and contradictory lights, leading men contrary ways; and contradictory propositions will be divine truths, if

if an ungrounded strength of assurance be an evidence, that any proposition is a divine revelation. CHAP. XIX.

§ 12. THIS cannot be otherwise, whilst firmness of persuasion is made the cause of believing, and confidence, of being in the right, is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himself believed he did well, and that he had a call to it, when he persecuted the christians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong: but yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken. Good men are men still, liable to mistakes; and are sometimes warmly engaged in errors, which they take for divine truths, shining in their minds with the clearest light. Firmness of persuasion, no proof that any proposition is from God.

§ 13. LIGHT, true light in the mind is, or can be nothing else, but the evidence of the truth of any proposition; and, if it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light it has, or can have, is from the clearness and validity of those proofs, upon which it is received. To talk of any other light in the understanding, is to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of the prince of darkness; and, by our own consent; to give ourselves up to delusion, to believe a lye. For, if strength of persuasion be the light, which must guide us; I ask, how shall any one distinguish between the delusions of satan, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an angel of light. And they, who are led by this son of the morning, are as fully satisfied of the illumination, i. e. are as strongly persuaded, that they are enlightened, by the Spirit of God, as any one, who is so: they acquiesce and rejoice in it, are acted by it: and no body can be more sure, nor more in the right (if their own strong belief may be judge) than they. Light in the mind, what.

§ 14. HE, therefore, that will not give himself up to all the extravagancies of delusion and error, must bring this guide, of his light within, to the trial. God, when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine original, or no. When he illuminates the mind with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth, by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth, which he would have us assent to, by his authority; and convinces us, that it is from him, by some marks, which reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last judge and guide, in every thing, I do not mean that we must consult reason, and examine whether a proposition, revealed from God, can be made out, by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be a revelation from God, or no. And, if reason finds it to be revealed from God, reason then declares for it, as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit, that thorowly warms our fancies, must pass for an inspiration, if there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions, whereby to judge of our persuasions: if reason must not examine their truth, by something extrinsecal to the persuasions themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished. Revelation must be judged of, by reason.

§ 15. IF this internal light, or any proposition which, under that title, we take for inspired, be conformable to the principles of reason, or to the word of God, which is attested revelation, reason warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it, in our belief and actions: if it receive no testimony, nor evidence, from either of these rules, we cannot take it for a revelation, or so much as for true, till we have some other mark, that it is a revelation, besides our believing that it is so. Thus we see the holy men of old, who had revelations from God, had something else, besides that internal light, of assurance in their own minds, to testify to them that it was from God. They were not left to their own persuasions alone, that those persuasions were from God; but had outward signs to convince them of the author of those revelations. And, when they were to convince others, they had a power given them, to justify the truth of their commission from heaven. Belief, no proof of revelation.

BOOK IV. ven; and, by visible signs, to assert the divine authority of a message they were sent with. Moses saw the bush burn, without being consumed, and heard a voice out of it. This was something, besides finding an impulse upon his mind, to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt: and yet he thought not this enough, to authorize him to go with that message, till God, by another miracle, of his rod turned into a serpent, had assured him of a power to testify his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them, whom he was sent to. Gideon was sent by an angel, to deliver Israel from the Midianites, and yet he desired a sign to convince him, that this commission was from God. These, and several the like instances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to shew that they thought not an inward seeing, or persuasion of their own minds, without any other proof, a sufficient evidence, that it was from God, tho' the scripture does not every where mention their demanding, or having such proofs.

§ 16. IN what I have said, I am far from denying, that God can, or doth sometimes, enlighten men's minds, in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions, by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But, in such cases too, we have reason and scripture, unerring rules, to know whether it be from God, or no. Where the truth, embraced, is consonant to the revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates of right reason, or holy writ, we may be assured that we run no risk, in entertaining it as such; because, tho' perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation, which he has given us of truth. But it is not the strength of our private persuasion, within ourselves, that can warrant it to be a light, or motion from heaven: nothing can do that, but the written word of God without us, or that standard of reason, which is common to us with all men. Where reason, or scripture, is express for any opinion, or action, we may receive it, as of divine authority: but it is not the strength of our own persuasions, which can, by itself, give it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it, as much as we please; that may shew it to be a fondling of our own, but will, by no means, prove it to be an offspring of heaven, and of divine original.

C H A P. XX.

Of wrong assent, or error.

CHAP. § 1. **K**NOWLEDGE being to be had, only of visible, certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.

XX.
Causes of
error,

BUT, if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is laid down, in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded, "how men come to give their assents contrary to probability?" For there is nothing more common, than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious, than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes, and firmly adheres to. The reasons whereof, tho' they may be very various, yet, I suppose, may be all reduced to these four.

1. Want of proofs.
2. Want of ability to use them.
3. Want of will to use them.
4. Wrong measures of probability.

1. Want of
proofs.

§ 2. **F**IRST, by want of proofs, I do not mean only the want of those proofs, which are no where extant, and so are no where to be had; but the want even of those proofs, which are in being, or might be procured. And thus

thus, men want proofs, who have not the convenience, or opportunity, to make experiments and observations themselves, tending to the proof of any proposition; nor likewise the convenience to enquire into, and collect the testimonies of others: and, in this state, are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition; whose lives are worn out, only in the provisions for living. These men's opportunity of knowledge and enquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are but little instructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out to still the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man, who drudges on all his life, in a laborious trade, should be more knowing in the variety of things, done in the world, than a pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow lane, and dirty road, only to market, should be skilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more possible, that he, who wants leisure, books, and languages, and the opportunity of conversing with variety of men, should be in a condition to collect those testimonies and observations, which are in being, and are necessary to make out many, nay most of the propositions that, in the societies of men, are judged of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of assurance so great, as the belief of the points, he would build on them, is thought necessary; so that a great part of mankind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs, on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those opinions: the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious enquiries.

§ 3. WHAT shall we say then? are the greatest part of mankind, by the necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance, in those things, which are of greatest importance to them? (for of these it is obvious to enquire.) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide, but accident, and blind chance, to conduct them to their happiness, or misery? Are the current opinions, and licensed guides of every country, sufficient evidence and security to every man, to venture his greatest concerns on; nay, his everlasting happiness, or misery? Or, can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom, and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor countryman be eternally happy, for having the chance to be born in Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the ill luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some of these things, I will not here examine: but this I am sure, that men must allow one, or other of these to be true, (let them chuse which they please) or else grant, that God has furnished men with faculties, sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time at all, to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this, as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life, who might not find many vacancies, that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.

§ 4. BESIDES those, whose improvements and informations are straitened by the narrowness of their fortunes, there are others, whose largeness of fortune would plentifully enough supply books, and other requisites, for clearing of doubts, and discovering of truth: but they are cooped in close, by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those, whose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay, farther from the liberty and opportunities of a fair enquiry, than those poor and wretched labourers, we before spoke of. And, however they may seem high and great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that, which should be the freest part of man, their understandings. This is generally the case of all those, who live in places, where care is taken to propagate truth,

Obj. What shall become of those who want them? answered.

People hindered from enquiry.

BOOK IV. truth, without knowledge; where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country; and must, therefore, swallow down opinions, as silly people do empiricks pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe that they will do the cure: but, in this, are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing, what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chuse the physician, to whose conduct they would trust themselves.

2. Want of skill to use them.

§ 5. SECONDLY, those, who want skill to use those evidences they have, of probabilities; who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circumstance its due allowance, may be easily misled to assent to positions, that are not probable. There are some men of one, some but of two syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but advance one step farther. These cannot always discern that side, on which the strongest proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that, which in itself is the more probable opinion. Now, that there is such a difference between men, in respect of their understandings, I think no body, who has had any conversation with his neighbours, will question: tho' he never was at Westminster-hall, or the Exchange, on the one hand; nor at Alms-houses, or Bedlam, on the other. Which great difference in men's intellects, whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body, particularly adapted to thinking; or in the dulness, or untractableness, of those faculties, for want of use; or, as some think, in the natural differences of men's souls themselves; or some, or all of these together; it matters not here to examine: only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees, in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to so great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between some men and others, in this respect, than between some men and some beasts. But, how this comes about, is a speculation, tho' of great consequence, yet not necessary to our present purpose.

3. Want of will to use them.

§ 6. THIRDLY, there are another sort of people that want proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them: who, tho' they have riches and leisure enough, and want neither parts, nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages some men's thoughts elsewhere: laziness and idleness in general, or a particular aversion for books, study, and meditation, keep others from any serious thoughts at all: and some out of fear, that an impartial enquiry would not favour those opinions, which best suit their prejudices, lives, and designs, content themselves, without examination, to take upon trust, what they find convenient and in fashion. Thus most men, even of those that might do otherwise, pass their lives, without an acquaintance with, much less a rational assent to, probabilities, they are concerned to know, tho' they lie so much within their view, that to be convinced of them, they need but turn their eyes that way. But we know, some men will not read a letter, which is supposed to bring ill news; and many men forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear, their affairs are in no very good posture. How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks, they have a low opinion of their souls, who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald livery of coarse patches, and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or their country taylor (I mean the common opinion of those, they have conversed with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention, how unreasonable this is, for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is, to the greatest contempters of knowledge, to be found ignorant, in things they are

are concerned to know. But this at least is worth the consideration of those, who call themselves gentlemen, that, however, they may think credit, respect, power and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune; yet they will find all these still carried away from them, by men of lower condition, who surpass them in knowledge. They, who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he is certainly the most subjected, the most enflaved, who is so in his understanding. In the foregoing instances, some of the causes have been shewn of wrong assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable doctrines are not always received, with an assent proportionable to the reasons, which are to be had for their probability; but hitherto, we have considered only such probabilities, whose proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraces the error.

§ 7. FOURTHLY, there remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either *ἐπιχέου*, suspend their assent, or give it to the less probable opinion: and to this danger are those exposed, who have taken up wrong measures of probability; which are,

1. PROPOSITIONS, that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles.
2. RECEIVED hypotheses.
3. PREDOMINANT passions, or inclinations.
4. AUTHORITY.

§ 8. FIRST, the first and firmest ground of probability, is the conformity any thing has to our own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge, which we have embraced, and continue to look on, as principles. These have so great an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually, by them, we judge of truth, and measure probability, to that degree, that what is inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence, borne to these principles, is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidences of our own senses, are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing, contrary to these established rules. How much the doctrine of innate principles, and that principles are not to be proved, or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave also to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only, with assurance, believe it to be so, upon the authority of others. For he hath a strong bias, put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his assent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion, in itself not evidently true.

§ 9. THERE is nothing more ordinary, than children's receiving, into their minds, propositions (especially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurses, or those about them: which, being insinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiassed understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or false) riveted there, by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding those, of this sort, to be as ancient in their minds, as their very memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them, as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: They look on them as the urim and thummim, set up in their minds, immediately by God himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges, to which they are to appeal, in all manner of controversies.

§ 10. THIS opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined, what reception any

4. Wrong measures of probability; whereof,

1. Doubtful propositions, taken for principles.

BOOK IV.

proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internal oracles; whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to such principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great obstinacy, that is to be found in men, firmly believing quite contrary opinions, tho' many times equally absurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning, from received, traditional principles. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lye, rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist, that, from the very first dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle, constantly inculcated, viz. that he must believe as the church (i. e. those of his communion) believes, or that the pope is infallible; and this he never so much as heard questioned, till at forty, or fifty, years old, he met with one of other principles: how is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of transubstantiation? This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh, which he sees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man, of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, that he must believe his reason (for so men improperly call arguments, drawn from their principles) against his senses? Let an enthusiast be principled, that he, or his teacher, is inspired, and acted by an immediate communication of the divine Spirit, and you, in vain, bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconsistent with these principles, to be moved, by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine, even those very principles, which many never suffer themselves to do.

2. Received hypotheses.

§ 11. SECONDLY, next to these are men, whose understandings are cast into a mold, and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis. The difference between these and the former, is, that they will admit of matter of fact, and agree with dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning of reasons, and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance with their senses, as the former: they can endure to hearken to their information, a little more patiently; but will, by no means, admit of their reports, in the explanation of things; nor be prevailed on, by probabilities, which would convince them, that things are not brought about, just after the same manner, that they have decreed within themselves, that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing, for a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, to have his authority, of forty years standing, wrought out of hard rock Greek and Latin, with no small expence of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant, over-turned by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess, that what he taught his scholars, thirty years ago, was all error and mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance, at a very dear rate? What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? And whoever, by the most cogent arguments, will be prevailed with, to disrobe himself, at once, of all his old opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which, with hard study, he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in quest a-fresh of new notions? All the arguments, can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller, to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothesis, may be reduced the errors, that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis, or right principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The instances of men, contending for different opinions, which they all derive from the infallible truth of the scripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All, that call themselves christians, allow the text, that says, *pelagians*, to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty

weighty duty. But yet, how very erroneous will one of their practices be, who, understanding nothing but the French, take this rule, with one translation, to be, "repentez vous," repent; or with the other, "faitiez penitence," do penance?

§ 12. THIRDLY, probabilities, which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions, run the same fate. Let never so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning, and money on the other; it is easy to foresee, which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud-walls, resist the strongest batteries: and tho' perhaps, sometimes, the force of a clear argument may make some impression; yet they nevertheless stand firm, keep out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell a man, passionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses of the falshood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words of her's shall invalidate all their testimonies. "Quod volumus, facile credimus; what suits our wishes, is forwardly believed;" is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented; and tho' men cannot always openly gain-say, or resist the force of manifest probabilities, that make against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding, constantly to close with the more probable side; but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination, as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities.

3. Predominant passions.

§ 13. FIRST, that the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them: and the consequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be some of them incoherent. There are very few discourses so short, clear, and consistent, to which most men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of dissingenuity, or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old reply, "non persuadebis, etiam si persuaseris; tho' I cannot answer, I will not yield."

The means of evading probabilities;
1. Supposed fallacy.

§ 14. SECONDLY, manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent withheld, upon this suggestion, that "I know not, yet, all that may be said on the contrary side;" and therefore, tho' I beaten, it is not necessary I should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind. This is a refuge against conviction, so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine, when a man is quite out of the verge of it.

2. Supposed arguments for the contrary.

§ 15. BUT yet, there is some end of it: and a man, having carefully enquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness, done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total, on both sides, may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs, in matter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are so cogent and clear; and some testimonies, in matter of fact, so universal, that he cannot refuse his assent. So that, I think, we may conclude, that in propositions, where, tho' the proofs in view are of most moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect, that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced, on the contrary side, there assent, suspense, or dissent are often voluntary actions: but where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect, that there is either fallacy of words (which sober and serious consideration may discover) nor equally valid proofs, yet undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a considerate man) there, I think, a man, who has weighed them, can scarce refuse his assent to the side, on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be the probable, that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method and order, which should stamp, on paper, a coherent discourse; or that a blind, fortuitous concurrence of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of animals: in these and the like cases, I think, no body that considers them, can be one jot at a stand, which side to take, nor at all waver in his assent. Lastly, when

What probabilities determine the assent.

BOOK IV. when there can be no supposition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony of witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the matter of fact attested; which, by enquiry, is to be learned, v. g. whether there was, 1700 years ago, such a man at Rome, as Julius Cæsar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational man's power, to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows, and closes with such probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think, it is in a man's power to suspend his assent; and, perhaps, content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion, that suits with his inclination, or interest, and so stop from farther search. But that a man should afford his assent to that side, on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impossible, as it is to believe the same thing probable, and improbable, at the same time.

Where it is
in our power
to suspend it.

§ 16. As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately, or by the assistance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those objects, which I turn my eyes to, and look on, in day-light: and what, upon full examination, I find the most probable, I cannot deny my assent to. But, tho' we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent, where the probability manifestly appears, upon due consideration of all the measures of it: yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by stopping our enquiry, and not employing our faculties, in the search of any truth. If it were not so, ignorance, error, or infidelity could not in any case be a fault. Thus, in some cases, we can prevent, or suspend, our assent: but can a man, versed in modern, or antient history, doubt whether there be such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius Cæsar? Indeed, there are millions of truths, that a man is not, or may not think himself concerned to know; as whether our king Richard the Third was crook-backed, or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician, or a magician. In these and such-like cases, where the assent, one way or other, is of no importance, to the interest of any one; no action, no concernment of his, following, or depending thereon; there it is not strange, that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion, or render itself to the first comer. These, and the like opinions, are of so little weight and moment, that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty. But, where the mind judges, that the proposition has concernment in it; where the assent, or not assenting, is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good, or evil, to depend on chusing, or refusing, the right side, and the mind sets itself seriously to enquire and examine the probability: there, I think, it is not in our choice to take, which side we please, if manifest odds appear on either. The greater probability, I think, in that case, will determine the assent: and a man can no more avoid assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas.

If this be so, the foundation of error will lie, in wrong measures of probability; as the foundation of vice, in wrong measures of good.

4. Authority. § 17. FOURTHLY, the fourth and last wrong measure of probability, I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance, or error, more people, than all the other together, is that, which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter; I mean, the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends, or party, neighbourhood, or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of those of the same profession? As if honest, or bookish men could not err, or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude: yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity, it comes to me with the passport of former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it: other men have been, and are of the same opinion (for that is all is said) and, therefore,

therefore, it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up by such measures. All men are liable to error, and most men are in many points, by passion, or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives, that influenced the men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find, that it was the embracing of truth, for its own sake, that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive, upon this ground: there is no error to be named, which has not had its professors: and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

§ 18. BUT, notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right, as to say, there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions, as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the truth; but, indeed, because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. For, if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the partizans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are so zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own: much less would he have reason to think, that they took them upon the examination of arguments, and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party, that education, or interest, has engaged them in; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, shew their courage and warmth, as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If a man's life shews, that he has no serious regard for religion; for what reason should we think, that he beats his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this, or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready, for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those, who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that society. Thus men become professors of, and combatants for, those opinions, they were never convinced of, nor proselytes to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their heads: and tho' one cannot say, there are fewer improbable, or erroneous opinions in the world, than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer, that actually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the division of the sciences.

§ 1. ALL, that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, first, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, secondly, that, which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, thirdly, the ways and means, whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated: I think, science may be divided, properly, into these three sorts.

CHAP. XXI.
Three sorts.

§ 2. FIRST, the knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings, their constitutions, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little more enlarged sense of the word, I call *quæritæ*, or natural philosophy. The end of this, is bare, speculative truth; and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as number, and figure, &c.

§ 3. SECONDLY, *πρακτική*, the skill of right applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable,

VOL. I.

4 Y

under

BOOK IV. under this head is ethicks, which is the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it.

3: Σημεῖον. § 4. THIRDLY, the third branch may be called Σημεῖον, or the doctrine of signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Λογικὴ, logick; the business whereof, is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of, for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For since the things, the mind contemplates, are none of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign, or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas. And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up any where, but in the memory, a no very sure repository: therefore, to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary. Those, which men have found most convenient, and, therefore, generally make use of, are articulate sounds. The consideration, then, of ideas and words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge, in the whole extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logick and critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This is the first division of the objects of knowledge.

§ 5. THIS seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural, division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the contemplation of things themselves, for the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or the signs, the mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer information. All which three, viz. things, as they are in themselves knowable; actions, as they depend on us, in order to happiness; and the right use of signs, in order to knowledge, being *toto cælo* different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one from another.

The end of the Essay of HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.



A

L E T T E R

To the Right Reverend

Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester,

Concerning some Passages relating to

Mr. LOCKE'S Essay of Human Understanding:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordship's, in
Vindication of the TRINITY.

My LORD,



I CANNOT but look upon it as a great honour, that your Lordship, who are so thoroughly acquainted with the incomparable writings of antiquity, and know so well how to entertain your self with the great men, in the commonwealth of letters, should, at any time, take into your hand my mean papers; and so far bestow any of your valuable minutes, on my Essay of Human Understanding, as to let the world see, you have thought my notions worth your Lordship's consideration. My aim in that, as well as every thing else written by me, being purely to follow truth, as far as I could discover it; I think myself beholden to whoever shews me my mistakes, as to one who, concurring in my design, helps me forward in my way.

YOUR Lordship has been pleased to favour me with some thoughts of your's in this kind, in your late "Learned Discourse, in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity;" and I hope I may say, have gone a little out of your way, to do me that kindness; for the obligation is thereby the greater. And if your Lordship has brought in the mention of my book, in a chapter, entitled, "Objections against the Trinity, in point of Reason, answered;" when, in my whole Essay, I think, there is not to be found any thing like an objection against the Trinity: I have the more to acknowledge to your Lordship, who would not let the foreignness of the subject hinder your Lordship from endeavouring to set me right, as to some errors your Lordship apprehends in my book: when other writers, using some notions like mine, gave you that, which was occasion enough for you, to do me the favour to take notice of what you dislike in my Essay.

YOUR Lordship's name is of so great authority in the learned world, that I, who profess myself more ready, upon conviction, to recant, than I was at first to publish my mistakes, cannot pay that respect is due to it, without telling the reasons, why I still retain any of my notions, after your Lordship's having appeared dissatisfied with them. This must be my apology, and I hope such a one as your Lordship will allow, for my examining what you have printed, against several passages in my book, and my shewing the reasons, why it has not prevailed with me to quit them.

THAT your Lordship's reasonings may lose none of their force, by my misapprehending, or misrepresenting them, (a way too familiarly used in writings, that

that have any appearance of controversy) I shall crave leave to give the reader your Lordship's arguments in the full strength of your own expressions; that so, in them, he may have the advantage to see the deficiency of my answers, in any point, where I shall be so unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow the light, your Lordship affords me.

YOUR Lordship having, in the two or three preceding pages, justly, as I think, found fault with the account of reason, given by the Unitarians and a late writer, in those passages you quote out of them; and then coming to the *Nature of Substance*, p. 233. and relating what that author has said, concerning the mind's getting of simple ideas, and those simple ideas, being the sole matter and foundation of all our reasonings, your Lordship thus concludes, p. 234.

" THEN it follows, that we can have no foundation of reasoning, where there can be no such ideas, from sensation, or reflection."

" Now this is the case of substance; it is not intromitted by the senses, nor depends upon the operation of the mind; and so it cannot be within the compass of our reason. And, therefore, I do not wonder, that the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, have almost discarded substance, out of the reasonable part of the world. For they not only tell us," &c.

THIS, as I remember, is the first place, where your Lordship is pleased to quote any thing out of my "*Essay of Human Understanding*," which your Lordship does in these words following.

p. 234. " THAT we can have no idea of it by sensation, or reflection; but that nothing is signified by it, only an uncertain supposition of we know not what." and therefore it is paralleled more than once, with the Indian philosopher's " He-knew-not-what, which supported the tortoise, that supported the elephant, that supported the earth: so substance was found out only to support accidents. And that, when we talk of substances, we talk like children; who being asked a question about somewhat, which they knew not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something."

These words of mine, your Lordship brings to prove, that I am one of " the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, that have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world." An accusation, which your Lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not understand, what it is " almost to discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world." If your Lordship means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any such thing, as substance, that your Lordship will acquit me of, when your Lordship looks again into that chapter, which you have cited more than once, where your Lordship will find these words.

Human Understanding,
B. ii. c. 23.
§ 4.

" WHEN we talk, or think, of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication, or collection, of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing, called horse, or stone; yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject, which support we denote by the name, substance; tho' it be certain, we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support." And again,

§ 5. " THE same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we considering not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea, or notion, of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist; by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the nature, or substance, of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas, we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like

" ignorance

"ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations, which we experiment in ourselves within." And again,

"WHATEVER, therefore, be the secret nature of substance in general, all § 6.
"the ideas we have, of particular distinct substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, tho' unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself."

AND I further say, in the same section, "That we suppose these combinations to rest in, and to be adherent to, that unknown, common subject, which inheres not in any thing else. And that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas, they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and, therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such and such qualities; a body is a thing that is extended, figured and capable of motion; a spirit, a thing capable of thinking."

THESE, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the substance is supposed always something, besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable idea, tho' we know not what it is.

"OUR idea of body, I say, is an extended, solid substance; and our idea B. ii. c. 23.
"of our souls, is of a substance that thinks." So that, as long as there is § 22.
any such thing as body, or spirit, in the world, I have done nothing towards the discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any simple idea, or sensible quality, left, according to my way of arguing, substance cannot be discarded; because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in, and of a substance, wherein they inhere: and of this, that whole chapter is so full, that I challenge any one, who reads it, to think I have almost, or one jot, discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. And of this, man, horse, sun, water, iron, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned of distinct sorts of substances, will be my witnesses, as long as any such thing remains in being; of which I say, "that the ideas of substances are such combinations of B. ii. c. 12.
"simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct, particular things, subsisting § 6.
"by themselves, in which the supposed, or confused, idea of substance is always the first and chief."

IF by almost discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world, your Lordship means, that I have destroyed, and almost discarded the true idea, we have of it, by calling it a "substratum, a supposition of, we know not B. ii. c. 23.
"what, support of such qualities, as are capable of producing simple ideas in us, § 1.
"an obscure and relative idea: that, without knowing what it is, it is that § 2.
"which supports accidents: so that of substance, we have no idea of what it § 3.
"is, but only a confused obscure one, of what it does:" I must confess this B. ii. c. 13. § 19.
and the like, I have said of our idea of substance; and should be very glad to be convinced by your Lordship, or any body else, that I have spoken too meanly of it. He, that would shew me a more clear and distinct idea of substance, would do me a kindness I should thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians: for their account, or, idea, of it is, that it is "Ens, or res per se subsistens, et subsistans accidentibus;" which in effect is no more, but that substance is a being, or thing; or in short, something, they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is something, which supports accidents, or other simple ideas, or modes, and is not supported itself, as a mode, or an accident. So that I do not see but Burgerdicius, Sanderson, and the whole tribe of logicians, must be reckoned with "the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, who have "almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world."

BUT supposing, my Lord, that I, or these gentlemen, logicians of note in the schools, should own, that we have a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate idea of substance; would it not be a little too hard to charge us, with discarding substance out of the world? For what almost discarding, and reasonable part of the world, signifies, I must confess, I do not clearly comprehend:

but let almost, and reasonable part, signify here, what they will, for I dare say your Lordship meant something by them, would not your Lordship think you were a little hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging yourself to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of several other things which, in this very treatise, you confess our understandings come short in, and cannot comprehend, you should be accused to be one of these gentlemen, that have almost discarded God, or those other mysterious things, whereof, you contend, we have very imperfect and inadequate ideas, out of the reasonable world? For, I suppose, your Lordship means by "almost discarding out of the reasonable world," something that is blameable, for it seems not to be inserted for a commendation; and yet, I think, he deserves no blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obscure ideas, where he has no better; however, if it be inferred from thence, that either he almost excludes those things out of being, or out of rational discourse, if that be meant, by the reasonable world; for the first of these will not hold, because the being of things in the world depends not on our ideas: the latter, indeed, is true, in some degree, but is no fault; for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confused, obscure ideas, we cannot discourse and reason about those things so well, fully and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear and distinct ideas.

YOUR Lordship, I must own, with great reason, takes notice that I paralleled more than once, our idea of substance, with the Indian philosopher's he-knew-not-what, which supported the tortoise, &c.

THIS repetition is, I confess, a fault in exact writing: but I having acknowledged and excused it, in these words, in my preface; "I am not ignorant, how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let my Essay go with a fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers." And there further add, "that I did not publish my Essay for such great masters of knowledge, as your Lordship; but fitted it to men of my own size, to whom repetitions might be sometimes useful." It would not, therefore, have been besides your Lordship's generosity (who were not intended to be provoked by this repetition) to have passed by such a fault, as this, in one, who pretends not beyond the lower rank of writers. But I see your Lordship would have me exact, and without any faults; and I wish I could be so, the better to deserve your Lordship's approbation.

My saying, "that when we talk of substance, we talk like children, who being asked a question about something, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, "that it is something;" your Lordship seems mightily to lay to heart, in these words that follow.

p. 235. "If this be the truth of the case, we must still talk like children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For, if we cannot come at a rational idea of substance, we can have no principle of certainty to go upon, in this debate.

If your Lordship has any better and distincter idea of substance than mine is, which I have given an account of, your Lordship is not at all concerned in what I have there said. But those, whose idea of substance, whether a rational, or not rational idea, is like mine, something, they know not what, must in that, with me, talk like children, when they speak of something, they know not what. For a philosopher, that says, that which supports accidents is something, he knows not what; and a country-man that says, the foundation of the great church at Harlem, is supported by something, he knows not what; and a child, that stands in the dark, upon his mother's muff, and says, he stands upon something, he knows not what, in this respect talk all three alike. But if the countryman knows, that the foundation of the church at Harlem is supported by a rock, as the houses about Bristol are; or by gravel, as the houses about London are; or by wooden piles, as the houses in Amsterdam are; it is plain, that then, having a clear and distinct idea of the thing, that supports the church, he does not talk of this matter, as a child, nor will he, of the support of accidents,

accidents, when he has a clearer and more distinct idea of it, than that it is barely something. But as long as we think like children, in cases, where our ideas are no clearer, nor distincter than theirs, I agree with your Lordship, that I know not how it can be remedied, but that we must talk like them.

YOUR Lordship's next paragraph begins thus: "I do not say, that we can P. 235:
" have a clear idea of substance, either by sensation or reflection; but from
" hence I argue, that this is a very insufficient distribution of the ideas, neces-
" sary to reason."

YOUR Lordship here argues against a proposition, that I know no body that holds: I am sure the author of *The Essay of Human Understanding* never thought, nor, in that *Essay*, hath any where said, that the ideas, that come into the mind by sensation and reflection, are all the ideas that are necessary to reason, or that reason is exercised about; for then, he must have laid by all the ideas of simple and mixed modes and relations, and the complex ideas, of the species of substances, about which he has spent so many chapters; and must have denied that these complex ideas are the objects of men's thoughts, or reasonings, which he is far enough from. All that he has said about sensation and reflection is, that all our simple ideas are received by them, and that these simple ideas are the foundation of all our knowledge, for as much as all our complex, relative, and general ideas are made by the mind, abstracting, enlarging, comparing, compounding and referring, &c. these simple ideas, and their several combinations, one to another, whereby complex and general ideas are formed, of modes, relations, and the several species of substances, all which are made use of, by reason, as well as the other faculties of the mind.

I THEREFORE agree with your Lordship, that the ideas of sensation, or reflection, is a very insufficient distribution of the ideas necessary to reason. Only my agreement with your Lordship had been more intire to the whole sentence, if your Lordship had rather said, ideas made use of by reason; because I do not well know what is meant by ideas, necessary to reason. For reason, being a faculty of the mind, nothing, in my poor opinion, can properly be said to be necessary to that faculty, but what is required to its being. As nothing is necessary to fight in a man, but such a constitution of the body and organ, that a man may have the power of seeing; so I submit it to your Lordship, whether any thing can properly be said, to be necessary to reason in a man, but such a constitution of body, or mind, or both, as may give him the power of reasoning. Indeed, such a particular sort of object, or instruments, may be some times said to be necessary to the eye, but that is never said, in reference to the faculty of seeing, but in reference to some particular end of seeing; and then a microscope, and a mite may be necessary to the eye, if the end proposed be, to know the shape and parts of that animal. And so, if a man would reason about substance, then the idea of substance is necessary to his reason: but yet, I doubt not, but that many a rational creature has been, who, in all his life, never bethought himself of any necessity his reason had, of an idea of substance.

YOUR Lordship's next words are; "for, besides these, there must be some P. 233.
" general ideas, which the mind doth form, not by mere comparing those ideas
" it has got, from sense, or reflection; but by forming distinct general notions of
" things from particular ideas."

HERE, again, I perfectly agree with your Lordship, that, besides the particular ideas, received from sensation and reflection, the mind "forms general
" ideas, not by mere comparing those ideas it has got by sensation and reflection;" for this I do not remember I ever said. But this I say, "ideas become general, B. iii. c. 3.
" by separating them from the circumstances of time and place, and any other § 6.
" ideas, that may determine them to this, or that, particular existence. By
" this way of abstraction they are made, &c." And to the same purpose, I B. i. c. 11.
explain myself in another place. § 9.

YOUR Lordship says, "the mind forms general ideas, by forming general
" nations of things from particular ideas." And I say, "the mind forms
" general

"general ideas, by abstracting from particular ones." So that there is no difference, that I perceive, between us, in this matter, but only a little in expression.

- P. 235. IT follows, "and among these general notions, or rational ideas, substance is one of the first; because we find, that we can have no true conceptions of any modes, or accidents, (no matter which) but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, wherein they are. Since it is a repugnancy to our first conceptions of things, that modes, or accidents, should subsist by themselves; and, therefore, the rational idea of substance, is one of the first and most natural ideas in our minds."

WHETHER the general idea of substance be one of the first, or most natural, ideas in our minds, I will not dispute with your Lordship, as not being, I think, very material to the matter in hand. But, as to the idea of substance, what it is, and how we come by it, your Lordship says, "it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves; and, therefore, we must conceive a substratum, wherein they are."

- B. ii. c. 23. § 4. AND, I say, "because we cannot conceive how simple ideas of sensible qualities should subsist alone, or one in another, we suppose them existing in, and

§ 1. "supported by, some common subject." Which I, with your Lordship, call also substratum.

WHAT now can be more consonant to itself, than what your Lordship and I have said, in these two passages, is consonant to one another? whereupon, my Lord, give me leave, I beseech you, to boast to the world, that what I have said, concerning our general idea of substance, and the way, how we come by it, has the honour to be confirmed by your Lordship's authority. And that from hence I may be sure the saying, [that the general idea, we have of substance, is, that it is a substratum, or support, to modes or accidents, wherein they do subsist: and that the mind forms it, because it cannot conceive how they should subsist of themselves,] has no objection in it against the Trinity; for then your Lordship would not, I know, be of that opinion, nor own it, in a chapter, where you are answering objections against the Trinity; however my words, which amount to no more, have been (I know not how) brought into that chapter: tho' what they have to do there, I must confess to your Lordship, I do not yet see.

- P. 236. IN the next words, your Lordship says, "but we are still told, that our understandings can have no other ideas, but either from sensation, or reflection."

B. ii. c. 1. § 5. THE words of that section your Lordship quotes, are these; "the understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions, they produce in us: and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in one of those two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding, and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection: and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will upon taking a strict view, see, that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted, tho', perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter."

THESE words seem to me to signify something different, from what your Lordship has cited out of them; and if they do not, were intended, I am sure, by me, to signify all those complex ideas of modes, relations, and specifick substances; which how the mind itself forms out of simple ideas, I have shewn, in the following part of my book, and intended to refer to it, by these words,

"as

"as we shall see hereafter," with which I close that paragraph. But if by ideas, your Lordship signifies simple ideas, in the words you have set down, I grant, then, they contain my sense, viz. "that our understandings can have (i. e. in the natural exercise of our faculties) "no other simple ideas, but either "from sensation, or reflection."

YOUR Lordship goes on: "and [we are still told] that herein chiefly lies the "excellency of mankind above brutes, that these cannot abstract and enlarge "ideas, as men do."

HAD your Lordship done me the favour to have quoted the place in my book, from whence you had taken these words, I should not have been at a loss, where to find them. Those in my book, which I can remember, any where, come nearest to them, run thus.

"THIS, I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not B. ii. c. 11. "at all in brutes; and that the having of general ideas, is that, which puts a § 10. "perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes; and is an excellency, which the "faculties of brutes do, by no means, attain to."

THO', speaking of the faculties of the human understanding, I took occasion, by the by, to conjecture how far brutes partook with men, in any of the intellectual faculties; yet it never entered into my thoughts, on that occasion, to compare the utmost perfections of human nature with that of brutes; and, therefore, was far from saying, "herein chiefly lies the excellency of mankind above brutes, that these cannot abstract and enlarge their ideas, as men do." For it seems to me an absurdity, I would not willingly be guilty of, to say, that the "excellency of mankind lies chiefly, or any ways in this, that brutes cannot abstract." For brutes being not able to do any thing, cannot be any excellency of mankind. The ability of mankind does not lie in the impotency, or disabilities of brutes. If your Lordship had charged me to have said, that herein lies one excellency of mankind above brutes, viz. that men can, and brutes cannot abstract; I must have owned it to be my sense: but what I ought to say, to what your Lordship approved, or disproved of, in it, I shall better understand, when I know to what purpose your Lordship was pleased to cite it.

THE immediately following paragraph runs thus: "but how comes the general idea, of substance, to be framed in our minds?" Is this by "abstracting "and enlarging simple ideas? no, "but it is by a complication of many simple B. 2. c. 23. "ideas together: because, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by § 1. "themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum, wherein they "do subsist, and from whence they do result, which, therefore, we call, substance." And is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being of substance, "that we accustom our selves to suppose a substratum?" "Is that custom grounded upon true reason, or not? If not, then accidents, or modes, "must subsist of themselves, and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support "them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, "but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to."

HEREIN your Lordship seems to charge me with two faults: one, that I make "the general idea of substance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas together:" the other, as if I had said, the being of substance had no other foundation, but the fancies, of men.

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your Lordship, that I say, in more places than one, and particularly those above quoted, where, ex professo, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abstracting; and, therefore, could not be understood to mean, that that of substance was made any other way; however my pen might have slipped, or the negligence of expression, where I might have something else, than the general idea of substance in view, might make me seem to say so.

THAT I was not speaking of the general idea of substance, in the passage your Lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is, "of the complex ideas of substances." And the first section of it, which your Lordship cites, for those words you have set down, stands thus:

B. ii. c. 23.
§ 1.

"THE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of
" the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior
" things, or by reflections on its own operations, takes notice also, that a cer-
" tain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being pre-
" sumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehen-
" sion, and made use of, for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject,
" by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and
" consider as one simple idea, which, indeed, is a complication of many ideas to-
" gether: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist
" by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum, wherein they
" do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call sub-
" stance."

IN which words, I do not observe any, that deny the general idea of substance
to be made by abstraction; nor any that say, "it is made by a complication of
many simple ideas together." But speaking, in that place, of the ideas of distinct
substances, such as man, horse, gold, &c. I say they are made up of certain com-
binations of simple ideas; which combinations are looked upon, each of them,
as one simple idea, tho' they are many; and we call it by one name of substance,
tho' made up of modes, from the custom of supposing a substratum, wherein
that combination does subsist. So that, in this paragraph, I only give an account
of the idea of distinct substances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, tho'
they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on, as
one idea, called by one name, as making distinct sorts of substances.

B. ii. c. 23.
§ 2. BUT that my notion, of substance in general, is quite different from these, and
has no such combination of simple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate fol-
lowing words, where I say, "the idea of pure substance in general, is only a sup-
position of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of pro-
ducing simple ideas in us." And these two, I plainly distinguish all along, par-

§ 6. ticularly where I say, "whatever, therefore, be the secret and abstract nature
" of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular, distinct substances,
" are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, tho'
" unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself."

THE other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of substance to be
doubtful, or rendered it so, by the imperfect and ill grounded idea I have given
of it. To which I beg leave to say, that I ground not the being, but the idea of
substance, on our accustoming ourselves to suppose some substratum; for it is of
the idea alone, I speak there, and not of the being of substance. And having every
where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a substance: I cannot be supposed
to question, or doubt of, the being of substance, till I can question, or doubt of,

Ib. § 29, my own being. Further I say, "sensation convinces us that there are solid, ex-
tended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones." So that I
think the being of substance is not shaken, by what I have said: and if the idea
of it should be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being
of substance, would not be at all shaken, by my saying, we had but an obscure,
imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accustoming ourselves to
suppose some substratum; or indeed, if I should say, we had no idea of sub-
stance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being,
and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example; it cannot be doubted
but there are distinct species of separate spirits, of which yet we have no distinct
ideas at all: it cannot be questioned but spirits have ways of communicating their
thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.

THE being, then, of substance being safe and secure, notwithstanding any thing
I have said, let us see whether the idea of it be not so too. Your Lordship asks,
P. 236, with concern, "and is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being (if your
Lordship please, let it be the idea) "of substance, that we accustom ourselves
to suppose a substratum; is that custom grounded upon true reason, or no?" I
B. ii. c. 23.
§ 4. have said, that it is grounded upon this, "that we cannot conceive how sim-
ple ideas of sensible qualities should subsist alone, and, therefore, we
" suppose

"suppose them to exist in, and to be supported by, some common subject, which support we denote by the name, substance." Which I think is a true reason, because it is the same your Lordship grounds the supposition of a substratum on, in this very page; even on "the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves." So that I have the good luck, here again, to agree with your Lordship: and consequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the substratum to modes, or accidents, which is our idea of substance in general, is founded in this, "that we cannot conceive how modes, or accidents, can subsist by themselves."

THE words next following, are: "if it be grounded, upon plain and evident P. 237. reason, then we must allow an idea of substance, which comes not in by sensation, or reflection; and so we may be certain of something, which we have not, by those ideas."

THESE words of your Lordship's contain nothing, as I see in them, against me: for I never said, that the general idea of substance comes in by sensation and reflection; or, that it is a simple idea of sensation, or reflection, tho' it be ultimately founded in them: for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of something, or being, with the relation of a support to accidents. For general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection, but are the creatures, or inventions, of the understanding, as, I think, I have shewn; and also, how the mind makes them from ideas, which it has got by sensation and reflection: and as to the ideas of relation, how the mind forms them, and how B. iii. c. 3. they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in, ideas of sensation and reflection, I have likewise shewn.

BUT that I may not be mistaken what I mean, when I speak of ideas of sensation and reflection, as the materials of all our knowledge; give me leave, my Lord, to set down here a place or two out of my book, to explain myself; as I thus speak of ideas of sensation and reflection. B. ii. c. 25. & c. 28. § 18.

"THAT these, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several B. ii. c. 1. modes, and the compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all § 5. our whole stock of ideas: and we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in one of these two ways." This thought, in another place, I express thus:

"THESE simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and B. ii. c. 2. furnished to the mind, only by those two ways above-mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection." And again, § 2.

"THESE are the most considerable of those simple ideas, which the mind has, B. ii. c. 7. and out of which is made all its other knowledge: all which it receives by § 10. the two fore-mentioned ways, of sensation and reflection." And,

"THUS I have, in a short draught, given a view of our original ideas, from B. ii. c. 21. whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up." § 73.

THIS, and the like said in other places, is what I have thought concerning ideas of sensation and reflection, as the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and consequently of all our knowledge. I have set down these particulars out of my book, that the reader having a full view of my opinion herein, may the better see what in it is liable to your Lordship's reprehension. For that your Lordship is not very well satisfied with it, appears not only by the words under consideration, but by these also: "But we are still told, that our P. 236. understanding can have no other ideas, but either from sensation, or reflection. And, let us suppose this principle to be true, that the simple ideas, by sensation or reflection, are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning." P. 240.

YOUR Lordship's argument, in the passage we are upon, stands thus: "If the general idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason, then we must allow an idea of substance, which comes not in by sensation, or reflection." This is a consequence which, with submission, I think will not hold, because it is founded upon a supposition which, I think, will not hold, viz. that reason and ideas are inconsistent; for if that supposition be not true, then the general idea of substance may be grounded on plain and evident reason: and

yet

and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on, and derived from, ideas, which come in by sensation or reflection, and so cannot be said to come in by sensation or reflection.

To explain myself, and clear my meaning in this matter: all the ideas of all the sensible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by sensation; the ideas of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, knowing, &c. come into my mind by reflection: the ideas of these qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind, to be by themselves inconsistent with existence; or, as your Lordship P. 236. well expresses it, "we find that we can have no true conception of any modes, or accident, but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, wherein they are;" i. e. that they cannot exist, or subsist, of themselves. Hence the mind perceives their necessary connection with inherence, or being supported; which being a relative idea, superadded to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a support. For I never denied, that the mind could frame to itself ideas of relation, but have shewed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation. But because a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a supporter, or a support, is not represented to the mind, by any clear and distinct idea; therefore the obscure, indistinct, vague idea of thing, or something, is all that is left to be the positive idea, which has the relation of a support, or substratum, to modes, or accidents; and that general indetermined idea of something, is, by the abstraction of the mind, derived also from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection: and thus the mind, from the positive, simple ideas, got by sensation or reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of substance; which, without these positive simple ideas, it would never have.

THIS your Lordship (without giving, by retail, all the particular steps of the mind in this business) has well expressed in this more familiar way.

P. 236. "WE find, we can have no true conception of any modes, or accidents, but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, wherein they are; since it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes, or accidents, should subsist by themselves."

Ibid. HENCE your Lordship calls it the rational idea of substances: and says, P. 253. "I grant that, by sensation and reflection, we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reason is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves." So that if this be that, which your Lordship means by the rational idea of substance, I see nothing there is in it, against what I have said, that it is founded on simple ideas of sensation or reflection, and that it is a very obscure idea.

YOUR Lordship's conclusion from your foregoing words, is, "and so we P. 273. may be certain of some things, which we have not by those ideas:" which is a proposition, whose precise meaning your Lordship will forgive me, if I profess, as it stands there, I do not understand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your Lordship means, we may certainly know the existence of something, which we have not by those ideas; or certainly know the distinct properties of something, which we have not by those ideas; or certainly know the truth of some proposition, which we have not by those ideas: for to be certain of something, may signify either of these. But, in which soever of these it be meant, I do not see how I am concerned in it.

YOUR Lordship's next paragraph is as followeth:

P. 273. "THE idea of substance, we are told again, is nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante; which according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding. But very little weight is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology, when the word is used in another sense by the best authors, such as Cicero and Quintilian; who take substance for the same as essence, as Valla hath proved; and so the Greek word imports; but Boetius in translating Aristotle's Predicaments, rather chose the word substance, as more proper to express a compound being, and
"reserved

" reserved essence for what was more simple and immaterial. And in this P. 273.
 " sense, substance was not applied to God, but only essence, as St. Augustin
 " observes."

YOUR Lordship here seems to dislike my taking notice, that the derivation of the word substance favours the idea we have of it : and your Lordship tells me " that very little weight is to be laid on a bare grammatical etymology." Tho' little weight were to be laid on it, if there were nothing else to be laid for it ; yet when it is brought to confirm an idea, which your Lordship allows of, nay, calls a rational idea, and says is founded in evident reason, I do not see what your Lordship had to blame in it. For tho' Cicero and Quintilian take substantia for the same with essence, as your Lordship says ; or for riches and estate, as I think they also do ; yet I suppose it will be true, that substantia is derived a substando, and that that shews the original import of the word. For, my Lord, I have been long of opinion, as may be seen in my book, that if we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for ; and therefore I must beg your Lordship to excuse this conceit of mine, this etymological observation, especially since it hath nothing in it against the truth, nor against your Lordship's idea of substance.

BUT your Lordship opposes to this etymology, the use of the word substance, by the best authors, in another sense ; and thereupon gives the world a learned account of the use of the word substance, in a sense, wherein it is not taken for the substratum of accidents : however, I think it a sufficient justification of myself to your Lordship, that I use it in the same sense, your Lordship does, and that your Lordship thinks not fit to govern yourself, by those authorities ; for then, your Lordship could not apply the word substance to God, as Boethius did not, and as your Lordship has proved out of St. Augustin, that it was not applied. Tho' I guess it is the consideration of substance, as it is applied to God, that brings it into your Lordship's present discourse. But if your Lordship and I (if without presumption I may join myself with you) have, in the use of the word, substance, quitted the example of the best authors, I think the authority of the schools, which has a long time been allowed in philosophical terms, will bear us out in this matter.

IN the remaining part of this paragraph it follows : " but afterwards, the P. 238.
 " names of substance and essence were promiscuously used, with respect to God
 " and his creatures ; and do imply, that which makes the real being, as distin-
 " guished from modes and properties. And so the substance and essence of a
 " man are the same ; not being taken for the individual substance, which cannot
 " be understood without particular modes and properties ; but the general sub-
 " stance, or nature, of man, abstractly from all the circumstances of persons."

HERE your Lordship makes these terms, general substance, nature and essence, to signify the same thing ; how properly, I shall not here inquire. Your Lordship goes on.

" AND I desire to know, whether, according to true reason, that be not a P. 238.
 " clear idea of man ; not of Peter, James or John, but of a man, as
 " such ?"

THIS, I think, no body denies : nor can any one deny it, who will not say, that the general, abstract idea, which he has in his mind of a sort, or species of animals, that he calls man, ought not to have that general name man applied to it : for that is all (as I humbly conceive) which these words of your Lordship here amount to.

" THIS, your Lordship says, is not a mere universal name, or mark, or Ibid.
 " sign." Your Lordship says it is an idea, and every body must grant it to be an idea : and therefore it is, in my opinion, safe enough from being thought a mere name, or mark, or sign of that idea. For he must think very oddly, who takes the general name of any idea, to be the general idea itself : it is a mere mark, or sign, of it, without doubt, and nothing else. Your Lordship adds,

P. 238. "BUT there is as clear and distinct a conception of this in our minds, as we can have from any such simple ideas, as are conveyed by our senses."

If your Lordship means by this, (as the words seem to me to import) that we have as clear and distinct an idea of the general substance, or nature, or essence of the species, man, as we have of the particular colour and figure of a man, when we look on him, or of his voice, when we hear him speak, I must crave leave to dissent from your Lordship. Because the idea, we have of the substance, wherein the properties of a man do inhere, is a very obscure idea: so in that part, our general idea of man is obscure and confused: as also, how that substance is differently modified in the different species of creatures, so as to have different properties, and powers, whereby they are distinguished, that also we have very obscure, or rather no distinct ideas of at all. But there is no obscurity, or confusion at all, in the idea of a figure, that I clearly see, or of a sound, that I distinctly hear; and such are, or may be, the ideas that are conveyed in, by sensation or reflection. It follows:

P. 238. "I do not deny that the distinction of particular substances, is by the several modes and properties of them (which they may call a complication of simple ideas, if they please) but I do assert, that the general idea, which relates to the essence, without these, is so just and true an idea, that, without it, the complication of simple ideas will never give us a right notion of it."

HERE, I think, that your Lordship asserts, "that the general idea of the real essence (for so I understand general idea, which relates to the essence) without the modes and properties, is a just and true idea." For example: the real essence of a thing, is that internal constitution, on which the properties of that thing depend. Now your Lordship seems to me to acknowledge, that that internal constitution, or essence, we cannot know: for your Lordship says,

P. 256. "that from the powers and properties of things, which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal essence of things, as these powers and properties discover." That is unquestionably so; but if those powers and properties discover no more of those internal essences, but that there are internal essences, we shall know only that there are internal essences, but shall have no idea, or conception at all, of what they are; as your Lordship seems to confess, in the next words of the same 256th page, where you add; "I do not say, that we can know all essences of things alike, nor that we can attain to a perfect understanding of all that belong to them; but if we can know so much, as that there are certain beings in the world, endued with such distinct powers and properties, what is it we complain of the want of?" Wherein your Lordship seems to terminate our knowledge of those internal essences in this, "that there are certain beings endued with distinct powers and properties." But what these beings, these internal essences are, that we have no distinct conceptions of: as your Lordship confesses yet plainer, a little after,

P. 257. in these words: "for altho' we cannot comprehend the internal frame and constitution of things." So that we having, as is confessed, no idea of what this essence, this internal constitution of things, on which their properties depend, is: how can we say it is any way a just and true idea? But your Lordship says, "it is so just and true an idea, that, without it, the contemplation of simple ideas will never give us a right notion of it." All the idea we have of it, which is only that there is an internal, tho' unknown constitution of things, on which their properties depend, simple ideas of sensation and reflection, and the contemplation of them have alone helped us to; and because they can help us no further, that is the reason, we have no perfecter notions of it.

THAT, which your Lordship seems to me principally to drive at, in this and the foregoing paragraph, is, to assert, that the general substance of man, and so of any other species, is that, which makes the real being of that species, abstractly from the individuals of that species. By general substance, here, I suppose, your Lordship means the general idea of substance: and that which induces me to take the liberty to suppose so, is, that I think your Lordship is
here

here discoursing of the idea of substance, and how we come by it. And if your Lordship should mean otherwise, I must take the liberty to deny there is any such thing, in *rerum natura*, as a general substance that exists itself, or makes any thing.

TAKING it, then, for granted, that your Lordship says, that this is the general idea of substance, viz. "that it is that, which makes the real being of any thing; your Lordship says, that it is as clear and distinct a conception in our minds, as we can have from any such simple ideas, as are conveyed by our senses." Here I must crave leave to dissent from your Lordship. Your Lordship says, in the former part of this page, "that substance and essence do imply that, which makes the real being." Now what I beseech your Lordship, do these words, that which, here signify more than something? And the idea expressed by something, I am apt to think your Lordship will not say is as clear and distinct a conception, or idea, in the mind, as the idea of the red colour of a cherry, or the bitter taste of wormwood, or the figure of a circle, brought into the mind by the senses.

YOUR Lordship farther says, "it makes (whereby, I suppose, your Lordship means, constitutes, or is) the real being, as distinguished from modes and properties."

For example, my Lord, strip this supposed, general idea of a man, or gold, of all its modes and properties, and then tell me, whether your Lordship has as clear and distinct an idea, of what remains, as you have of the figure of the one, or the yellow colour of the other. I must confess the remaining something, to me affords so vague, confused and obscure an idea, that I cannot say, I have any distinct conception of it; for, barely by being something, it is not in my mind clearly distinguished from the figure, or voice of a man, or the colour, or taste of a cherry, for they are something too. If your Lordship has a clear and distinct idea of that "something, which makes the real being as distinguished from all its modes and properties," your Lordship must enjoy the privilege of the fight and clear ideas you have: nor can you be denied them, because I have not the like; the dimness of my conceptions must not pretend to hinder the clearness of your Lordship's, any more than the want of them, in a blind man, can debar your Lordship of the clear and distinct ideas of colours. The obscurity I find in my own mind, when I examine what positive, general, simple idea of substance I have, is such as I profess, and further than that I cannot go: but what, and how clear it is in the understanding of a seraph, or of an elevated mind, that I cannot determine. Your Lordship goes on.

"I must do that right to the ingenious author of *The Essay of Human Understanding* (from whence these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them) that he makes the case of spiritual and corporeal substances to be alike, as to their ideas. And, that we have as clear a notion of a spirit, as we have of a body; the one being supposed to be the substratum to those simple ideas, we have from without, and the other of those operations, we find within ourselves. And that it is as rational to affirm, there is no body, because we cannot know its essence, as it is called, or have no idea of the substance of matter; as to say there is no spirit, because we know not its essence, or have no idea of a spiritual substance." P. 239.

FROM hence it follows, that we may be certain, that there are both spiritual and bodily substances, altho' we can have no clear and distinct ideas of them. But, if our reason depend upon our clear and distinct ideas, how is this possible? We cannot reason without clear ideas, and yet we may be certain without them; can we be certain without reason? Or, doth our reason give us true notions of things, without these ideas? If it be so, this new hypothesis about reason must appear to be very unreasonable."

THAT which your Lordship seems to argue here, is, that we may be certain, without clear and distinct ideas. Who your Lordship here argues against, under the title, of this new hypothesis about reason, I confess I do not know. For I do not remember, that I have any where placed certainty, only in clear and distinct

ting ideas, but in the clear and visible connection of any of our ideas, be those ideas, what they will; as will appear to any one who will look into B. iv. c. 4. § 18. and B. iv. c. 6. § 3. of my Essay, in the latter of which, he will find these words: "certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement, or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition." As, in the proposition your Lordship mentions, v. g. "that we may be certain there are spiritual and "bodily substances;" or, that bodily substances do exist, is a proposition, of whose truth we may be certain; and so of spiritual substances. Let us now examine, wherein the certainty of these propositions consists.

FIRST, as to the existence of bodily substances, I know, by my senses, that something extended, and solid, and figured does exist; for my senses are the utmost evidence and certainty I have, of the existence of extended, solid, figured things. These modes being, then, known to exist by our senses, the existence of them (which I cannot conceive can subsist, without something to support them) makes me see the connection of those ideas, with a support, or as it is called, a subject of inhesion, and so consequently the connection of that support (which cannot be nothing) with existence. And thus I come by a certainty of the existence of that something, which is a support of those sensible modes, tho' I have but a very confused, loose, and undetermined idea of it, signified by the name substance. After the same manner, experimenting thinking in myself, by the existence of thought in me, to which something, that thinks, is evidently and necessarily connected in my mind; I come to be certain that there exists in me, something that thinks, tho' of that something, which I call substance also, I have but a very obscure, imperfect idea.

BEFORE I go any farther, it is fit I return my acknowledgments to your Lordship, for the good opinion you are pleased here to express of the "author of "The Essay of Human Understanding," and that you do not impute to him the ill use, some may have made of his notions. But he craves leave to say, that he should have been better preserved from the hard and sinister thoughts, which some men are always ready for, if in what you have here published, your Lordship had been pleased to have shewn where you directed your discourse against him, and where against others, from p. 234. to p. 262. of your Vindication of the Trinity. For nothing, but my book and my words, being quoted, the world will be apt to think that I am the person, who argue against the Trinity, and deny mysteries, against whom your Lordship directs those pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over with great attention, yet, in many places, I cannot discern, whether it be against me, or any body else, that your Lordship is arguing. That which often makes the difficulty is, that I do not see how, what I say, does at all concern the controversy your Lordship is engaged in, and yet I alone am quoted. Your Lordship goes on.

P. 240. "LET us suppose this principle to be true," that the simple ideas, by sensation or reflection, are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning: "I ask then, how we come to be certain, that there are spiritual substances "in the world, since we can have no clear and distinct ideas concerning them? "Can we be certain, without any foundation of reason? This is a new sort of "certainty, for which we do not envy these pretenders to reason. But methinks, they should not at the same time assert the absolute necessity of these "ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge "without them. If there be any other method, they overthrow their own "principle; if there be none, how come they to any certainty, that there are "both bodily and spiritual substances?"

THIS paragraph, which continues to prove, that we may have certainty without clear and distinct ideas, I would flatter myself is not meant against me, because it opposes nothing that I have said; and so shall not say any thing to it, but only set it down to do your Lordship right, that the reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how he will easily overlook me, and think I am not at all concerned in it, since my words alone are quoted, in several pages immediately preceding

preceding and following: and in the very next paragraph it is said, how they come to know; which word, they, must signify some body besides the author of Christianity not mysterious; and then I think, by the whole tenor of your Lordship's discourse, no body will be left but me, that can possibly be taken to be the other: for, in the same paragraph, your Lordship says, "the same persons say, that, notwithstanding their ideas, it is possible for matter to think."

I KNOW not what other person says so, but I; but if any one does, I am sure no person but I, say so in my book, which your Lordship has quoted for them, viz. *Human Understanding*, B. iv. c. 3. This which is a riddle to me, the more amazes me, because I find it in a treatise of your Lordship's, who so perfectly understands the rules and methods of writing, whether in controversy, or any other way. But this, which seems wholly new to me, I shall better understand, when your Lordship pleases to explain it. In the mean time, I mention it as an apology for myself, if sometimes I mistake your Lordship's aim, and so misapply my answer. What follows in your Lordship's next paragraph, is this:

"As to these latter (which is my business) I must enquire farther, how they P. 240.

"come to know there are such? The answer is," by self-reflection on those powers, we find in ourselves, which cannot come from a mere bodily substance.

"I allow the reason to be very good," but the question I ask is, "whether

"this argument be from the clear and distinct idea, or not?" We have ideas,

in our selves, of the several operations of our minds, of knowing, willing, con-

sidering, &c. which cannot come from a bodily substance. "Very true; but

"is all this contained in the simple idea of these operations? How can that be,

"when the same persons say, that notwithstanding their ideas, it is possible for

"matter to think? For it is said, "that we have the ideas of matter and

"thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any material be-

"ing thinks, or not; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our

"own ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether omnipotency hath not

"given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive, or think.

"If this be true, then, for all that we can know, by our ideas of matter and

"thinking, matter may have a power of thinking: and, if this hold, then it

"is impossible to prove a spiritual substance in us, from the idea of thinking:

"for, how can we be assured, by our ideas, that God hath not given such a

"power of thinking to matter, so disposed as our bodies are? Especially since

"it is said, that, in respect of our notions, it is not much more remote from

"our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, super-add, to our

"idea of matter, a faculty of thinking, than that he should super-add to it

"another substance, with a faculty of thinking." Whoever asserts this, can

"never prove a spiritual substance in us, from a faculty of thinking; because he

"cannot know, from the idea of matter and thinking, that matter so disposed

"cannot think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the

"matter of our bodies so, as to be capable of it."

THESE words, my Lord, I am forced to take to myself; for tho' your Lord-

ship has put it, the same persons say, in the plural number, yet there is no body

quoted for the following words, but my Essay; nor do I think any body, but

I, has said so. But so it is, in this present chapter, I have the good luck to be

joined with others, for what I do not say, and others with me for what, I ima-

gine, they do not say; which, how it came about, your Lordship can best re-

solve. But to the words themselves: in them your Lordship argues, that,

upon my principles, "it cannot be proved that there is a spiritual substance in

us." To which, give me leave, with submission, to say, that I think it may be

proved from my principles, and I think I have done it; and the proof in my

book stands thus. First, we experiment in our selves thinking. The idea of

this action, or mode of thinking, is inconsistent with the idea of self-subsistence;

and, therefore, has a necessary connection with a support, or subject of inhesion:

the idea of that support is what we call substance; and so from thinking, ex-

perimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking substance in us, which, in my

sense, is a spirit. Against this your Lordship will argue, that, by what I have said, of the possibility that God may, if he pleases, super-add to matter a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved, that there is a spiritual substance in us, because, upon that supposition, it is possible it may be a material substance, that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, that the general idea of substance being the same every where, the modification of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a spirit, without considering what other modifications it has, as, whether it has the modification of solidity, or no. As, on the other side, substance, that has the modification of solidity, is matter, whether it has the modification of thinking, or no. And, therefore, if your Lordship means by a spiritual, an immaterial substance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my principles can it be proved (your Lordship meaning, as I think you do, demonstratively proved) that there is an immaterial substance in us, that thinks. Tho'

B. iv. c. 10. I presume, from what I have said about the supposition of a system of matter, § 16. thinking (which there demonstrates that God is immaterial) will prove it in the highest degree probable, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. But your Lordship thinks not probability enough; and by charging the want of demonstration upon my principles, that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable, from principles of philosophy. That demonstration I should with joy receive from your Lordship, or any one. For, tho' all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without it, as I have shewn, yet it would be a great advance of our knowledge in nature and philosophy.

To what I have said in my book, to shew that all the great ends of religion and morality are secured, barely by the immortality of the soul, without a necessary supposition that the soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, that immortality may and shall be annexed to that, which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal, as the apostle expressly declares in these words; "for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."

1 Cor. xv.
53.

PERHAPS my using the word spirit, for a thinking substance, without excluding materiality out of it, will be thought too great a liberty, and such as deserves censure, because I leave immateriality out of the idea, I make it a sign of. I readily own, that words should be sparingly ventured on, in a sense wholly new; and nothing, but absolute necessity, can excuse the boldness of using any term, in a sense, whereof we can produce no example. But, in the present case, I think I have great authorities to justify me. The soul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us, which thinks. And he, that will look into the first book of Cicero's Tusculan questions, and into the sixth book of Virgil's *Æneids*, will find that these two great men, who of all the Romans best understood philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny, the soul to be a subtil matter, which might come under the name of aura, or ignis, or æther; and this soul, they both of them called *spiritus*: in the notion of which, it is plain, they included only thought and active motion, without the total exclusion of matter. Whether they thought right in this, I do not say, that is not the question: but whether they spoke properly, when they called an active, thinking, subtil substance, out of which they excluded only gross and palpable matter, *spiritus*, spirit: I think that no body will deny, that if any among the Romans can be allowed to speak properly, Tully and Virgil are the two, who may most securely be depended on for it: and one of them speaking of the soul, says "*dum spiritus hos regit artus*;" and the other, "*vita continetur corpore & spiritu*." Where it is plain, by, corpus, he means (as generally every where) only gross matter that may be felt and handled; as appears by these words; "*si cor aut sanguis, aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; si anima est, forte dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur*." Tusc. Quæst. l. i. c. 11. Here Cicero opposes corpus to ignis and anima, i. e. aura, or breath: and the foundation of that his distinction of the soul, from that which he calls corpus, or body, he gives a little lower in these words; "*tanta ejus tenuitas ut fugiat aciem*." Ib. c. 22.

NOR

NOR was it the heathen world alone, that had this notion of spirit; the most enlightened of all the antient people of God, Solomon himself, speaks after the same manner: "That, which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts, even Eccles. iii. "one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other, yea they have 19. "all one spirit." So I translate the Hebrew word רוּחַ, here, for so I find it translated, the very next verse but one; "Who knoweth the spirit of a man Ver. 21. "that goeth upward, and the spirit of a beast that goeth down to the earth." In which places it is plain that Solomon applies the word רוּחַ, and our translators of him the word spirit, to a substance, out of which immateriality was not wholly excluded, "unless the spirit of a beast, that goeth downwards to the "earth, be immaterial." Nor did the way of speaking in our Saviour's time vary from this: St. Luke tells us, that when our Saviour, after his resurrection, Chap. xxiv. stood in the midst of them, "they were affrighted, and supposed that they had 37. seen πνεῦμα," the Greek word which always answers spirit, in English; and so the translators of the Bible render it here, "they supposed that they had seen a spirit." But our Saviour says to them, "Behold my hands and my feet, that Ver. 39. "it is I myself, handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as "you see me have." Which words of our Saviour put the same distinction between body and spirit, that Cicero did in the place above cited, viz. that the one was a gross compages, that could be felt and handled; and the other such Lib. 6. as Virgil describes the ghost, or foul, of Anchises.

"Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
 "Ter frustra comprehensa manus effugit imago,
 "Par levibus, ventis, volucrique simillima somno."

I WOULD not be thought hereby to say, that spirit never does signify a purely immaterial substance. In that sense the scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says, "God is a spirit:" and, in that sense, I have used it; and, in that sense, I have proved from my principles, that there is a spiritual substance; and am certain that there is a spiritual, immaterial substance: which is, I humbly conceive, a direct answer to your Lordship's question in the beginning of this argument, viz. "How come we to be certain, that there are spiritual substances, supposing "this principle to be true," that the simple ideas by sensation and reflection, are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning? But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial spirit, should please to give a system of very subtil matter, sense, and motion, it might, with propriety of speech, be called spirit; tho' materiality were not excluded out of its complex idea. Your Lordship proceeds:

"It is said indeed elsewhere, that it is repugnant to the idea of senseless P. 242. "matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge. But B. iv. c. 10. "this doth not reach the present case; which is not what matter can do of it- § 5. "self, but what matter prepared by an omnipotent hand can do. And what "certainty can we have, that he hath not done it? We can have none from the "ideas, for those are given up in this case; and, consequently, we can have no "certainty upon these principles, whether we have any spiritual substance "within us, or not."

YOUR Lordship in this paragraph proves, that from what I say, "we can B. iv. c. 10. "have no certainty whether we have any spiritual substance in us, or not." If, § 5. by spiritual substance, your Lordship means an immaterial substance in us, as you speak, p. 246. I grant what your Lordship says is true, that it cannot, upon these principles, be demonstrated. But I must crave leave to say, at the same time, that, upon these principles, it can be proved, to the highest degree of probability. If, by spiritual substance, your Lordship means a thinking substance, I must dissent from your Lordship, and say, that we can have a certainty, upon my principles, that there is a spiritual substance in us. In short, my Lord, upon my principles, i. e. from the idea of thinking, we can have a certainty that there is a thinking substance in us; from hence we have a certainty that

B. iv. that there is an eternal, thinking substance. This thinking substance, which has been from eternity, I have proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking substance, has put into us a thinking substance, which, whether it be a material or immaterial substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our ideas; tho' from them it may be proved, that it is to the highest degree probable, that it is immaterial. This, in short, my Lord, is what I have to say on this point; which may, in good measure, serve for an answer to your Lordship's next leaf, or two; which I shall set down, and then take notice of some few particulars, which I wonder to find your Lordship accuse me of. Your Lordship says:

- P. 242. "But we are told, That from the operations of our minds, we are able to
B. ii. c. 23. "frame a complex idea of a spirit. How can that be, when we cannot from
§ 15. "those ideas be assured, but that those operations may come from a material
"substance? If we frame an idea on such grounds, it is at most but a possible
"idea; for it may be otherwise, and we can have no assurance from our ideas,
"that it is not: so that the most men may come to, in this way of ideas, is,
"that it is possible it may be so, and it is possible it may not; but that it is
"impossible for us, from our ideas, to determine either way. And is not this
"an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reason?
- P. 243. "I AM very glad to find the idea of a spiritual substance made as consistent
"and intelligible, as that of a corporeal. "For as the one consists of a cohesion
"of solid parts, and the power of communicating motion by impulse, so the
"other consists in a power of thinking, and willing, and moving the body; and
§ 27. "that the cohesion of solid parts, is as hard to be conceived as thinking: and
"we are as much in the dark, about the power of communicating motion by
"impulse, as in the power of exciting motion by thought. We have by daily
"experience clear evidence of motion, produced both by impulse and by
"thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we
"are equally at a loss in both.
- § 28. "FROM whence it follows, that we may be certain of a being of a spiritual
"substance, altho' we have no clear and distinct idea of it, nor are able to com-
"prehend the manner of its operations: and, therefore, it is a vain thing in any
"to pretend, that all our reason and certainty is founded on clear and distinct
"ideas; and that they have reason to reject any doctrine, which relates to spi-
"ritual substances, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the
"same thing is confessed by the most inquisitive men, about the manner of
§ 31. "operation, both in material and immaterial substances. It is affirmed, that
"the very notion of body implies something very hard, if not impossible to be
"explained or understood by us; and that the natural consequence of it, viz.
"divisibility, involves us in difficulties impossible to be explicated, or made
§ 32. "consistent; that we have but some few superficial ideas of things; that we
"are destitute of faculties to attain to the true nature of them; and that when
"we do that, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, and can discover
"nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance.
- "THESE are very fair and ingenuous confessions of the shortness of human
"understanding, with respect to the nature and manner of such things, which
"we are most certain of the being of, by constant and undoubted experience. I
"appeal now to the reason of mankind, whether it can be any reasonable founda-
"tion for rejecting a doctrine proposed to us, as of divine revelation, because
"we cannot comprehend the manner of it; especially when it relates to the
§ 33, 34, 35. "divine essence. For as the same author observes, "our idea of God is framed
"from the complex ideas of those perfections, we find in our selves, but en-
"larging them so, as to make them suitable to an infinite being, as know-
"ledge, power, duration, &c. And the degrees, or extent, of these, which
§ 36. "we ascribe to the sovereign being, are all boundless and infinite. For it is in-
"finity, which joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes
"that complex idea, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the
"supreme being.

"Now

" Now, when our knowledge of gross material substances is so dark ; when the notion of spiritual substances is above all ideas of sensation ; when the higher any substance is, the more remote from our knowledge ; but especially, when the very idea of a supreme being implies its being infinite and incomprehensible ; I know not whether it argues more stupidity, or arrogance, to expose a doctrine, relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it : but of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the certainty of our reason, from clear and distinct ideas : and if we can attain to certainty without them, and where it is confessed we cannot have them, as about substance ; then these cannot be the sole matter and foundation of our reasoning, which is peremptorily asserted by this late author."

HERE, after having argued, that notwithstanding what I say, about our idea of a spirit, it is impossible, from our ideas, to determine whether that spirit in us be a material substance, or no, your Lordship concludes the paragraph thus : " and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reason ?"

I ANSWER, I think it is a way to bring us to a certainty in these things, P. 243. which I have offered as certain ; but I never thought it a way to certainty, where we cannot reach certainty ; nor shall I think the worse of it, if your Lordship should instance in an hundred other things, as well as the immateriality of the spirit in us, wherein this way does not bring us to a certainty ; unless, at the same time, your Lordship shall shew us another way, that will bring us to a certainty in those points, wherein this way of ideas failed. If your Lordship, or any body else, will shew me a better way to a certainty in them, I am ready to learn, and will lay by that of ideas. The way of ideas will not, from philosophy, afford us a demonstration, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. Whereupon your Lordship asks, " and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reason ?" The way of argument, which your Lordship opposes to the way of ideas, will, I humbly conceive, from philosophy, as little afford us a demonstration, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. Whereupon, may not any one likewise ask, " and is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reason ?" Is any way, I beseech your Lordship, to be condemned as an ill way to bring us to certainty, demonstrative certainty, because it brings us not to it, in a point where reason cannot attain to such certainty ? Algebra is a way to bring us to certainty in mathematicks ; but must it be presently condemned as an ill way, because there are some questions in mathematicks, which a man cannot come to certainty in, by the way of Algebra ?

IN page 247. after having set down several confessions of mine, " of the shortness of human understanding," your Lordship adds these words : " I appeal now to the reason of mankind, whether it can be any reasonable foundation for rejecting a doctrine, proposed to us, as of divine revelation ; because we cannot comprehend the manner of it ; especially, when it relates to the divine essence." And I beseech you, my Lord, where did I ever say so, or any thing like it ? And yet it is impossible, for any reader, but to imagine, that that proposition, which your Lordship appeals to the reason of mankind against, is a proposition of mine, which your Lordship is confuting, out of confessions of my own, great numbers whereof stand quoted out of my Essay, in several pages of your Lordship's book, both before, and after, this your Lordship's appeal to the reason of mankind. And now I must appeal to your Lordship, whether you find any such proposition in my book ? If your Lordship does not, I too must then appeal to the reason of mankind, whether it be reasonable for your Lordship, to bring so many confessions out of my book to confute a proposition, that is no where in it ? There is no doubt, reason for it ; which, since your Lordship does not, that I see, declare, and I have not wit enough to discover, I shall, therefore, leave to the reason of mankind to find out.

YOUR Lordship has, in this part of your discourse, spoke very much of reason ; as, " is not this an admirable way to bring us to a certainty of reason ?" P. 244.

" And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our reason and certainty" P. 245.

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tainty P. 246.

- P. 250. "tainty is founded on clear and distinct ideas. I appeal now to the reason of
 P. 251. "mankind. I am yet upon the certainty of our reason. The certainty is not
 "placed in the idea, but in good and sound reason. Allowing the argument
 "to be good, yet it is not taken from the idea, but from principles of true
 "reason."

WHAT your Lordship says at the beginning of this chapter, in these words,
 P. 230. "we must consider what we understand by reason," made me hope, I should
 here find what your Lordship understands by reason, explained, that so I might
 rectify my notion of it, and might be able to avoid the obscurity and confusion,
 which very much perplex most of the discourses, wherein it is appealed to, or
 from, as judge. But, notwithstanding the explication, I flattered myself with
 the hopes of, from what I thought your Lordship had promised, I find no other
 account of reason, but in quotations out of others, which your Lordship justly
 blames. Had I been so happy, as to have been enlightened in this point, by your
 Lordship's learned pen, so as to have seen distinctly, what your Lordship under-
 stands by reason, I should possibly have excused myself, from giving your
 Lordship the trouble of these papers, and been able to have perceived, without
 applying myself any farther to your Lordship, how so much of my Essay came
 into a chapter, which was designed to answer "objections against the trinity,
 "in point of reason." It follows:

- P. 246. "BUT I go yet farther: and as I have already shewed, we can have no cer-
 "tainty of an immaterial substance within us, from these simple ideas; so I
 "shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient evidence, brought from them,
 "by their own confession concerning the existence of the most spiritual and in-
 "finite substance, even God himself." And then your Lordship goes on, to give
 an account of my proof of a God: which your Lordship closes with these
 words:

- P. 252. "THAT, which I design, is to shew, that the certainty of it is not placed
 "upon any clear and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason distinct from
 "it; which was the thing I intended to prove."

If this be the thing your Lordship designed, I am then at a loss, who your
 Lordship designed it against: for I do not remember, that I have any where
 said, that we could not be convinced by reason of any truth, but where all the
 ideas, concerned in that conviction, were clear and distinct; for knowledge
 and certainty in my opinion, lies in the perception of the agreement, or disa-
 greement, of ideas, such as they are, and not always in having perfectly clear
 and distinct ideas. Tho' those, I must own, the clearer and more distinct
 they are, contribute very much to our more clear and distinct reasoning and dis-
 couring about them. But, in some cases, we may have certainty about obscure
 ideas; v. g. by the clear idea of thinking in me, I find the agreement of the
 clear idea of existence, and the obscure idea of a substance in me, because I
 perceive the necessary agreement of thinking, and the relative idea of a support;
 which support, without having any clear and distinct idea of what it is, beyond
 this relative one of a support, I call substance.

- If your Lordship intended this against another, who has said, "clear and
 "distinct ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning;" it
 seems very strange to me, that your Lordship should intend it against one, and
 quote only the words of another. For above ten pages before, your Lordship
 had quoted nothing but my book; and, in the immediate preceding paragraph,
 you bring a large quotation out of the tenth section of the tenth chapter of my
 P. 251. fourth book; of which your Lordship says, "this is the substance of the argu-
 "ment used, to prove an infinite, spiritual being, which I am far from weaken-
 "ing the force of; but that which I design, is to shew, that the certainty of
 "it is not placed upon clear and distinct ideas." Whom now, I beseech your
 Lordship, can this be understood to be intended against, but me? For how can
 my using an argument, whose certainty is not placed upon clear and distinct
 ideas, prove any thing against another man, who says, "that clear and distinct
 "ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning?" This proves
 only

only against him, that uses the argument; and, therefore, either I must be supposed here to hold, that clear and distinct ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning, (which I do not remember that I ever said) or else that your Lordship here proves against no body.

BUT tho' I do not remember that I have any where said, that clear and distinct ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning; yet I do own, that simple ideas are the foundations of all our knowledge, if that be it, which your Lordship questions: and, therefore, I must think myself concerned in what your Lordship says in this very place, p. 246. in these words, "I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient evidence brought from these simple ideas, by their own confession, concerning the existence of God himself."

THIS being spoken in the plural number, cannot be understood to be meant of the author of Christianity not Mysterious, and no body else: and whom can any reader reasonably apply to it, but the author of the Essay of Human Understanding; since, besides that it stands in the midst of a great many quotations out of that book, without any other person being named, or any one's words but mine quoted, my proof alone of a deity is brought out of that book, to make good what your Lordship here says; and no body else is any where mentioned, or quoted, concerning it?

THE same way of speaking of the persons you are arguing against, in the plural number, your Lordship uses in other places; as, "which they may call P. 238. a complication of simple ideas, if they please."

"WE do not envy these pretenders to reason; but methinks they should P. 240. not, at the same time, assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge, and declare, that we may have certain knowledge without them." And all along in that page, they. And in the very next page, my words being quoted, your Lordship asks, "how that can be, when the same persons say, that P. 241. notwithstanding their ideas, it is possible for matter to think?" So that I do not see, how I can exempt myself from being meant, to be one of those pretenders to reason, wherewith we can be certain, without any foundation of reason; which your Lordship, in the immediate foregoing page, does not envy for P. 240. this new sort of certainty. How can it be understood, but that I am one of those persons, that "at the same time, assert the absolute necessity of these ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them? tho' your Lordship very civilly says, p. 239. that you must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them, that," &c. yet, methinks, it is the author himself, and his use of these notions, that is blamed and argued against; but still in the plural number, which he confesses himself not to understand.

MY Lord, if your Lordship can shew me, where I pretend to reason, or certainty, without any foundation of reason; or where it is I assert the absolute necessity of any ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain knowledge without them, your Lordship will do me a great favour: for this, I grant, is a new sort of certainty, which I long to be rid of, and to disown to the world. But truly, my Lord, as I pretend to no new sort of certainty, but just such as human understanding was possessed of, before I was born; and should be glad, I could get more out of the books and writings, that come abroad in my days: so, my Lord, if I have any where pretended to any new sort of certainty, I beseech your Lordship shew me the place, that I may correct the vanity of it, and unsay it to the world.

AGAIN, your Lordship says thus, "I know not, whether it argues more P. 246; stupidity, or arrogance, to expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it."

HERE, my Lord, I find the same, they, again, which some pages back, evidently involved me: and since that you have named no body besides me, nor alleged any body's writing but mine; give me leave, therefore, to ask your Lordship,

Lordship, whether I am one of these, they, here also, that I may know, whether I am concerned to answer for myself? I am ashamed to importune your Lordship so often, about the same matter; but I meet with so many places, in your Lordship's (I had almost said new) way of writing, that put me to a stand, not knowing whether I am meant, or no, that I am at a loss, whether I should clear myself from what possibly your Lordship does not lay to my charge; and yet the reader, thinking it meant of me, should conclude that to be in my book, which is not there, and which I utterly disown.

P. 246. THO' I cannot be joined with those, who expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because they cannot comprehend the manner of it; unless your Lordship can shew where I have so exposed it, which I deny that I have any where done: yet your Lordship, before you come to the bottom of the same

P. 246. page, has these words, "I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient evidence brought from them, by their own confession, concerning the existence of the most spiritual and infinite substance, even God himself."

If your Lordship did mean me in that, they, which is some lines backwards, I must complain to your Lordship, that you have done me an injury, in imputing that to me, which I have not done. And if, their, here, were not meant, by your Lordship, to relate to the same persons, I ask, by what shall the reader distinguish them? and how shall any body know, who it is your Lordship means? For that I am comprehended here is apparent, by your quoting my Essay, in the very next words, and arguing against it, in the following pages.

I ENTER not here into your Lordship's argument; that which I am now considering is your Lordship's peculiar way of writing, in this part of your treatise, which makes me often in a doubt, whether the reader will not condemn my book, upon your Lordship's authority, where he thinks me concerned, if I say nothing: and yet your Lordship may look upon my defence, as superfluous, when I did not hold what your Lordship argued against.

P. 246. BUT to go on with your Lordship's argument, your Lordship says, "I shall now shew, that there can be no sufficient evidence, brought from simple ideas, by their own confession, concerning the existence of the most spiritual and infinite substance, even God himself."

YOUR Lordship's way of proving it, is this: your Lordship says, we are told, P. 246. b. iv. c. 10. § 1. "That the evidence of it is equal to mathematical certainty; and very good arguments are brought to prove it, in a chapter on purpose: but that which I take notice of, is, that the argument from the clear and distinct idea of a God, is passed over." Supposing all this to be so, your Lordship, methinks, with submission, does not prove the proposition you undertook, which was this; "there can be no sufficient evidence, brought from simple ideas, by their own confession, concerning, [i. e. to prove] the existence of a God." For if I did in that chapter, as your Lordship says, pass over the proof from the clear and distinct idea of God, that, I presume, is no confession, that there can be no sufficient evidence, brought from clear and distinct ideas, much less from simple ideas, concerning the existence of a God; because the using of one argument, brought from one foundation, is no confession that there is not another principle, or foundation. But, my Lord, I shall not insist upon this, whether it be a confession, or no.

LEAVING confession, out of the proposition, I humbly conceive your Lordship's argument does not prove. Your Lordship's proposition to be proved, is, "there can be no sufficient evidence brought, from simple ideas, to prove the existence of a God; and your Lordship's reason is, because the argument from the clear and distinct idea of God, is omitted in my proof of a God. I will suppose, for the strengthening your Lordship's reasoning in the case, that I had said (which I am far enough from saying) that there was no other argument to prove the existence of God, but what I had used in that chapter; yet, my Lord, with all this, your Lordship's argument, I humbly conceive, would not hold: for I might bring evidence from simple ideas, tho' I brought none from the

the idea of God; for the idea, we have of God, is a complex, and no simple idea. So that the terms being changed from simple ideas, to a clear and distinct complex idea of God, the proposition, which was undertaken to be proved, seems to me unproved.

YOUR Lordship's next words are, "how can this be consistent with deducing our certainty of knowledge from clear and simple ideas?"

P. 247.

HERE your Lordship joins something that is mine, with something that is not mine. I do say, that all our knowledge is founded in simple ideas; but I do not say, it is all deduced from clear ideas; much less that we cannot have any certain knowledge of the existence of any thing, whereof we have not a clear, distinct, complex idea; or, that the complex idea must be clear enough, to be in itself the evidence of the existence of that thing; which seems to be your Lordship's meaning here. Our knowledge is all founded on simple ideas, as I have before explained, tho' not always about simple ideas; for we may know the truth of propositions, which include complex ideas, and those complex ideas may not always be perfectly clear ideas.

In the remaining part of this page, it follows: "I do not go about to justify those who lay the whole stress upon that foundation, which I grant to be too weak to support so important a truth; and that those are very much to blame, who go about to invalidate other arguments for the sake of that: but I doubt all that talk about clear and distinct ideas being made the foundation of certainty, came originally from these discourses, or meditations, which are aimed at. The author of them was an ingenious, thinking man, and he endeavoured to lay the foundation of certainty, as well as he could. The first thing he found any certainty in, was his own existence; which he founded upon the perceptions of the acts of his mind, which some call an internal, infallible perception, that we are. From hence he proceeded to enquire, how we came by this certainty? And he resolved it into this, that he had a clear and distinct perception of it; and from hence he formed this general rule, that what he had a clear and distinct perception of, was true. Which, in reason, ought to go no farther, than where there is the like degree of evidence."

P. 247.

THIS account which your Lordship gives here, what it was, wherein Descartes laid the foundation of certainty, containing nothing in it to shew, what your Lordship proposed here, viz. "that there can be no sufficient evidence, brought from ideas, by my own confession, concerning the existence of God himself;" I willingly excuse myself, from troubling your Lordship concerning it. Only I crave leave to make my acknowledgment to your Lordship, for what you are pleased, by the way, to drop in these words: "But I doubt all this talk, about clear and distinct ideas being made the foundation of certainty, came originally from these discourses, or meditations, which are aimed at."

By the quotations, in your Lordship's immediately preceding words, taken B. iv. c. 10. out of my Essay, which relate to that ingenious, thinking author, as well as by § 7. what in your following words is said, of his founding certainty in his own existence; it is hard to avoid thinking that your Lordship means, that I borrowed from him my notions concerning certainty. And your Lordship is so great a man, and every way so far above my meanness, that it cannot be supposed that your Lordship intended this for any thing, but a commendation of me to the world, as the scholar of so great a master. But tho' I must always acknowledge, to that justly admired gentleman, the great obligation of my first deliverance from the unintelligible way of talking, of the philosophy in use, in the schools in his time; yet I am so far from entitling his writings to any of the errors, or imperfections, which are to be found in my Essay, as deriving their original from him, that I must own to your Lordship, they were spun barely out of my own thoughts, reflecting, as well as I could, on my own mind, and the ideas I had there, and were not, that I know, derived from any other original. But, possibly, I all this while assume to myself an honour, which your Lordship did not intend to me, by this intimation; for tho' what goes before and

after, seems to appropriate those words to me, yet some part of them brings me under my usual doubt, which I shall remain under, till I know, whom these words, viz. "This talk about clear and distinct ideas, being made the foundation of certainty," belong to.

- P. 248. THE remaining part of this paragraph contains a discourse of your Lordship's upon Descartes's general rule of certainty, in these words: "For the certainty here was not grounded on the clearness of the perception, but on the plainness of the evidence, which is of that nature, that the very doubting of it proves it; since it is impossible, that any thing should doubt, or question, its own being, that had it not. So that here it is not the clearness of the idea, but an immediate act of perception, which is the true ground of certainty. And this cannot extend to things without ourselves, of which we can have no other perception, than what is caused by the impressions of outward objects. But whether we are to judge according to these impressions, doth not depend on the ideas themselves, but upon the exercise of our judgment and reason about them, which put the difference between true and false, and adequate and inadequate ideas. So that our certainty is not from the ideas themselves, but from the evidence of reason, that those ideas are true and just, and, consequently, that we may build our certainty upon them."

GRANTING all this to be so, yet I must confess, my Lord, I do not see how it any ways tends to shew either your Lordship's proof, or my confession, that my proof of an infinite spiritual being is not placed upon ideas; which is, what your Lordship professes to be your design here.

BUT tho' we are not yet come to your Lordship's proof, that the certainty in my proof of a deity is not placed on ideas; yet I crave leave to consider, what your Lordship says here, concerning certainty, about which one cannot employ too many thoughts, to find wherein it is placed. Your Lordship says, "That Descartes's certainty was not grounded on the clearness of the perception, but on the plainness of the evidence." And a little lower; here (i. e. in Descartes's foundation of certainty) it is not the clearness of the idea, but an immediate act of perception, on which is the true ground of certainty. And a little lower, that, in things without us, our certainty is not from the ideas, but from the evidence of reason, that those ideas are true and just."

- YOUR Lordship, I hope, will pardon my dulness, if, after your Lordship has placed the grounds of certainty of our own existence, sometimes in the plainness of the evidence, in opposition to the clearness of the perception; sometimes in the immediate act of perception, in opposition to the clearness of the idea, and the certainty of other things without us, in the evidence of reason, that these ideas are true and just, in opposition to the ideas themselves: I know not, by these rules, wherein to place certainty; and therefore stick to my own plain way, by ideas, delivered in these words: "Wherever we perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge; and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain, real knowledge. Of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things, I think I have shewn, wherein it is that certainty, real certainty, consists." Whereof more may be seen in chap. vi. in which, if your Lordship find any mistakes, I shall take it as a great honour to be set right by you.
- B. iv. c. 4. § 18.

YOUR Lordship, as far as I can guess your meaning (for I must own, I do not clearly comprehend it) seems to me, in the foregoing passage, to oppose this assertion, that the certainty of the being of any thing, might be made out from the idea of that thing. Truly, my Lord, I am so far from saying (or thinking) so, that I never knew any one of that mind; but Descartes, and some that have followed him, in his proof of a God, from the idea, which we have of God in us; which I was so far from thinking a sufficient ground of certainty, that your Lordship makes use of my denying, or doubting of it, against me, as we shall see in the following words, p. 248.

"BUT

"BUT the idea of an infinite being has this peculiar to it, that necessary existence is implied in it. This is a clear and distinct idea, and yet it is denied that this doth prove the existence of God. How then can the grounds of our certainty arise from clear and distinct ideas, when, in one of the clearest ideas of our minds, we can come to no certainty by it?"

YOUR Lordship's proof here, as far as I comprehend it, seems to be, that it is confessed, "That certainty does not arise from clear and distinct ideas, because it is denied that the clear and distinct idea of an infinite being, that implies necessary existence in it, does prove the existence of a God."

HERE your Lordship says, it is denied; and, in five lines after, you recal that saying, and use these words, "I do not say that it is denied, to prove it?" Which of these two sayings of your Lordship's must I now answer to? If your Lordship says it is denied, I fear that will not hold to be so in matter of fact, which made your Lordship unsay it; tho' that being most to your Lordship's purpose, occasioned, I suppose, its dropping from your pen. For if it be not denied, I think the whole force of your Lordship's argument fails. But your Lordship helps that out, as well as the thing will bear, by the words that follow in the sentence, which altogether stands thus: "I do not say, that it is denied to prove it; but this is said, that it is a doubtful thing, from the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts. What can this mean, unless it be to let us know, that even clear and distinct ideas may lose their effect, by the difference of men's tempers and studies? So that, besides ideas, in order to a right judgment, a due temper and application of the mind is required."

IF I meant, in those words of mine, quoted here by your Lordship, just as your Lordship concludes they mean, I know not why I should be ashamed of it; for I never thought that ideas, even the most clear and distinct, would make men certain of what might be demonstrated from them, unless they were of a temper to consider, and would apply their minds to them. There are no ideas more clear and distinct, than those of numbers, and yet there are a thousand demonstrations concerning numbers, which millions of men do not know, (and so have not the certainty about them, they might have) for want of application.

I COULD not avoid here to take this to myself: for this passage of your Lordship's is pinned down upon me so close, by your Lordship's citing the 7th sect. of the 10th chapter of my ivth book, that I am forced here to answer for myself; which I shall do, after having first set down my words, as they stand in the place quoted by your Lordship: "How far the idea of a most perfect being, which a B. iv. c. 10. man may frame in his mind, does, or does not, prove the existence of a God, § 7. "I will not here examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this, upon that sole foundation, and take some men's having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident, some men have none, and some a worse than none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a deity; and out of an over-fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own existence, and the sensible parts of the universe, offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth, as can any where be delivered, that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead."

THE meaning of which words of mine, were not to deny that the idea of a most perfect being doth prove a God; but to blame those, who take it for the only proof, and endeavour to invalidate all others. For the belief of a God being, as I say in the same section, the foundation of all religion and genuine morality,

lity, I thought no arguments, that are made use of, to work the persuasion of a God into men's minds, should be invalidated. And the reason I give, why they should all be left to their full strength, and none of them rejected, as unfit to be hearkened to, is this: because "in the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth." So that my meaning here, was not, as your Lordship supposes, to ground certainty on the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, in opposition to clear and distinct ideas, as is very evident from my words; but to shew of what ill consequence it is, to go about to invalidate any argument, which hath a tendency to settle the belief of a God, in any one's mind; because, in the difference of men's tempers and application, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another: so that I speaking of belief, and your Lordship, as I take it, speaking in that place of certainty, nothing can (I crave leave to say) be inferred from these words of mine, to your Lordship's purpose. And that I meant belief, and not certainty, is evident from hence, that I look upon the argument, there spoke of, as not conclusive, and so not able to produce certainty in any one, tho' I did not know how far it might prevail on some men's persuasions, to confirm them in the truth. And since not all, nor the most of those that believe a God, are at the pains, or have the skill, to examine and clearly comprehend the demonstrations of his being; I was unwilling to shew the weakness of the argument there spoke of; since possibly by it, some men might be confirmed in the belief of a God, which is enough to preserve in them true sentiments of religion and morality.

- P. 249. Your Lordship hereupon asks, "Wherein is this different from what all men of understanding have said?"

I ANSWER: in nothing that I know; nor did I ever, that I remember, say that it was. Your Lordship goes on to demand,

- P. 249. "WHY then should these clear and simple ideas be made the sole foundation of reason?"

I ANSWER: that I know not; they must give your Lordship a reason for it, who have made clear ideas the sole foundation of reason. Why I have made simple ones the foundation of all knowledge, I have shewn. Your Lordship goes on.

- P. 249. "One would think by this"—

By what, I beseech your Lordship?

"THAT these ideas would presently satisfy men's minds, if they attended to them."

WHAT those ideas are, from which your Lordship would expect such present satisfaction, and upon what grounds your Lordship expects it, I do not know. But this I will venture to say, that all the satisfaction men's minds can have, in their enquiries after truth and certainty, is to be had only from considering, observing, and rightly laying together of ideas, so as to find out their agreement, or disagreement, and no other way.

BUT I do not think ideas have truth and certainty, always so ready to satisfy the mind in its enquiries, that there needs no more to be satisfied, than to attend to them, as one does to a man, whom one asks a question, to be satisfied; which your Lordship's way of expression seems to me to intimate. But they must be considered well, and their habitudes examined; and where their agreement, or disagreement, cannot be perceived by an immediate comparison, other ideas must be found out, to discover the agreement, or disagreement, of those under consideration, and then all laid in a due order, before the mind can be satisfied in the certainty of that truth, which it is seeking after. This, my Lord, requires often a little more time and pains, than attending to a tale that is told, for present satisfaction. And I believe some of the incomparable Mr. Newton's wonderful demonstrations cost him so much pains, that tho' they were all founded in nothing, but several ideas of quantity, yet those ideas did not presently satisfy his mind, tho' they were such that, with great application and labour of thought, they

they were able to satisfy him with certainty, i. e. produce demonstration. Your Lordship adds,

"But even this will not do, as to the idea of an infinite being."

P. 249.

THO' the complex idea, for which the sound, God, stands (whether containing in it the idea of necessary existence, or no, for the case is the same) will not prove the real existence of a being, answering that idea, any more than any other idea, in any one's mind, will prove the existence of any real being, answering that idea; yet, I humbly conceive, it does not hence follow, but that there may be other ideas, by which the being of a God may be proved. For no body, that I know, ever said, that every idea would prove every thing, or that an idea, in men's minds, would prove the existence of such a real being: and therefore, if this idea fails to prove what is proposed to be proved by it, it is no more an exception against the way of ideas, than it would be an exception against the way of a *medius terminus*, in arguing that some body used one that did not prove. It follows:

"It is not enough to say, they will not examine how far it will hold; for P. 249. they ought either to say, that it doth hold, or give up this ground of certainty from clear and distinct ideas."

HERE, my Lord, I am got again into the plural number: but not knowing any body, but myself, who has used these words, which are set down out of my Essay, and which you are, in this and the foregoing paragraph, arguing against, I am forced to beg your Lordship to let me know, who those persons are, whom your Lordship, joining with me, intitles with me to these words of my book; or to whom your Lordship, joining me, intitles me, by these words of mine, to what they have published, that I may see how far I am answerable for them.

Now, as to the words themselves, viz. "I will not examine how far the idea proposed does, or does not, prove the existence of a God," because they are mine; and your Lordship excepts against them, and tells me, "it was not enough to say, I will not examine, &c. For I ought either to have said, that it doth hold, or give up this ground of certainty from clear and distinct ideas." I will answer as well as I can.

I COULD not then, my Lord, well say, that that doth hold, which I thought did not hold; but I imagined I might, without entering into the examen, and shewing the weakness of that argument, pass it by, with saying, "I would not examine," and so left it with this thought, "*valeat quantum valere potest*."

BUT tho' I did this, and said not then, it will hold, nay think now, it will not hold, yet I do not see how from thence I was then, or am now, under any necessity to give up the ground of certainty from ideas; because the ground of certainty from ideas may be right, tho', in the present instance, a right use were not made of them, or a right idea was not made use of, to produce the certainty sought. Ideas in mathematicks are a sure ground of certainty; and yet every one may not make so right a use of them, as to attain to certainty by them: but yet any one's failing of certainty by them, is not the overturning of this truth, that "certainty is to be had by them." Clear and distinct I have omitted here to join with ideas, not because clear and distinct make any ideas unfit to produce certainty, which have all other fitness to do it; but because I do not limit certainty to clear and distinct ideas only, since there may be certainty from ideas, that are not in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct.

YOUR Lordship, in the following paragraph, endeavours to shew, that I have not proved the being of a God by ideas; and from thence, with an argument not unlike the preceding, you conclude, that ideas cannot be the grounds of certainty, because I have not grounded my proof of a God on ideas. To which way of argumentation, I must crave leave here again to reply, that your Lordship's supposing, as you do, that there is another way to certainty, which is not that of ideas, does not prove that certainty may not be had from ideas, because I make use of that other way. This being premised, I shall endeavour to shew, that my proof of a deity is all grounded on ideas, how-

ever your Lordship is pleased to call it by other names. Your Lordship's words are :

P. 249. " BUT instead of the proper argument from ideas, we are told, that " from
§ 6. " the consideration of ourselves, and what we find in our own constitutions, " our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth ; that " there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being. All which I " readily yield ; but we see plainly, the certainty is not placed in the idea, but " in good and sound reason," from the consideration of ourselves and our constitutions. " What ! in the idea of our selves ? No certainly."

GIVE me leave, my Lord, to ask where I ever said, that certainty was placed in the idea, which your Lordship urges my words, as a contradiction of ? I think, I never said so. 1. Because I do not remember it. 2. Because your Lordship has not quoted any place, where I have said so, 3. Because I, all along in my book, which has the honour to be so often quoted here by your Lordship, say the quite contrary. For I place certainty, where I think every body will find it, and no where else, viz. in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; so that, in my opinion, it is impossible to be placed in any one single idea, simple or complex. I must own, that I think certainty grounded on ideas : and, therefore, to take your Lordship's words here, as I think they are meant, in opposition to what I say, I shall take the liberty to change your Lordship's words here, " What ! in the idea of ourselves ? No certainly ;" into words used by your Lordship in the foregoing page, to the same purpose, " What ! can the grounds of our certainty arise from the idea of ourselves ? No certainly."

To which permit me, my Lord, with due respect to reply, Yes, certainly. The certainty of the being of a God, in my proof, is grounded on the idea of ourselves, as we are thinking beings. But your Lordship urges my own words, which are, that, " from the consideration of our selves, and what we " find in our constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain " and evident truth."

My Lord, I must confess I never thought that the consideration of ourselves, and what we find in our own constitutions, excluded the consideration of the idea, either of being, or of thinking, two of the ideas, that make a part of the complex idea, a man has of himself. If consideration of ourselves excludes those ideas, I may be charged with speaking improperly : but it is plain, nevertheless, that I ground the proof of a God, on those ideas, and, I thought, I spoke properly enough ; when meaning, that the consideration of those ideas, which our own being offered us, and so finding their agreement, or disagreement, with others, we were thereby, i. e. by thus reasoning, led into the knowledge of the existence of the first, infinite being, i. e. of God. I expressed it, as I did, in the more familiar way of speaking : for my purpose, in that chapter, being to make out the knowledge of the existence of a God, and not to prove that it was by ideas, I thought it most proper to express myself, in the most usual and familiar way, to let it the easier into men's minds, by common words and known ways of expression : and therefore, as I think, I have scarce used the word idea, in that whole chapter, but only in that one place, where my speaking against laying the whole proof, only upon our idea of a most perfect being obliged me to it.

BUT your Lordship says, that in this way of coming to a certain knowledge of the being of a God, " from the consideration of ourselves, and what we " find in our own constitutions," the certainty is placed in good and sound reason. I hope so. But not in the idea.

WHAT your Lordship here means by, not placed in the idea, I confess I do not well understand ; but if your Lordship means, that it is not grounded on the ideas of thinking and existence, before-mentioned, and the comparing of them, and finding their agreement, or disagreement, with other ideas ; that I must take the liberty to dissent from : for, in this sense, it may be placed in ideas, and in good and sound reason too, i. e. in reason rightly managing those

those ideas, so as to produce evidence by them. So that, my Lord, I must own, I see not the force of the argument, which says, not in ideas, but in sound reason; since I see no such opposition between them, but that ideas and sound reason may consist together. For instance: when a man would shew the certainty of this truth, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; the first thing, probably, that he does, is to draw a diagram. What is the use of that diagram? but steadily to suggest to his mind those several ideas, he would make use of, in that demonstration. The considering and laying these together, in such order, and with such connection, as to make the agreement of the ideas of the three angles of the triangle, with the ideas of two right ones, to be perceived, is called right reasoning, and is the business of that faculty, which we call reason; which when it operates rightly, by considering and comparing ideas so as to produce certainty, this shewing, or demonstration, that the thing is so, is called good and sound reason. The ground of this certainty lies in ideas themselves, and their agreement, or disagreement, which reason neither does, nor can alter, but only lays them so together, as to make it perceivable; and, without such a due consideration and ordering of the ideas, certainty could not be had: and thus certainty is placed both in ideas, and in good and sound reason.

THIS affords an easy answer to your Lordship's next words, brought to prove, that the certainty of a God is not placed on the idea of ourselves. They stand thus:

"For let our idea be taken, which way we please, by sensation or reflection; P. 250.
"yet it is not the idea, that makes us certain, but the argument, from that
"which we perceive in, and about, ourselves."

NOTHING truer than that it is not the idea, that makes us certain, without reason, or without the understanding: but it is as true, that it is not reason, it is not the understanding, that makes us certain without ideas. It is not the sun, makes me certain it is day, without my eyes; nor it is not my sight makes me certain it is day, without the sun; but the one employed about the other. Nor is it one idea by itself, that in this, or any case, makes us certain; but certainty consists in the perceived agreement, or disagreement, of all the ideas, that serve to shew the agreement, or disagreement, of distinct ideas, as they stand in the proposition, whose truth, or falsehood, we would be certain of. The using of intermediate ideas to shew this, is called argumentation, and the ideas so used in train, an argument; so that, in my poor opinion, to say, that the argument makes us certain, is no more than saying, the ideas made use of, make us certain.

THE idea of thinking in ourselves, which we receive by reflection, we may by intermediate ideas, perceive to have a necessary agreement and connection with the idea of the existence of an eternal, thinking being. This, whether your Lordship will call placing of certainty in the idea, or placing the certainty in reason; whether your Lordship will say, it is not the idea, that gives us the certainty, but the argument, is indifferent to me; I shall not be so unmannerly as to prescribe to your Lordship, what way you should speak, in this or any other matter. But this your Lordship will give me leave to say, that let it be called, how your Lordship pleases, there is no contradiction in it, to what I have said concerning certainty, or the way, how we came by it, or the ground, on which I place it. Your Lordship farther urges my words, out of the fifth section of the same chapter.

BUT, "we find in ourselves perception and knowledge." It is very true. P. 250.
But how doth this prove there is a God? Is it from the clear and distinct idea of it? No, but from this argument, that, "either there must have been a knowing being from eternity, or an unknowing; for something must have been
"from eternity: but if an unknowing being, then it was impossible there ever
"should have been any knowledge, it being as impossible that a thing, without knowledge, should produce it, as that a triangle should make itself three
"angles bigger than two right ones." Allowing the argument to be good,

"yet

" yet it is not taken from the idea, but from the principles of true reason ;
 " as, that no man can doubt his own perception ; that every thing must have a
 " cause ; that this cause must either have knowledge, or not ; if it have, the
 " point is gained : if it hath not, nothing can produce nothing ; and confe-
 " quently a not knowing being cannot produce a knowing."

YOUR Lordship here contends, that my argument is not taken from the idea, but from true principles of reason. I do not say it is taken from any one idea, but from all the ideas concerned in it. But your Lordship, if you herein oppose any thing I have said, must, I humbly conceive, say, not from ideas, but from true principles of reason ; several whereof your Lordship has here set down. And whence I beseech your Lordship, comes the certainty of any of those propositions, which your Lordship calls true principles of reason, but from the perceivable agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas contained in them ? Just as it is expressed in those propositions, v. g. " a man cannot doubt of his own perception," is a true principle of reason, or a true proposition, or a certain proposition ; but to the certainty of it we arrive, only by perceiving the necessary agreement of the two ideas, of perception and self-consciousness.

AGAIN, " every thing must have a cause : " Tho' I find it so set down for one, by your Lordship, yet, I humbly conceive, is not a true principle of reason, nor a true proposition ; but the contrary. The certainty whereof we attain, by the contemplation of our ideas, and by perceiving that the idea of eternity, and the idea of the existence of something do agree, and the idea of existence from eternity, and of having a cause, do not agree, or are inconsistent within the same thing. But " every thing, that has a beginning, must have a cause," is a true principle of reason, or a proposition certainly true ; which we come to know, by the same way, i. e. by contemplating our ideas, and perceiving that the idea, of beginning to be, is necessarily connected with the idea of some operation ; and the idea of operation, with the idea of something operating, which we call a cause ; and so the beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the idea of a cause, as is expressed in the proposition : and thus it comes to be a certain proposition ; and so may be called a principle of reason, as every true proposition is to him that perceives the certainty of it.

THIS, my Lord, is my way of ideas, and of coming to certainty by them ; which, when your Lordship has again considered, I am apt to think your Lordship will no more condemn, than I do except against your Lordship's way of arguments, or principles of reason. Nor will it, I suppose, any longer offend your Lordship, under the notion of a new way of reasoning ; since I flatter myself, both these ways will be found to be equally old, one as the other ; tho', perhaps, formerly they have not been so distinctly taken notice of, and the name of ideas is of later date, in our English language.

If your Lordship says, as I think you mean, viz. that my argument, to prove a God, is not taken from ideas, your Lordship will pardon me, if I think otherwise. For I beseech your Lordship, are not ideas, whose agreement, or disagreement, as they are expressed in propositions, as perceived, immediately, or by intuition, the principles of true reason ? And does not the certainty we have, of the truth of these propositions, consist in the perception of such agreement, or disagreement ? And does not the agreement, or disagreement, depend upon the ideas themselves ? Nay, so intirely depend upon the ideas themselves, that it is impossible for the mind, or reason, or argument, or any thing to alter it ? All that reason, or the mind does, in reasoning or arguing, is to find out, and observe, that agreement, or disagreement : and all that argument does, is, by an intervening idea, to shew it, where an immediate putting the ideas together will not do it.

As for example, in the present case : the proposition, of whose truth I would be certain, is this : " a knowing being has eternally existed." Here the ideas joined, are eternal existence, with a knowing being. But does my mind perceive any immediate connection, or repugnancy, in these ideas ? No. The proposition then, at first view, affords me no certainty ; or, as our English idiom phrases it,
 it

it is not certain, or I am not certain of it. But tho' I am not, yet I would be certain, whether it be true, or no. What then must I do? Find arguments to prove that it is true, or the contrary. And what is that, but to cast about, and find out intermediate ideas, which may shew me the necessary connection, or inconsistency, of the ideas in the proposition? Either of which, when, by these intervening ideas, I am brought to perceive, I am then certain that the proposition is true, or I am certain that it is false. As in the present case, I perceive in myself thought and perception; the idea of actual perception has an evident connection with an actual being, that doth perceive and think: the idea of an actual, thinking being, hath a perceivable connection with the eternal existence of some knowing being, by the intervention of the negation of all being, or the idea of nothing, which has a necessary connection with no power, no operation, no causality, no effect, i. e. with nothing. So that the idea of once actually nothing, has a visible connection with nothing to eternity, for the future; and hence the idea of an actual being, is perceived to have a necessary connection with some actual being from eternity. And, by the like way of ideas, may be perceived the actual existence of a knowing being, to have a connection with the existence of an actual, knowing being, from eternity; and the idea of an eternal, actual, knowing being, with the idea of immateriality, by the intervention of the idea of matter, and of its actual division, divisibility, and want of perception, &c. which are the ideas, or, as your Lordship is pleased to call them, arguments, I make use of, in this proof, which I need not here go over again; and which is partly contained in these following words, which your Lordship thus quotes, out of the 10th section of the same chapter.

AGAIN, "If we suppose nothing to be first, matter can never begin to be; P. 251.
 "if bare matter without motion to be eternal, motion can never begin to be:
 "if matter and motion be supposed eternal, thought can never begin to be:
 "for if matter could produce thought, then thought must be in the power
 "of matter; and if it be in matter, as such, it must be the inseparable property
 "of all matter; which is contrary to the sense and experience of mankind.
 "If only some parts of matter have a power of thinking, how comes so great
 "a difference in the properties of the same matter? What disposition of mat-
 "ter is required to thinking? And from whence comes it? Of which no ac-
 "count can be given in reason." To which your Lordship subjoins:

"THIS is the substance of the argument used, to prove an infinite, spiritual P. 251.
 "being, which I am far from weakening the force of: but that which I design,
 "is to shew, that the certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct
 "ideas, but upon the force of reason, distinct from it; which was the thing I
 "intended to prove."

YOUR Lordship says, that the certainty of it (I suppose your Lordship means the certainty produced by my proof of a deity) is not placed upon clear and distinct ideas. It is placed, among others, upon the ideas of thinking, existence, and matter, which I think are all clear and distinct ideas; so that there are some clear and distinct ideas in it: and one can hardly say, there are not any clear and distinct ideas in it, because there is one obscure and confused one in it, viz. that of substance; which yet hinders not the certainty of the proof.

THE words which your Lordship subjoins to the former, viz. "But upon the P. 252.
 force of reason, distinct from it;" seem to me to say, as far as I can understand them, that the certainty of my argument for a deity, is placed not on clear and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason.

THIS, among other places before set down, makes me with your Lordship had told us, what you understand by reason; for in my acceptance of the word reason, I do not see but the same proof may be placed upon clear and distinct ideas, and upon reason too. As I said before, I can perceive no inconsistency, or opposition, between them, no more than there is any opposition between a clear object and my faculty of seeing, in the certainty of any thing I receive by my eyes; for this certainty may be placed very well on, both the clearness of the object, and the exercise of that faculty in me.

P. 245. YOUR Lordship's next words, I think, should be read thus; "distinct from them:" for if they were intended, as they are printed, "distinct from it," I confess I do not understand them. "Certainty not placed on clear and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason distinct from them," my capacity will reach the sense of: but then I cannot but wonder what, "distinct from them," do there; for I know no body that does not think that reason, or the faculty of reasoning, is distinct from the ideas, it makes use of, or is employed about, whether those ideas be clear and distinct, or obscure and confused. But if that sentence be to be read, as it is printed, viz. "The certainty of it is not placed upon any clear and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason distinct from it;" I acknowledge your Lordship's meaning is above my comprehension. Upon the whole matter, my Lord, I must confess, that I do not see that what your Lordship says, you intended here to prove, is proved, viz. that certainty, in my proof of a God, is not placed on ideas. And next, if it were proved, I do not see how it answers any objection against the Trinity, in point of reason.

BEFORE I go on to what follows, I must beg leave to confess, I am troubled to find these words of your Lordship, among those I have above set down, out P. 250. of the foregoing page, viz. allowing the argument to be good, and cannot forbear to wish, that when your Lordship was writing this passage, you had had in your mind what you are pleased here to say, viz. that you are far from weakening the force of my argument, which I used to prove an infinite, spiritual being.

MY Lord, your Lordship is a great man, not only by the dignity your merits are invested with, but more by the merits of your parts and learning. Your Lordship's words carry weight and authority with them: and he that shall quote but a saying, or a doubt, of your Lordship's, that questions the force of my argument, for the proof of a God, will think himself well founded and to be hearkened to, as gone a great way in the cause. These words "allowing the argument to be good," in the received way of speaking, are usually taken to signify, that he that speaks them, does not judge the argument to be good; but that, for discourse-sake, he at present admits it. Truly, my Lord, till I read these words in your Lordship, I always took it for a good argument; and was so fully persuaded of its goodness, that I spoke higher of it, than of any reasoning of mine, any where, because I thought it equal to a demonstration. If it be not so, it is fit I recal my words, and that I do not betray so important and fundamental a truth, by a weak, but over-valued argument: and, therefore, I cannot, upon this occasion, but importune your Lordship, that, if your Lordship (as your words seem to intimate) sees any weakness in it, your Lordship would be pleased to shew it me; that either I may amend that fault, and make it conclusive, or else retract my confidence, and leave that cause to those, who have strength suitable to its weight. But to return to what follows, in your Lordship's next paragraph.

P. 252. 2. "THE next thing necessary to be cleared in this dispute, is, the distinction between nature and person; and of this we can have no clear and distinct idea, from sensation, or reflection. And yet all our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly about this point, unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction. But that these come not into our minds, by these simple ideas, of sensation and reflection, I shall now make it appear."

By this it is plain, that the business of the following pages is to make it appear, that "we have no clear and distinct idea of the distinction of nature and person, from sensation, or reflection:" or, as your Lordship expresses it, a little lower, "The apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction, come not into our minds by the simple ideas, of sensation and reflection."

AND what, pray my Lord, can be inferred from hence, if it should be so? Your Lordship tells us,

“ALL our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of the distinction between nature and person; and we must talk unintelligibly, about this point, unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction.”

If it be so, the inference I should draw from thence (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this, that it concerns those, who write on that subject, to have themselves, and to lay down to others, clear and distinct apprehensions, or notions, or ideas (call them what you please) of what they mean; by nature and person, and of the grounds of identity and distinction.

THIS seems, to me, the natural conclusion, flowing from your Lordship's words; which seem here to suppose clear and distinct apprehensions (something like clear and distinct ideas) necessary for the avoiding unintelligible talk, in the doctrine of the Trinity. But I do not see how your Lordship can, from the necessity of clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, &c. in the dispute of the Trinity, bring in one, who has perhaps mistaken the way, to clear and distinct notions concerning nature and person, &c. as fit to be answered among those, who bring objections against the Trinity, in point of reason. I do not see, why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue against his Essay, in a chapter, that he should write, to answer objections against the unity of God, in point of reason, or revelation: for upon what ground soever any one writes in this dispute, or any other, it is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly, on either side.

If by the way of ideas, which is that of the author of the Essay of Human Understanding, a man cannot come to clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person; if, as he proposes from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, such apprehensions cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a mistaken philosopher: but it will not follow from thence, that he is not an orthodox christian; for he might (as he did) write his Essay of Human Understanding, without any thought of the controversy between the Trinitarians and Unitarians: nay, a man might have writ all, that is in his book, that never heard one word of any such dispute.

THERE is in the world a great and fierce contest, about nature and grace: it would be very hard for me, if I must be brought in as a party, on either side, because a disputant, in that controversy, should think the clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and grace, come not into our minds, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection. If this be so, I may be reckoned among the objectors against all sorts and points of orthodoxy, whenever any one pleases: I may be called to account as one heterodox, in the points of “free-grace, free-will, predestination, original sin, justification by faith, transubstantiation, the Pope's supremacy,” and what not? as well as in the doctrine of the Trinity; and all, because they cannot be furnished with clear and distinct notions of grace, free-will, transubstantiation, &c. by sensation, or reflection. For, in all these, or any other points, I do not see, but there may be complaint made, that they have not always a right understanding and clear notions of those things, on which the doctrine, they dispute of, depends. And it is not altogether unusual, for men to talk unintelligibly, to themselves and others, in these and other points of controversy, for want of clear and distinct apprehensions, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordship dislike it) ideas: for all which unintelligible talking, I do not think myself accountable, tho' it should so fall out, that my way, by ideas, would not help them to, what it seems is wanting, clear and distinct notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpose, they may, for all me, make use of any other more successful, and leave me out of the controversy, as one useless to either party, for deciding of the question.

SUPPOSING, as your Lordship says, and as you have undertaken to make appear, that “the clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person, and

"and the grounds of identity and distinction, should not come into the mind by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection;" what, I beseech your Lordship, is this to the dispute concerning the Trinity, on either side? And if, after your Lordship has endeavoured to give clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, the disputants in this controversy should still talk unintelligibly, about this point, for want of clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person; ought your Lordship to be brought in, among the partisans on the other side, by any one, who writ a Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity? In good earnest, my Lord, I do not see how the clear and distinct notions of nature and person, not coming into the mind, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, any more contains any objection against the doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and distinct apprehensions of original sin, justification, or transubstantiation, not coming to the mind, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, contains any objection against the doctrine of original sin, justification, or transubstantiation, and so of all the rest of the terms, used in any controversy in religion; however your Lordship, in a Treatise of the Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, and in the chapter, where you make it your business to answer objections in point of reason, set your self seriously to prove, that "clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction, come not into our minds by these simple ideas, of sensation and reflection." In order to the making this appear, we read as followeth:

- P. 252. "As to nature, that is sometimes taken for the essential property of a thing: as, when we say, that such a thing is of a different nature from another; we mean no more, than that it is differenced by such properties, as come to our knowledge. Sometimes, nature is taken for the thing itself, in which these properties are; and so Aristotle took nature for a corporeal substance, which had the principles of motion in itself: but nature and substance are of an equal extent; and so that, which is the subject of powers and properties, is the nature, whether it be meant of bodily, or spiritual substances."

YOUR Lordship, in this paragraph, gives us two significations of the word nature; 1. That it is sometimes taken for essential properties, which I easily admit. 2. That sometimes it is taken for the thing itself, in which these properties are, and consequently for substance itself. And this your Lordship proves out of Aristotle.

WHETHER Aristotle called the thing itself, wherein the essential properties are, nature, I will not dispute; but that your Lordship thinks fit to call substance, nature, is evident. And from thence I think your Lordship endeavours to prove, in the following words, that we can have from ideas no clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature. Your Lordship's words are:

- P. 253. "I GRANT, that by sensation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible, that they should subsist by themselves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas."

How we come by the idea of substance, from the simple ones of sensation and reflection, I have endeavoured to shew, in another place, and therefore shall not trouble your Lordship with it here again. But what your Lordship infers, in these words, "So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas;" I do not well understand. Your Lordship, indeed, here again, seems to oppose reason and ideas; and to that I say, mere ideas are the objects of the understanding, and reason is one of the faculties of the understanding employed about them; and that the understanding, or reason, which ever your Lordship pleases to call it, makes, or forms, out of the simple ones, that come in by sensation and reflection, all the other ideas, whether general, relative, or complex, by abstracting, comparing, and compounding its positive, simple ideas, whereof it cannot make, or frame any one, but what it receives by sensation, or reflection. And therefore, I never denied that reason was employed about our particular, simple

simple ideas, to make out of them ideas general, relative, and complex; nor about all our ideas, whether simple or complex, positive or relative, general or particular: it being the proper business of reason, in the search after truth and knowledge, to find out the relations between all these sorts of ideas, in the perception, whereof knowledge and certainty of truth consists.

THESE, my Lord, are, in short, my notions about ideas, their original and formation, and of the use the mind, or reason, makes of them in knowledge. Whether your Lordship thinks fit to call this a new way of reasoning, must be left to your Lordship; whether it be a right way, is that alone, which I am concerned for. But your Lordship seems all along (I crave leave here once for all to take notice of it) to have some particular exception against ideas, and particularly clear and distinct ideas, as if they were not to be used, or were of no use in reason and knowledge; or, as if reason were opposed to them, or leads us into the knowledge and certainty of things without them; or, the knowledge of things did not at all depend on them. I beg your Lordship's pardon for expressing myself so variously and doubtfully in this matter; the reason whereof is, because I must own, that I do not every where clearly understand what your Lordship means, when you speak, as you do, of ideas; as if I ascribed more to them, than belonged to them; or expected more of them, than they could do; v. g. where your Lordship says,

"BUT is all this contained in the simple idea of these operations?" And P. 241. again, "so that here it is not the clearness of the idea, but an immediate act of P. 248. perception, which is the true ground of certainty." And farther, "so that our certainty is not from the ideas themselves, but from the evidence of reason." And in another place, "it is not the idea that makes us certain, but P. 250. the argument from that which we perceive in, and about ourselves. Is it from the clear and distinct idea of it? No! but from this argument." And here, p. 253. "the nature of things belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas."

THESE, and several the like passages, your Lordship has, against what your P. 243. Lordship calls this new way of ideas, and an admirable way to bring us to the certainty of reason.

I NEVER said, nor thought ideas, nor any thing else, could bring us to the certainty of reason, without the exercise of reason. And then, my Lord, if we will employ our minds, and exercise our reason, to bring us to certainty; what, I beseech you, shall they be employed about, but ideas? For ideas, in my sense B. i. c. 1. of the word, are, "whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a § 8. man thinks; or, whatsoever it is the mind can be employed about, in thinking." And again, I have these words, "whatsoever is the immediate object B. ii. c. 8. of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea." So that my § 8. way of ideas, and of coming to certainty by them is to employ our minds in thinking upon something; and I do not see, but your Lordship yourself, and every body else, must make use of my way of ideas, unless they can find out a way, that will bring them to certainty, by thinking on nothing. So that let certainty be placed, as much as it will, on reason, let the nature of things belong as properly as it will, to our reason, it will nevertheless be true, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; and that the complex idea the word, nature, stands for, is ultimately made up of the simple ideas of sensation and reflection. Your Lordship proceeds,

"BUT we must yet proceed farther: for nature may be considered two ways: P. 253.

"1. As it is in distinct individuals; as the nature of a man is equally in Peter, James and John; and this is the common nature, with a particular subsistence, proper to each of them. For the nature of man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same nature, as it is in James and John; otherwise, they would be but one person, as well as have the same nature. And this distinction of persons in them, is discerned, both by our senses, as to their different accidents; and by our reason, because they have a separate existence; not coming into it at once, and in the same manner."

- P. 253. "2. NATURE may be considered abstractly, without respect to individual persons; and then it makes an intire notion of itself. For however the same nature may be in different individuals, yet the nature in itself remains one and the same; which appears from this evident reason, that otherwise every individual must make a different kind."

I AM so little confident of my own quickness, and of having got, from what your Lordship has said here, a clear and distinct apprehension concerning nature, that I must beg your Lordship's pardon, if I should happen to dissatisfy your Lordship, by talking unintelligibly, or besides the purpose, about it. I must then confess to your Lordship. 1. That I do not clearly understand, whether your Lordship, in these two paragraphs, speaks of nature, as standing for essential properties; or of nature, as standing for substance; and yet it is of great moment in the case, because your Lordship allows, that the notion of nature, in the former of these senses, may be had from sensation and reflection; but of nature, in the latter sense, your Lordship says, "it properly belongs to reason, and not mere ideas." 2. Your Lordship's saying, in the first of these paragraphs, "that the nature of man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same nature, as it is in James and John;" and in the second of them, "that however the same nature may be in different individuals, yet the nature itself remains one and the same;" does not give me so clear and distinct an apprehension concerning nature, that I know which, in your Lordship's opinion, I ought to think, either that one and the same nature is in Peter and John; or that a nature, distinct from that in John, is in Peter: and the reason is, because I cannot, in my way by ideas, well put together one and the same, and distinct. My apprehension, concerning the nature of man, or the common nature of man (if your Lordship will, upon this occasion, give me leave to trouble your Lordship with it) is, in short, this; that it is a collection of several ideas, combined into one complex, abstract idea, which, when they are found united in any individual existing, tho' joined in that existence, with several other ideas, that individual, or particular being is truly said to have the nature of a man, or the nature of a man to be in him; for as much as all these simple ideas are found united in him, which answer the complex, abstract idea, to which the specifick name man is given, by any one: which abstract, specifick idea, he keeps the same, when he applies the specifick name standing for it, to distinct individuals; i. e. no body changes his idea of a man, when he says Peter is a man, from that idea, which he makes the name man to stand for, when he calls John a man. This short way by ideas, has not, I confess, those different, and more learned and scholastick considerations, set down by your Lordship. But how they are necessary, or at all tend to prove, what your Lordship has proposed to prove, viz. that we have no clear and distinct idea of nature, from the simple ideas, got from sensation and reflection, I confess I do not yet see. But your Lordship goes on to it:

- P. 254. "LET us now see, how far these things can come from our simple ideas, by reflection and sensation. And I shall lay down the hypothesis of those, who resolve our certainty into ideas, as plainly and intelligibly as I can."

HERE I am got again into the plural number: for tho' it be said the hypothesis of those, yet my words alone are quoted for that hypothesis, and not a word of any, else, in this whole business concerning nature. What they are, I shall give the reader, as your Lordship has set them down.

Human Understanding,
b. ii. chap.
30, 31.

1. WE are told, "that all simple ideas are true and adequate. Not, that they are the true representations of things without us; but that they are the true effects of such powers in them, as produce such sensation within us. So that really we can understand nothing certainly by them, but the effects they have upon us."

FOR these words of mine, I find Human Understanding, B. ii. ch. 30, 31. quoted; but I crave leave to observe to your Lordship, that in neither of these chapters do I find the words, as they stand here, in your Lordship's book. B. ii. chap. 31. § 2. of my Essay, I find these words, "that all our simple
"idea

" ideas are adequate, because being nothing but the effects of certain powers
 " in things fitted, or ordained, by God, to produce such sensations in us, they
 " cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers." And in chap.
 30. § 2. I say, that " our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of
 " things. Not that they are all of them the images, or representations, of
 " what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of
 " bodies hath been already shewed."

THESE are the words in my book, from whence those in your Lordship's
 seem to be gathered, but with some difference; for I do not remember that
 I have any where said, of all our simple ideas, that they are none of them
 true representations of things without us; as the words I find in your Lordship's
 book, seem to make me say. The contrary whereof, appears from the words,
 which I have set down, out of chap. 30. where I deny only the simple ideas
 of secondary qualities, to be representations; but do every where affirm, that
 the simple ideas of primary qualities, are the images, or representations, of what
 does exist without us. So that my words, in the chapters quoted by your Lord-
 ship, not saying that all our simple ideas are only effects, and none of them
 representations, your Lordship, I humbly conceive, cannot, upon that account,
 infer from my words, as you do here, viz. " so that really we can understand P. 245.
 " nothing certainly by them."

THE remaining words of this sentence, I must beg your Lordship's par- P. 254.
 don, if I profess I do not understand: they are these; " but the effects they
 " have upon us." They here, and them in the preceding words, to which
 they are joined, signify simple ideas; for it is of those your Lordship infers,
 " so that really we can understand nothing certainly by them, but the effects
 " they have upon us." And then your Lordship's words import thus much, so
 " that really we can understand nothing certainly by simple ideas, but the effects
 " simple ideas have upon us;" which I cannot understand to be, what your
 Lordship intended to infer, from the preceding words, taken to be mine. For,
 I suppose your Lordship argues, from my opinion, concerning the simple ideas
 of secondary qualities, the little real knowledge we should receive from them,
 if it be true, that they are not representations, or images, of any thing in
 bodies, but only effects of certain powers in bodies to produce them in us:
 and, in that sense, I take the liberty to read your Lordship's words thus; so
 that can really we understand nothing certainly by [these ideas] but the effects
 [those powers] have upon us. To which I answer,

1. THAT we as certainly know and distinguish things by ideas, supposing
 them nothing but effects, produced in us by these powers, as if they were re-
 presentations. I can as certainly, when I have occasion for either, distinguish
 gold from silver, by the colour, or wine from water, by the taste; if the co-
 lour of the one, or the taste of the other, be only an effect of their powers
 on me, as if that colour and that taste were representations and resemblances of
 something in those bodies.

2. I ANSWER; that we have certainly as much pleasure and delight by
 those ideas, one way as the other. The smell of a violet, or taste of a peach,
 gives me as real and certain delight, if it be only an effect, as if it were the true
 resemblance of something in that flower and fruit. And I a little the more
 wonder, to hear your Lordship complain so much of want of certainty in this
 case, when I read these words of your Lordship in another place:

" THAT from the powers and properties of things, which are knowable by P. 256.
 " us, we may know as much of the internal essence of things, as those
 " powers and properties discover. I do not say, that we can know all essences
 " of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect understanding of all that
 " belong to them: but if we can know so much, as that there are certain
 " beings in the world, endued with such distinct powers and properties; what
 " is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things? But
 " we do not see the bare essence of things. What is that bare essence, with-
 " out the powers and properties belonging to it? It is that internal consti-
 " tution

"tution of things, from whence those powers and properties flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any discoveries that have been yet made) that is a good argument, to prove the uncertainty of philosophical speculations, about the real essence of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the certainty of such essences. For although we cannot comprehend the internal frame, or constitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the substance; yet by them we certainly know, that there are such essences, and that they are distinguished from each other, by their powers and properties."

GIVE me leave, if your Lordship please, to argue after the same manner in the present case: "that from these simple ideas, which are knowable by us, we know as much of the powers and internal constitutions of things, as these powers discover; and, if we can know so much, as that there are such powers, and that there are certain beings in the world, endued with such powers and properties," that by these simple ideas, that are but the effects of these powers, we can as certainly distinguish the beings, wherein those powers are, and receive as certain advantage from them, as if those simple ideas were resemblances: "what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things? But we do not see that internal constitution, from whence those powers flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be for any discoveries that have been yet made) that is a good argument, to shew how short our philosophical speculations are about the real, internal constitutions of things; but is no prejudice to us, who, by those simple ideas, search out, find and distinguish things for our uses. For tho', by those ideas, which are not resemblances, we cannot comprehend the internal frame, or constitution of things, nor, in what manner, these ideas are produced in us by those powers; yet, by them, we certainly know, that there are such essences, or constitutions, of these substances, that have those powers, whereby they regularly produce those ideas in us; and that they are distinguished from each other by those powers."

THE next words your Lordship sets down, as out of my book, are:

P. 254. "2. ALL our ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate, because they refer to the real essences of things, of which we are ignorant, and no man knows what substance is in itself: and they are all false, when looked on, as the representations of the unknown essences of things."

IN these too, my Lord, you must give me leave to take notice, that there is a little variation from my words: for I do not say, "that all our ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate, because they refer to the real essences of things; for some people may not refer them to real essences." But I do

B. ii. c. 21. "say, "that all ideas of substances, which are referred to real essences, are in that respect inadequate:" as may be seen more at large in that chapter.

P. 254. YOUR Lordship's next quotation has in it something of a like slip. The words, which your Lordship sets down, are,

"3. ABSTRACT ideas are only general names, made by separating circumstances of time, and place, &c. from them, which are only the inventions and creatures of the understanding."

FOR these, your Lordship quotes chap. 3. § 6. of my third book; where my words are, "the next thing to be considered, is how general words come to be made. For since all things, that exist, are only particulars, how come we by general terms? or where find we those general natures, they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being made signs of general ideas; and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time or place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this, or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction, they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort." By which words it appears, that I am far enough from saying, "that abstract ideas are only general names." Your Lordship's next quotation out of my book, is,

"4. ESSENCE

4. "ESSENCE may be taken two ways. 1. For the real, internal unknown P. 255.
 "constitutions of things; and in this sense it is understood as to particular
 "things. 2. For the abstract idea; and one is said to be the nominal, the
 "other the real essence. And the nominal essences only are immutable, and
 "are helps to enable them to consider things, and to discourse of them."

HERE too, I think, there are some words left out, which are necessary to make my meaning clearly understood; which your Lordship will find, if you think fit to give yourself the trouble, to cast your eye again on that chapter, which you here quote. But not discerning clearly, what use your Lordship makes of them, as they are either in your Lordship's quotation, or in my book, I shall not trouble your Lordship about them. Your Lordship goes on:

"BUT two things are granted, which tend to clear this matter.

P. 255.

"1. THAT there is a real essence, which is the foundation of powers and properties.

"2. THAT we may know these powers and properties, altho' we are ignorant of the real essence."

IF, by that indefinite expression, "we may know these powers and properties," your Lordship means, "that we may know some of the powers and properties that depend on the real essences of substances;" I grant it to be my meaning. If your Lordship, in these words, comprehends all their powers and properties, that goes beyond my meaning. From these two things, which I grant your Lordship says, you infer,

"1. THAT from those true and adequate ideas, which we have of the P. 255.
 "modes and properties of things, we have sufficient certainty of the real essence of them: for these ideas are allowed to be true; and either by them, we may judge of the truth of things, or we can make no judgment at all of any thing without ourselves.

"IF our ideas be only the effects we see, of the powers without us; yet our reason must be satisfied, that there could be no such powers, unless there were some real beings, which had them. So that either we may be certain, by these effects, of the real being of things; or it is not possible, as we are framed, to have any certainty at all, of any thing without ourselves."

ALL this, if I mistake not your Lordship, is only to prove, that by the ideas of properties and powers, which we observe in things, our reason must be satisfied that there are without us real beings, with real essences: which being that, which I readily own, and have said in my book, I cannot but acknowledge myself obliged to your Lordship, for being at the pains, to collect places out of my book, to prove what I hold in it; and the more, because your Lordship does it by ways and steps, which possibly I should never have thought of. Your Lordship's next inference is,

"2. THAT from the powers and properties of things, which are knowable P. 256.

"by us, we may know as much of the internal essence of things, as those powers and properties discover. I do not say, that we can know all essences of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect understanding of all that belong to them: but if we can know so much, as that there are certain beings in the world, endued with such distinct powers and properties; what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things? But we do not see the bare essence of things. What is that bare essence without the powers and properties belonging to it? It is that internal constitution of things, from whence those powers and properties flow. Suppose we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any discoveries that have been yet made) that is a good argument to prove the uncertainty of philosophical speculations, about the real essences of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who inquire after the certainty of such essences. For altho' we cannot comprehend the internal frame, or constitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the substance; yet, by them, we certainly know that there are such essences, and that they are distinguished from each other, by their powers and properties."

THIS second inference seems to be nothing but a reproof to those who complain, "that they do not see the bare essences of things." Complaining that God did not make us, otherwise than he has, and with larger capacities, than he has thought fit to give us, is, I confess, a fault worthy of your Lordship's reproof. But to say, that if we knew the real essences, or internal constitutions of those beings, some of whose properties we know, we should have much more certain knowledge concerning those things, and their properties, I am sure is true, and I think no faulty complaining; and if it be, I must own myself to your Lordship to be one of those complainers.

BUT your Lordship asks, "what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our certainty of things?"

IF your Lordship means, as your words seem to import, "what is it we complain of, in order to our certainty," that those properties are the properties of some "beings, or that something does exist, when those properties exist? I answer, we complain of the want of nothing, in order to that certainty, or such a certainty as that is. But there are other very desirable certainties, or other parts of knowledge concerning the same things, which we may want, when we have those certainties. Knowing the colour, figure and smell of hyssop, "I can, when I see hyssop, know so much, as that there is a certain being in the world, endued with such distinct powers and properties;" and yet I may justly complain, that I want something in order to certainty, that hyssop will cure a bruise, or cough, or that it will kill moths; or, used in a certain way, harden iron; or an hundred other useful properties that may be in it, which I shall never know; and yet might be certain of, if I knew the real essences, or internal constitution of things, on which all their properties depend.

YOUR Lordship agreeing with me, "that the real essence is that internal constitution of things, from whence their powers and properties flow; adds farther, suppose we be ignorant of this [essence,] as we are like to be for any discoveries have been yet made, that is a good argument to prove the uncertainty of philosophical speculations, about the real essences of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the certainty of such essences."

I KNOW no body that ever denied the certainty of such real essences, or internal constitutions, in things that do exist, if it be that that your Lordship means by certainty of such essences. If it be any other certainty, that your Lordship enquires after, relating to such essences, I confess I know not what it is, since your Lordship acknowledges, "we are ignorant of those real essences, those internal constitutions, and are like to be so; and seem to think it the incurable cause of uncertainty in philosophical speculations."

YOUR Lordship adds, "for altho' we cannot comprehend the internal frame and constitution of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the substance."

HERE I must acknowledge to your Lordship, that my notion of these essences differs a little from your Lordship's; for I do not take them to flow from the substance in any created being, but to be, in every thing, that internal constitution, or frame, or modification of the substance, which God in his wisdom and good pleasure thinks fit to give to every particular creature, when he gives it a being: and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist. Your Lordship's third inference begins thus:

P. 257. "3. THE essences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them: for they are founded on the natural constitution of things."

I THINK the real essences of things are not so much founded on, as that they are the very real constitution of things, and therefore I easily grant there is reality in them; and it was from that reality, that I called them real essences. But yet, from hence, I cannot agree to what follows.

P. 257. "AND however the abstracted ideas are the work of the mind, yet they are not mere creatures of the mind; as appears by an instance produced of the essence of the sun, being in one, single individual; in which case it is granted, that the idea may be so abstracted, that more suns might agree in it, and

"and it is as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there are stars. So that here we have a real essence, subsisting in one individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and the same essence remaining. But in this one sun, there is a real essence, and not a mere nominal, or abstracted essence: but, suppose there were more suns; would not each of them have the real essence of the sun? For what is it makes the second sun, but having the same real essence with the first? If it were but a nominal essence, then the second would have nothing but the name."

THIS, my Lord, as I understand it, is to prove, that the abstract, general essence of any sort of things, or things of the same denomination, v. g. of man, or marigold, hath a real being, out of the understanding; which I confess, my Lord, I am not able to conceive. Your Lordship's proof here, brought out of my Essay, concerning the sun, I humbly conceive will not reach it: because what is said there, does not at all concern the real, but nominal essence; as is evident from hence, that the idea, I speak of there, is a complex idea: but we have no complex idea of the internal constitution, or real essence, of the sun. Besides, I say expressly, that our distinguishing substances into species by names, is not at all founded on their real essences. So that, the sun being one of these substances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your Lordship, be supposed to mean, by essence of the sun, the real essence of the sun, unless I had so expressed it. But all this argument will be at an end, when your Lordship shall have explained what you mean by these words, "true sun." In my sense of them, any thing will be a true sun, to which the name sun may be truly and properly applied; and to that substance, or thing, the name sun, may be truly and properly applied, which has united in it that combination of sensible qualities, by which any thing else, that is called sun, is distinguished from other substances, i. e. by the nominal essence: and thus our sun is denominated and distinguished from a fixed star; not by a real essence, that we do not know (for if we did, it is possible we should find the real essence, or constitution, of one of the fixed stars, to be the same with that of our sun) but by a complex idea of sensible qualities co-existing; which, wherever they are found, make a true sun. And thus I crave leave to answer your Lordship's question, "for what is it makes the second sun to be a true sun, but having the same real essence with the first? If it were but a nominal essence, then the second would have nothing but the name?"

I humbly conceive, if it had the nominal essence, it would have something besides the name, viz. that nominal essence, which is sufficient to denominate it truly a sun, or to make it be a true sun, tho' we know nothing of that real essence, whereon that nominal one depends. Your Lordship will then argue, that that real essence is in the second sun, and makes the second sun. I grant it, when the second sun comes to exist, so as to be perceived by us, to have all the ideas contained in our complex idea, i. e. in our nominal essence of a sun. For should it be true (as is now believed by astronomers) that the real essence of the sun were in any of the fixed stars; yet such a star could not, for that, be by us called a sun, whilst it answers not our complex idea, or nominal essence, of a sun. But how far that will prove, that the essences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them, distinct from that of abstract ideas in the mind, which are merely creatures of the mind, I do not see; and we shall farther enquire, in considering your Lordship's following words:

"THEREFORE there must be a real essence in every individual of the same P. 258. kind." Yes, and I beg leave of your Lordship to say, of a different kind too. For that alone is it, which makes it to be what it is.

THAT every individual substance has a real, internal, individual constitution, i. e. a real essence, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your Lordship says,

"PETER, James and John are all true and real men." Answ. Without P. 258. doubt, supposing them to be men, they are true and real men, i. e. supposing the name of that species belongs to them. And so three bobagues are all true and

and real bobaques, supposing the name of that species of animals belongs to them.

For I beseech your Lordship to consider, whether, in your way of arguing, by naming them Peter, James and John, names familiar to us, as appropriated to individuals of the species, man, your Lordship does not first suppose them men; and then very safely ask, whether they be not all true and real men? But if I should ask your Lordship, whether Weweena, Chuckery and Coushedra, were true and real men or no; your Lordship would not be able to tell me, until, I having pointed out to your Lordship the individuals, called by those names; your Lordship by examining whether they had in them those sensible qualities, which your Lordship has combined into that complex idea, to which you give the specific name, man, determined them all, or some of them, to be of the species, which you call man, and so to be true and real men: which when your Lordship has determined, it is plain you did it by that, which is only the nominal essence, as not knowing the real one. But your Lordship farther asks,

- P. 258. "WHAT is it makes Peter, James and John, real men? Is it the attributing the general name to them? No certainly; but that the true and real essence of a man is in every one of them."

If, when your Lordship asks, what makes them men? your Lordship used the word, making, in the proper sense, for the efficient cause, and in that sense it were true, that the essence of a man, i. e. the specific essence of that species made a man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this specific essence had a reality, beyond that of being only a general abstract idea in the mind. But when it is said, "that it is the true and real essence of a man, in every one of them, that makes Peter, James and John, true and real men;" the true and real meaning of these words is no more, but that the essence of that species, i. e. the properties, answering the complex, abstract idea, to which the specific name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called men, or is the reason, why they are called men. Your Lordship adds,

- P. 258. "AND we must be as certain of this, as we are, that they are men."

How, I beseech your Lordship, are we certain, that they are men, but only by our senses, finding those properties in them, which answer the abstract complex idea, which is in our minds, of the specific idea, to which we have an-

- P. 258. nexed the specific name man? This I take to be the true meaning of what your Lordship says, in the next words, viz. "they take their denomination of being men, from that common nature, or essence, which is in them;" and I am apt to think, these words will not hold true, in any other sense.

- P. 258. YOUR Lordship's fourth inference begins thus:

"THAT the general idea is not made from the simple ideas, by the mere act of the mind, abstracting from circumstances, but from reason and consideration of the nature of things."

I THOUGHT, my Lord, that reason and consideration had been acts of the mind, mere acts of the mind, when anything was done by them. Your Lordship gives a reason for it, viz.

- P. 258. "FOR, when we see several individuals, that have the same powers and properties, we thence infer, that there must be something common to all, which makes them of one kind."

I GRANT the inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, that the general idea, the name is annexed to, is not made by the mind. I have said, and it agrees with what your Lordship here says, that "the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows nature, and puts no ideas together, which are not supposed to have an union in nature: no body joins the voice of a sheep, with the shape of an horse; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men observing certain qualities

"qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied nature, and, of ideas so united, made their complex ones of substances, &c." Which is very little different from what your Lordship here says, that it is from our observation of individuals, that we come to infer, "that there is something common to them all." But I do not see how it will thence follow, that the general, or specifick, idea is not made, by the mere act of the mind. No, says your Lordship.

"THERE is something common to them all, which makes them of one P. 259. kind; and if the difference of kinds be real, that which makes them all of one kind, must not be a nominal, but real essence."

THIS may be some objection to the name of nominal essence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing designed by it. There is an internal constitution of things, on which their properties depend. This your Lordship and I are agreed of, and this we call the real essence. There are also certain complex ideas, or combinations of these properties, in men's minds, to which they commonly annex specifick names, or names of sorts, or kinds, of things. This, I believe, your Lordship does not deny. These complex ideas, for want of a better name, I have called nominal essences; how properly, I will not dispute. But if any one will help me to a better name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then I must, to express myself, use this. Now, my Lord, body, life, and the power of reasoning, being not the real essence of a man, as I believe your Lordship will agree; will your Lordship say, that they are not enough to make the thing, wherein they are found, of the kind called man, and not of the kind called baboon, because the difference of these kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the thing of one kind and not of another, I do not see how animal rationale can be enough really to distinguish a man from an horse: for that is but the nominal, not real essence of that kind, designed by the name man. And yet, I suppose, every one thinks it real enough, to make a real difference between that and other kinds. And if nothing will serve the turn, to make things of one kind and not of another (which as I have shewed, signifies no more but ranking of them under different, specifick names) but their real, unknown constitutions, which are the real essences, we are speaking of, I fear it would be a long while, before we should have really different kinds of substances, or distinct names for them; unless we could distinguish them, by these differences, of which we have no distinct conceptions. For I think it would not be readily answered me, if I should demand, wherein lies the real difference, in the internal constitution, of a stag, from that of a buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and no body questions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different. Your Lordship farther says,

"AND this difference doth not depend upon the complex ideas of substances, P. 259. whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds."

I CONFESS, my Lord, I know not what to say to this, because I do not know what these complex ideas of substances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a mistake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are these:

"FOR, let them mistake in their complication of ideas, either in leaving P. 259. out, or putting in, what doth not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of a man, and an horse, and a tree, are just what they were."

THE mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is this, that things are here taken to be distinguished by their real essences; when, by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are already distinguished by their nominal essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your Lordship, does your Lordship mean, when you say, "the real essence of a man, and an horse, and a tree;" but that there are such kinds, already set out, by the signification of these names, man, horse, tree? And what, I beseech your Lordship, is the signification of each of these specifick names, but the complex idea it stands

for? And that complex idea is the nominal essence, and nothing else. So that taking man, as your Lordship does here, to stand for a kind, or sort of individuals, all which agree in that common, complex idea, which that specific name stands for; it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals, comprehended under the specific name, man, in your use of it, would be just the same, let others leave out, or put into their complex idea, of man, what they please; because the real essence, on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. those properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.

FOR I take it for granted, that in using the name, man, in this place, your Lordship uses it for that complex idea, which is in your Lordship's mind, of that species. So that your Lordship, by putting it for, or substituting it in the place of that complex idea, where you say, the real essence of it is just as it was, or the very same it was, does suppose the idea it stands for, to be steadily the same. For, if I change the signification of the word, man, whereby it may not comprehend just the same individuals which, in your Lordship's sense, it does but shut out some of those that, to your Lordship, are men, in your signification of the word, man; or take in others, to which your Lordship does not allow the name, man; I do not think your Lordship will say, that the real essence of man, in both the senses, is the same; and yet your Lordship seems to say so, when you say, "let men mistake, in the complication of their ideas, either in leaving out, or putting in, what does not belong to them; and let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of the individuals, comprehended under the names, annexed to these ideas, will be the same:" for so, I humbly conceive, it must be put, to make out what your Lordship aims at. For as your Lordship puts it, by the name, of man, or any other specific name, your Lordship seems to me to suppose, that that name stands for, and not for, the same idea, at the same time.

FOR example, my Lord, let your Lordship's idea, to which you annex the sign man, be a rational animal: let another man's idea be a rational animal of such a shape; let a third man's idea be of an animal, of such a size, and shape, leaving our rationality; let a fourth's be an animal, with a body of such a shape, and an immaterial substance, with a power of reasoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea, an immaterial substance: It is plain every one of these will call his, a man, as well as your Lordship; and yet it is as plain that, man, as standing for all these distinct, complex ideas, cannot be supposed to have the same internal constitution, i. e. the same real essence. The truth is, every distinct, abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a real, distinct kind, whatever the real essence (which we know not, of any of them) be.

AND therefore I grant it true, what your Lordship says in the next words, P. 259. "and let the nominal essences differ never so much, the real, common essence, or nature, of the several kinds, are not at all altered by them;" i. e. that our thoughts, or ideas cannot alter the real constitutions, that are in things that exist; there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the change of ideas, to which we annex them, can and does alter the signification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which, by these names, we rank and sort them into. Your Lordship farther adds,

P. 259. "AND these real essences are unchangeable, i. e. the internal constitutions are unchangeable." Of what, I beseech your Lordship, are the internal constitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exists, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as easily, by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it, that is unchangeable? The internal constitution, or real essence of a species; which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specific name, v. g. of man, horse, or tree, is annexed to, or made the sign of the same, abstract, complex idea, under which I rank several individuals, it is impossible, but the real constitution, on which that unaltered, complex idea, or nominal essence depends, must be the same, i. e. in other words, where we find all the same properties, we have

have reason to conclude there is the same real, internal constitution, from which those properties flow.

BUT your Lordship proves the real essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them, in these following words:

"FOR, however there may happen some variety in individuals, by particular accidents, yet the essences of men, and horses, and trees, remain always the same; because they do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the creator, who hath made several sorts of beings."

IT is true, the real constitutions, or essences, of particular things existing, do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the creator; but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does depend, and wholly depend upon the ideas of men.

YOUR Lordship here ending your four inferences, and all your discourse about nature; you come, in the next place to treat of person, concerning which your Lordship discourseth thus:

"2. LET us now come to the idea of a person. For altho' the common P. 259. nature in mankind be the same, yet we see a difference in the several individuals, from one another: so that Peter, and James, and John, are all of the same kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John. But what is this distinction founded upon? They may be distinguished from each other, by our senses, as to difference of features, distance of place, &c. but that is not all; for supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several individuals in the same nature. And here lies the true common idea of a person, which arises from that manner of subsistence, which is in one individual, and is not communicable to another. An individual, intelligent substance, is rather supposed to the making of a person, than the proper definition of it: for a person relates to something, which doth distinguish it from another intelligent substance, in the same nature; and therefore the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of subsistence, which agrees to one, and to none else of the kind: and this is it which is called personality."

BUT then your Lordship asks, "but how do our simple ideas help us out, in this matter? Can we learn from them the difference of nature and person?"

IF nature and person are taken for two real beings, that do, or can, exist any where, without any relation to these two names, I must confess I do not see how simple ideas, or any thing else, can help us out, in this matter; nor can we, from simple ideas, or any thing else, that I know, learn the difference between them, nor what they are.

THE reason, why I speak thus, is, because your Lordship, in your fore-cited words, says, "here lies the true idea of a person;" and in the foregoing discourse speaks of nature, as if it were some steady, established being, to which one certain, precise idea necessarily belongs, to make it a true idea; whereas, my Lord, in the way of ideas, I begin at the other end, and think that the word person, in itself, signifies nothing; and so no idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the true idea of it. But as soon as the common use of any language has appropriated it to any idea, then, that is the true idea of a person, and so of nature: but because the propriety of language, i. e. the precise idea, that every word stands for, is not always exactly known, but is often disputed, there is no other way for him, that uses a word, which is in dispute, but to define what he signifies by it; and then the dispute can be no longer verbal, but must necessarily be about the idea, which he tells us he puts it for.

TAKING, therefore, nature and person for the signs of two ideas, they are put to stand for, there is nothing, I think, that helps us so soon, nor so well to find the difference of nature and person, as simple ideas; for, by enumerating all the simple ideas, that are contained in the complex idea, that each of them is made to stand for, we shall immediately see the whole difference, that is between them.

FAR be it from me to say, there is no other way but this: your Lordship proposing to clear the distinction between nature and person, and having declared, P. 252. "we can have no clear and distinct idea of it, by sensation or reflection, and that the grounds of identity and distinction come not into our minds, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection;" gave me some hopes of getting farther insight into these matters, so as to have more clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, than was to be had by ideas. But after having, with attention, more than once read over what your Lordship, with so much application, has writ thereupon; I must, with regret, confess, that the way is too delicate, and the matter too abstruse, for my capacity; and that I have learned nothing, out of your Lordship's elaborate discourse, but this, that I must content myself with the condemned way by ideas, and despair of ever attaining any knowledge, by any other than that, or farther than that will lead me to it.

THE remaining part of the chapter containing no remarks of your Lordship, upon any thing in my book, I am glad I have no occasion to give your Lordship any farther trouble, but only to beg your Lordship's pardon for this, and to assure your Lordship, that I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient servant,

John Locke.

POSTSCRIPT.

MY LORD,

UPON a review of these papers, I can hardly forbear wondering at myself what I have been doing in them; since I can scarce find upon what ground this controversy with me stands, or whence it rose, or whither it tends. And I should certainly repent my pains in it, but that I conclude that your Lordship, who does not throw away your time upon slight matters and things of small moment, having a quicker sight and larger views than I have, would not have troubled yourself so much with my book, as to bestow on it seven and twenty pages together, of a very learned treatise, and that on a very weighty subject; and in those twenty seven pages, bring seven and twenty quotations out of my book, unless there were something in it, wherein it is very material that the world should be set right; which is what I earnestly desire should be done. And to that purpose alone, have taken the liberty to trouble your Lordship with this letter.

If I have any where omitted any thing of moment, in your Lordship's discourse, concerning my notions, or any where mistaken your Lordship's sense, in what I have taken notice of, I beg your Lordship's pardon; with this assurance, that it was not wilfully done. And if any where, in the warm pursuit of an argument, over-attention to the matter should have made me let slip any form of expression, in the least circumstance not carrying with it the utmost marks of that respect, that I acknowledge due, and shall always pay to your Lordship's person, and known, great learning, I disown it; and desire your Lordship to look on it, as not coming from my intention, but inadvertency.

No body's notions, I think, are the better or truer, for ill manners joined with them; and I conclude your Lordship, who so well knows the different

cast

cast of men's heads, and of the opinions that possess them, will not think it ill manners, in any one, if his notions differ from your Lordship's, and that he owns that difference, and explains the grounds of it, as well as he can. I have always thought, that truth and knowledge, by the ill and over-eager management of controversies, lose a great deal of the advantages, they might receive from the variety of conceptions, there is in men's understandings. Could the heats, and passion, and ill language, be left out of them, they would afford great improvements to those, who could separate them from by-interests and personal prejudices. These I look upon your Lordship to be altogether above.

It is not for me, who have so mean a talent in it myself, to prescribe to any one, how he should write; for when I have said all I can, he, it is like, will follow his own method, and perhaps cannot help it. Much less would it be good manners in me, to offer any thing that way, to a person of your Lordship's high rank, above me, in parts and learning, as well as place and dignity. But yet, your Lordship will excuse it to my short-sightedness, if I wish sometimes that your Lordship would have been pleased, in this debate, to have kept every one's part separate to himself, that what I am concerned in, might not have been so mingled with the opinions of others, which are no tenets of mine, nor, as I think, does, what I have written, any way relate to; but that I, and every one might have seen, whom your Lordship's arguments bore upon, and what interest he had in the controversy, and how far. At least, my Lord, give me leave to wish, that your Lordship had shewn what connection any thing I have said, about ideas, and particularly about the idea of substance, about the possibility that God, if he pleased, might endue some systems of matter with a power of thinking; or what I have said to prove a God, &c. has, with any objections, that are made, by others, against the doctrine of the Trinity, or against mysteries: for many passages, concerning ideas, substances, the possibility of God's bestowing thought on some systems of matter, and the proof of a God, &c. your Lordship has quoted, out of my book, in a chapter, wherein your Lordship professes to answer "objections against the Trinity, in point of reason." Had I been able to discover, in these passages of my book, quoted by your Lordship, what tendency your Lordship had observed in them, to any such objections, I should perhaps have troubled your Lordship with less impertinent answers. But the uncertainty, I was very often in, to what purpose your Lordship brought them, may have made my explications of myself less apposite, than what your Lordship might have expected. If your Lordship had shewed me any thing, in my book, that contained, or implied, any opposition in it, to any thing revealed in holy writ, concerning the Trinity, or any other doctrine contained in the bible, I should have been thereby obliged to your Lordship, for freeing me from that mistake, and for affording me an opportunity to own to the world that obligation, by publicly retracting my error. For I know not any thing more disingenuous, than not publicly to own a conviction, one has received, concerning any thing erroneous, in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater offence against mankind, than to propagate a falsehood, whereof one is convinced, especially in a matter, wherein men are highly concerned not to be misled.

THE holy scripture is to me, and always will be, the constant guide of my assent; and I shall always hearken to it, as containing infallible truth, relating to things of the highest concernment. And I wish I could say, there were no mysteries in it: I acknowledge there are to me, and I fear always will be. But, where I want the evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, because God has said it: and I shall presently condemn and quit any opinion of mine, as soon as I am shewn that it is contrary to any revelation in the holy scripture. But I must confess to your Lordship, that I do not yet perceive any such contrariety in any thing in my Essay of Human Understanding.

Mr. LOCKE's REPLY

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Bishop of *Worcester's* Answer to his Letter,

Concerning some Passages relating to

Mr. LOCKE's Essay of Human Understanding :

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordship's, in
Vindication of the TRINITY.

MY LORD,



OUR Lordship having done my letter the honour to think it worth your reply, I think myself bound, in good manners, publickly to acknowledge the favour, and to give your Lordship an account of the effect, it has had upon me, and the grounds, upon which I yet differ from you in those points, wherein I am still under the mortification of not being able to bring my sentiments wholly to agree with your Lordship's. And this I the more readily do, because it seems to me, that that, wherein the great difference now lies between us, is founded only on your fears; which, I conclude, upon a sedate review, your Lordship will either part with, or else give me other reasons, besides your apprehensions, to convince me of mistakes in my book, which your Lordship thinks to be of consequence, even in matters of religion.

YOUR Lordship makes my Letter to consist of two parts: my complaint of your Lordship, and my vindication of myself. You begin with my complaint; one part whereof was, that I was brought into a controversy, wherein I had never meddled, nor knew how I came to be concerned in. To this your Lordship is pleased to promise me satisfaction.

SINCE your Lordship has condescended so far, as to be at the pains to give me and others, satisfaction in this matter, I crave leave to second your design herein, and to premise a remark, or two, for the clearer understanding the nature of my complaint, which is the only way to satisfaction in it.

1. THEN it is observed, that the proposition, which you dispute against, as opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, is this, that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty. This is evident not only from what your Lordship subjoins to the account of reason, given by the author of Christianity not mysterious; but also, by what your Lordship says here again, in your answer to me, P. 14. in these words: "to lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and distinct ideas, was the opinion I opposed."

2. IT is to be observed, that this you call a new way of reasoning; and those that build upon it, gentlemen of this new way of reasoning.

3. IT is to be observed, that a great part of my complaint was, that I was made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, without any reason at all.

To this complaint of mine, your Lordship has had the goodness to make this answer:

"Now

" Now to give you, and others, satisfaction as to this matter, I shall first
 " give an account of the occasion of it; and then shew what care I took to
 " prevent misunderstanding about it."

THE first part of the satisfaction your Lordship is pleased to offer, is contained in these words:

" THE occasion was this: being to answer the objections, in point of reason (which had not been answered before) the first I mentioned was; That it was above reason, and therefore not to be believed. In answer to this, I proposed two things to be considered: 1. What we understand by reason. 2. What ground, in reason, there is to reject any doctrine above it, when it is proposed as a matter of faith."

" As to the former I observed, that the Unitarians, in their late pamphlets, talked very much about clear and distinct ideas and perceptions, and that the mysteries of faith were repugnant to them; but never went about to state the nature and bounds of reason, in such a manner, as they ought to have done, who make it the rule and standard of what they are to believe. But I added, that a late author, in a book called Christianity not mysterious, had taken upon him to clear this matter, whom, for that cause, I was bound to consider: the design of his discourse related wholly to matters of faith, and not to philosophical speculations; so that there can be no dispute, about his application of those, he calls principles of reason and certainty."

" WHEN the mind makes use of intermediate ideas, to discover the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, received into them; this method of knowledge, he faith, is properly called reason, or demonstration."

" THE mind, as he goes on, receives ideas two ways.

" 1. BY intromission of the senses.

P. 6.

" 2. BY considering its own operations.

" AND these simple and distinct ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning."

AND so all our certainty is resolved into two things, either " immediate perception, which is self-evidence: or the use of intermediate ideas, which discovers the certainty of any thing dubious: which is what he calls reason."

" Now this, I said, did suppose, that we must have clear and distinct ideas, of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds (by reason) and that the only way to attain this certainty, is by comparing these ideas together; which excludes all certainty of faith, or reason; where we cannot have such clear and distinct ideas."

" FROM hence I proceeded to shew, that we could not have such clear and distinct ideas, as were necessary in the present debate, either by sensation or reflection, and consequently we could not attain to any certainty about it; for which I instanced in the nature of substance, and person, and the distinction between them."

" AND by virtue of these principles, I said, that I did not wonder that the gentlemen, of this new way of reasoning, had almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world."

THIS is all your Lordship says here, to give me, and others, satisfaction, as to the matters of my complaint. For what follows, to the 35th page of your answer, is nothing but your Lordship's arguing, against what I have said, concerning substance.

IN these words, therefore, above quoted, I am to find the satisfaction, your Lordship has promised, as to the occasion, why your Lordship made me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, and in that joined me with the Unitarians, and the author of Christianity not mysterious. But I crave leave to represent to your Lordship, wherein the words above quoted come short of giving me satisfaction.

IN the first place, it is plain, they were intended for a short narrative of what was contained in the tenth chapter, of your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, relating to this matter. But how could your Lordship think, that the repeating

repeating the same things over again; could give me, or any body else, satisfaction, as to my being made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning.

INDEED, I cannot say it is an exact repetition of what is to be found, in the beginning of that tenth chapter; because your Lordship said, in that tenth chapter, that "the author of Christianity not mysterious, gives an account of reason, which supposes, that we must have clear and distinct ideas, of what-
 Vin. p. 232. "ever we pretend to a certainty of, in our minds." But here, in the passage above set down, out of your answer to my letter, I find it is not to his account of reason, but to something taken out of that, and something borrowed by him, out of my book, to which your Lordship annexes this supposition. For your
 Answ. p. 6. Lordship says, "now this, I said, did suppose, that we must have clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds (by reason.)"

If your Lordship did say so, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, your Printer did your Lordship two manifest injuries; the one is, that he omitted these words [by reason]: and the other, that he annexed your Lordship's words, to the account of reason, there given, by the author of Christianity not mysterious; and not to those words, your Lordship here says, you annexed them to. For this, here refers to other words, and not barely to that author's account of reason; as any one may satisfy himself, who will but compare these two places together.

ONE thing more seems to me very remarkable, in this matter, and that is, that "the laying all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear
 Answ. p. 14. "and distinct ideas, should be the opinion, which you oppose," as your Lordship declares; and that this should be it, for which the Unitarians, the author of Christianity not mysterious, and I, are jointly brought on the stage, under the title of The gentlemen of this new way of reasoning: and yet no one quotation be brought out of the Unitarians, to shew it to be their opinion; nor any thing alleged out of the author of Christianity not mysterious, to shew it to be his; but only some things quoted out of him, which are said to suppose all foundation of certainty to be laid upon clear and distinct ideas: which, that they do suppose it, is not, I think, self-evident, nor yet proved. But this I am sure, as to myself, I do no where lay all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas; and therefore am still at a loss, why I was made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning.

ANOTHER thing, wherein your Lordship's narrative, intended for my satisfaction, comes short of giving it me, is this; that at most it gives but an account of the occasion, why the Unitarians, and the author of Christianity not mysterious were made, by your Lordship, the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning. But it pretends not to say a word, why I was made one of them; which was the thing, wherein I needed satisfaction. For your Lordship breaks off your report of the matter of fact, just when you were come to the matter of my complaint; which you pass over in silence, and turn your discourse to what I have said in my letter: for your Lordship ends the account of the occasion, in these words: "the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning had almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world." And there your Lordship stops. Whereas, it is in the words, that immediately follow, that I am brought in, as one of those gentlemen, of which I would have been glad to have known the occasion; and it is in this, that I needed satisfaction. For that which concerns the others, I meddle not with; I only desire to know, upon what occasion, or why, I was brought into this dispute of the Trinity? But of that, in this account of the occasion, I do not see that your Lordship says any thing.

I HAVE been forced, therefore, to look again a little closer into this whole matter: and, upon a fresh examination of what your Lordship has said, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, and in your answer to my letter, I come now to see a little clearer, that the matter, in short, stands thus: the author of Christianity not mysterious, was one of the gentlemen of this new way

way of reasoning, because he had laid down a doctrine, concerning reason, which supposed clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty. But that doctrine of his tied me not at all to him, as may be seen by comparing his account of reason, with what I have said of reason, in my Essay, which your Lordship accuses of no such supposition; and so I stood clear from his account of reason, or any thing it supposes. But he having given an account of the original of our ideas, and having said something about them, conformable to what is in my Essay, that has tied him and me so close together, that, by this sort of connection, I came to be one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, which consists in making clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, tho' I nowhere say, or suppose, clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty.

How your Lordship came to join me, with the author of Christianity not mysterious, I think is now evident. And he being the link, whereby your Lordship joins me to the Unitarians, in objections against the Trinity, in point of reason, answered; give me leave, my Lord, a little to examine the connection of this link, on that side also, i. e. what has made your Lordship join him and the Unitarians in this point, viz. making clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty; that great battery, it seems, which they make use of, against the doctrine of the Trinity in point of reason.

Now as to this, your Lordship says, "that the Unitarians having not ex-^{Vindic. p.}
 "tained the nature and bounds of reason, as they ought; the author of Chris-^{231.}
 "tianity not mysterious hath endeavoured to make amends for this, and takes
 "upon him to make this matter clear." And then your Lordship sets down his account of reason, at large.

I WILL not examine how it appears, that the author of Christianity not mysterious, gave this account of reason, to supply the defect of the Unitarians herein, or to make amends for their not having done it. Your Lordship does not quote any thing out of him, to shew that it was to make amends for what the Unitarians had neglected. I only look to see how the Unitarians and he come to be united, in this dangerous principle of the necessity of clear and distinct ideas to certainty: which is that, which makes him a gentleman of this new and dangerous way of reasoning; and consequently me too; because he agrees in some particulars with my Essay.

Now, my Lord, having looked over his account of reason, as set down by your Lordship; give me leave to say, that he, that shall compare that account of reason, with your Lordship's animadversion annexed to it, in these words, "this is offered to the world, as an account of reason; but to shew how very ^{Vindic. p.}
 "loose and unsatisfactory it is, I desire it may be considered, that this doctrine ^{232.}
 "supposes that we must have clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to
 "any certainty of, in our minds; and that the only way to attain this certainty,
 "is by comparing these ideas together; which excludes all certainty of faith,
 "or reason, where we cannot have such clear and distinct ideas:" will, I fear, hardly defend himself from wondering at the way, your Lordship has taken to shew, how loose and unsatisfactory an account of reason his is; but by imagining that your Lordship had a great mind to say something against clear and distinct ideas, as necessary to certainty; or that your Lordship had some reason for bringing them in, that does not appear in that account of reason; since in it, from one end to the other, there is not the least mention of clear and distinct ideas. Nor does he, (that I see) say any thing, that supposes, that we must have clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our minds.

BUT whether he and the Unitarians do, or do not, lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear, and distinct ideas, I concern not myself: all my enquiry is, how he, and I and the Unitarians come to be joined together, as gentlemen of this new way of reasoning? Which, in short, as far as I can trace and observe the connection, is only thus.

Vindic. p.
231.

THE Unitarians are the men of this new way of reasoning, because they speak of clear and distinct perceptions, in their answer to your Lordship's sermon, as your Lordship says. The author of Christianity not mysterious, is joined to the Unitarians, as a gentleman of this new way of reasoning, because his doctrine, concerning reason, supposes we must have clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our minds: and I am joined to that author, because he says, "that the using of intermediate ideas to discover the agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas received into our minds, is reason; and that the mind receives ideas, by the intromission of the senses, and by considering its own operations. And these simple and distinct ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning." This, because it seems to be borrowed out of my book, is that, which unites me to him, and by him consequently to the Unitarians.

AND thus I am come to the end of the thread of your Lordship's discourse, whereby I am brought into the company of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, and thereby bound up in the bundle and cause of the Unitarians, arguing against the doctrine of the Trinity, by objections in point of reason.

I HAVE been longer upon this, than I thought I should be: but the thread, that ties me to the Unitarians, being spun very fine and subtil, is, as it naturally falls out, the longer for it, and the harder to be followed, so as to discover the connection every where. As for example; the thread, that ties me to the author of Christianity not mysterious, is so fine and delicate, that, without laying my eyes close to it, and poring a good while, I can hardly perceive how it hangs together; that because he says, what your Lordship charges him to say in the 234th page of your Vindication, &c. and because I say what your Lordship quotes out of my Essay, in the same page, that therefore, I am one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, which your Lordship opposes in the Unitarians, as dangerous to the doctrine of the Trinity. This connection of me with the author of Christianity not mysterious; and by him with the Unitarians (being in a point, wherein I agree with your Lordship, and not with them, if they do lay all the foundation of knowledge in clear and distinct ideas) is, I say, pretty hard for me clearly to perceive now, tho' your Lordship has given me, in your letter, that end of the clue, which was to lead me to it, for my satisfaction; but was impossible for me, or (as I think) any body else, to discover, whilst it stood, as it does, in your Lordship's Vindication, &c.

AND now, my Lord, it is time I ask your Lordship's pardon, for saying in my first letter, "that I hoped I might say, you had gone a little out of your way to do me a kindness;" which your Lordship, by so often repeating of it seems to be displeased with. For, besides that there is nothing out of the way, to a willing mind, I have now the satisfaction to be joined to the author of Christianity not mysterious, for his agreeing with me, in the original of our ideas and the materials of our knowledge (tho' I agree not with him, or any body else, in laying all foundation of certainty in matters of faith, in clear and distinct ideas;) and his being joined with the Unitarians, by giving an account of reason, which supposes clear and distinct ideas, as necessary to all knowledge and certainty; I have now, I say, the satisfaction to see, how I lay directly in your Lordship's way, in opposing these gentlemen, who lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and distinct ideas; i. e. the Unitarians, the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning so dangerous, to the doctrine of the Trinity. For the author of Christianity not mysterious agreeing with them in some things, and with me in others, he being joined to them, on one side, by an account of reason, that supposes clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty; and to me, on the other side, by saying, "the mind has its ideas from sensation and reflection, and that those are the materials and foundations of all our knowledge," &c. who can deny, but so ranged in a row, your Lordship may place yourself so, that we may seem to you but one object, and so one shot be aimed at us, all together? Tho', if your Lordship

ship would be at the pains to change your station a little; and view us on the other side, we should visibly appear to be very far afunder; and I, in particular, be found, in the matter controverted, to be nearer to your Lordship, than to either of them, or any body else, who lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and distinct ideas. For I perfectly assent to what your Lordship saith, "That there are many things, of which we may be certain, and yet can have no clear and distinct ideas of them." Vind. p. 233.

BESIDES this account of the occasion, of bringing me into your Lordship's chapter, wherein objections against the Trinity, in point of reason, are answered, which we have considered; your Lordship promises "to shew, what care you took, to prevent being misunderstood about it, to give me and others satisfaction as to this matter:" which I find about the end of the first quarter of your Lordship's answer to me. All the pages between, being taken up, in a dispute against what I have said about substance, and our idea of it; that I think has now no more to do with the question, whether I ought to have been made one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, or with my complaint about it; tho' there be many things in it, that I ought to consider apart, to shew the reason why I am not yet brought to your Lordship's sentiments, by what you have there said. To return, therefore, to the business in hand.

YOUR Lordship says, "I come, therefore, now to shew the care I took, to prevent being misunderstood; which will best appear, by my own words, viz. I must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding (from whence these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes, than he intended them) that he makes the cases of spiritual and corporeal substances to be alike." P. 35.

THESE words, my Lord, which you have quoted out of your Vindication, &c. I, with acknowledgment, own, will keep your Lordship from being misunderstood, if any one should be in danger to be so foolishly mistaken, as to think your Lordship could not treat me with great civility, when you pleased; or that you did not here make me a great compliment, in the epithet, which you here bestow upon me. These words, also, of your Lordship, will certainly prevent your Lordship's being misunderstood, in allowing me to have made the case of spiritual and corporeal substances to be alike. But this was not what I complained of: my complaint was, that I was brought into a controversy, wherein what I had written, had nothing more to do, than in any other controversy whatsoever; and that I was made a party, on one side of a question, tho' what I said, in my book, made me not more on the one side of that question, than the other. And that your Lordship had so mixed me, in many places, with those gentlemen, whose objections against the Trinity, in point of reason, your Lordship was answering, that the reader could not but take me to be one of them, that had objected against the Trinity, in point of reason. As for example; where your Lordship first introduces me, your Lordship says, "That the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world. For they not only tell us," "That we can have no idea of it by sensation and reflection; but that nothing is signified by it, only an uncertain supposition of we know not what." And for these words, B. i. ch. iv. § 18. of my Essay, is quoted. Vind. p. 234.

NOW my Lord, what care is there taken? what provision is there made, in the words above alleged by your Lordship, to prevent your being misunderstood, if you meant not, that I was one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning? And if you did mean, that I was, your Lordship did me a manifest injury. For I no where make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty; which is the new way of reasoning, which your Lordship opposes in the Unitarians, as contrary to the doctrine of the Trinity. Your Lordship says, you took care not to be misunderstood. And the words, wherein you took that care, are these: "I must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding, (from whence these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them) that he makes the case of spiritual and corporeal substances to be alike." P. 35.

"stances to be alike." But which of these words are they, my Lord, I beseech you, which are to hinder people from taking me, to be one of the gentlemen of that new way of reasoning, wherewith they overturn the doctrine of the Trinity? I confess, my Lord, I cannot see any of them that do: and that I did not see any of them, that could hinder men from that mistake, I shewed your Lordship, in my first letter to your Lordship, where I take notice of that

P. 58. passage in your Lordship's book. My words are: "I return my acknowledg-
 "ment to your Lordship, for the good opinion, you are here pleased to express
 "of the author of the Essay of Human Understanding; and that you do not
 "impute to him the ill use, some may have made of his notions. But he
 "craves leave to say, That he should have been better preserved from the hard
 "and sinister thoughts which some men are always ready for; if, in what you
 "have here published, your Lordship had been pleased to have shewn, where
 "you directed your discourse against him, and where against others, from
 "p. 234, to p. 262. Nothing but my words and my book being quoted, the
 "world will be apt to think, that I am the person, who argue against the
 "Trinity, and deny mysteries, against whom your Lordship directs those
 "pages. And indeed, my Lord, tho' I have read them over, with great at-
 "tention, yet, in many places, I cannot discern, whether it be against me, or
 "any body else, that your Lordship is arguing. That which often makes the
 "difficulty is, that I do not see, how what I say does at all concern the contro-
 "versy your Lordship is engaged in, and yet I alone am quoted." To which
 complaint of mine, your Lordship returns no other answer, but refers me to
 the same passage again for satisfaction; and tells me, that therein you took care
 not to be misunderstood. Your Lordship might see, that those words did not
 satisfy me in that point, when I did myself the honour to write to your Lord-
 ship; and how your Lordship should think the repetition of them in your an-
 swer, should satisfy me better, I confess I cannot tell.

P. 60. I MAKE the like complaint in these words: "This paragraph, which con-
 "tinues to prove, that we may have certainty without clear and distinct ideas,
 "I would flatter myself is not meant against me, because it opposes nothing
 "that I have said, and so shall not say any thing to it; but only set it down to
 "do your Lordship right, that the reader may judge. Tho' I do not find how
 "he will easily overlook me, and think I am not at all concerned in it, since
 "my words alone are quoted in several pages, immediately preceding and fol-
 "lowing: and in the very next paragraph it is said, how they come to know;
 "which word, they, must signify some body, besides the author of Christi-
 "anity not mysterious: and then, I think, by the whole tenour of your
 "Lordship's discourse, no body will be left but me, possible to be taken to be
 "the other; for in the same paragraph your Lordship says, the same per-
 "sons say, that notwithstanding their ideas, it is possible for matter to
 "think."

"I know not what other person says so, but I; but if any one does, I am
 "sure no person, but I say so, in my book, which your Lordship has quoted
 "for them, viz. Human Understanding, B. iv. ch. 3. This, which is a rid-
 "dle to me, the more amazes me, because I find it in a treatise of your Lord-
 "ship's, who so perfectly understands the rules and methods of writing, whether
 "in controversy, or any other way: but this, which seems wholly new to me,
 "I shall better understand, when your Lordship pleases to explain it." In the
 mean time, I mention it as an apology for myself, if sometimes I mistake your
 Lordship's aim, and so misapply my answer.

To this also your Lordship answers nothing, but for satisfaction refers me to
 the care you took to prevent being misunderstood; which, you say, appears by
 those words of yours above-recited. But what there is, in those words, that
 can prevent the mistake I complained I was exposed to; what there is in them,
 that can hinder any one from thinking, that I am one of the they and them that
 oppose the doctrine of the Trinity, with arguments in point of reason; that I
 must

must confess, my Lord, I cannot see, tho' I have read them over and over again to find it out.

THE like might be said, in respect of all those other passages, where I make the like complaint, which your Lordship takes notice, I was frequent in; nor could I avoid it, being almost every leaf perplexed to know, whether I was concerned, and how far, in what your Lordship said, since my words were quoted, and others argued against. And for satisfaction herein, I am sent to a compliment of your Lordship's. I say not this, my Lord, that I do not highly value the civility and good opinion your Lordship has expressed of me therein; but to let your Lordship see, that I was not so rude, as to complain of want of civility in your Lordship: but my complaint was of something else; and therefore it was something else, wherein I wanted satisfaction.

INDEED your Lordship says, in that passage; "from the author of the P. 35. Essay of Human Understanding, these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them." But, my Lord, how this helps, in the case, to prevent my being mistaken to be one of those, whom your Lordship had to do with in this chapter, in answering objections, in point of reason against the Trinity, I must own, I do not yet perceive: for these notions, which your Lordship is there arguing against, are all taken out of my book, and made use of, by no body that I know, but your Lordship, or myself: and which of us two it is, that hath borrowed them, to serve other purposes than I intended them, I must leave to your Lordship to determine. I, and I think every body else with me, will be at a loss, to know who they are, till either their words, and not mine, are produced to prove, that they do use those notions of mine, which your Lordship there calls these notions, to purposes to which I intended them not.

BUT to those words, in your Lordship's Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, you, in your answer to my letter, for farther satisfaction, add as followeth: "it was too plain, that the bold writer against the mysteries of our P. 35. faith, took his notions and expressions from thence: and what could be said more for your vindication, than that he turned them into other purposes, than the author intended them?"

WITH submission, my Lord, it is as plain, as print can make it, that whatever notions and expressions, that writer took from my book; those in question, which your Lordship there calls these notions, my book is only quoted for; nor does it appear, that your Lordship knew, that that writer had any where made Vindic. 2. use of them: or, if your Lordship knew them to be any where in his writings, 239. the matter of astonishment and complaint is still the greater, that your Lordship should know where they were, in his writings, used to serve other purposes than I intended them; and yet your Lordship should quote only my book, where they were used to serve only those purposes I intended them.

How much this is for my vindication, we shall presently see: but what it can do to give satisfaction to me, or others, as to the matters of my complaint, for which it is brought by your Lordship, that I confess I do not see. For my complaint was not against those gentlemen, that they had cast any aspersions upon my book, against which I desired your Lordship to vindicate me; but my complaint was of your Lordship, that you had brought me into a controversy, and so joined me with those, against whom you were disputing, in defence of the Trinity, that those, who read your Lordship's book, would be apt to mistake me for one of them.

BUT your Lordship asks, "what could be said more for my vindication?" My Lord, I shall always take it for a very great honour, to be vindicated by your Lordship against others. But in the present case, I wanted no vindication against others: if my book or notions had need of any vindication, it was only against your Lordship; for it was your Lordship, and not others, who had in your book disputed against passages, quoted out of mine, for several pages together.

P. 36. NEVERTHELESS, my Lord, I gratefully acknowledge the favour you have done me, for being guarantee for my intentions, which you can have no reason to repent of. For as it was not in my intention to write any thing against truth, much less against any of the sacred truths contained in the scriptures; so I will be answerable for it, that there is nothing in my book, which can be made use of, to other purposes, but what may be turned upon them, who so use it, to shew their mistake and error. No body can hinder, but that syllogism, which was intended for the service of truth, will sometimes be made use of, against it. But it is nevertheless of truth's side, and always turns upon the adversaries of it.

YOUR Lordship adds, "and the true reason why the plural number was so often used by me, was because he [i. e. the author of Christianity not mysterious] built upon those, which he imagined had been your grounds."

WHETHER it was your Lordship, or he, that imagined those to be my grounds, which were not my grounds, I will not pretend to say. Be that as it will; it is plain, from what your Lordship here says, that all the foundation of your Lordship's so positively, and in so many places, making me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, was but an imagination of an imagination. Your Lordship says, "he built upon those, which he imagined had been my grounds;" but it is but an imagination in your Lordship, that he did so imagine; and with all due respect, give me leave to say, a very ill-grounded imagination too. For it appears to me no foundation to think, that because he, or any body, agrees with me in things, that are in my book, and so appear to be my opinion; therefore he imagines, he agrees with me in other things, which are not in my book, and are not my opinion. As in the matter before us; what reason is there to imagine, that the author of Christianity not mysterious imagined, that he built on my grounds, in laying all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas, (if he does so) which is no where laid down in my book; because he builds on my grounds, concerning the original of our ideas, or any thing else, he finds in my book, or quotes out of it? For this is all that the author of Christianity not mysterious has done in this case, or can be brought to support such an imagination.

BUT supposing it true, that he imagined he built upon my grounds; what reason, I beseech your Lordship, is that for using the plural number, in quoting words, which I alone spoke, and he no where makes use of? To this your Lordship says, "that he imagined he built upon my grounds; and your Lordship's business was to shew those expressions of mine, which seemed most to countenance his method of proceeding, could not give any reasonable satisfaction:" which, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much. The author of Christianity not mysterious, writes something, which your Lordship disapproves; your Lordship imagines, he builds upon my grounds; and then your Lordship picks out some expressions of mine, which, you imagine, do most countenance his method of proceeding, and quote them, as belonging in common to us both; tho' it be certain, he no where used them. And this your Lordship tells me (to give me satisfaction, what care you took not to be misunderstood) was the true reason, why you so often used the plural number: which with submission, my Lord, seems to me to be no reason at all; unless it can be a reason to ascribe my words to another man, and me together, which he never said; because your Lordship imagines, he might, if he would, have said them. And ought not this, my Lord, to satisfy me of the care you took, not to be misunderstood?

P. 36. YOUR Lordship goes on to shew your care to prevent your being misunderstood: your words are, "but you [i. e. the author of the letter to your Lordship] say, you don't place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas, but in the clear and visible connection of any of our ideas. And, certainty of knowledge, you tell us, is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. Whether this be a true account of the certainty of knowledge, or not, will be presently considered. But it is very possible he

" might

" might mistake, or misapply your notions ; but there is too much reason to believe, he thought them the same : and we have no reason to be sorry, that he hath given you this occasion for explaining your meaning, and for the vindication of yourself, in the matters you apprehend I had charged you with."

YOUR Lordship herein says, it is very possible the author of Christianity not mysterious might mistake, or misapply my notions. I find it, indeed, very possible, that my notions may be mistaken and misapplied ; if by misapplied, he meant drawing inferences from thence, which belong not to them. But if that possibility be reason enough to join me in the plural number, with the author of Christianity not mysterious, or with the Unitarians ; it is as much a reason to join me in the plural number with the Papists, when your Lordship has an occasion to write against them next ; or with the Lutherans, or Quakers, &c. for it is possible, that any of these may mistake, or in that sense misapply my notions. But if mistaking, or misapplying my notions, does actually join me to any body, I know no body that I am so strictly joined to, as your Lordship : for, as I humbly conceive, no body has so much mistaken and misapplied my notions, as your Lordship. I should not take the liberty to say this, were not my thinking so the very reason and excuse, for my troubling your Lordship with this second letter. For, my Lord, I do not so well love controversy, especially with so great and so learned a man, as your Lordship, as to say a word more ; had I not hopes to shew, for my excuse, that it is my misfortune to have my notions to be mistaken or misapplied by your Lordship.

YOUR Lordship adds, " but there is too much reason to believe, that he P. 36. thought them the same ; i. e. that the author of Christianity not mysterious thought that I had laid all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas," as well as he did ; for that is it, upon which all this dispute is raised. Whether he himself laid all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas, is more than I know. But what that too much reason is to believe, that he thought that I did, I am sure is hard for me to guess, till your Lordship is pleased to name it. For that there is not any such thing, in my book, to give him, or any body else, reason to think so, I suppose your Lordship is now satisfied : and I would not willingly suppose the reason to be, that unless he, or somebody else thought so, my book could not be brought into the dispute ; tho' it be not easy to find any other. It follows in your Lordship's letter,

" AND we have no reason to be sorry, that he hath given you this occasion, P. 36. for the explaining your meaning, and for the vindication of yourself, in the matter you apprehended, I had charged you with."

MY Lord, I know not any occasion he has given me, of vindicating myself : your Lordship was pleased to join me with the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, who laid all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas. All the vindication I make, or need to make, in the case, is, that I lay not all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas ; and so there was no reason to join me with those that do. And for this vindication of myself, your Lordship alone gives me occasion : but whether your Lordship has reason to be sorry, or not sorry, your Lordship best knows.

YOUR Lordship goes on, in what is designed for my satisfaction, as followeth :

" AND if your answer doth not come fully up, in all things, to what I could P. 37. wish ; yet I am glad to find, that in general, you own the mysteries of the christian faith, and the scriptures, to be the rule and foundation of it."

WHICH words, my Lord, seem to me rather to shew, that your Lordship is not willing to be satisfied with my book, than to shew any care, your Lordship took, to prevent people's being led, by your Lordship's book, into a mistake, that I was one of the gentlemen of that new way of reasoning, who argued against the doctrine of the Trinity.

THE gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, whom your Lordship sets yourself to answer, in that tenth chapter of your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, are those, who lay all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas ;

ideas; and from that foundation, raise objections against the Trinity, in point of reason. Your Lordship joins me with these gentlemen, in that chapter, and calls me one of them. Of this I complain; and tell your Lordship, in the place and words you have quoted out of my letter, "that I do not place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas." I expected upon this, that your Lordship would have afforded me, and said, that then I was none of them; nor should have been joined with them. But, instead of that, your Lordship tells me, "my answer doth not come fully up in all things, to what your Lordship could wish." The question is, whether I ought to be lifted with these, and ranked on their side, who place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas? What more direct and categorical answer could your Lordship wish for, to decide this question, than that which I give? To which nothing can be replied, but that it is not true: but that your Lordship does not object to it; but says, "it does not come fully up in all things, to what your Lordship could wish." What other things there can be wished for, in an answer, which, if it be true, decides the matter, and which is not doubted to be true, comes not within my guess. But tho' my answer be an unexceptionable answer, as to the point in question, yet, it seems, my book is not an unexceptionable book, because I own, that in it I say, "that certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, as expressed in any proposition." Whether it be true, that certainty of knowledge lies in such a perception, is nothing to the question here; that, perhaps, we may have an occasion to examine in another place. The question here is, whether I ought to have been ranked with those, who lay all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas? And to that, I think, my answer is a full and decisive answer; and there is nothing wanting in it, which your Lordship could wish for, to make it fuller.

BUT it is natural the book should be found fault with, when the author, it seems, has had the ill luck to be under your Lordship's ill opinion. This I could not but be surprized to find in a paragraph, which your Lordship declares was designed to give me satisfaction. Your Lordship says, "tho' my answer doth not come up, in all things, to what you could wish; yet you are glad to find, that in general I own the mysteries of the christian faith, and the scriptures to be the foundation and rule of it."

MY Lord, I do not remember that ever I declared to your Lordship, or any body else, that I did not own all the doctrines of the christian faith, and the scriptures to be the sole rule and foundation of it. And, therefore, I know no more reason your Lordship had to say, that you are glad to find, that in general I own, &c. than I have reason to say, "that I am glad to find, that in general your Lordship owns the mysteries of the christian faith, and the scriptures to be the foundation and rule of it." Unless it be taken for granted that those, who do not write and appear in print, in controversies of religion, do not own the christian faith, and the scriptures as the rule of it.

I KNOW, my Lord, of what weight a commendation from your Lordship's pen is in the world: and I perceive your Lordship knows the value of it, which has made your Lordship temper your's, of me, with so large an alloy, for fear possibly, lest it should work too strongly on my vanity. For whether I consider, where these words stand, or how they are brought in, or what intimation they carry with them; which way soever I turn them, I do not find they were intended to puff me up, tho' they are in a paragraph purposely written to give me satisfaction; and grounded on words of mine, which seem to be approved by your Lordship, before any, in my letter; but which yet have, nothing to do in this place (whether your Lordship has been at the pains to fetch them from my postscript) unless it be to give vent to so extraordinary a sort of compliment: for they are, I think, in their subject, as well as place, the remotest of any in my letter, from the argument your Lordship was then upon; which was to shew what care you had taken not to be misunderstood to my prejudice. For what, I beseech you, my Lord, would you think of him, who from some words of your Lordship's, that seemed to express much of a christian spirit

spirit and temper (for so your Lordship is pleased to say, of these of mine) should seek occasion to tell your Lordship, and the world, that he was glad to find that your Lordship was a christian, and that you believed the bible? For this, common humanity, as well as christian charity, obliges us to believe, of every one, who calls himself a christian, till he manifests the contrary. Whereas the saying, I am glad to find such an one believes the scripture, is understood to intimate, that I knew the time when he did not; or, at least, when I suspected he did not. But perhaps your Lordship had some other meaning in it, which I do not see. The largeness of your Lordship's mind, and the charity of a father of our church, makes me hope that I passed not in your Lordship's opinion for a heathen, till your Lordship read that passage, in the postscript of my late letter to you.

BUT to return to the satisfaction your Lordship is giving me. To those words quoted out of my postscript, your Lordship subjoins: "which words seem to express so much of a christian spirit and temper, that I cannot believe, you intended to give any advantage to the enemies of the christian faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them, to apply them in that manner, is a thing very fit for you to consider."

YOUR Lordship here again expresses a favourable opinion of my intentions, which I gratefully acknowledge: but you add, "that it is fit for me to consider, whether there hath not been too just occasion for them, to apply them in that manner." My Lord, I shall do what, your Lordship thinks, is fit for me to do, when your Lordship does me the favour to tell me, who those enemies of the faith are, who have applied those words of my postscript (for to those alone, by any kind of construction, can I make your Lordship's word, them, refer) and the manner, which they have applied them in, and the too just occasion, they have had, so to apply them. For I confess, my Lord, I am at a loss, as to all these; and thereby unable to obey your Lordship's commands, till your Lordship does me the favour to make me understand all these particulars better.

BUT if, by any new way of construction, unintelligible to me, the word, them, here shall be applied to any passages of my Essay of Human Understanding; I must humbly crave leave to observe this one thing, in the whole course of what your Lordship has designed for my satisfaction, that tho' my complaint be of your Lordship's manner of applying, what I had published in my Essay, so as to interest me, in a controversy, wherein I meddled not; your Lordship all along tells me of others, that have misapplied, I know not what, words in my book, after I know not what manner. Now, as to this matter, I beseech your Lordship to believe, that when any one, in such a manner, applies my words, contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, and me a party in that controversy against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows, I complain your Lordship has done, I shall complain of them too; and consider, as well as I can, what satisfaction they give me and others in it.

YOUR Lordship's next words are: "for, in an age, wherein the mysteries of P. 37. faith are so much exposed, by the promoters of scepticism and infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous consequence, to start such new methods of certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful, than before; as will soon appear from your own concessions."

THESE words contain a farther accusation of my book, which shall be considered in its due place. What I am now upon, is the satisfaction your Lordship is giving me, in reference to my complaint. And as to that, what follows to the 46th page, is brought only to shew that your Lordship had reason to say, "that my notions were carried beyond my intentions:" for, in these words, your Lordship winds up all the following, eight or nine pages, viz. "thus far I have endeavoured, with all possible brevity and clearness, to lay P. 46. down your sense about this matter; by which it is sufficiently proved, that I had reason to say, that your notions were carried beyond your intentions."

I BEG leave to mind your Lordship, that my complaint was not that your Lordship said, "that my notions were carried beyond my intentions." I was not so absurd, as to turn what was matter of acknowledgment, into matter of complaint. And, therefore, in shewing the care, you had taken of me, for my satisfaction, your Lordship needed not to have been at so much pains, in so long a deduction, to prove to me, that you had reason for saying, what was so manifestly in my favour, whether you had reason for saying it, or no. But my complaint was, that the new way of reasoning, accused by your Lordship, as opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, being, in laying all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas, your Lordship ranked me amongst the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, tho' I laid not all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct ideas. And this being my complaint, it is for this, that there needs a reason. Your Lordship subjoins,

- P. 46. "BUT you still seem concerned that I quote your words; altho' I declare, "they were used to other purposes, than you intended them. I do confess to you, that the reason of it was, that I found your notions, as to certainty, by ideas, was the main foundation, which the author of Christianity
- P. 47. "not mysterious went upon; and that he had nothing, which looked like reason, if that principle were removed; which made me so much endeavour to shew, that it would not hold. And so, I suppose, the reason of my mentioning your words so often, is no longer a riddle to you."

MY Lord, he that will give himself the trouble to look into the 61st page of my former letter, where I speak of your Lordship's way of proceeding, as a riddle to me; or into the 59th page, which your Lordship here quoted, for my seeming concerned at it; will find my complaint, in both places, as well as several others, was, that I was so every where joined with others, under the comprehensive words of, they, and them, &c. tho' my book alone was every where quoted, "that the world would be apt to think I was the person, "who argued against the Trinity, and denied mysteries;" against whom your Lordship directed these very pages. For so I express myself, in that very 59th page, which your Lordship here quotes. And, as to this, your Lordship's way of writing (which is the subject of my complaint) is (for any thing, your Lordship has, in your answer, said, to give me satisfaction) as much still a riddle to me, as ever.

- FOR that, which your Lordship here says, and is the only thing, I can find, your Lordship has said to clear it, seems to me to do nothing towards it. Your
- P. 47. Lordship says, "the reason of it was, that you found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which the author of Christianity "not mysterious went upon," &c.

WITH submission, I thought your Lordship had found, that the foundation, which the author of Christianity not mysterious went upon, and for which he was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made, or supposed, clear and distinct ideas, necessary to certainty; but that is not my notion, as to certainty by ideas. My notion of certainty by ideas, is, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, such as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct, or no: nor have I any notions of certainty, more than this one. And if your Lordship had for this called me a gentleman of a new way of reasoning, or made me one of the opposers of the doctrine of the Trinity, I should perhaps have wondered; but should not at all have complained of your Lordship, for directly questioning this, or any of my opinions: I should only have examined what your Lordship has said to support, or have desired you to make out, that charge against me; which is what I shall do, by and by, when I come to examine what your Lordship now charges this opinion with: but I shall not add any complaints to my defence.

THAT which I complained of, was, that I was made one of the gentlemen of

of the new way of reasoning, without being guilty of what made them so; and so was brought into a chapter, wherein I thought myself not concerned: which was managed so, that my book was all along quoted, and others argued against; others were entitled to what I said, and I, to what others said, without knowing why, or how. Nor am I yet, I must own, much enlightened in the reason of it: that was the cause, why I then thought it a new way of writing; and that must be my apology for thinking so still, till I light upon, or am directed to, some author, who has ever writ thus before.

AND thus I come to the end of what your Lordship has said, to that part of my letter, which your Lordship calls my complaint; wherein, I think, I have omitted nothing which your Lordship has alleged for the satisfaction of others, or myself, under those two heads, of the occasion of your Lordship's way of writing, as you did, and the care you took not to be misunderstood. And if, my Lord, as to me, it has not, possibly, had all the success, your Lordship proposed; I beg your Lordship to attribute it to my dulness, or any thing, rather than an unwillingness to be satisfied.

MY Lord, I so little love controversy, that I never began a dispute with any body; nor shall ever continue it, where others begin with me, any longer than the appearance of truth, which first made me write, obliges me not to quit it. But least of all, would I have any controversy with your Lordship, if I had any design in writing, but the defence of truth. I do not know my own weakness, or your Lordship's strength so little, as to enter the lists with your Lordship, only for a trial of skill, or the vain and ridiculous hopes of victory. Nothing, I know, but truth on my side, can support me against so great a man; whose very name in writing, and authority in the learned world, is of weight enough to crush, and sink, whatever opinion has not that solid basis to bear it up.

THERE are men, that enter into disputes to get a name in controversy, or for some little by-ends of a party: your Lordship has been so long in the first rank of the men of letters; and, by common consent, settled at the top of this learned age, that it must pass for the utmost folly, not to think, that, if your Lordship condescended so far, as to meddle with any of the opinions of so inconsiderable a man, as I am, it was with a design to convince me of my errors, and not to gain reputation on one, so infinitely below your match. It is upon this ground, that I still continue to offer my doubts to your Lordship, in those parts, wherein I am not yet so happy as to be convinced; and it is with this satisfaction, I return this answer to your Lordship, that, if I am in a mistake, your Lordship will certainly detect it, and lead me into the truth; which I shall embrace, with the acknowledgment of the benefit I have received from your Lordship's instructions. And, that your Lordship, in the mean time, will have the goodness to allow me, as becomes a scholar, willing to profit by the favour you do me, to shew your Lordship where I stick, and in what points your Lordship's arguments have failed to work upon me. For, as, on the one side, it would not become one, that would learn of your Lordship, to acknowledge himself convinced, before he is convinced; and I know, your Lordship would blame me for it, if I should do so: so, on the other side, to continue to dissent from your Lordship, where you have done me the honour to take pains with me, without giving you my reasons for it, would, I think, be an ungrateful and unmannerly fullness.

YOUR Lordship has had the goodness to write several leaves, to give me satisfaction as to the matter of my complaints. I return your Lordship my most humble thanks, for this great condescension; which I take as a pledge, that you will bear with the representation of my doubts, in other points, wherein I am so unlucky, as not to be yet thoroughly enlightened by your Lordship. And so I go on to the remaining parts of your letter, which, I think, may be comprehended under these two, viz. those things in my Essay, which your Lordship now charges, as concerned in the controversy of the Trinity; and others,

others, as faulty in themselves, whether we consider them with respect to any doctrines of religion, or no.

IN the close of your Lordship's letter, after some other expressions of civility
 7. 133. to me, for which I return your Lordship my thanks, I find these words:
 " I do assure you, that it is out of no disrespect, or the least ill-will to you,
 " that I have again considered this matter; but because I am further convinced,
 " that, as you have stated your notion of ideas, it may be of dangerous conse-
 " quence to that article of christian faith, which I endeavoured to defend."

THIS now is a direct charge against my book; and I must own it a great satisfaction to me, that I shall now be no longer at a loss, who it is your Lordship means; that I shall stand by myself, and by myself answer for my own faults, and not be so placed in such an association with others, that will hinder me from knowing, what is my particular guilt, and share in the accusation. Had your Lordship done me the favour to have treated me so before, you had heard nothing of all those complaints, which have been so troublesome to your Lordship.

To take now a right view of this matter, it is fit to consider the beginning and progress of it: your Lordship had a controversy with the Unitarians; they, in their answer to your Lordship's sermons, and elsewhere, talk of ideas; the author of Christianity not mysterious (whether an Unitarian, or no, your Lordship says not, neither do I enquire,) gives an account of reason, which, as your Lordship says, supposes certainty to consist only in clear and distinct ideas: and, because he expresses himself in some other things, conformable to what I had said in my book, my book is brought into the controversy, tho' there be no such opinion in it, as your Lordship opposed. For what that was, is plain, both from what has been observed out of the beginning of the tenth chapter of your Vindication of the Trinity, and the fourteenth page of your letter, viz. this proposition, " That certainty, as to matters of faith, is founded upon clear and " distinct ideas:" But my book not having that proposition in it, which your Lordship then opposed, as overthrowing mysteries of faith, at that time, fell, by I know not what chance and misfortune, into the Unitarian controversy.

UPON examination, my book being not found guilty of that proposition, which your Lordship, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, opposed, because it overthrows the mysteries of faith; I thought it acquitted, and clear from that controversy. No, it must not escape so: your Lordship, having again considered this matter, has found new matter of accusation, and a new charge is brought against my book; and what now is it? Even this, " That, as " I have stated my notion of ideas, it may be of dangerous consequence to that " article of the christian faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to de- " fend."

THE accusation then, as it now stands, is, that my notion of ideas may be of dangerous consequence, &c.

SUCH an accusation as this, brought in any court in England, would, no doubt, be thought to shew a great inclination to have the accused be suspected, rather than any evidence of being guilty of any thing; and so would immediately be dismissed, without hearing any plea to it. But in controversies, in print, wherein an appeal is made to the judgment of mankind, the strict rules of proceeding in justice, are not always thought necessary to be observed; and the sentence of those, who are appealed to, being never formally pronounced, a cause can never be dismissed, as long as the prosecutor is pleased to continue, or renew his charge.

As to the matter in hand, tho' what your Lordship says here, against my book, be nothing but your apprehension of what may be; yet no body will think it strange, or unsuitable to your Lordship's character and station, to be watchful over any article of the christian faith, especially one, that you have endeavoured to defend; and to warn the world of any thing, your Lordship may suspect to be of dangerous consequence to it, as far as you can espy it.

And

And to this give me leave, my Lord, to attribute the trouble your Lordship has been at, to write again in this matter.

ANOTHER thing I must take notice of, in this your Lordship's new charge against my book, that it is against my notion of ideas, as I have stated it. This containing all that I have said, in my Essay, concerning ideas, which, as your Lordship takes notice, is not a little; your Lordship, I know, would not be thought to leave so general an accusation upon my book, as you could receive no answer to: and therefore, tho' your Lordship has not been pleased plainly to specify here the particulars, in my notion of ideas, which your Lordship apprehends to be of dangerous consequence to that article, which your Lordship has defended; I shall endeavour to find them, in other parts of your letter.

YOUR Lordship's words, in the immediately preceding page, run thus: P. 132.
"I can easily bear the putting of philosophical notions into a modern and fashionable dress."

"LET men express their minds, by ideas, if they please; and take pleasure in sorting, and comparing, and connecting of them, I am not forward to condemn them: for every age must have its new modes; and it is very well, if truth and reason be received in any garb. I was, therefore, far enough from condemning your way of ideas, until I found it made the only ground of certainty, and made use of, to overthrow the mysteries of our faith, as I told you in the beginning."

THESE words, leading to your Lordship's accusation, I thought the likeliest to shew me what it was in my book, that your Lordship now declared against, as what might be of dangerous consequence to that article, you have defended; and that seemed to me, to lie in these two particulars, viz. the making so much use of the word ideas; and my placing, as I do, certainty in ideas, i. e. in the things signified by them. And these two seem here to be the particulars, which your Lordship comprehends, under my way by ideas. But that I might not be led into mistake, by this passage, which seemed a little more obscure and doubtful to me, than I could have wished; I consulted those other places, wherein your Lordship seemed to express what it was, that your Lordship now accused in my book, in reference to the Unitarian controversy; and which your Lordship apprehends, may be of dangerous consequence to that article.

YOUR Lordship, in the close of the words above-quoted, out of the 132d page of your answer, tells me: "you were far enough from condemning my way of ideas, till your Lordship found it made the only ground of certainty, and made use of, to overthrow the mysteries of our faith, as you told me in the beginning."

MY Lord, the way of ideas, which your Lordship opposed at first, was the way of certainty only by clear and distinct ideas; as appears by your words above-quoted, out of your 14th page: but that, your Lordship now knows, was not my way of certainty by ideas; and therefore that, and all the use can be made of it, to overthrow the mysteries of our faith, be that as it will, cannot any more be charged on my book, but is quite out of doors: and, therefore, what you said in the beginning, gave me no light into what was your Lordship's present accusation.

BUT, page the 23d, I found these words: "when new terms are made use of, by ill men, to promote scepticism and infidelity, and to overthrow the mysteries of our faith, we have then reason to inquire into them, and to examine the foundation and tendency of them. And this was the true and only reason, of my looking into this way of certainty by ideas, because I found it applied to such purposes."

HERE, my Lord, your Lordship seems to lay your accusation wholly against new terms and their tendency.

AND in another place, your Lordship has these words:

"THE world hath been strangely amused with ideas of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done, by the help of the ideas; and yet these ideas, at last, come to be only common notions of things, which
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"we must make use of, in our reasoning. You [i. e. the author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding] say, in that chapter about the existence of God, you thought it most proper to express yourself, in the most usual and familiar way, by common words and expressions. I would you had done so quite through your book; for then you had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith, to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery, (as they imagined) against the mysteries of the christian faith. But you might have enjoyed the satisfaction of your ideas, long enough, before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing mischief."

By which places it is plain, that that, which your Lordship apprehends, in my book, "may be of dangerous consequence, to the article, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend," is my introducing new terms; and that, which your Lordship instances in, is that of ideas. And the reason, your Lordship gives, in every of these places, why your Lordship has such an apprehension of ideas, as "that they may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, is, because they have been applied to such purposes. And I might (your Lordship says) have enjoyed the satisfaction of my ideas, long enough, before you had taken notice of them, unless your Lordship had found them employed in doing mischief." Which, at last, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, viz. that your Lordship fears ideas, i. e. the term, ideas, may, some time or other, prove of very dangerous consequence to what your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, because they have been made use of, in arguing against it. For I am sure your Lordship does not mean that you apprehend the things, signified by ideas, "may be of dangerous consequence to the article of faith, your Lordship endeavours to defend," because they have been made use of, against it: for (besides that your Lordship mentions terms) that would be to expect that those, who oppose that article, should oppose it, without any thoughts: for the thing signified by ideas, is nothing but the immediate objects of our minds, in thinking: so that, unless any one can oppose the article, your Lordship defends, without thinking on something, he must use the things signified by ideas; for he, that thinks, must have some immediate object of his mind, in thinking, i. e. must have ideas.

BUT whether it be the name, or the thing; ideas in sound, or ideas in signification, that your Lordship apprehends may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which your Lordship endeavours to defend; it seems to me, I will not say a new way of reasoning, (for that belongs to me) but were it not your Lordship's, I should think it a very extraordinary way of reasoning, to write against a book, wherein your Lordship acknowledges, they are not used to bad purposes, nor employed to do mischief; only, because that you find, that ideas are, by those who oppose your Lordship, employed to do mischief; and so apprehend, they may be of dangerous consequence to the article, your Lordship has engaged in the defence of. For, whether ideas, as terms, or ideas, as the immediate objects of the mind, signified by those terms, may be, in your Lordship's apprehension, of dangerous consequence to that article; I do not see, how your Lordship's writing against the notion of ideas, as stated in my book, will at all hinder your opposers from employing them, in doing mischief, as before.

HOWEVER, be that as it will, so it is, that your Lordship apprehends these "new terms, these ideas, with which the world hath, of late, been so strangely amused (tho' at last they come to be only common notions of things, as your P. 93. Lordship owns) may be of dangerous consequence to that article."

MY Lord, if any, in their answer to your Lordship's sermons, and, in their other pamphlets, wherein your Lordship complains, they have talked so much of ideas, have been troublesome to your Lordship with that term; it is not strange, that your Lordship should be tired with that sound: but how natural soever it be to our weak constitutions, to be offended with any sound, wherewith an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, my Lord, I know your Lordship

Lordship has a better opinion of the articles of our faith, than to think any of them can be overturned, or so much as shaken with a breath, formed into any found, or term, whatsoever.

NAMES are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions, and so they be sufficiently appropriated to them, in their use, I know no other difference any of them have, in particular, but as they are of easy, or difficult, pronunciation, and of a more, or less, pleasant sound: and what particular antipathies there may be in men, to some of them, upon that account, is not easy to be foreseen. This I am sure, no term whatsoever in itself bears, one more than another, any opposition to truth of any kind; they are only propositions, that do, or can, oppose the truth of any article, or doctrine: and thus no term is privileged from being set in opposition to truth.

THERE is no word to be found, which may not be brought into a proposition, wherein the most sacred and most evident truths may be opposed; but that is not a fault in the term, but him that uses it: and, therefore, I cannot easily persuade myself (whatever your Lordship hath said, in the heat of your concern) that you have bestowed so much pains upon my book, because the word, idea, is so much used there. For tho' upon my saying, in my chapter about the existence of God, "that I scarce used the word, idea, in that whole P. 93: " chapter; your Lordship wishes, that I had done so quite thro' my book: yet I must rather look upon that as a compliment to me, wherein your Lordship wished, that my book had been, all thro', suited to vulgar readers, not used to that, and the like terms, than that your Lordship has such an apprehension of the word, idea; or that there is any such harm in the use of it, instead of P. 23: the word, notion, (with which your Lordship seems to take it to agree, in signification) that your Lordship would think it worth your while to spend any part of your valuable time and thoughts, about my book, for having the word, idea, so often in it: for this would be to make your Lordship to write only against an impropriety of speech. I own to your Lordship, it is a great condescension in your Lordship to have done it, if that word have such a share, in what your Lordship has writ against my book, as some expressions would persuade one; and I would, for the satisfaction of your Lordship, change the term of idea for a better, if your Lordship, or any one, could help me to it. For, that notion will not so well stand for every immediate object of the mind, in thinking, as idea does, I have (as I guess) somewhere given a reason in my book, by shewing that the term, notion, is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain sort of those objects, which I call mixed modes: and, I think, it would not sound altogether so well, to say, the notion of red, and the notion of a horse; as the idea of red, and the idea of a horse. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no fondness for, nor antipathy to any particular, articulate sounds: nor do I think there is any spell, or fascination in any of them.

BUT be the word, idea, proper, or improper, I do not see, how it is the better, or worse, because ill men have made use of it, or because it has been made use of to bad purposes: for if that be a reason to condemn, or lay it by, we must lay by the terms of scripture, reason, perception, distinct, clear, &c. nay, the name of God, himself, will not escape: for I do not think any one of these, or any other term, can be produced, which has not been made use of, by such men, and to such purposes. And, therefore, "if the Unitarians, in their " late pamphlets, have talked very much of, and strangely amused the world " with, ideas;" I cannot believe your Lordship will think that word one jot the worse, or the more dangerous, because they use it; any more than, for the use of them, you will think reason, or scripture terms, ill, or dangerous. And, therefore, what your Lordship says, in the bottom of this ninety-third page, that "I might have enjoyed the satisfaction of my ideas, long enough, before your " Lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them employed in " doing mischief;" will, I presume, when your Lordship has considered again of this matter, prevail with your Lordship, to let me enjoy still the satisfaction,

I take in my ideas, i. e. as much satisfaction as I can take, in so small a matter, as is the using of a proper term, notwithstanding it should be employed by others, in doing mischief.

FOR, my Lord, if I should leave it wholly out of my book, and substitute the word notion, every where, in the room of it; and every body else do so too, (tho' your Lordship does not, I suppose, suspect that I have the vanity to think, they would follow my example) my book would, it seems, be the more to your Lordship's liking: but I do not see how this would one jot abate the mischief, your Lordship complains of: for the Unitarians might as much employ notions, as they do now ideas, to do mischief; unless they are such fools as to think, they can conjure with this notable word, idea, and that the force, of what they say, lies in the sound, and not in the signification of their terms.

THIS I am sure of, that the truths of the christian religion can be no more battered by one word, than another; nor can they be beaten down, nor endangered, by any sound whatsoever: and I am apt to flatter myself, that your Lordship is satisfied, there is no harm in the word, ideas, because you say, you should not have taken any notice of my ideas, "if the enemies of our faith had not taken up my new way, of ideas, as an effectual battery against the mysteries of the christian faith." In which place, by new way of ideas, nothing, I think, can be construed to be meant, but my expressing myself, by that of ideas; and not by other more common words, and of antienter standing in the English language.

MY new way by ideas, or my way by ideas, which often occurs in your Lordship's letter, is, I confess, a very large and doubtful expression; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole Essay: because treating in it, of the Understanding, which is nothing but the faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty of the mind, which consists in thinking, without considering the immediate objects of the mind, in thinking, which I call ideas: And, therefore, in treating of the understanding, I guess it will not be thought strange, that the greatest part of my book has been taken up, in considering what these objects of the mind, in thinking, are; whence they come; what use the mind makes of them, in its several ways of thinking; and what are the outward marks, whereby it signifies them to others, or records them for its own use. And this, in short, is my way by ideas, that which your Lordship calls my new way by ideas; which, my Lord, if it be new, it is but a new history of an old thing: for, I think, it will not be doubted, that men always performed the actions of thinking, reasoning, believing, and knowing, just after the same manner, that they do now: tho', whether the same account has heretofore been given of the way, how they performed these actions, or wherein they consisted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your Lordship, I should

P. 8r. have been safe from that gentle reprimand of your Lordship's for "thinking my way of ideas new, for want of looking into other men's thoughts, which appear in their books."

YOUR Lordship's words, as an acknowledgment of your instructions in the case, and as a warning to others, who will be so bold adventurers as to spin any thing barely out of their own thoughts, I shall set down at large; and they run thus: "whether you took this way of ideas, from the modern philosopher, mentioned by you, is not at all material; but I intended no reflection upon you in it (for that you mean, by my commending you, as a scholar of so great a master) I never meant to take from you the honour of your own inventions; and I do believe you, when you say, that you wrote from your own thoughts, and the ideas you had there. But many things may seem new to one, who converses only with his own thoughts, which really are not so; as he may find, when he looks into the thoughts of other men, which appear in their books. And therefore, altho' I have a just esteem for the invention of such who can spin volumes barely out of their own thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the world more, if, after they have thought so much themselves, they would examine what thoughts others have

" had

" had before them, concerning the same things; that so those may not be thought their own inventions, which are common to themselves and others. " If a man should try all the magnetical experiments himself, and publish them, " as his own thoughts, he might take himself to be the inventor of them: " but he that examines and compares with them what Gibbert, and others, have " done before him, will not diminish the praise of his diligence, but may wish he " had compared his thoughts with other men's; by which the world would receive greater advantage, altho' he lost the honour of being an original."

To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your Lordship, " that many things " may seem new, to one, that converses only with his own thoughts, which " really are not so:" But I must crave leave to suggest to your Lordship, that if, in the spinning them out of his own thoughts, they seem new to him, he is certainly the inventor of them; and they may as justly be thought his own invention, as any one's, and he is as certainly the inventor of them, as any one, who thought on them, before him: the distinction of invention, or not invention, lying not in thinking first, or not first, but in borrowing, or not borrowing, your thoughts from another: and he to whom, spinning them out of his own thoughts, they seem new, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented printing in Europe, who without any communication with the Chinese, spun it out of his own thoughts; tho' it were ever so true, that the Chinese had the use of printing, nay, of printing in the very same way among them, many ages before him. So that he, that spins any thing out of his own thoughts, that seems new to him, cannot cease to think it his own invention, should he examine ever so far, what thoughts others have had before him, concerning the same thing; and should find, by examining, that they had the same thoughts too.

BUT what great obligation this would be to the world, or weighty cause of turning over and looking into books, I confess I do not see. The great end to me, in conversing with my own, or other men's, thoughts, in matters of speculation, is to find truth, without being much concerned, whether my own spinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the honour of an original, may be seen, in that place of my book, where, if any where, that itch of vain-glory was likeliest to have shewn itself, had I been so over-run with it, as to need a cure. It is where I speak of certainty in these following words, taken notice of, by your Lordship, in another place: " I think I have shewn, wherein it is, P. 39. " that certainty, real certainty, consists; which, whatever it was to others, " was, I confess, to me, heretofore, one of those desiderata, which I found " great want of."

HERE, my Lord, however new this seemed to me, and the more so, because, possibly, I had in vain hunted for it, in the books of others; yet I spoke of it, as new only to myself; leaving others in the undisturbed possession of what either by invention, or reading, was theirs before; without assuming to myself any other honour, but that of my own ignorance, till that time, if others before had shewn wherein certainty lay. And yet, my Lord, if I had, upon this occasion, been forward to assume to myself the honour of an original, I think I had been pretty safe in it; since I should have had your Lordship for my guarantee and vindicator in that point, who are pleased to call it new; and, as such, to write against it.

AND truly, my Lord, in this respect, my book has had very unlucky stars, since it hath had the misfortune to displease your Lordship, with many things in it, for their novelty; as " new way of reasoning; new hypothesis about reason; new sort of certainty; new terms; new way of ideas; new method of certainty," &c. and yet, in other places, your Lordship seems to think it worthy in me, of your Lordship's reflection, for saying but what others have said before: as where I say, " in the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth;" your Lordship asks, Vol. I. " what

Vind. p.

234, 240.

Answ. p. 23.

83, 93.

Vind. p. " what is this different from what all men of understanding have said ?" Again,
249. I take it, your Lordship meant not these words, for a commendation of my

P. 23. book, where you say; " but if no more be meant by the simple ideas that
" come in, by sensation or reflection, and their being the foundation of our
" knowledge; but that our notions of things come in, either from our senses,
" or the exercise of our minds; as there is nothing extraordinary in the disco-
" very, so your Lordship is far enough from opposing that, wherein you think
" all mankind are agreed.

P. 92. " AND again, but what need all this great noise, about ideas and certainty,
" true and real certainty by ideas; if, after all, it comes only to this, that our
" ideas only represent to us such things, from whence we bring arguments to
" prove the truth of things?

P. 93. " AND the world hath been strangely amused with ideas of late; and we
" have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of ideas; and
" yet these ideas, at last, come to be only common notions of things, which
" we must make use of, in our reasoning." And to the like purpose, in other
places.

Whether therefore, at last, your Lordship will resolve, that it is new,
or no, or more faulty by its being new, must be left to your Lordship. This I
find, by it, that my book cannot avoid being condemned on the one side, or
the other; nor do I see a possibility to help it. If there be readers, that like
only new thoughts; or, on the other side, others that can bear nothing, but
what can be justified, by received authorities in print; I must desire them to
make themselves amends, in that part, which they like, for the displeasure,
they receive in the other: but if many should be so exact as to find fault with
both, truly I know not well what to say to them. The case is a plain case,
the book is all over naught, and there is not a sentence in it, that is not, either
for its antiquity, or novelty, to be condemned; and so there is a short end of
it. From your Lordship, indeed, in particular, I can hope for something

P. 35. better; for your Lordship thinks the general design of it so good, that that, I
flatter myself, would prevail on your Lordship, to preserve it from the fire.

BUT, as to the way, your Lordship thinks, I should have taken, to prevent
the having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with others;
it unluckily so fell out, in the subject of my Essay of Human Understanding,
that I could not look into the thoughts of other men, to inform myself.
For my design being, as well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account
of the operations of the mind in thinking, I could look into no body's un-
derstanding, but my own, to see how it wrought; nor have a prospect into other
men's minds, to view their thoughts there, and observe what steps and motions
they took, and by what gradations they proceeded, in their acquainting them-
selves with truth, and their advance to knowledge. What we find of their
thoughts, in books, is but the result of this, and not the progress and working
of their minds, in coming to the opinions, or conclusions, they set down and
published.

ALL, therefore, that I can say of my book, is, that it is a copy of my own
mind, in its several ways of operation. And all that I can say, for the pub-
lishing of it, is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made, and operate
alike in most men; and that some, that I shewed it to, before I published it,
liked it so well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. And, therefore, if it
should happen, that it should not be so, but that some men should have ways
of thinking, reasoning, or arriving at certainty, different from others, and above
those, that I find my mind to use, and acquiesce in, I do not see, of what use
my book can be to them. I can only make it my humble request, in my
own name, and in the name of those, that are of my size, who find their
minds work, reason and know, in the same low way, that mine does, that those
men of a more happy genius would shew us the way of their nobler flights;
and particularly would discover to us their shorter, or surer way to certainty,
than by ideas, and the observing their agreement or disagreement.

IN the mean time, I must acknowledge, that if I had been guilty of affecting to be thought an original, a correction could not have come from any body, so disinterested in the case, as your Lordship; since your Lordship, so much declines being thought an original, for writing in a way, wherein it is hard to avoid thinking, that you are the first, till some other can be produced that writ so before you.

BUT to return to your Lordship's present charge against my book: in the 38th page of your Lordship's answer, I find these words; "in an age, where-
"in the mysteries of faith are so much exposed by the promoters of scepticism
"and infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous consequence, to start such new meth-
"ods of certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before."

BY which passage, and some expressions that seem to look that way, in the places above-quoted; I take it for granted, that another particular in my book, which your Lordship suspects may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, is my placing of certainty, as I do, in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas.

THO' I cannot conceive how any term, new or old, idea or not idea, can have any opposition, or danger in it, to any article of faith, or any truth whatsoever; yet I easily grant, that propositions are capable of being opposite to propositions, and may be such as, if granted, may overthrow articles of faith, or any other truth they are opposite to. But your Lordship not having, as I remember, shewn, or gone about to shew, how this proposition, viz. that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, is opposite or inconsistent, with that article of faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend: it is plain, it is but your Lordship's fear, that it may be of dangerous consequence to it; which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconsistent with that article.

No body, I think, can blame your Lordship, or any one else, for being concerned for any article of the christian faith: but if that concern (as it may, and, as we know, it has done) makes any one apprehend danger, where no danger is; are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any proposition, because any one, tho' of the first rank and magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous consequence to any truth of religion, without shewing that it is so? If such fears be the measures, whereby to judge of truth and falsehood, the affirming that there are antipodes would be still a heresy; and the doctrine of the motion of the earth must be rejected, as overthrowing the truth of the scripture: for of that dangerous consequence, it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious divines, out of their great concern for religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great apprehensions of what dangerous consequence it might be, it is now universally received by learned men, as an undoubted truth; and writ for by some, whose belief of the scripture is not at all questioned; and particularly, very lately, by a divine of the church of England, with great strength of reason, in his wonderfully ingenious New Theory of the earth.

THE reason your Lordship gives, of your fears, that it may be of such dangerous consequence to that article of faith which your Lordship endeavours to defend, tho' it occurs, in more places than one, is only this, viz. that it is made use of, by ill men, to do mischief; i. e. to oppose that article of faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend. But, my Lord, if it be a reason to lay by any thing as bad, because it is, or may be used to an ill purpose; I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our defence, are sometimes made use of, to do mischief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous consequence, for all that. No body lays by his sword and pistols, or thinks them of such dangerous consequence, as to be neglected, or thrown away; because robbers, and the worst of men, sometimes make use of them to take away honest men's lives, or goods: and the reason is, because they were designed, and will serve to preserve them. And who knows, but this

this may be the present case? If your Lordship thinks, that placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of ideas, be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith; on the other side, perhaps others, with me, may think it a defence against error, and so, (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to.

I WOULD not, my Lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any one's judgment against your Lordship's: but I have said this only to shew, while the argument lies for, or against the truth of any proposition, barely in an imagination, that it may be of consequence to the supporting, or overthrowing of any remote truth; it will be impossible, that way, to determine of the truth, or falsehood, of that proposition. For imagination will be set up against imagination, and the stronger, probably, will be against your Lordship; the strongest imaginations being usually in the weakest heads. The only way, in this case, to put it past doubt, is, to shew the inconsistency of the two propositions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the other; the true the false one.

YOUR Lordship says, indeed, this is a new method of certainty. I will not say so myself, for fear of deserving a second reproof from your Lordship, for being too forward to assume to myself the honour of being an original. But this, I think, gives me occasion, and will excuse me from being thought impertinent, if I ask your Lordship, whether there be any other, or older method of certainty? and what it is? For if there be no other, nor older than this, either this was always the method of certainty, and so mine is no new one; or else the world is obliged to me for this new one, after having been so long, in the want of so necessary a thing, as a method of certainty. If there be an older, I am sure your Lordship cannot but know it; your condemning mine, as new, as well as your thorough insight into antiquity, cannot but satisfy every body that you do. And, therefore, to set the world right, in a thing of that great concernment, and to overthrow mine, and thereby prevent the dangerous consequence there is, in my having unreasonably started it, will not, I humbly conceive, misbecome your Lordship's care of that article you have endeavoured to defend; nor the good-will, you bear to truth in general: for I will be answerable for myself, that I shall; and I think, I may be, for all others, that they all will give off the placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, if your Lordship will be pleased to shew, that it lies in any thing else.

BUT truly, not to ascribe to myself an invention of what has been as old, as knowledge is in the world, I must own, I am not guilty of what your Lordship is pleased to call starting new methods of certainty. Knowledge, ever since there has been any in the world, has consisted in one particular action of the mind; and so, I conceive, will continue to do, to the end of it: and to start new methods of knowledge or certainty (for they are to me the same thing) i. e. to find out and propose new methods of attaining knowledge, either with more ease and quickness, or in things yet unknown, is what, I think, no-body could blame: but this is not that, which your Lordship here means, by new methods of certainty. Your Lordship, I think, means by it, the placing of certainty in something, wherein either it does not consist; or else, wherein it was not placed before now; if this be to be called a new method of certainty: as to the latter of these, I shall know, whether I am guilty or no, when your Lordship will do me the favour to tell me, wherein it was placed before; which your Lordship knows, I professed myself ignorant of, when I writ my book, and so am still: but if starting of new methods of certainty, be the placing of certainty in something, wherein it does not consist; whether I have done that, or no, I must appeal to the experience of mankind.

THERE are several actions of men's minds, that they are conscious to themselves of performing; as willing, believing, knowing, &c. which they have so particular a sense of, that they can distinguish them one from another; or else they

they could not say, when they willed, when they believed, and when they knew any thing. But tho' these actions were different enough, from one another, not to be confounded by those, who spoke of them; yet no-body, that I had met with, had, in their writings, particularly set down, wherein the act of knowing precisely consisted.

To this reflection, upon the actions of my own mind, the subject of my Essay concerning Human Understanding naturally led me; wherein, if I have done any thing new, it has been to describe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their minds do, when they perform that action, which they call knowing; and if, upon examination, they observe, I have given a true account of that action of their minds, in all the parts of it; I suppose it will be in vain to dispute, against what they find, and feel, in themselves: and if I have not told them right, and exactly what they find and feel in themselves, when their minds perform the act of knowing, what I have said, will be all in vain; men will not be persuaded against their senses. Knowledge is an internal perception of their minds; and if, when they reflect on it, they find it is not, what I have said it is, my groundless conceit will not be hearkened to, but be exploded by every body, and die of itself; and no-body need to be at any pains to drive it out of the world: so impossible is it to find out, or start new methods of certainty, or to have them received, if any one places it in any thing, but in that, wherein it really consists: much less can any one be in danger to be misled into error, by any such new, and, to every one visibly, senseless project. Can it be supposed, that any one could start a new method of seeing, and persuade men thereby, that they do not see what they do see? Is it to be feared, that any one can cast such a mist over their eyes, that they should not know, when they see, and so be led out of their way by it?

KNOWLEDGE, I find, in myself, and, I conceive in others, consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call ideas: but whether it does so, in others, or no, must be determined by their own experience, reflecting upon the action of their mind, in knowing; for that I cannot alter, nor, I think, they themselves: but, whether they will call those immediate objects of their minds, in thinking, ideas, or no, is perfectly in their own choice. If they dislike that name, they may call them notions, or conceptions, or how they please; it matters not, if they use them so, as to avoid obscurity and confusion. If they are constantly used in the same and a known sense, every one has the liberty to please himself in his terms; there lies neither truth, nor error, nor science, in that; tho' those, that take them for things, and not for what they are, bare arbitrary signs of our ideas, make a great deal ado, often about them, as if some great matter lay in the use of this, or that sound. All that I know, or can imagine, of difference about them, is, that those words are always best, whose significations are best known, in the sense they are used; and so are least apt to breed confusion.

My Lord, your Lordship has been pleased to find fault with my use of the new term, ideas, without telling me a better name, for the immediate objects of the mind, in thinking. Your Lordship has also been pleased to find fault with my definition of knowledge, without doing me the favour to give me a better: for it is only about my definition of knowledge, that all this stir, concerning certainty, is made. For with me, to know and to be certain, is the same thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I know. What reaches to knowledge, I think, may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think, cannot be called knowledge; as your Lordship could not but observe, in § 18. of chap. iv. of my fourth book, which you have quoted.

My definition of knowledge, in the beginning of the fourth book of my Essay stands thus: "knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the perception
" of the connexion, and agreement, or disagreement, and repugnancy of any

" of our ideas." This definition your Lordship dislikes, and apprehends, " it may be of dangerous consequence, as to that article of christian faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend." For this, there is a very easy remedy: It is but for your Lordship to set aside this definition of knowledge, by giving us a better, and this danger is over. But your Lordship chuses rather to have a controversy with my book, for having it in it, and to put me upon the defence of it; for which I must acknowledge myself obliged to your Lordship, for affording me so much of your time, and for allowing me the honour of conversing so much with one, so far above me, in all respects.

YOUR Lordship says, " it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of christian faith, which you have endeavoured to defend." Tho' the laws of disputing allow bare denial, as a sufficient answer to sayings, without any offer of a proof; yet, my Lord, to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous consequence, in, my book, as to that article, I shall not stand still sullenly, and put your Lordship upon the difficulty of shewing, wherein that danger lies: but shall, on the other side, endeavour to shew your Lordship, that that definition of mine, whether true or false, right or wrong, can be of no dangerous consequence to that article of faith. The reason, which I shall offer for it, is this; because it can be of no consequence to it, at all.

THAT, which your Lordship is afraid, it may be dangerous to, is an article of faith: that, which your Lordship labours, and is concerned for, is the certainty of faith. Now, my Lord, I humbly conceive the certainty of faith, if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so, has nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge: and to talk of the certainty of faith, seems all one to me, as to talk of the knowledge of believing; a way of speaking not easy to me to understand.

PLACE knowledge in what you will, " start what new methods of certainty of faith: that are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before;" place certainty on such grounds, as will leave little, or no, knowledge in the world: (for these are the arguments your Lordship uses, against my definition of knowledge) this shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the assurance of faith; that is quite distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with knowledge."

FAITH stands by itself, and upon grounds of its own; nor can be removed from them, and placed on those of knowledge. Their grounds are so far from being the same, or having any thing common, that when it is brought to certainty, faith is destroyed; it is knowledge then, and faith no longer.

WITH what assurance soever of believing, I assent to any article of faith, so that I stedfastly venture my all upon it, it is still but believing. Bring it to certainty, and it ceases to be faith. I believe that Jesus Christ was crucified, dead, and buried, rose again the third day from the dead, and ascended into heaven: let now such methods of knowledge, or certainty, be started, as leave men's minds more doubtful than before: let the grounds of knowledge be resolved into what any one pleases, it touches not my faith: the foundation of that stands, as sure, as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it: and one may as well say, that any thing, that weakens the sight, or casts a mist before the eyes, endangers the hearing; as that any thing, which alters the nature of knowledge (if that could be done) should be of dangerous consequence to an article of faith.

WHETHER then I am, or am not, mistaken, in the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; whether this account of knowledge be true, or false, enlarges, or straitens, the bounds of it, more than it should; faith still stands upon its own basis, which is not at all altered by it; and every article of that has just the same unmoved foundation, and the very same credibility that it had before. So that, my Lord, whatever I have said about certainty, and how much soever I may be out in it: if I am mistaken, your Lordship has no reason to apprehend any danger to any article of faith, from thence; every one of them stands upon the same bottom, it did before,

fore, out of the reach of what belongs to knowledge and certainty. And thus much, of my way of certainty by ideas; which, I hope, will satisfy your Lordship, how far it is from being dangerous to any article of the christian faith whatsoever.

I FIND one thing more, your Lordship charges on me, in reference to the P. 103. Unitarian controversy; and that is, where your Lordship says, that "if these [i. e. my notions of nature, and person] hold, your Lordship does not see, how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity."

MY Lord, since I have a great opinion, that your Lordship sees, as far as any one, and I shall be justified to the world, in relying upon your Lordship's foresight, more than on any one's; these discomfiting words of your Lordship's would dishearten me so, that I should be ready to give up what your Lordship confesses so untenable; with this acknowledgment however to your Lordship, as its great defender,

" ———— Si Pergama dextrâ
" Defendi possint, etiam hæc defensa fuissent."

This, I say, after such a declaration of your Lordship's, I should think, out of a due value for your Lordship's great penetration and judgment, I had reason to do, were it any other cause, but that of an article of the christian faith. For these, I am sure, shall all be defended and stand firm to the world's end; tho' we are not always sure, what hand shall defend them. I know as much may be expected from your Lordship's, in the case, as any body's; and therefore I conclude, when you have taken a view of this matter again, out of the heat of dispute, you will have a better opinion of the articles of the christian faith, and of your own ability to defend them, than to pronounce, that "if my notions of nature and person hold, your Lordship cannot see, how it is possible to defend that article of the christian faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend." For it is, methinks, to put that article upon a very ticklish issue, and to render it as suspected, and as doubtful, as is possible, to men's minds, that your Lordship should declare it not possible to be defended, "if my notions of nature and person hold;" when all, that I can find that your Lordship excepts against, in my notions of nature and person, is nothing but this, viz. that these are two sounds, which in themselves signify nothing.

BUT before I come to examine, how by nature and person, your Lordship, at present in your answer, engages me in the Unitarian controversy; it will not be beside the matter to consider, how, by them, your Lordship at first brought my book into it.

"In your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, your Lordship says, Vind. p. 252. "the next thing to be cleared in this dispute, is the distinction between nature and person. And of this, we can have no clear and distinct idea, from sensation or reflection: and yet all our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly, about this point, unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction: but that these come not into our minds, by these simple ideas of sensation and reflection."

To this I replied, "If it be so, the inference, I should draw from thence, P. 148. (if it were fit for me to draw any) would be this; that it concerns those, who write on that subject, to have themselves, and to lay down to others, clear and distinct apprehensions, or notions, or ideas (call them what you please) of what they mean, by nature and person, and of the grounds of identity and distinction."

"THIS appears to me to be the natural conclusion, flowing from your Lordship's words; which seem here to suppose clear and distinct apprehensions (something like clear and distinct ideas) necessary for the avoiding unintelligible talk, in the doctrine of the Trinity. But I do not see, how your Lordship

“ ship can, from the necessity of clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, &c. in the dispute of the Trinity, bring in one, who has, perhaps, mistaken the way to clear and distinct notions, concerning nature and person, &c. as fit to be answered among those, who bring objections against the Trinity, in point of reason. I do not see, why an Unitarian may not as well bring him in, and argue against his Essay, in a chapter, that he should write, to answer objections against the unity of God, in point of reason, or revelation: for upon what ground soever any one writes in this dispute, or any other, it is not tolerable to talk unintelligibly, on either side.

“ If by the way of ideas, which is that of the author of the Essay of Human Understanding, a man cannot come to clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person; if, as he proposes, from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, such apprehensions cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a mistaken philosopher: but it will not follow from thence, that he is not an orthodox christian; for he might (as he did) write his Essay of Human Understanding, without any thought of the controversy between the Trinitarians and the Unitarians. Nay, a man might have writ all that is in his book, that never heard one word of any such dispute.

“ THERE is in the world a great and fierce contest, about nature and grace: It would be very hard for me, if I must be brought in as a party, on either side, because a disputant in that controversy should think, the clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and grace come not into our minds, by these simple ideas of sensation and reflection. If this be so, I may be reckoned among the objectors against all sorts and points of orthodoxy, whenever any one pleases: I may be called to account, as one heterodox, in the points of free-grace, free-will, predestination, original sin, justification by faith, transubstantiation, the pope's supremacy, and what not? as well as in the doctrine of the Trinity; and all, because they cannot be furnished with clear and distinct notions of grace, free-will, transubstantiation, &c. by sensation or reflection. For in all these, or any other points, I do not see, but there may be a complaint made, that they have not always a right understanding and clear notions of those things, on which the doctrine they dispute of, depends. And it is not altogether unusual for men to talk unintelligibly to themselves, and others, in these and other points in controversy, for want of clear and distinct apprehensions, or (as I would call them, did not your Lordship dislike it) ideas: for all which unintelligible talking, I do not think myself accountable, tho' it should so fall out, that my way, by ideas, would not help them to, what it seems is wanting, clear and distinct notions. If my way be ineffectual to that purpose, they may, for all me, make use of any other more successful; and leave me out of the controversy, as one useless to either party, for deciding of the question.

“ SUPPOSING, as your Lordship says, and as you have undertaken to make appear, that the clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction, should not come into the mind, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection; what, I beseech your Lordship, is this to the dispute, concerning the Trinity, on either side? And if, after your Lordship has endeavoured to give clear and distinct apprehensions, of nature and person, the disputants in this controversy should still talk unintelligibly, about this point, for want of clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person; ought your Lordship to be brought in, among the partisans, on the other side, by any one, who writ a Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity? In good earnest, my Lord, I do not see how the clear and distinct notions of nature and person, not coming into the mind, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, any more contains any objection against the doctrine of the Trinity, than the clear and distinct apprehensions of original sin, justification, or transubstantiation, not coming into the mind, by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, contains any ob-

“ jection

jection against the doctrine of original sin, justification, or transubstantiation; and so of all the rest of the terms, used in any controversy, in religion:”

All that your Lordship answers to this, is in these words: “The next thing, *Anf. p. 100.* I undertook to shew, was, that we can have no clear and distinct idea of nature and person, from sensation or reflection. Here you spend many pages to shew, that this doth not concern you. Let it be so. But it concerns the matter I was upon; which was to shew, that we must have ideas [I think, my Lord, it should be, clear and distinct ideas] of these things, which we cannot come to, by sensation and reflection.”

BUT be that as it will; I have troubled your Lordship here, with this large repetition out of my former letter, because I think it clearly shews, that my book is no more concerned in the controversy about the Trinity, than any other controversy extant; nor any more opposite to that side of the question, that your Lordship has endeavoured to defend, than to the contrary: and also because, by your Lordship’s answer to it, in these words, “let it be so,” I thought you had not only agreed to all that I had said, but that, by it, I had been dismissed out of that controversy.

IT is an observation, I have somewhere met with, “That whoever is once got into the inquisition, guilty, or not guilty, seldom ever gets clear out again.” I think your Lordship is satisfied there is no heresy in my book. The suspicion it was brought into, upon the account of placing certainty only upon clear and distinct ideas, is found groundless, there being no such thing in my book; and yet it is not dismissed out of the controversy. It is alleged still, that “my notion of ideas, as I have stated it, may be of dangerous consequence, as to that article of the christian faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend;” and so I am bound over to another trial. “Clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction, so necessary in the dispute of the Trinity, cannot be had from sensation and reflection,” was another accusation. To this, whether true or false, I pleaded, that it makes me no party in this dispute of the Trinity, more than in any dispute, that can arise; nor of one side of the question more than another. My plea is allowed, “let it be so;” and yet nature and person are made use of again, to hook me into the heretical side of the dispute: and what is now the charge against me, in reference to the Unitarian controversy, upon the account of nature and person? Even this new one, viz. that “if my notions of nature and person hold, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity.” How is this new charge proved? even *P. 103.* thus, in these words annexed to it: “For if these terms really signify nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex ideas, which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the signs of two ideas; then it is plain, that they are only notions of the mind, as all abstracted and complex ideas are; and so one nature and three persons can be no more.”

MY Lord, I am not so conceited of my notions; as to think that they deserve that your Lordship should dwell long upon the consideration of them: But pardon me, my Lord, if I say, that it seems to me that this representation, which your Lordship here makes to yourself, of my notions of nature and person, and the inference from it, were made a little in haste: and that if it had not been so, your Lordship would not, from the preceding words, have drawn this conclusion; “and so one nature and three persons can be no more;” nor charged it upon me.

FOR as to that part of your Lordship’s representation of my notions of nature and person, wherein it is said, “if these terms in themselves signify nothing;” tho’ I grant that to be my notion of the terms, nature and person, that they are two sounds, that naturally signify not one thing, more than another, nor in themselves signify any thing at all, but have the signification, which they have, barely by imposition; yet in this my notion of them, give me leave to presume, that, upon more leisurely thoughts, I shall have your Lordship, as well as the rest of mankind, that ever thought of this matter, concurring with

me. So that if your Lordship continues positive in it, "That you cannot see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity, if this my notion of nature and person hold;" I, as far as my eye-sight will reach in the case (which possibly is but a little way) cannot see, but it will be plain to all mankind, that your Lordship gives up the doctrine of the Trinity: since this notion of nature and person, that they are two words, that signify by imposition, is what will hold, in the common sense of all mankind. And then, my Lord, all those, who think well of your Lordship's ability to defend it, and believe that you see as far into that question, as any body (which I take to be the common sentiment of all the learned world, especially of those of our country and church) will be in great danger to have an ill opinion of the evidence of that article: since, I imagine, there is scarce one of them, who does not think this notion will hold, viz. that these terms, nature and person, signify what they do signify, by imposition, and not by nature.

THO', if the contrary were true, viz. that these two words, nature and person, had this particular privilege, above other names of things, that they did naturally, and in themselves, signify what they do signify, and that they received not their significations from the arbitrary imposition of men; I do not see how the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity should depend hereon: unless your Lordship concludes, that it is necessary to the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, that these two articulate sounds should have natural significations, and that, unless they are used in those significations, it were impossible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity. Which is, in effect, to say, that where these two words are not in use, and in their natural signification, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be defended. And if this be so, I grant your Lordship had reason to say, that if it hold, that the terms, nature and person, signify by imposition, your Lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity. But then, my Lord, I beg your Lordship to consider, whether this be not mightily to prejudice that doctrine, and to undermine the belief of that article of faith, to make so extraordinary a supposition necessary to the defence of it; and of more dangerous consequence to it, than any thing, your Lordship can imagine, deducible from my book?

As to the remaining part of what your Lordship has, in the foregoing passage, set down as some of my notions of nature and person, viz. that these terms are only abstract, or complex ideas; I crave leave to plead, that I never said any such thing; and I should be ashamed, if I ever had said, that these, or any other terms, were ideas: which is all one as to say, that the sign is the thing signified. Much less did I ever say, "That these terms are only abstract and complex ideas, which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the signs of two ideas." For to say, that the common use of language "has appropriated abstract and complex ideas to be the signs of ideas," seems to me so extraordinary a way of talking, that I can scarce persuade myself, it would be of credit to your Lordship, to think it worth your while to answer a man, whom you could suppose to vent such gross jargon.

THIS, therefore, containing none of my notions of nature and person, nor, indeed, any thing that I understand; whether your Lordship rightly deduces from it this consequence, viz. "and so one nature and three persons can be no more;" is what I neither know, nor am concerned to examine.

YOUR Lordship has been pleased to take my Essay of Human Understanding to task, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity; because the doctrine of it will not furnish your Lordship "with clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction. For, says your Lordship, we must talk unintelligibly about this point [of the Trinity] unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person," &c.

WHATEVER, by my way of ideas, one can have clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, I shall not now dispute, how much soever I am of the mind one may. Nor shall I question the reasonableness of this principle, your

your Lordship goes upon, viz. that my book is to be disputed against, as opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, because it fails to furnish your Lordship "with clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, and the distinction "between them;" tho' I promised no such clear and distinct apprehensions, nor have treated, in my book, any where of nature, at all. But upon this occasion I cannot but observe, that your Lordship yourself, in that place, makes "clear "and distinct ideas necessary to that certainty of faith," which your Lordship thinks requisite, tho' it be that very thing, for which you blame the men of the new way of reasoning, and is the very ground of your disputing against the Unitarians, the author of Christianity not mysterious, and me, jointly under that title."

YOUR Lordship, to supply that defect in my book, of clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, for the vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, without which it cannot be talked of intelligibly, nor defended, undertook to clear the distinction between nature and person. This, I told your Lordship, gave me hopes of getting farther insight into these matters, and more clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, than was to be had by ideas; but that, after all the attention, and application, I could use, in reading what your Lordship had writ of it, I found myself so little enlightened concerning nature and person, by what your Lordship had said, that I found no other remedy, but that I must be content with the condemned way by ideas.

THIS, which I thought not only an innocent, but a respectful answer, to what your Lordship had said, about nature and person, has drawn upon me a more severe reflection than I thought it deserved. SCEPTICISM is a pretty hard word, which I find dropt in more places than one; but I shall refer the consideration of that, to another place. All that I shall do now, shall be to mark out (since your Lordship forces me to it) more particularly than I did before, what I think very hard to be understood, in that which your Lordship has said to clear the distinction between nature and person; which I shall do, for these two ends:

FIRST, as an excuse for my saying, "that I had learnt nothing out of your "Lordship's elaborate discourse of them, but this; that I must content myself "with my condemned way by ideas."

AND next to shew, why not only I, but several others, think, that if my book deserved to be brought in, and taken notice of, among the Anti-trinitarian writers, for want of clear and distinct ideas of nature and person; what your Lordship has said upon these subjects, will more justly deserve, by him that writes next in the defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, to be brought in, among the opposers of the doctrine of the Trinity, as of dangerous consequence to it, for want of giving clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person; unless the same thing ranks one man among the Unitarians, and another among the Trinitarians.

WHAT your Lordship had said, for the clearing of the distinction of nature and person, having surpassed my understanding, as I told your Lordship in my former letter; I was resolved not to incur your Lordship's displeasure, a second time, by confessing I found not myself enlightened by it, till I had taken all the help I could imagine, to find out these clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, which your Lordship had so much declared for. To this purpose, I consulted others, upon what you had said; and desired to find some body, who understanding it himself, would help me out, where my own application and endeavours had been used to no purpose. But my misfortune has been, my Lord, that, among several, whom I have desired to tell me the sense of what your Lordship had said, for clearing the notions of nature and person, there has not been one, who owned, that he understood your Lordship's meaning; but confessed, the farther he looked into what your Lordship had there said, about nature and person, the more he was at a loss about them.

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ONE said, your Lordship began with giving two significations of the word, nature. One of them, as it stood for properties, he said he understood: but the other, wherein "nature was taken for the thing itself, wherein those properties were," he said, he did not understand. But that, he added, I was not to wonder at, in a man, who was not very well acquainted with Greek; and, therefore, might well be allowed not to have learning enough to understand an English word, that Aristotle was brought to explain and settle the sense of. Besides, he added, that, which puzzled him the more in it, was the very explication, which was brought of it out of Aristotle, viz. that "nature was a corporeal substance, which had the principles of motion in itself;" because he could not conceive a corporeal substance, having the principles of motion in itself. And if nature were a corporeal substance, having the principles of motion in itself; it must be good sense to say, that a corporeal substance, or, which is the same thing, a body, having the principles of motion in itself, is nature; which he confessed, if any body should say to him, he could not understand.

ANOTHER thing, he said, that perplexed him in this explication of nature, was, that if "nature was a corporeal substance, which had the principles of motion in itself," he thought it might happen, that there might be no nature at all: for corporeal substances having all equally principles, or no principles of motion in themselves; and all men, who do not make matter and motion eternal, being positive in it, that a body, at rest, has no principle of motion in it, must conclude, that corporeal substance has no principle of motion in itself: from hence it will follow, that to all those, who admit not matter and motion to be eternal, no nature, in that sense, will be left at all, since nature is said to be a corporeal substance, which hath the principles of motion in itself; but such a sort of corporeal substance, those men have no notion of, at all, and consequently none of nature, which is such a corporeal substance.

NOW, said he, if this be that clear and distinct apprehension of nature, which is so necessary to the doctrine of the Trinity, they who have found it out for that purpose, and find it clear and distinct, have reason to be satisfied with it, upon that account: but how they will reconcile it to the creation of matter, I cannot tell. I, for my part, said he, can make it consist, neither with the creation of the world, nor with any other notions; and so, plainly, cannot understand it.

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HE farther said, in the following words, which are these, "but nature and substance are of an equal extent; and so that, which is the subject of powers and properties, is the nature, whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual substances;" he neither understood the connexion, nor sense: first, he understood not, he said, that "nature and substance were of the same extent." Nature, he said, in his notion of it, extended to things, that were not substances; as he thought it might properly be said, the nature of a rectangular triangle was, that the square of the hypotenuse, was equal to the square of the two other sides; or, it is the nature of sin to offend God: tho' it be certain, that neither sin, nor a rectangular triangle, to which nature is attributed in these propositions, are either of them substances.

FURTHER, he said, that he did not see how the particle, but, connects this to the preceding words: but least of all, could he comprehend the inference from hence: "and so, that, which is the subject of powers and properties, is nature, whether it be meant of bodily, or spiritual substances." Which deduction, said he, stands thus: "Aristotle takes nature for a corporeal substance, which has the principle of motion in itself; therefore nature and substance are of an equal extent, and so both corporeal and incorporeal substances are nature." This is the very connexion, said he, of the whole deduction, in the foregoing words, which I understand not, if I understand the words: and if I understand not the words, I am yet farther from understanding any thing of this explication of nature, whereby we are to come to clear and distinct apprehensions of it.

METHINKS

METHINKS, said he, going on, I understand how by making nature and substance one and the same thing, that may serve to bring substance, into this dispute; but for all that, I cannot, for my life, understand nature to be substance, nor substance to be nature.

THERE is another inference said he, in the close of this paragraph, which, both for its connexion and expression, seems to me very hard to be understood, it being set down in these words: "so that the nature of things properly be-
"longs to our reason, and not to mere ideas." For when a man knows what it is, for the nature of things properly to belong to reason, and not to mere ideas, there will, I guess, some difficulty remain, in what sense soever he shall understand that expression, to deduce this proposition, as an inference from the foregoing words, which are these: "I grant, that by sensation or reflection, we
"come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond those, because it is impossible that
"they should subsist by themselves: so that the nature of things properly be-
"longs to our reason, and not to mere ideas." Vindic. p. 253.

IT is true, said I; but his Lordship, upon my taking reason in that place for the power of reasoning, hath, in his answer, with a little kind of warmth, corrected my mistake in these words: "still you are at it, that you can find
"no opposition between ideas and reason: but ideas are objects of the un-
"derstanding, and the understanding is one of the faculties employed about
"them. No doubt of it. But you might easily see that, by reason, I under-
"stood principles of reason, allowed by mankind; which, I think, are very
"different from ideas. But I perceive reason, in this sense, is a thing you have
"no idea of; or one as obscure as that of substance." Answ. p. 101.

I IMAGINE, said the gentleman, that if his Lordship should be asked, "how he perceives you have no idea of reason, in that sense, or one, as obscure
"as that of substance?" he would scarce have a reason ready to give for his saying so: and what we say, which reason cannot account for, must be ascribed to some other cause.

NOW truly, said I, my mistake was so innocent and so unaffected, that if I had had these very words said to me then, which his Lordship sounds in my ears now, to awaken my understanding, viz. "that the principles of reason are
"very different from ideas," I do not yet find, how they would have helped me to see what it seems, was no small fault, that I did not see before. Because, let reason, taken for principles of reason, be as different as it will from ideas; reason, taken as a faculty, is as different from them, in my apprehension: and in both senses of the word, reason, either as taken for a faculty, or for the principles of reason allowed by mankind, reason and ideas may consist together.

CERTAINLY, said the gentleman, ideas have something in them, that you do not see; or else such a small mistake, as you made, in endeavouring to make them consistent with reason, as a faculty, would not have moved so great a man, as my Lord Bishop of Worcester so as to make him tell you, "that
"reason, taken for the common principles of reason, is a thing, whereof you
"have no idea, or one, as obscure as that of substance." For, if I mistake not, you have, in your book, in more places than one, spoke, and that pretty largely, of self-evident propositions and maxims: so that, if his Lordship has ever read those parts of your Essay, he cannot doubt, but that you have ideas of those common principles of reason.

IT may be so, I replied; but such things are to be born from great men, who often use them as marks of distinction: tho' I should less expect them from my Lord Bishop of W. than from almost any one; because he has the solid and interior greatness of learning, as well as that of outward title and dignity. But since he expects it from me, I will do what I can to see what he says, is his meaning here, by reason. I will repeat it just as his Lordship says, "I might easily have seen what he understood by it." My Lord's words, immediately following those above taken notice of, are: "and so that, which is
"the 252." Vindic. p.

"the subject of powers and properties is the nature, whether it be meant of
 "bodily or spiritual substances." And then follow these, which, to be rightly
 understood, his Lordship says, must be read thus: "I grant, that by sensation
 "and reflection, we come to know the properties of things; but our reason,
 "i. e. the principles of reason allowed by mankind, are satisfied that there
 "must be something beyond these, because it is impossible, they should subsist
 "by themselves: so that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason,
 i. e. to the principles of reason allowed by mankind; and not to mere ideas.
 This explication of it, replied the gentleman, which my Lord Bishop has given
 of this passage, makes it more unintelligible to me, than it was before; and I
 know him to be so great a master of sense, that I doubt, whether he himself
 will be better satisfied with this sense of his words, than with that, which you
 understood it in. But let us go on to the two next paragraphs, wherein his
 Lordship is at farther pains to give us clear and distinct apprehensions of nature:
 and, that we may not mistake, let us first read his words, which run thus:

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"BUT we must yet proceed farther: for nature may be considered two ways."
 "1. As it is in distinct individuals; as the nature of a man is equally in Peter,
 "James, and John; and this is the common nature, with a particular subsis-
 "tence, proper to each of them. For the nature of a man, as in Peter, is
 "distinct from that same nature, as it is in James and John; otherwise they
 "would be but one person, as well as have the same nature. And this dis-
 "tinction of persons in them, is discerned both by our senses, as to their diffe-
 "rent accidents; and by our reason, because they have a separate existence,
 "not coming into it at once, and in the same manner.

"2. NATURE may be considered abstractly, without respect to individual
 "persons; and then it makes an intire notion of itself. For, however the
 "same nature may be in different individuals, yet the nature in self remains one
 "and the same; which appears from this evident reason, that otherwise every
 "individual must make a different kind."

IN these words, said he, having read them, I find the same difficulties, you
 took notice of, in your letter. As, first, that it is not declared whether his
 Lordship speaks here of nature, as standing for essential properties, or of na-
 ture, as standing for substance; which dubiouness casts an obscurity on the
 whole place. And next, I can no more tell than you, whether it be his Lord-
 ship's opinion, that I ought to think, that one and the same nature is in Peter
 and John; or, that a nature distinct from that in John, is in Peter; and that
 for the same reason which left you at a loss, viz. because I cannot put together
 one and the same and distinct. But since his Lordship, in his answer to you,
 has said nothing to give us light in these matters, we must be content to be in
 the dark; and if he has not thought fit to explain it, so as to make himself to
 be understood by us, we may be sure he has a reason for it. But pray tell me,
 did you understand the rest of these two paragraphs, that you mentioned only
 those two difficulties? For I must profess to you, that I understand so little of
 either of them, that they contribute nothing at all, to give me those clear and
 distinct apprehensions of nature and person, which I find, by his Lordship, it
 is necessary to have, before one can have a right understanding of the doctrine
 of the Trinity. Nay, I am so far from gaining, by his Lordship's discourse,
 those clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, that what he objects
 to your new method of certainty, I found verified in this his clearing the distinc-
 tion between nature and person, that it left me in more doubt than I was in before.

TRULY, Sir, replied I, that was just my case; but minding then, only what I
 thought immediately related to the objections to my book, which followed, I passed
 by what I might have retorted, concerning the obscurity and difficulty in his Lord-
 ship's doctrine, about nature and person, and contented myself to tell his Lord-
 ship, in as respectful terms, as I could find, that I could not understand him;
 which drew from him that severe reflection, that I obstinately stick to a way,
 that leads to scepticism, which is the way of ideas. But now that, for the
 vindication of my book, I am shewing that his Lordship's way, without ideas,

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does as little (I will not say less) furnish us with clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, as my Essay does; I do not see, but that his Lordship's Vindication of the Trinity is as much against the doctrine of the Trinity, as my Essay of Human Understanding; and may, with as much reason on that account, be animadverted on by another, who vindicates the doctrine of the Trinity, as my book is by his Lordship.

INDEED, saith he, if failing of clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, render any book obnoxious to one, that vindicates the doctrine of the Trinity, and gives him sufficient cause to write against it, as opposite to that doctrine; I know no book of more dangerous consequence to that article of faith, nor more necessary to be writ against, by a defender of that article, than that part of his Lordship's vindication, which we are now upon. For, to my thinking, I never met with any thing more unintelligible about that subject, nor that is more remote from clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person. For what more effectual method could there be to confound the notions of nature and person, instead of clearing their distinction, than to discourse of them, without first defining them? Is this a way, to give clear and distinct apprehensions of two words, upon a right understanding of which, all our notions of the doctrine of the Trinity depend; and without which, we must talk unintelligibly about that point?

HIS Lordship tells us here, nature may be considered two ways. What is Vind. p. 253, it the nearer to be told, nature may be considered, two, or twenty ways, till we know what that is, which is to be considered two ways? i. e. till he defines the term, nature, that we may know what precisely is the thing meant by it.

He tells us, "nature may be considered,

" 1. As it is in individuals.

" 2. Abstractly."

1. HIS Lordship says, "nature may be considered, as in distinct individuals." It is true, by those, that know what nature is. But his Lordship having not yet told me, what nature is, nor what he here means by it, it is impossible for me to consider nature in, or out of, individuals, unless I can consider I know not what: so that this consideration is, to me, as good as no consideration; neither does or can it help at all, to any clear and distinct apprehensions of nature. Indeed he says, Aristotle, by nature, signified a corporeal substance; and from thence his Lordship takes occasion to say, that "nature and substance are of an equal extent:" tho' Aristotle, taking nature for a corporeal substance, gave no ground for such a saying, because corporeal substance and substance are not of an equal extent. But to pass by that: if his Lordship would have us understand here, that, by nature, he means substance, this is but substituting one name, in the place of another; and, which is worse, a more doubtful and obscure term, in the place of one that is less so: which will, I fear, not give us very clear and distinct apprehensions of nature. His Lordship goes on;

"As the nature of a man is equally in Peter, James, and John; and
"this is the common nature, with a particular subsistence, proper to each of
"them."

HERE his Lordship does not tell us what consideration of nature there may be, but actually affirms and teaches something. I wish I had the capacity to learn by it the clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, which is the lesson he is upon here. He says, "That the nature of a man is equally in Peter, James, and John." That's more than I know: because I do not know what things Peter, James, and John are. They may be drills, or horses, for ought I know; as well as Weweena, Cuchiye, and Cousheda, may be drills, as his Lordship says, for ought he knows. For I know no law of speech, that more necessarily makes these three sounds, Peter, James, and John, stand for three men, then Weweena, Cuchiye, and Cousheda, stand for three men: For I knew a horse that was called Peter; and I do not know but the master of the same team might call other of his horses, James and John. Indeed if Peter,
James,

James and John, are supposed to be the names only of men, it cannot be questioned but the nature of man is equally in them; unless one can suppose each of them to be a man, without having the nature of man in him; that is, suppose him to be a man, without being a man. But then this, to me, I confess gives no manner of clear, or distinct, apprehensions, concerning nature, in general, or the nature of man in particular; it seeming to me to say no more but this, that a man is a man, and a drill is a drill, and a horse is a horse: or, which is all one, what has the nature of a man, has the nature of a man, or is a man; and what has the nature of a drill, has the nature of a drill, or is a drill; and what has the nature of a horse, has the nature of a horse, or is a horse; whether it be called Peter, or not called Peter. But if any one should repeat this a thousand times to me, and go over all the species of creatures, with such an unquestionable assertion of every one of them; I do not find, that thereby I should get one jot clearer, or distincter, apprehensions either of nature in general, or of the nature of a man, a horse, or a drill, &c. in particular.

HIS Lordship adds, "and this is the common nature, with a particular subsistence proper to each of them." I do not doubt but his Lordship set down these words, with a very good meaning; but such is my misfortune, that I, for my life, cannot find it out. I have repeated, and this, twenty times to myself; and my weak understanding always reels, and what? To which I am always ready to answer, "the nature of a man in Peter, and the nature of a man in James, and the nature of a man in John, is the common nature;" and there I stop, and can go no farther, to make it coherent to myself, till I add, of man: and then it must be read thus: "the nature of man in Peter is the common nature of man, with a particular subsistence, proper to Peter." That the nature of man in Peter, is the nature of a man, if Peter be supposed to be a man, I certainly know, let the nature of a man be what it will, of which I yet know nothing: but if Peter be not supposed to be the name of a man, but be the name of a horse, all that knowledge vanishes, and I know nothing. But let Peter be ever so much a man, and let it be impossible to give that name to a horse; yet I cannot understand these words, that the common nature of man is in Peter; for whatsoever is in Peter, exists in Peter; and whatsoever exists in Peter, is particular: but the common nature of man, is the general nature of man, or else I understand not what is meant, by common nature: and it confounds my understanding, to make a general, a particular.

BUT to help me to conceive this matter, I am told, "it is the common nature, with a particular subsistence proper to Peter." But this helps not my understanding in the case: for, first, I do not understand what subsistence is, if it signify any thing different from existence; and if it be the same with existence, then it is so far from loosening the knot, that it leaves it just as it was, only covered with the obscure and less known term subsistence. For the difficulty to me, is, to conceive an universal nature, or universal any-thing, to exist; which would be, in my mind, to make an universal a particular; which, to me, is impossible.

No, said another who was by, it is but using the word, subsistence, instead of existence, and there is nothing easier; if one will consider this common, or universal nature, with a particular existence, under the name of subsistence, the business is done.

JUST as easy, replied the former, I find it in myself, as to consider the nature of a circle with four angles; for to consider a circle with four angles, is no more impossible to me, than to consider a universal, with a particular existence; which is to consider a universal, really existing, and in effect a particular. But the words, "proper to each of them," follow to help me out. I hoped so, till I considered them; and then I found I understood them, as little as all the rest: for I know not what is, a subsistence proper to Peter, more than to James, or John, till I know Peter himself: and then, indeed, my senses will discern him from James or John, or any man living.

HIS Lordship goes on: "for the nature of man, as in Peter, is distinct from that same nature, as it is in James and John; otherwise they would be but one person, as well as have the same nature." These words, by the causal particle, for, which introduces them, should be a proof of something, that goes before: but what they are meant, for a proof of, I confess I understand not. For the proposition preceding, as far as I can make any thing of it, is this; that the general nature of a man has a particular existence in each of the three, Peter, James, and John. But then how the saying, that "the nature of man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same nature, as it is in James and John," does prove that the general nature of man does, or can, exist in either of them, I cannot see.

THE words which follow, "otherwise they would be but one person, as well as have the same nature," I see the connexion of; for it is visible they were brought to prove, that the nature in Peter is distinct from the nature in James and John. But with all that, I do not see of what use, or significance, they are here; because to me they are more obscure and doubtful, than the proposition they are brought to prove: for I scarce think there can be a clearer proposition than this, viz. that three natures that have three distinct existences in three men, are, as his Lordship says, three distinct natures, and so needs no proof. But to prove it by this, that "otherwise they could not be three persons," is to prove it by a proposition unintelligible to me; because his Lordship has not yet told me, what the clear and distinct apprehension of person is, which I ought to have. For his Lordship supposing it, as he does to be a term, which has in itself a certain signification; I, who have no such conception of it, should in vain look for it, in the propriety of our language, which is established upon arbitrary imposition; and so can, by no means, imagine what, person, here signifies, till his Lordship shall do me the favour to tell me.

To this I replied, that page 259, which is but six pages farther, your Lordship explains the notion of person.

To which the gentleman answered, whether I can get clear and distinct apprehensions of person, by what his Lordship says there, of person, I shall see, when I come to it. But this, in the mean time, must be confessed, that person comes in here, six pages too soon, for those, who want his Lordship's explication of it, to make them have clear and distinct apprehensions of what he means, when he uses it.

FOR we must certainly talk unintelligibly, about nature and person, as well as about the doctrine of the Trinity, unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person; as his Lordship says, in the foregoing page.

It follows, "and this distinction of persons, in them, is discerned both by our senses, as to their different accidents; and by our reason, because they have a separate existence; not coming into it, at once, and in the same manner."

THESE words, said he, which conclude this paragraph, tell us how persons are distinguished; but, as far as I can see, serve not at all to give us any clear and distinct apprehensions of nature, by considering it in distinct individuals; which was the business of this paragraph.

HIS Lordship says, we may consider nature, as in distinct individuals: and so I do, as much, when I consider it, in three distinct physical atoms, or particles, of air or ether, as when I consider it in Peter, James, and John: for three distinct physical atoms are three distinct individuals, and have three distinct natures in them, as certainly as three distinct men; tho' I cannot discern the distinction between them, by my senses, as to their different accidents; nor is their separate existence discernible to my reason, by their not coming into it at once, and in the same manner: for they did, for I ought I know, or at least might, come into existence at once, and in the same manner, which was by creation. I think it will be allowed, that God did or might, create more than one physical atom of matter, at once: so that here nature may be con-

sidered in distinct individuals, without any of those ways of distinction, which his Lordship here speaks of : and so I cannot see, how these last words contribute ought, to give us clear and distinct apprehensions of nature, by considering nature in distinct individuals.

BUT to try what clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature, his Lordship's way of considering nature, in this paragraph carries in it : let me repeat his Lordship's discourse to you here, only changing one common nature, for another, viz. putting the common nature of animal, for the common nature of man, which his Lordship has chose to instance in ; and then his Lordship's words would run thus : " nature may be considered two ways ; first, as it is in distinct individuals ; as the nature of an animal is equally in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus : and this is the common nature, with a particular subsistence, proper to each of them. For the nature of animal, as in Bucephalus, is distinct from the same nature, as in Podargus and Alexander ; otherwise they would be but one person, as well as have the same nature. And this distinction of persons in them, is discerned both by our senses, as to their different accidents, and by our reason, because they have a separate existence, not coming into it at once, and in the same manner."

To this I said, I thought he did violence to your Lordship's sense, in applying the word person, which signifies an intelligent individual, to Bucephalus and Podargus, which were two irrational animals.

To which the gentleman replied, that he fell into this mistake, by his thinking, your Lordship had somewhere spoken, as if an individual intelligent substance were not the proper definition of person. But, continued he, I lay no stress on the word, person, in the instance, wherein I have used his Lordship's words, and therefore, if you please, put individual, for it ; and then reading it so, let me ask you, whether that way of considering it, contributes any thing, to the giving you clear and distinct apprehensions of nature ? which it ought to do, if his Lordship's way of considering, nature, in that paragraph, were of any use to that purpose : since the common nature, of animal, is as much the same, or as his Lordship says, in the next paragraph, as much an entire notion of itself, as the common nature of man. And the common nature of animal, is as equally in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus, with a particular subsistence proper to each of them, as the common nature of man is equally in Peter, James, and John, with a particular subsistence, proper to each of them, &c. but pray what does all this do, towards the giving you clear and distinct apprehensions of nature ?

I REPLIED, truly neither the consideration of nature, as in his Lordship's distinct individuals, viz. in Peter, James, and John ; nor the consideration of nature, as in your distinct individuals, viz. in Alexander, Bucephalus, and Podargus, did any thing towards the giving me clear and distinct apprehensions of nature. Nay, they were so far from it, that, after having gone over both the one and the other, several times in my thoughts, I seem to have less clear and distinct apprehensions of nature, than I had before ; but whether it will be so with other people, as I perceive it is with you, and me, and some others, none of the dullest, whom I have talked with, upon this subject, that must be left to experience ; and if there be others, that do hereby get such clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature, which may help them, in their notions of the Trinity, that cannot be denied them.

THAT is true, said he : but if that be so, I must necessarily conclude, that the Notionists, and the Ideists, have their apprehensive faculties very differently turned ; since in their explaining themselves (which they, on both sides, think clear and intelligible) they cannot understand one another.

BUT let us go on to nature, considered abstractly, in the next words.

SECONDLY, nature may be considered, says his Lordship, abstractly, without respect to individual persons.

I do not see, said he, what persons do here, more than any other individuals : for nature, considered abstractly, has no more respect to persons, than any other sort of individuals.

AND

AND then, says his Lordship, it makes an entire notion of itself. To make an entire notion of itself, being an expression, I never met with before, I shall not, I think, be much blamed, if I be not confident, that I perfectly understand it. To guess, therefore, as well as I can, what can be meant by it, I consider, that whatever the mind makes an object of its contemplation at any time, may be called one notion, or, as you perhaps would call it, one idea; which may be an entire notion, or idea, tho' it be but the half of what is the object of the mind, at another time. For methinks the number, five, is as much an entire notion of itself, when the mind contemplates the number, five, by itself, as the number ten is an entire notion by itself, when the mind contemplates that alone, and its properties: and, in this sense, I can understand an entire notion by itself: but if it mean any thing else, I confess I do not understand it. But then the difficulty remains: for I cannot see how, in this sense, nature, abstractly considered, makes an entire notion, more than the nature of Peter makes an entire notion. For if the nature in Peter be considered by itself, or if the abstract nature of man be considered by itself, or if the nature of animal (which is yet more abstract) be considered by itself; every one of these, being made the whole object, that the mind, at any time, contemplates, seems to me, as much an entire notion, as either of the other.

BUT farther, what the calling nature, abstractly considered, an entire notion in itself, contributes to our having, or not having clear and distinct apprehensions of nature, is yet more remote from my comprehension.

HIS Lordship's next words are; "for however the same nature may be in
"different individuals; yet the nature in itself remains one and the same: Vindic. p. 254.
"which appears, from this evident reason, that otherwise every individual must
"make a different kind."

THE coherence of which discourse, continued he, tending, as it seems, to prove, that nature, considered abstractly, makes an entire notion of itself; stands as far as I can comprehend it, thus: "because every individual must not make
"a different kind; therefore nature, however it be in different individuals, yet
"in itself it remains one and the same. And because nature, however it be
"in different individuals, yet in itself remains one and the same; therefore,
"considered abstractly, it makes an entire notion of itself." This is the argument of this paragraph; and the connexion of it, if I understand the connecting words, "for, and from this evident reason." But if they are used for any thing else, but to tie those propositions together, as the proofs one of another, in that way I have mentioned them; I confess I understand them not, nor any thing, that is meant by this whole paragraph. And, in that sense, I understand it in, what it does towards the giving us clear and distinct apprehensions of nature, I must confess, I do not see at all.

THUS far, said he, we have considered his Lordship's explication of nature; and my understanding what his Lordship had discoursed upon it, under several heads, for the giving us clear and distinct apprehensions concerning it.

LET us now read what his Lordship has said, concerning person; that I may, since you desire it of me, let you see, how far I have got any clear and distinct apprehension of person, from his Lordship's explication of that. His Lordship's words are; "let us now come to the idea of a person. For, altho' Vindic. p. 259.
"the common nature of mankind be the same, yet we see a difference in the
"several individuals from one another: so that Peter, and James, and John,
"are all of the same kind; yet Peter is not James, and James is not John.
"But what is this distinction founded upon? They may be distinguished from
"each other by our senses, as to difference of features, distance of place, &c.
"but that is not all; for supposing there were no external difference, yet
"there is a difference between them, as several individuals in the same common
"nature. And here lies the true idea of a person, which arises from the manner of substance, which is in one individual, and is not communicable to
"another. An individual, intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making
"of a person, than the proper definition of it; for a person relates to something

" thing, which doth distinguish it from another intelligent substance, in the same nature; and, therefore, the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of subsistence, which agrees to one, and to none else, of the same kind; and this is it which is called personality."

IN these words, this I understand very well, that supposing Peter, James, and John to be all three men; and man, being a name for one kind of animals, they are all of the same kind. I understand too very well, that Peter is not James, and James is not John, but that there is a difference in these several individuals. I understand also, that they may be distinguished from each other by our senses, as to different features and distance of place, &c. But what follows, I do confess, I do not understand, where his Lordship says, " but that is not all; for supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several individuals in the same nature." For first, whatever willingness I have to gratify his Lordship, in whatever he will have me suppose, yet I cannot, I find, suppose, that there is no such external difference between Peter and James, as difference of place; for I cannot suppose a contradiction: and it seems to me to imply a contradiction to say, Peter and James are not in different places. The next thing, I do not understand, is, what his Lordship says in these words; " for supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several individuals in the same nature." For these words being here to shew, what the distinction of Peter, James, and John is founded upon, I do not understand how they at all do it.

HIS Lordship says, " Peter is not James, and James is not John." He then asks, " but what is this distinction founded upon?" And to resolve that, he answers, " not by difference of features, or distance of place, with an &c. because, supposing there were no such external difference, yet there is a difference between them." In which passage, by these words, such external difference, must be meant all other difference, but what his Lordship, in the next words, is going to name; or else I do not see, how his Lordship shews, what this distinction is founded upon. For if, supposing such external differences away, there may be other differences, on which to found their distinction, besides that other, which his Lordship subjoins, viz. " the difference that is between them, as several individuals in the same nature:" I cannot see, that his Lordship has said any thing to shew, what the distinction between those individuals is founded on; because, if he has not, under the terms external difference, comprized all the differences, besides that his chief and fundamental one, viz. " the difference between them as several individuals, in the same common nature;" it may be founded on what his Lordship has not mentioned. I conclude then, it is his Lordship's meaning, (or else I can see no meaning in his words) that supposing no difference between them, of features, or distance of place, &c. i. e. no other difference between them, yet there would be still the true ground of distinction, in the difference between them, as several individuals in the same common nature.

LET us then understand, if we can, what is the difference between things, barely as several individuals, in the same common nature, all other differences laid aside.

TRULY, said I, that I cannot conceive.

NOR I neither, replied the gentleman: for considering them as several individuals, was what his Lordship did, when he said, Peter was not James, and James was not John; and if that were enough to shew, on what the distinction between them was founded, his Lordship needed have gone no farther in his enquiry, after that, for that he had found already: and yet methinks thither are we at last come again, as to the foundation of the distinction between them, viz. that they are several individuals, in the same common nature. Nor can I here see any other ground of the distinction between those, that are several individuals in the same common nature, but this, that they are several individuals in the same common nature. Either this is all the meaning, that his Lordship's words, when considered, carry in them; or else I do

do not understand what they mean : and either way, I must own, they do not much towards the giving me clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person.

ONE thing more I must remark to you, in his Lordship's way of expressing himself here ; and that is, in the former part of the words last read, he speaks, as he does all along, of the same common nature being in mankind, or in the several individuals : and, in the latter part of them, he speaks of several individuals being in the same common nature. I do by no means find fault with such figurative and common ways of speaking, in popular and ordinary discourses, where inaccurate thoughts allow inaccurate ways of speaking ; but I think I may say, that metaphorical expressions (which seldom terminate in precise truth) should be as much as possible avoided, when men undertake to deliver clear and distinct apprehensions, and exact notions of things : because, being taken strictly and according to the letter, (as we find they are apt to be) they always puzzle and mislead, rather than enlighten and instruct.

I do not say this (continued he) with an intention to accuse his Lordship of inaccurate notions ; but yet, I think, his sticking so close all along to that vulgar way of speaking, of the same common nature being in several individuals, has made him less easy to be understood. For to speak truly and precisely of this matter, as in reality it is, there is no such thing as one and the same common nature in several individuals : for all, that in truth is in them, is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the true meaning (when it has any) of that metaphorical and popular phrase, I take to be this, and no more, that every particular individual man, or horse, &c. has such a nature or constitution, as agrees, and is conformable to that idea, which that general name stands for.

HIS Lordship's next words are ; " And here lies the true idea of a person, " which arises from that manner of subsistence, which is in one individual, " and is not communicable to another." The reading of these words, said he, makes me wish, that we had some other way of communicating our thoughts, than by words : for, no doubt, it would have been as much a pleasure to have seen what his Lordship's thoughts were, when he writ this, as it is now an uneasiness to pucker in words and expressions, whose meaning one does not comprehend. But let us do the best we can. " And here, says his Lordship, lies the true idea of person."

PERSON, being a dis-syllable, that in itself signifies nothing ; what is meant by the true idea of it (it having no idea, one more than another, that belongs to it, but the idea of the articulate sound, that those two syllables make in pronouncing) I do not understand. If, by true idea, be meant true signification, then these words will run thus ; here lies the true signification of the word person ; and then, to make it more intelligible, we must change here into herein, and then the whole comma will stand thus ; herein lies the true signification of the word person : which reading herein, must refer to the preceding words : and then the meaning of these words will be, the true signification of person lies in this, that " supposing there were no other difference, " in the several individuals of the same kind ; yet there is a difference between " them, as several individuals, in the same common nature." Now, if in this lies the true signification of the word, person, he must find it here, that can. For if he does find it in these words, he must find it to be such a signification, as will make the word, person, agree as well to Bucephalus and Podargus, as to Alexander : for, let the difference between Bucephalus and Podargus, as several individuals, in the same common nature, be what it will ; it is certain, it will always be as great, as the difference between Alexander and Hector, as several individuals in the same common nature. So that, if the true signification of person, lies in that difference, it will belong to Bucephalus and Podargus, as well as to Alexander and Hector. But let any one reason ever so subtilly, or profoundly, about the true idea, or true signification of the term, person, he will never be able to make me understand, that Bucephalus and Podargus are

persons, in the true signification of the word, person, as commonly used in the English tongue.

BUT that, which, more certainly and for ever, will hinder me from finding the true signification of person, lying in the foregoing words, is, that they require me to do, what I find is impossible for me to do, i. e. find a difference between two individuals, as several individuals, in the same common nature, without any other difference. For if I never found any other difference, I should never find two individuals. For, first, we find some difference, and by that we find they are two, or several, individuals; but, in this way, we are bid to find two individuals, without any difference: but that, I find, is too subtil and sublime for my weak capacity. But when, by any difference of time, or place, or any thing else, I have once found them to be two, or several, I cannot, for ever after, consider them but as several. They being once, by some difference, found to be two, it is unavoidable for me, from thenceforth, to consider them as two. But to find severals, where I find no difference; or, as his Lordship is pleased to call it, external difference at all; is, I confess, too hard for me.

THIS his Lordship farther tells us, in these words which follow; "which arises from the manner of subsistence, which is in one individual, which is not communicable to another:" which is, I own, a learned way of speaking, and is supposed to contain some refined philosophick notion in it, which to me is either wholly incomprehensible, or else may be expressed in these plain and common words, viz. that every thing that exists has, in the time or place, or other perceivable differences of its existence, something incommunicable to all those of its own kind, whereby it will eternally be kept several from all the rest. This, I think, is that, which the learned have been pleased to term a peculiar manner of subsistence; but if this manner of subsistence be any thing else, it will need some farther explication to make me understand it.

HIS Lordship's next words, which follow, I must acknowledge are also wholly incomprehensible to me: they are, "an individual, intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making of a person, than the proper definition of it."

PERSON is a word; and the idea, that word stands for, or the proper signification of that word, is what I take his Lordship is here giving us. Now what is meant by saying, "an individual, intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making the signification of the word person, than the proper definition of it," is beyond my reach. And the reason his Lordship adjoins, puts it, in that, or any other sense, farther from my comprehension. "For a person relates to something, which does distinguish it from another intelligent substance, in the same nature; and, therefore, the foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of subsistence, which agrees to one, and none else, of the kind; and this is that, which is called personality."

THESE words, if nothing else, convince me, that I am Davus, and not Oedipus; and so I must leave them.

HIS Lordship, at last, gives us what, I think, he intends for a definition of person, in these words: "Therefore, a person is a compleat, intelligent substance, with a peculiar manner of subsistence." Where I cannot but observe, that what was, as I think, denied or half-denied to be the proper definition of person; in saying, "it was rather supposed to the making of a person, than the proper definition of it," is yet here got into his Lordship's definition of person; which I cannot suppose, but his Lordship takes to be a proper definition. There is only one word changed in it; and instead of individual, intelligent substance, his Lordship has put it compleat, intelligent substance; which, whether it makes his the more proper definition, I leave to others; since, possibly, some will be apt to think, that a proper definition of person cannot be well made, without the term individual, or an equivalent. But his Lordship has, as appears by the place, put in compleat, to exclude the soul from being a person; which whether it does it, or no, to me seems doubtful: because, possibly,

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possibly, many may think, that the soul is a compleat, intelligent substance by itself, whether in the body, or out of the body; because every substance, that has a being, is a compleat substance, whether joined, or not joined, to another. And as to the soul's being intelligent, no-body, I guess, thinks, that the soul is compleated in that, by its union with the body; for then it would follow, that it would not be equally intelligent out of the body; which, I think, no-body will say.

AND thus I have, at your request, gone over all, that his Lordship has said, to give us clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, which are so necessary to the understanding the doctrine of the Trinity, and talking intelligibly about it. And if I should judge of others by my own dulness, I should fear, that by his Lordship's discourse, few would be helped to think, or talk, intelligibly about it. But I measure not others, by my narrow capacity: I wish others may profit by his Lordship's explication of nature and person, more than I have done. And so the conversation ended.

MY Lord, I should not have troubled your Lordship with a dialogue of this kind, had not your Lordship forced me to it, in my own defence. Your Lordship at the end of your above-mentioned explication of nature, has these words; "let us now see how far these things can come from our ideas, by sensa-^{Vindic. p.} tion and reflection." And, to the like purpose, in the close of your explication²⁵⁴ of person, your Lordship says, "but how do our simple ideas help us out, in "this matter?" Can we learn from them the difference of nature and person?" Your Lordship concludes, we cannot. But you say, what makes a person, must be understood some other way. And hereupon, my Lord, my book is thought worthy, by your Lordship, to be brought into the controversy, and argued against, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity; because, as your Lordship conceives, clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person cannot be had from it.

I HUMBLY crave leave to represent to your Lordship, that, if want of affording clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, make any book Anti-trinitarian, and, as such, fit to be writ against, by your Lordship; your Lordship ought, in the opinion of a great many men, in the first place, to write against your own Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity; since, among the many I have consulted, concerning your Lordship's notions of nature and person, I do not find any one, that understands them better, or has got from them any clear, or more distinct, apprehensions concerning nature and person, than I myself; which indeed is none at all.

THE owning of this to your Lordship, in my former letter, I find, displeased your Lordship: I, therefore, here laid before your Lordship some part of those difficulties, which appear to me, and others, in your Lordship's explication of nature and person, as my apology for saying, I had not learned any thing by it. And, to make it evident, that if want of clear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, involve any treatise in the Unitarian controversy, your Lordship's upon that account, is, I humbly conceive, as guilty as mine; and may be reckoned one of the first, that ought to be charged with that offence against the doctrine of the Trinity.

THIS, my Lord, I cannot help thinking, till I understand better. Whether the not being able to get clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, from what your Lordship has said of them, be the want of capacity in my understanding, or want of clearness in that, which I have endeavoured to understand, I shall not presume to say; of that the world must judge. If it be my dulness (as I cannot presume much upon my own quickness, having every day experience, how short-sighted I am) I have this yet to defend me, from any very severe censure in the case, that I have as much endeavoured to understand your Lordship, as I ever did to understand any body. And if your Lordship's notions, laid down about nature and person, are plain and intelligible, there are a great many others, whose parts lie under no blemish in the world, who find them neither plain, nor intelligible.

PARDON

PARDON me therefore, I beseech you, my Lord, if I return your Lordship's question, "how do your Lordship's notions help us out in this matter? Can we learn from them, clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the grounds of identity and distinction?" To which the answer will stand, no; till your Lordship has explained your notions of them a little clearer, and shewn what ultimately they were founded on, and made up of, if they are not ultimately founded on, and made up of, our simple ideas, received from sensation and reflection; which is that, for which, in this point, you except against my book: and yet, tho' your Lordship sets yourself to prove, that they cannot be had from our simple ideas by sensation and reflection; tho' your Lordship lays down several heads about them; yet you do not, that I see, offer any thing to instruct us, from what other original they come, or whence they are to be had.

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254, &c.

BUT, perhaps, this may be my want of understanding what your Lordship has said about them: and, possibly, from the same cause it is, that I do not see how the four passages your Lordship subjoins, as out of my book (tho' there be no such passages in my book; as, I think, your Lordship acknowledges, since your Lordship answers nothing, to what I said thereupon;) the two things

Vindic. p.
254, 255---
259.

P. 255. your Lordship says, are granted, that tend to the clearing this matter; and the four inferences your Lordship makes; are all or any of them, applied by your Lordship, to shew that clear and distinct apprehensions, concerning nature and person, cannot be had, upon my principles; at least, as clear as can be had upon your Lordship's, when you please to let us know them.

P. 255-259.

HITHERTO, my Lord, I have considered only what is charged upon my book, by your Lordship, in reference to the Unitarian controversy, viz. the manner and grounds, on which my book has been, by your Lordship, endeavoured to be brought into the controversy concerning the Trinity, with which it hath nothing to do; nor has your Lordship, as I humbly conceive, yet shewn that it has.

THERE remains to be considered several things, which your Lordship thinks faulty in my book; which, whether they have any thing to do, or no, with the doctrine of the Trinity, I think myself obliged to give your Lordship satisfaction in, either by acknowledging my errors, or giving your Lordship an account, wherein your Lordship's discourse comes short of convincing me of them. But these papers being already grown to a bulk, that exceeds the ordinary size of a letter, I shall respite your Lordship's farther trouble in this matter, for the present, with this promise, that I shall not fail to return my acknowledgments to your Lordship, for those other parts of the letter, you have honoured me with.

BEFORE I conclude, it is fit, with due acknowledgment, I take notice of these words, in the close of your Lordship's letter: "I hope, that in the managing this debate, I have not either transgressed the rules of civility, or mistaken your meaning; both which I have endeavoured to avoid. And I return you thanks for the civilities, you have expressed to me, through your letter: and I do assure you, that it is out of no disrespect, or the least ill-will to you, that I have again considered this matter," &c.

YOUR Lordship hopes, you have not mistaken my meaning: and I, my Lord, hope, that where you have (as I humbly conceive, I shall make it appear, you have) mistaken my meaning, I may, without offence, lay it before your Lordship. And I the more confidently ground that hope, upon this expression of your Lordship, here, which I take to be intended to that purpose; since, in those several instances I gave, in my former letter, of your Lordship's mistaking not only my meaning, but the very words of my book, which you quoted, your Lordship has had the goodness to bear with me, without any manner of reply.

P. 133. YOUR Lordship assures me, "that it is out of no disrespect, or the least ill-will to me, that you have again considered this matter."

MY Lord, my never having, by any act of mine, deserved otherwise of your Lordship, is a strong reason to keep me from questioning what your Lordship

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ship says: and, I hope, my part in the controversy has been such, that I may be excused from making any such profession, in reference to what I write to your Lordship. And I shall take care to continue to defend myself so, in this controversy, which your Lordship is pleased to have with me, that I shall not come within the need of any apology, that what I say is out of no disrespect, or the least ill-will, to your Lordship. But this must not hinder me any where, from laying the argument in its due light for the advantage of truth.

THIS, my Lord, I say not to your Lordship, who, proposing to yourself, as you say, in this very page, nothing but truth, will not, I know, take it amiss, that I endeavour to make every thing, as plain and as clear as I can: but this I say, upon occasion of some exceptions of this kind, which I have heard others have made against the former letter, I did myself the honour to write to your Lordship, as if I did therein bear too hard upon your Lordship. Tho' your Lordship, who knows very well the end of arguing, as well as rules of civility, finds nothing to blame in my way of writing; and I should be very sorry, it should deserve any other character, than what your Lordship has been pleased to give it in the beginning of your postscript. It is my misfortune to have any controversy with your Lordship; but since the concern of truth alone engages me in it, as I know your Lordship will expect, that I should omit nothing, that should make for truth, for that is the end we both profess to aim at; so I shall take care to avoid all foreign, passionate, and unmannerly mixtures, which do no way become a lover of truth, in any debate, especially with one of your Lordship's character and dignity.

My Lord, the imputation of a tendency to scepticism, and to the overthrowing any article of the christian faith, are no small charges; and all censures of that high nature, I humbly conceive, are with the more caution to be passed, the greater the authority is of the person, they come from. But whether to pronounce so hardly of the book, merely upon surmises, be to be taken for a mark of good-will to the author, I must leave to your Lordship. This I am sure, I find the world thinks me obliged to vindicate myself. I have taken leave to say, merely upon surmises, because I cannot see any argument, your Lordship has any where brought, to shew its tendency to scepticism, beyond what your Lordship has in these words in this page, viz. that it is your Lordship's great prejudice against it, that it leads to scepticism; or, that your Lordship can find no way to attain to certainty in it, upon my grounds.

I confess, my Lord, I think, that there is a great part of the visible, and a great deal more of the yet much larger intellectual world, wherein our poor and weak understandings, in this state, are not capable of knowledge; and this, I think, a great part of mankind agrees with me in. But whether, or no, my way of certainty, by ideas, comes short of what it should, or your Lordship's way, with or without ideas, will carry us to clearer and larger degrees of certainty; we shall see, when your Lordship pleases to let us know, wherein your way of certainty consists. Till then, I think, to avoid scepticism, it is better to have some way of certainty (tho' it will not lead us to it, in every thing) than no way at all.

THE necessity your Lordship has put upon me, of vindicating myself, must be my apology for giving your Lordship this second trouble; which, I assure myself, you will not take amiss, since your Lordship was so much concerned for my vindication, as to declare, you had no reason to be sorry, that the author P. 36. of Christianity not mysterious had given me occasion to vindicate myself. I return your Lordship my humble thanks for affording me this second opportunity to do it, and am, with the utmost respect,

London,
29 June,
1697.

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

P O S T S C R I P T.


MY LORD,

TH O' I have so great a precedent, as your Lordship has given me, in the letter, you have honoured me with; yet, I doubt, whether even your Lordship's example will be enough to justify me to the world, if, in a letter writ to one, I should put a postscript in answer to another man, to whom I do not speak in my letter: I shall, therefore only beg, that your Lordship will be pleased to excuse it, if you find a short answer to the paper of another man, not big enough to be published by itself, appear under the same cover with my answer to your Lordship. The paper itself came to my hands, at the same time, that your Lordship's letter did; and, containing some exceptions to my Essay concerning Human Understanding, is not wholly foreign in the matter of it.



A N
A N S W E R
T O
R E M A R K S
U P O N

An Essay concerning Human Understanding, &c.

 EFORE any thing came out against my Essay concerning Human Understanding, the last year, I was told, that I must prepare myself for a storm, that was coming against it; it being resolved by some men, that it was necessary that book of mine should, as it is phrased, be run down. I do not say, that the author of these remarks was one of those men; but I premise this, as the reason of the answer, I am about to give him: and tho' I do not say, he was one of them; yet in this, I think, every indifferent reader will agree with me, that his letter does not very well suit with the character, he takes upon himself, or the design he pretends in writing it.

HE pretends, the business of his letter to be informed: but if that were in P. 4. earnest so, I suppose he would have done two things, quite otherwise, than he has. The first is, that he would not have thought it necessary, for his particular information, that his letter (that pretends inquiry in the body of it, tho' it carries remarks in the title) should have been published in print: whereby I am apt to think, that however, in it, he puts on the person of a learner, yet he would miss his aim, if he were not taken notice of, as a teacher; and particularly, that his remarks shewed the world great faults in my book.

THE other is, that he has not set his name to his letter of inquiries; whereby I might, by knowing the person that inquires, the better know how to suit my answer to him. I cannot much blame him, in another respect, for concealing his name; for, I think, any one, who appears among christians, may be well ashamed of his name, when he raises such a doubt as this, viz. whether an infinitely powerful and wise being, be veracious or no; unless falsehood be in such reputation with this gentleman, that he concludes lying to be no mark of weakness and folly. Besides, this author might, if he had pleased, have taken notice, that, in more places than one, I speak of the goodness of God; another evidence, as I take it, of his veracity.

HE seems concerned to know, "upon what ground I will build the divine P. 6, 7. law, when I pursue morality to a demonstration?"

If he had not been very much in haste, he would have seen, that his questions, in that paragraph, are a little too forward; unless he thinks it necessary I should write, when, and upon what, he thinks fit. When I know him better, I may, perhaps, think I owe him great observance; but so much as that, very few men think due to themselves.

I HAVE said, indeed, in my book, that I thought morality capable of demonstration, as well as the mathematicks: but I do not remember, where I promised this gentleman to demonstrate it to him.

HE says, "if he knew upon what grounds I would build my demonstration P. 6. of morality, he could make a better judgment of it." His judgment, who makes

makes such demands as this, and is so much in haste to be a judge, that he cannot stay, till what he has such a mind to be fitting upon, be born; does not seem of that consequence, that any one should be in haste to gratify his impatience.

- P. 4. AND, since, "he thinks the illiterate part of mankind (which is the greatest) must have a more compendious way to know their duty, than by long deductions;" he may do well to consider, whether it were, for their sakes, P. 6. he published this question, viz. "what is the reason and ground of the divine law?"

WHOEVER sincerely acknowledges any law to be the law of God, cannot fail to acknowledge also, that it hath all that reason and ground, that a just and wise law can, or ought to have; and will easily persuade himself to forbear raising such questions and scruples about it.

- P. 4. A MAN, that insinuates as he does, as if I held, that "the distinction of virtue and vice, was to be picked up by our eyes, our ears, or our nostrils;" shews so much ignorance, or so much malice, that he deserves no other answer but pity.
- P. 8. "THE immortality of the soul is another thing, he says, he cannot clear to himself, upon my principles." It may be so. The right reverend, the Lord Bishop of Worcester, in the letter he has lately honoured me with in print, has undertaken to prove, upon my principles, the soul's immateriality; which, I suppose, this author will not question to be a proof of its immortality: and to his Lordship's letter, I refer him for it. But, if that will not serve his turn, I P. 69. will tell him a principle of mine, that will clear it to him; and that is, the revelation of life and immortality, by Jesus Christ, thro' the gospel.

HE mentions other doubts he has, unresolved by my principles. If my principles do not reach them, the world I think will, I am sure I shall, be obliged to him, to direct me to such as will supply that defect in mine. For I never had the vanity to hope to out-do all other men. Nor did I propose to myself in publishing my Essay, to be an answerer of questions; or expect that all doubts should go out of the world, as soon as my book came into it.

THE world has now my book, such as it is: if any one finds, that there be many questions, that my principles will not resolve, he will do the world more service to lay down such principles as will resolve them, than to quarrel with my ignorance (which I readily acknowledge) and possibly for that, which cannot be done. I shall never think the worse of mine, because they will not resolve every one's doubts, till I see those principles, laid down by any one, that will; and then I will quit mine.

If any one finds any thing in my Essay, to be corrected, he may, when he pleases, write against it; and, when I think fit, I will answer him. For I do not intend my time shall be wasted, at the pleasure of every one, who may have a mind to pick holes in my book, and shew his skill in the art of confutation.

To conclude: were there nothing else in it, I should not think it fit to trouble myself about the questions of a man, which he himself does not think worth the owning.

Mr. LOCKE's REPLY

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Bishop of WORCESTER's Answer to his Second Letter:

Wherein, besides other incident matters, what his Lordship has said concerning certainty by reason, certainty by ideas, and certainty of faith; the resurrection of the same body; the immateriality of the soul; the inconsistency of Mr. LOCKE's notions with the articles of the christian faith, and their tendency to scepticism; is examined.

MY LORD,



OUR Lordship, in the beginning of the last letter, you honoured me with, seems so uneasy and displeased at my having said too much already, in the question between us, that I think I may conclude, you would be well enough pleased, if I should say no more; and you would dispense with me, for not keeping my promise I made you, to answer the other parts of your first letter. If this proceeds from any tenderness in your Lord-^{2d Letter,} ship for my reputation, that you would not have me expose myself, by an over-^{p. 167.} flow of words, in many places void of clearness, coherence, and argument, and that, therefore, might have been spared; I must acknowledge it is a piece of great charity, and such, wherein you will have a lasting advantage over me, since good manners will not permit me to return you the like. Or, should I, in the ebullition of thoughts, which in me your Lordship finds as impetuous, as the springs of Modena, mentioned by Ramazzini, be in danger to forget my self, and to think, I had some right, to return the general complaint of length and intricacy without force; yet you have secured your self from the suspicion of any such trash, on your side, by making cobwebs the easy product of those, ^{Page 4.} who write out of their own thoughts, which it might be a crime in me to impute to your Lordship.

IF this complaint of your's be not a charitable warning to me, I cannot well guess at the design of it; for I would not think that, in a controversy, which you, my Lord, have dragged me into, you would assume it as a privilege due to your self to be as copious, as you please, and say, what you think fit, and expect, I should reply only so, and so much, as would just suit your good liking, and serve to set the cause right, on that side, which your Lordship contends for.

MY Lord, I shall always acknowledge the great distance, that is between your Lordship and myself, and pay that deference, that is due to your dignity and person: but controversy, tho' it excludes not good manners, will not be managed with all that submission, which one is ready to pay in other cases. Truth, which is inflexible, has here its interest, which must not be given up in a compliment. Plato, and Aristotle, and other great names, must give way, rather than make us renounce truth, or the friendship we have for her.

THIS, possibly, your Lordship will allow, for it is not spun out of my own thoughts; I have the authority of others for it, and, I think, it was in print

before I was born. But you will say, however, I am too long in my replies. It is not impossible, but it may be so: but with all due respect to your Lordship's authority, (the greatness whereof I shall always readily acknowledge) I must crave leave to say, that, in this case, you are by no means a proper judge. We are now, as well your Lordship, as myself, before a tribunal, to which you have appealed, and before which you have brought me: it is the publick must be judge, whether your Lordship has enlarged too far, in accusing me, or I, in defending myself. Common justice makes great allowance to a man, pleading in his own defence, and a little length, (if he should be guilty of it) finds excuse, in the compassion of by-standers, when they see a man cautiously attacked, after a new way, by a potent adversary; and, under various pretences, occasions sought, and words wrested to his disadvantage.

THIS, my Lord, you must give me leave to think, to be my case, whilst this strange way, your Lordship has brought me into this controversy; your gradual accusations of my book, and the different causes, your Lordship has assigned of them; together with quotations out of it, which I cannot find there, and other things, I have complained of (to some of which, your Lordship has not vouchsafed any answer) shall remain unaccounted for, as, I humbly conceive, they do.

I CONFESS my answers are long, and I wish they could have been shorter: but the difficulty I have, to find out, and set before others, your Lordship's meaning, that they may see, what I am answering to, and so be able to judge of the pertinency of what I say, has unavoidably enlarged them. Whether this be wholly owing to my dulness, or whether a little perplexedness, both as to grammar and coherence, caused by those numbers of thoughts, whether of your own, or others, that crowd from all parts to be set down, when you write, may not be allowed to have some share in it, I shall not presume to say. I am at the mercy of your Lordship, and my other readers, in the point, and know not how to avoid a fault, that has no remedy.

Page 4. YOUR Lordship says, "the world soon grows weary of controversies, especially when they are about personal matters; which made your Lordship wonder, that one, who understands the world so well, should spend above fifty pages, in renewing and enlarging a complaint, wholly concerning himself."

To which give me leave to say, that if your Lordship had so much considered the world, and what it is not much pleased with, when you published your discourse, in vindication of the Trinity, perhaps your Lordship had not so personally concerned me, in that controversy, as it appears now you have, and continue still to do.

Page 4. YOUR Lordship "wonders, that I spend above fifty pages, in renewing and enlarging my complaint, concerning myself." Your wonder, I humbly conceive, will not be so great, when you recollect, that your answer to my complaint, and the satisfaction you proposed to give me, and others, in that personal matter, began the first letter, you honoured me with, and ended, in the 47th page of it; where you said, "you suppose the reason of your mentioning my words so often, was now no longer a riddle to me; and so you proceeded to other particulars of my vindication." If, therefore, I have spent fifty pages of my answer, in shewing, that what you offered in forty-seven pages, for my satisfaction, was none, but that the riddle was a riddle still; the disproportion, in the number of pages, is not so great, as to be the subject of much wonder; especially to those, who consider, that in what you call personal matter, I was shewing that my Essay, having in it nothing contrary to the doctrine of the Trinity, was yet brought into that dispute; and that, therefore, I had reason to complain of it, and of the manner of its being brought in: and if you had pleased not to have moved other questions, nor brought other charges against my book, till this, which was the occasion and subject of my first letter, had been cleared; by making out that the passages you had, in your Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, quoted out of my book,

book, had something in them, against the doctrine of the Trinity; and so were, with just reason, brought by you, as they were, into that dispute; there had been no other, but that personal matter, as you call it, between us.

In the examination of those pages, meant, as you said, for my satisfaction, and of other parts of your letter, I found (contrary to what I expected) matter of renewing and enlarging my complaint, and this I took notice of, and set down in my Reply, which it seems I should not have done: the knowledge of the world should have taught me better; and I should have taken that for satisfaction, which you were pleased to give, in which I could not find any, nor, as I believe, any intelligent or impartial reader: so that your Lordship's care of the world, that it should not grow weary of this controversy, and the fault, you find, of my misemploying fifty pages of my letter, reduces itself at last, in effect, to no more but this, that your Lordship should have a liberty to say what you please, pay me in what coin you think fit; my part should be, to be satisfied with it, rest content, and say nothing. This, indeed, might be a way not to weary the world, and to save fifty pages of clean paper, and put such an end to the controversy, as your Lordship would not dislike.

I LEARN, from your Lordship, that it is the first part of wisdom, in some P. 178. men's opinions, not to begin in such disputes. What the knowledge of the world (which is a sort of wisdom) should, in your Lordship's opinion, make a man do, when one of your Lordship's character begins with him, is very plain: he is not to reply, so far as he judges his defence and the matter requires, but as your Lordship is pleased to allow; which some may think no better, than if one might not reply at all.

AFTER having thus rebuked me, for having been too copious in my Reply, in the next words, your Lordship instructs me, what I should have answered; that "I should have cleared myself, by declaring to the world, that I owned P. 4. " the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received, in the christian church."

THIS, as I take it, is a mere personal matter, of the same woof with a Spanish sam-benito, and, as it seems to me, designed to fit close to me. What must I do now, my Lord? Must I silently put on, and wear this badge of your Lordship's favour, and, as one well understanding the world, say not a word of it, because the world soon grows weary of personal matters? If, in gratitude for this personal favour, I ought to be silent; yet I am forced to tell you, that, in what you require of me here, you possibly have cut out too much work, for a poor, ordinary layman, for whom it is too hard to know how a doctrine, so disputed, has been received in the christian church, and who might have thought it enough to own it, as delivered in the scriptures. Your Lordship, herein, lays upon me what I cannot do, without owning to know, what, I am sure, I do not know: for how the doctrine of the Trinity has been always received in the christian church, I confess myself ignorant. I have not had time to examine the history of it, and to read those controversies, that have been writ about it: and to own a doctrine, as received by others, when I do not know, how those others received it, is perhaps a short way to orthodoxy, that may satisfy some men: but he, that takes this way to give satisfaction, in my opinion, makes a little bold with truth; and it may be questioned, whether such a profession be pleasing to that God, who requires truth in the inward parts, however acceptable it may, in any man, be to his diocesan.

I PRESUME your Lordship, in your discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, intends to give it us, as it has been received in the christian church: and, I think, your words, viz. "it is the sense of the christian church, P. 87. " which you are bound to defend, and no particular opinions of your own," authorize one to think so. But if I am to own it, as your Lordship has there delivered it, I must own, what I do not understand; for, I confess, your exposition, of the sense of the church, wholly transcends my capacity.

If you require me to own it with an implicit faith, I shall pay that deference as soon, to your Lordship's exposition of the doctrine of the church, as any one's. But if I must understand, and know, what I own, it is my misfortune

tune

tune, and I cannot deny it, that I am as far from owning what you, in that discourse, deliver, as I can be from professing the most unintelligible thing, that ever I read, to be the doctrine that I own.

WHETHER I make more use of my poor understanding in the case, than you are willing to allow every one of your readers, I cannot tell: but such an understanding, as God has given me, is the best I have, and that, which I must use, in the apprehending what others say, before I can own the truth of it; and for this, there is no help, that I know.

THAT, which keeps me a little in countenance, is, that, if I mistake not, men of no mean parts, even divines of the church of England, and those of neither the lowest reputation, nor rank, find their understandings fail them, on this occasion; and stick not to own, that they understand not your Lordship, in that discourse, and particularly, that your sixth chapter is unintelligible to them, as well as me; whether the fault be in their, or my understanding, the world must be judge. But this is only by the by; for this is not the answer I here intend your Lordship.

YOUR Lordship tells me, that "to clear myself, I should have owned to the world the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received," &c. Answer. I know not whether in a dispute, managed after a new way, wherein one man is argued against, and another man's words all along quoted, it may not also be a good, as well as a new rule, for the answerer to reply to what was never objected, and clear himself from what was never laid to his charge. If this be not so, and that this new way of attacking, requires not this new way of defence, your Lordship's prescription to me here, what I should have done, will, "amongst the most intelligent and impartial readers," pass for a strange rule in controversy, and such as the learnedest of them will not be able to find in all antiquity; and therefore must be imputed to something else, than your Lordship's great learning.

DID your Lordship, in the discourse of the vindication of the Trinity, wherein you first fell upon my book, or in your letter (my answer to which, you are here correcting) did your Lordship, I say, any where object to me, that "I did not own the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received in the christian church," &c. ? If you did, the objection was so secret, so hidden, so artificial, that your words declared quite the contrary. In the Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, your Lordship says, that my notions were borrowed to serve other purposes [whereby, if I understand you right, you meant against the doctrine of the Trinity] than I intended them; which you repeat again*, for my satisfaction, and insist † upon for my vindication.

Vindic. p.
239.

Answ. 1.
p. 132, 133.

You having so solemnly, more than once, professed to clear me and my intentions from all suspicion of having any part in that controversy, as appears farther, in the close of your first letter, where all you charge on me, is the ill use, that others had made, or might make, of my notions; how could I suppose such an objection, made by your Lordship, which you declare against, without accusing your Lordship of manifest prevarication?

IF your Lordship had any thing upon your mind, any secret aims, which you did not think fit to own, but yet would have me divine, and answer to, as if I knew them; this, I confess, is too much for me, who look no farther into men's thoughts, than as they appear in their books. Where you have given your thoughts vent in your words, I have not, I think, omitted to take notice of them, not wholly passing by those insinuations, which have been dropped from your Lordship's pen; which, from another, who had not professed so much personal respect, would have shewn no exceeding good disposition of mind towards me.

WHEN your Lordship shall go on to accuse me, of not believing the doctrine of the Trinity, as received in the christian church, or any other doctrine, you shall think fit, I shall answer as I would to an inquisitor. For tho' your Lordship tells me, that "I need not be afraid of the inquisition, or that you

* Answ. 1. p. 35.

† Ibid. p. 36, 37, 40, 42, 46.

"intended

"intended to charge me with heresy, in denying the Trinity;" yet he, that P. 5.
shall consider your Lordship's proceeding with me, from the beginning, as far as it is hitherto gone, may have reason to think, that the methods and management of that holy office are not wholly unknown to your Lordship, nor have escaped your great reading. Your proceedings with me, have had these steps:

1. SEVERAL passages of my Essay of Human Understanding, and some of them relating barely to the being of a God, and other matters, wholly remote from any question about the Trinity, were brought into the Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, and there argued against, as containing the errors of those and them; which those and them, are not known to this day.

2. IN your Lordship's answer to my first letter, when what was given, as the great reason, why my Essay was brought into that controversy, viz. because in it "certainty was founded upon clear and distinct ideas;" was found to fail, and was only a supposition of your own; other accusations were fought out against it, in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity: viz. that "it might be Answ. 1.
"of dangerous consequence to that doctrine, to introduce the new term of P. 133.
"ideas, and to place certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of our ideas." What are become of these charges, we shall see in the progress of this letter, when we come to consider, what your Lordship has replied to my answer upon these points.

3. THESE accusations not having, it seems, weight enough, to effect what you intended, my book has been rumaged again, to find new, and more important faults in it; and now, at last, at the third effort, "my notions of ideas Answ. 2.
"are found inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith." This, indeed, title page.
carries some sound in it, and may be thought worthy the name and pains of so great a man, and zealous a father of the church, as your Lordship.

THAT I may not be too bold, in affirming a thing, I was not privy to, give me leave, my Lord, to tell your Lordship, why I presume my book has, upon this occasion, been looked over again, to see what could be found in it, capable to bear a deeper accusation, that might look like something, in a title-page. Your Lordship, by your station in the church, and the zeal you have shewn, in defending its articles, could not be supposed, when you first brought my book into this controversy, to have omitted these great enormities, that it now stands accused of, and to have cited it for smaller mistakes, some whereof were not found, but only imagined to be, in it, if you had then known these great faults, which you now charge it with, to have been in it. If your Lordship had been apprized of its being guilty of such dangerous errors, you would not certainly have passed them by: and, therefore, I think, one may reasonably conclude, that my Essay was new looked into, on purpose.

YOUR Lordship says, "that what you have done herein, you thought it your P. 177.
"duty to do, not with respect to yourself, but to some of the mysteries of our
"faith, which you do not charge me with opposing, but by laying such foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them." It cannot be doubted, but your duty would have made you, at the first, warn the world, that "my notions
"were inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith," if your Lordship had then known it: tho' the excessive respect and tenderness, you express towards me personally, in the immediately preceding words, would be enough utterly to confound me, were I not a little acquainted with your Lordship's civilities in this kind. For you tell me, "that these things laid together, P. 177.
"made your Lordship think it necessary to do that, which you was unwilling
"to do, until I had driven you to it; which was, to shew the reasons you
"had, why you looked on my notion of ideas, and of certainty by them, as
"inconsistent with itself, and with some important articles of the christian
"faith."

WHAT must I think now, my Lord, of these words? Must I take them as a mere compliment, which is never to be interpreted rigorously, according to the precise meaning of the words? Or must I believe that your unwillingness to do so hard a thing to me, restrained your duty, and you could not prevail

on yourself (how-much-so-ever the mysteries of faith were in danger to be overthrown) to get out these harsh words, viz. that "my notions were inconsistent with the articles of the christian faith," till your third onset, after I had forced you to your duty, by two replies of mine?

It will not become me, my Lord, to make myself a compliment from your words, which you did not intend me in them: but, on the other side, I would not willingly neglect to acknowledge any civility from your Lordship, in the full extent of it. The business is a little nice, because what is contained in those two passages, cannot by a less skilful hand than your's, be well put together, tho' they immediately follow one another. This, I am sure, falls out very untowardly, that your Lordship should drive me (who had much rather have been otherwise employed) to drive your Lordship, to do that, which you were unwilling to do. The world sees, how much I was driven: for what censures, what imputations, must my book have lain under, if I had not cleared it from those accusations, your Lordship brought against it, when I am charged now with evasions, for not clearing myself, from an accusation, which you never brought against me? But if it be an evasion, not to answer to an objection, that has not been made, what is it, I beseech you, my Lord, to make no reply to objections that have been made? Of which I promise to give your Lordship a list, whenever you shall please to call for it.

I FORBEAR it now, for fear that, if I should say all that I might, upon this new accusation, it would be more, than would suit with your Lordship's liking; and you should complain again, that you have opened a passage, which brings to your mind Ramazzini, and his springs of Modena. But your Lordship need not be afraid of being overwhelmed with the ebullition of my thoughts, nor much trouble yourself to find a way to give check to it: mere ebullition of thoughts never overwhelms, or sinks, any one, but the author himself: but if it carries truth with it, that, I confess, has force, and it may be troublesome to those, that stand in its way.

- P. 3. YOUR Lordship says, "you see how dangerous it is, to give occasion to one " of such a fruitful invention as I am, to write."

I AM obliged to your Lordship, that, you think my invention worth concerning yourself about, tho' it be so unlucky, as to have your Lordship and me, P. 80. always, differ about the measure of its fertility. In your first answer, you thought, I too much extended the fertility of my invention, and ascribed to it what it had no title to; and here, I think, you make the fertility of my invention greater than it is. For, in what I have answered to your Lordship, there seems to me no need at all of a fertile invention. It is true, it has been hard for me to find out, whom you writ against, or what you meant, in many places: as soon as that was found, the answer lay always so obvious, and so easy, that there needed no labour of invention, to discover what one should reply. The things themselves (where there were any) stripped of the ornaments of scholastick language, and the less obvious ways of learned writings, seemed to me to carry their answers visibly with them. This, permit me, my Lord, to say, that however fertile my invention is, it has not, in all this controversy, produced one fiction, or wrong quotation.

But, before I leave the answer you dictate, permit me to observe, that I am so unfortunate to be blamed for owning, what I was not accused to disown; and here for not owning, what I was never charged to disown. The like misfortune have my poor writings: they offend your Lordship in some places, because they are new; and in others, because they are not new.

Your next words, which are a new charge, I shall pass over, till I come to your proof of them, and proceed to the next paragraph. Your Lordship tells me, "you shall wave all unnecessary repetitions, and come immediately to the P. 5. " matter of my complaint, as it is renewed in my second letter."

WHAT your Lordship means, by unnecessary repetitions here, seems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing page, for having said too much in my own defence; and this, taken altogether, confirms my opinion, that

that, in your thoughts, it would have been better, I should have replied nothing at all. For you having set down here, near twenty lines, as a necessary repetition out of your former letter, your Lordship omits my answer to them, as wholly unnecessary to be seen; and consequently, you must think, was at first unnecessary to have been said. For, when the same words are necessary to be repeated again, if the same Reply, which was made to them, be not thought fit to be repeated too, it is plainly judged to be nothing to the purpose, and should have been spared at first.

It is true, your Lordship has set down some few expressions, taken out of several parts of my reply; but, in what manner, the reader cannot clearly see, without going back to the original of this matter. He must, therefore, pardon me the trouble of a deduction, which cannot be avoided, where controversy is managed at this rate; which necessitates, and so excuses, the length of the answer.

My book was brought into the Trinitarian controversy by these steps. Your Lordship says, that,

- "1. THE Unitarians have not explained the nature and bounds of reason. Vindic. p. 231.
- "2. THE author of Christianity not mysterious, to make amends for this, Ibid.
- "has offered an account of reason. Ibid. p. 232.
- "3. HIS doctrine, concerning reason, supposes that we must have clear and distinct ideas, of whatever we pretend to any certainty of, in our mind. Ibid. p. 233.
- "4. Your Lordship calls this a new way of reasoning.
- "5. THIS gentleman of this new way of reasoning," in his first chapter, says something, which has a conformity with some of the notions in my book. But it is to be observed, he speaks them, as his own thoughts, and not upon my authority, nor with taking any notice of me.

6. BY virtue of this, he is presently entitled to, I know not how much, of my book; and divers passages of my Essay are quoted, and attributed to him, under the title of "the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning," (for he is, by this time turned into a troop) and certain unknown (if they are not all contained in this one author's doublet) they, and these, are made, by your Lordship, to lay about them shrewdly, for several pages together, in your Lordship's Vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, &c. with passages, taken out of my book, which your Lordship was at the pains to quote, as theirs, i. e. certain, unknown Anti-trinitarians. Vindic. p. 234.

Of this your Lordship's way, strange and new to me, of dealing with my book, I took notice. Letts. p. 59.

To which, your Lordship tells me here, you replied in these following words, which your Lordship has set down, as no unnecessary repetition. Your words are: "it was, because the person, who opposed the mysteries of Christianity, went upon my grounds, and made use of my words;" altho' your Lordship declared withal, "that they were used to other purposes, than I intended them:" and your Lordship confessed, "that the reason, why you quoted my words so much, was, because your Lordship found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, on which the author of Christianity not mysterious went; and that he had nothing that looked like reason, if that principle were removed, which made your Lordship so much endeavour to shew, that it would not hold; and so you supposed the reason, why your Lordship so often mentioned my words, was no longer a riddle to me." And to this repetition your Lordship subjoins, that "I set down these passages, in my second letter," but with these words annexed, "that all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing of this matter." P. 5. P. 6.

ANSW. I say so, indeed, in the place quoted by your Lordship; and if I had said no more, your Lordship had done me justice, in setting down barely these words, as my reply, which being set down, when your Lordship was in the way of repeating your own words, with no sparing hand, as we shall see by and by, these few of mine set down thus, without the least intimation, that I had said any thing more, cannot but leave the reader under an opinion, that this was my whole reply.

BUT

Lett. 2. p.
48, &c.

BUT if your Lordship will please to turn to that place of my second letter, out of which you take these words, I presume you will find that I not only said, but proved, "that what you had said, in the words above repeated, to clear the riddle, in your Lordship's way of writing, did nothing towards it."

THAT, which was the riddle to me, was, that your Lordship writ against others, and yet quoted only my words; and that you pinned my words, which you argued against, upon a certain sort of these, and them, that nowhere appeared, or were to be found; and, by this way, brought my book into the controversy.

To this your Lordship says, "you told me, it was because the person, who opposed the mysteries of christianity, went upon my grounds, and made use of my words."

ANSW. He that will be at the pains to compare this, which you call a repetition here, with the place you quote for it, viz. *Ans. 1. p. 46.* will, I humbly conceive, find it a new sort of repetition; unless the setting down of words, and expressions, not to be found in it, be the repetition of any passage. But for a repetition, let us take it, of what your Lordship had said before.

*Ans. 1.
p. 46.*

THE reason, and the only reason, there given, why you quoted my words, after the manner you did, was, "because you found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which the author of Christianity not mysterious went upon." These are the words, in your Lordship's first letter, and this the only reason there given, tho' it hath grown a little, by repetition. And to this my reply was, "that I thought your Lordship had found, that that, which the author of Christianity not mysterious went upon, and for which he was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made, or supposed, clear and distinct ideas, necessary to certainty: but that was not my notion, as to certainty by ideas, &c." which reply, my Lord, did not barely say, but shewed the reason why I said, that what your Lordship had offered, as the reason of your manner of proceeding, did nothing towards the clearing of it; unless it could clear the matter, to say you joined me with the author of Christianity not mysterious, who goes upon a different notion of certainty from mine, because he goes upon the same with me. For he (as your Lordship supposes) making certainty to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of clear and distinct ideas; and I, on the contrary, making it consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of such ideas, as we have, whether they be perfectly, in all their parts, clear and distinct, or no; it is impossible, he should go upon my grounds; whilst they are so different, or that his going upon my grounds should be the reason of your Lordship's joining me with him. And now I leave your Lordship to judge, how you had cleared this matter; and whether what I had answered, did not prove, that what you said did nothing towards the clearing of it.

*Vindic. p.
232.
Ans. 1.
p. 14.*

THIS one thing, methinks, your Lordship has made very clear, that you thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my book, where you were arguing against that author, that he might be the person, and mine the words, you would argue against together: but it is as clear, that the particular matter, which your Lordship made use of, to this purpose, happened to be somewhat unluckily chosen: for your Lordship, having accused him of supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, which you declared to be the opinion you opposed; and, for that opinion, having made him a gentleman of the new way of reasoning, your Lordship imagined that was the notion of certainty, I went on: but it falling out otherwise, and I denying it to be mine, the imaginary tie, between that author and me, was unexpectedly dissolved; and there was no appearance of reason, for bringing passages out of my book, and arguing against them, as your Lordship did, as if they were that author's.

To justify this (since my notion of certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with, as opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity) he,
at

at any rate, must be brought to agree with me, and to go upon my notion of certainty. Pardon me, my Lord, that I say at any rate: the reason, I have to think so, is this: either that author does make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, and so does not go upon my notion of certainty; and then your assigning his going upon my notion of certainty, as the reason for your joining us as you did, shews no more but a willingness in your Lordship to have us joined: or he does not lay all certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas, and so possibly, for ought I know, may go upon my notion of certainty: But then, my Lord, the reason of your first bringing him and me into this dispute, will appear to have been none. All your arguing against the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, will be found to be against no-body, since there is no-body to be found, that lays all foundation of certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas; no-body to be found, that holds the opinion, that your Lordship opposes.

HAVING thus given you an account of some part of my reply, (to what your Lordship really answered, in that 46th page of your first letter) to shew Page 6. that my reply contained something more, than these words here set down by your Lordship, viz. "That all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing "this matter;" I come now to those parts of your repetition, as your Lordship is pleased to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated.

YOUR Lordship says, "that you told me" the reason, why I was brought into the controversy, after the manner I had complained of, "was because the P. 5. "person, who opposed the mysteries of christianity, went upon my grounds;" and for this you quote the 46th page of your first Letter. But having turned to that place, and finding there these words, "that you found my notions, as "to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which that author went "upon;" which are far from being repeated in the words, set down here, unless grounds, in general, be the same with notions, as to certainty by ideas; I beg leave to consider what you here say, as new to me, and not repeated.

YOUR Lordship says, that you brought me into the controversy, as you did, "because that author went upon my grounds." It is possible he did, or did not; but it cannot appear, that he did go upon my grounds, till those grounds are assigned, and the places both out of him and me produced to shew, that we agree in the same grounds, and go both upon them; when this is done, there will be room to consider, whether it be so, or no.

In the mean time, you have brought me into the controversy, for his going upon this particular ground, supposed to be mine, "that clear and distinct ideas "are necessary to certainty." It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to say, in general, as your Lordship does, "that he went upon my grounds;" Page 6. because tho' he should agree with me, in several other things, but differ from me, in this one notion of certainty, there could be no reason for your dealing with me, as you have done: that notion of certainty being your very exception, against his account of reason, and the sole occasion, you took, of bringing in passages, out of my book, and the very foundation of arguing against them.

YOUR Lordship farther says here, in this repetition, which you did not say Page 6. before, in the place referred to, as repeated, "that he made use of my words." I think he did, of words, something like mine. But, as I humbly conceive also, he made use of them, as his own, and not as my words; for I do not remember that he quotes me for them. This I am sure, that in the words, quoted out of him, by your Lordship, upon which my book is brought in, there is not one syllable of certainty by ideas.

No doubt whatever he, or I, or any one have said, if your Lordship disapproves of it, you have a right to question him that said it: but I do not see, how this gives your Lordship any right to entitle any body, to what he does not say, whoever else says it.

THE author of Christianity not mysterious, says, in his book, something suitable to what I had said in mine; borrowed, or not borrowed, from mine, I

Lett. 2. p.
48, &c.

BUT if your Lordship will please to turn to that place of my second letter, out of which you take these words, I presume you will find that I not only said, but proved, "that what you had said, in the words above repeated, to clear the riddle, in your Lordship's way of writing, did nothing towards it."

THAT, which was the riddle to me, was, that your Lordship writ against others, and yet quoted only my words; and that you pinned my words, which you argued against, upon a certain sort of these, and them, that nowhere appeared, or were to be found; and, by this way, brought my book into the controversy.

To this your Lordship says, "you told me, it was because the person, who opposed the mysteries of christianity, went upon my grounds, and made use of my words."

ANSW. He that will be at the pains to compare this, which you call a repetition here, with the place you quote for it, viz. *Ans. 1. p. 46.* will, I humbly conceive, find it a new sort of repetition; unless the setting down of words, and expressions, not to be found in it, be the repetition of any passage. But for a repetition, let us take it, of what your Lordship had said before.

*Ans. 1.
p. 46.*

THE reason, and the only reason, there given, why you quoted my words, after the manner you did, was, "because you found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which the author of Christianity not mysterious went upon." These are the words, in your Lordship's first letter,

Lett. 2. p.
49.

and this the only reason there given, tho' it hath grown a little, by repetition. And to this my reply was, "that I thought your Lordship had found, that that, which the author of Christianity not mysterious went upon, and for which he was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made, or supposed, clear and distinct ideas, necessary to certainty: but that was not my notion, as to certainty by ideas, &c." which reply, my Lord, did not barely say, but shewed the reason why I said, that what your Lordship had offered, as the reason of your manner of proceeding, did nothing towards the clearing of it; unless it could clear the matter, to say you joined me with the author of Christianity not mysterious, who goes upon a different notion of certainty from mine, because he goes upon the same with me. For he (as your Lordship supposes) making certainty to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of clear and distinct ideas; and I, on the contrary, making it consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of such ideas, as we have, whether they be perfectly, in all their parts, clear and distinct, or no; it is impossible, he should go upon my grounds; whilst they are so different, or that his going upon my grounds should be the reason of your Lordship's joining me with him. And now I leave your Lordship to judge, how you had cleared this matter; and whether what I had answered, did not prove, that what you said did nothing towards the clearing of it.

Vindic. p.
232.
*Ans. 1.
p. 14.*

THIS one thing, methinks, your Lordship has made very clear, that you thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my book, where you were arguing against that author, that he might be the person, and mine the words, you would argue against together: but it is as clear, that the particular matter, which your Lordship made use of, to this purpose, happened to be somewhat unluckily chosen: for your Lordship, having accused him of supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, which you declared to be the opinion you opposed; and, for that opinion, having made him a gentleman of the new way of reasoning, your Lordship imagined that was the notion of certainty, I went on: but it falling out otherwise, and I denying it to be mine, the imaginary tie, between that author and me, was unexpectedly dissolved; and there was no appearance of reason, for bringing passages out of my book, and arguing against them, as your Lordship did, as if they were that author's.

To justify this (since my notion of certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with, as opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity) he,
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at any rate, must be brought to agree with me, and to go upon my notion of certainty. Pardon me, my Lord, that I say at any rate: the reason, I have to think so, is this: either that author does make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, and so does not go upon my notion of certainty; and then your assigning his going upon my notion of certainty, as the reason for your joining us as you did, shews no more but a willingness in your Lordship to have us joined: or he does not lay all certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas, and so possibly, for ought I know, may go upon my notion of certainty: But then, my Lord, the reason of your first bringing him and me into this dispute, will appear to have been none. All your arguing against the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, will be found to be against no-body, since there is no-body to be found, that lays all foundation of certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas; no-body to be found, that holds the opinion, that your Lordship opposes.

HAVING thus given you an account of some part of my reply, (to what your Lordship really answered, in that 46th page of your first letter) to shew Page 6. that my reply contained something more, than these words here set down by your Lordship, viz. "That all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing "this matter;" I come now to those parts of your repetition, as your Lordship is pleased to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated.

YOUR Lordship says, "that you told me" the reason, why I was brought into the controversy, after the manner I had complained of, "was because the P. 5. "person, who opposed the mysteries of christianity, went upon my grounds;" and for this you quote the 46th page of your first Letter. But having turned to that place, and finding there these words, "that you found my notions, as "to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation, which that author went "upon;" which are far from being repeated in the words, set down here, unless grounds, in general, be the same with notions, as to certainty by ideas; I beg leave to consider what you here say, as new to me, and not repeated.

YOUR Lordship says, that you brought me into the controversy, as you did, "because that author went upon my grounds." It is possible he did, or did not; but it cannot appear, that he did go upon my grounds, till those grounds are assigned, and the places both out of him and me produced to shew, that we agree in the same grounds, and go both upon them; when this is done, there will be room to consider, whether it be so, or no.

In the mean time, you have brought me into the controversy, for his going upon this particular ground, supposed to be mine, "that clear and distinct ideas "are necessary to certainty." It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to say, in general, as your Lordship does, "that he went upon my grounds;" Page 6. because tho' he should agree with me, in several other things, but differ from me, in this one notion of certainty, there could be no reason for your dealing with me, as you have done: that notion of certainty being your very exception, against his account of reason, and the sole occasion, you took, of bringing in passages, out of my book, and the very foundation of arguing against them.

YOUR Lordship farther says here, in this repetition, which you did not say Page 6: before, in the place referred to, as repeated, "that he made use of my words." I think he did, of words, something like mine. But, as I humbly conceive also, he made use of them, as his own, and not as my words; for I do not remember that he quotes me for them. This I am sure, that in the words, quoted out of him, by your Lordship, upon which my book is brought in, there is not one syllable of certainty by ideas.

No doubt whatever he, or I, or any one have said, if your Lordship disproves of it, you have a right to question him that said it: but I do not see, how this gives your Lordship any right to entitle any body, to what he does not say, whoever else says it.

THE author of Christianity not mysterious, says, in his book, something suitable to what I had said in mine; borrowed, or not borrowed, from mine, I

leave your Lordship to determine for him: but I do not see what ground that gives your Lordship, to concern me in the controversy you have with him, for things I say, which he does not, and which I say, to a different purpose from his. Let that author and I agree in this one notion of certainty, as much as you please, what reason, I beseech your Lordship, could this be, to quote my words, as his, who never used them; and to purposes, as you say, more than once, to which I never intended them? This was that, which I complained, was a riddle to me: and since your Lordship can give no other reason for it, than those we have hitherto seen, I think it sufficiently unriddled, and you are in the right, when you say, "you think it is no longer a riddle to me."

I EASILY grant my little reading may not have instructed me, what has been, or what may be, done in the several ways of writing, and managing of controversy, which, like war, always produces new stratagems; only I beg my ignorance may be my apology, for saying, that this appears a new way of writing to me, and this is the first time, I ever met with it.

Vindic. p.
234.

BUT let the ten lines, which your Lordship has set down, out of him, be, if you please, supposed to be precisely my words, and that he quoted my book for them; I do not see how even this, entitles him to any more of my book, than he has quoted; or how any words of mine, in other parts of my book, can be ascribed to him, or argued against, as his, or rather, as I know not whose; which was the thing, I complained of; for the these, and they, those passages of my book were ascribed to, could not be that author, for he used them not; nor the author of the Essay of Human Understanding, for he was not argued against, but was discharged from the controversy under debate: so that neither he, nor I, being the they, and those, that so often occur, and deserved so much pains from your Lordship; I could not but complain of this, to me, incomprehensible way of bringing my book into that controversy.

Page 6. ANOTHER part of your Lordship's repetition, which, I humbly conceive, is no repetition, because this also I find not, in that passage quoted for it, is this, that your Lordship confessed that the reason, why you quoted my words so much.

Lett. 2.
p. 49.

Ibid. p. 51.

Lett. 2.
p. 50.

My Lord, I do not remember any need your Lordship had, to give a reason why you quoted my words so much, because I do not remember that I made that the matter of my complaint. That which I complained of, was not the quantity of what was quoted out of my book, but the manner of quoting it, viz. "That I was so every-where joined with others, under the comprehension, viz. five words, they and them, tho' my book alone were every where quoted, that the world would be apt to think, I was the person, who argued against the Trinity." And again, "that, which I complained of, was, that I was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, without being guilty of what made them so, and was so brought into a chapter, wherein I thought myself not concerned; which was managed so, that my book was all along quoted, and others argued against; others were entitled to what I said, and I to what others said, without knowing why, or how." Nay, I told your Lordship in that very reply, "that, if your Lordship had directly questioned any of my opinions, I should not have complained." Thus your Lordship sees my complaint was, not of the largeness, but of the manner of your quotations. But of that, in all these many pages employed, by your Lordship, for my satisfaction, you, as I remember, have not been pleased to offer any reason; nor can I hitherto find it any way cleared: when I do, I shall readily acknowledge your great mastery in this, as in all other ways of writing.

I HAVE, in the foregoing pages, for the clearing this matter, been obliged to take notice of them and those, as directly signifying no-body. Whether your Lordship will excuse me, for so doing, I know not, since I perceive such slight words, as them, and those, are not to be minded in your Lordship's writings: your Lordship has a privilege to use such trifling particles, without taking any great care what, or whom, they refer to.

To

To shew the reader, that I do not talk without book in the case, I shall set P. 90. down your Lordship's own words: " what a hard fate doth that man lie under, " that falls into the hands of a severe critick! He must have a care of his but, " and for, and them, and it. For the least ambiguity in any of these, will " fill up pages, in an answer, and make a book look considerable for the bulk " of it. And what must a man do, who is to answer all such objections, about " the use of particles?" I humbly conceive, it is not without reason, that your Lordship here claims an exemption from having a care of your but, and your for, and your them, and other particles: the sequel of your letter will shew, that it is a privilege your Lordship makes great use of, and therefore have reason to be tender of it, and to cry out against those unmannerly criticks, who question it. Upon this consideration, I cannot but look on it, as a misfortune to me, that it should fall in my way, to displease your Lordship, by disturbing you in the quiet, and perhaps ancient possession of so convenient a privilege. But how great soever the advantages of it may be to a writer, I, upon experience, find it is very troublesome and perplexing to a reader, who is concerned to understand what is written, that he may answer to it. But to return to the place we were upon:

YOUR Lordship goes on, and says, " whether it doth, or no," i. e. whe- P. 6. ther what your Lordship had said, doth clear this matter or no, " you are content to leave it to any indifferent reader; and there it must rest at last, altho' I " should write volumes about it."

UPON the reading of these last words of your Lordship's, I thought you had quite done, with this personal matter, so apt, as you say, to weary the world. But whether it be, that your Lordship is not much satisfied in the handling of it, or in the letting it alone; whether your Lordship meant by these last words, that what I write about it, is volumes, i. e. too much, as your Lordship has told me, in the first page; but what your Lordship says about it, is but necessary: whether these, or any other, be the cause of it, personal matter, as it seems, is very importunate and troublesome to your Lordship, as it is to the world. You turn it going, in the end of one paragraph, and personal matter thrusts itself in again, in the beginning of the next, whether of itself, without your Lordship's notice, or consent, I examine not: but thus stands the immediate following words, wherein your Lordship asks me, P. 6. " but for what cause do I continue so unsatisfied?" To which you make me give this answer, *that the cause, why I continue so unsatisfied, is, that the author mentioned went upon this ground, that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty, but that is not my notion, as to certainty by ideas; which is, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, such as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct, or no; and that I have no notions of certainty more than this one.*

THESE words, which your Lordship has set down for mine, I have printed in a distinct character, that the reader may take particular notice of them; not that there is any thing very remarkable in this passage itself, but because it makes the business of the fourscore following pages. For the three several answers, that your Lordship says, you have given to it, and that which you call your defence of them, reach, as I take it, to the 87th page. But another particular reason, why this answer, which your Lordship has made for me, to a question of your own putting, is distinguished by a particular character, is, to save frequent repetitions of it; that the reader, by having recourse to it, may see, whether those things, which your Lordship says of it, be so, or no, and judge whether I am in the wrong, when I assure him, that I cannot find them to be, as you say.

ONLY, before I come to what your Lordship positively says of this, which you call my answer, I crave leave to observe, that it supposes, I continue unsatisfied: to which I reply, that I no where say, that I continue unsatisfied. I may say, that what is offered for satisfaction, gives none to me, or any body

body else; and yet I, as well as other people, may be satisfied concerning the matter.

I COME now to what your Lordship says positively of it.

1. You say, that I tell you, that "the cause why I continued unsatisfied, is, that the author mentioned, went upon this ground; that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty; but that is not my notion of certainty by ideas, &c."

To which I crave leave to reply, that neither in the 50th page of my second letter, which your Lordship quotes for it, nor any where else, did I tell your Lordship any such thing. Neither could I assign, that author's going upon that ground, there mentioned, as any cause of dissatisfaction to me; because I know not "that he went upon this ground, that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty:" for I have met with nothing, produced by your Lordship out of him, to prove that he did so. And if it be true, that he goes upon grounds of certainty, that are not mine, I know no body, that ought to be dissatisfied with it, but your Lordship, who have taken so much pains to make his grounds mine, and my grounds his, and to entitle us both to what each has said apart.

2. YOUR Lordship says, "this is no more than what I had said before in my former letter." Answ. For this I appeal to the 57th, or rather (as I think you writ) 87th page, quoted for it by your Lordship; where any one must have very good eyes, to find all, that is set down here, in this answer (as you a little lower call it) which you have been pleased to put into my mouth: for neither in the one, nor the other of those pages, is there any such answer of mine. Indeed, in the 87th page, there are these words; "that certainty, in my opinion, lies in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, such as they are, and not always, in having perfectly clear and distinct ideas." But these words there, are not given, as an answer to this question, why do I continue so unsatisfied? And the remarkable answer, above set down, is, as I take it, more than these words, as much more in proportion, as your Lordship's whole letter is more than the half of it.

3. YOUR Lordship says of the remarkable answer above set down, that "you took particular notice of it."

To which I crave leave to reply, that your Lordship, no where before, took notice of this answer, as you call it, for it was no where before extant, tho' it be true, some part of the words of it were. But some part of the words of this answer (which, too, were never given as an answer to the question proposed) can never be this answer itself.

4. YOUR Lordship farther says, that "you gave three several answers to it."

To which I must crave leave further to reply, that never any one of the three answers, which you here say, you gave to this my answer, were given to this answer; which, in the words above set down, you made me give to your question, why I continued so unsatisfied?

To justify this my reply, there needs no more but to set down these your Lordship's three answers, and to turn to the places, where you say you gave them.

- P. 7. THE first of your three answers is this, "that those, who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do (according to this answer) and speak more agreeably to my original grounds of certainty." The place, you quote for this, is, Answ. 1. p. 80. but in that place, it is not given as an answer to my saying, that "the cause, why I continue unsatisfied, is, that the author mentioned, went upon this ground, that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty, but," &c. And if it be given for answer to it here, it seems a very strange one: for I am supposed to say, that "the cause, why I continue unsatisfied, is, that the author mentioned went upon a ground different from mine;" and to satisfy me, I am told, his way is better than mine; which cannot but be thought an answer, very likely to satisfy me.

YOUR

YOUR second Answer, which you say, you gave to that remarkable passage, above set down, is this; "that it is very possible the author of Christianity not
 "mysterious might mistake, or misapply, my notions; but there is too much
 "reason to believe, he thought them the same; and we have no reason to be
 "sorry, that he hath given me this occasion, for the explaining my meaning,
 "and for the vindication of myself, in the matters, I apprehend, he had charged
 "me with:" And for this, you quote your first letter, p. 36. But neither are
 these words, in that place, an answer to my saying, "that the cause, why I
 "continued dissatisfied, is, that that author went upon this ground, that clear
 "and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty, but, &c.

YOUR third answer, which you say you gave to that passage, above set down, is, "that my own grounds of certainty tend to scepticism; and that in an age,
 "wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed, by the promoters of
 "scepticism and infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous consequence, to start such
 "new methods of certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful,
 "than before:" For this you refer the reader to your first letter. But I must
 crave leave also to observe, that these words are not all to be found in that place,
 and those of them, which are there, are by no means an answer to my saying,
 "that the cause, why I continue unsatisfied, is, &c.

WHAT the words, which your Lordship has here set down, as your three answers, are brought in for, in those three places, quoted by your Lordship, any one, that will consult them, may see; it would hold me too long in personal matter, to explain that here; and therefore, for your Lordship's satisfaction, I pass by those particulars. But this I crave leave to be positive in, that in neither of them, they are given in reply to that, which is above set down, as my answer to your Lordship's question, "for what cause do I continue so unsatisfied?" Tho' your Lordship here says, that to this answer, they were given as a reply,
 and it was it you had taken notice of, and given these three several replies to. As answers, therefore, to what you make me say here, viz. "That the cause of
 "my continuing unsatisfied, is, that the author mentioned, went upon a ground
 "of certainty, that is none of mine;" I cannot consider them. For to this neither of them is given as an answer; tho' this, and it, in ordinary construction, make them have that reference. But these are some of your privileged particles, and may be applied how, and to what, you please.

BUT tho' neither of these passages be any manner of answer, to what your Lordship calls them answers to, yet you laying such stress on them, that well-nigh half your letter, as I take it, is spent in the defence of them; it is fit I consider what you say, under each of them.

I SAY, as I take it, near half your letter is in defence of these three passages.

ONE reason, why I speak so doubtfully, is, that tho' you say here, "that
 "you will lay them together, and defend them," and that, in effect, all that is said to the 87th page is ranged under these three heads; yet they being brought in, as answers to what I am made to say, is "the cause, why I continued unsatisfied." I should scarce think your Lordship should spend so many pages, in this personal matter, after you had, but two or three pages before, so openly blamed me, for spending a less number of pages in my answer, concerning personal matters, to what your Lordship had, in your letter, concerning them.

ANOTHER reason, why I speak so doubtfully, is, because I do not see, how these three passages need so long, or any, defences, where they are not attacked, or if they be attacked, methinks the defences of them should have been applied to the answers I had made to them; or if I have made none, and they be of such moment, that they require answers, your Lordship's minding me, that they did so, would either, by my continued silence, have left to your Lordship all, that you can pretend to, for my granting them, or else my answers to them have given your Lordship an occasion to defend them, and perhaps to have defended them otherwise, than you have done. This is certain, that these defences

had come time enough, when they had been attacked, and then it would have been seen, whether what was said, did defend them, or no. The truth is, my Lord, if you will give me leave to speak my thoughts freely, when I consider these three, as you call them, answers, how they themselves are brought in, and what relation that, which is brought, under each of them, has to them, and to the matter in question; methinks they look rather like texts chosen to be discoursed on, than as answers to be defended in a controversy: for the connexion of that, which in train is tacked on to them, is such that makes me see I am wholly mistaken, in what I thought the established rule of controversy. This was also another reason, why I said, you spent, as I take it, near half of your letter in defence of them. For when I consider how one thing hangs on to another, under the third answer, from page 20. where it is brought in, to page 87. where, I think, that which you call your defending it ends; it is a hard matter, by the relation and dependency of the parts of that discourse (contained in those pages) one on another, to tell where it ends.

BUT to consider the passages themselves, and the defence of them. THAT which you call your first answer, and which you say, you will defend, P. 7. is in these words: "those, who at offer clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty, than I do (according to this answer) and speak more agreeably to my original grounds of certainty." These words being brought in, at first, as a reply to what was called my answer, but was not my answer, as may be seen, Lett. 1. p. 87. I took no notice of them, in my second letter, as being nothing at all to the point in hand; and therefore, what need they have of a farther defence, when nothing is objected to them, I do not see. To what purpose is it to spend seven, or eight, pages to shew, that another's notion about certainty is better than mine; when that tends not to shew how your saying, "that the certainty of my proof of a God is not placed upon any clear and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason distinct from it," concerns me, which was the thing there to be shewn, as is visible to any one, who will vouchsafe to look into that 87th page of my first letter? And, indeed, why should your Lordship trouble yourself to prove, which of two different ways of certainty by ideas, is the best, when you have so ill an opinion of the whole way of certainty by ideas, that you accuse it of tendency to scepticism? But it seems your Lordship is resolved to have all the faults in my book cleared or corrected, and so you go on to defend these words: "that those, who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do." I could have wished that your Lordship had pleased a little to explain them, before you had defended them; for they are not, to me, without some obscurity. However, to guess, as well as I can, I think that the proposition that you intend here, is this, that those, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement, of only clear and distinct ideas, are more in the right, than I am, who place it in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, such as we have, tho' they be not, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct.

WHETHER your Lordship has proved this, or no, will be seen, when we come to consider, what you have said in the defence of it. In the mean time, I have no reason to be sorry to hear your Lordship say so; because this supposes, that certainty can be attained by the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of clear and distinct ideas: for, if certainty cannot be attained by the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of clear and distinct ideas, how can they be more in the right, who place certainty in one sort of ideas, than those, who place it in another sort of ideas, that it cannot be had in?

I SHALL proceed now, to examine, what your Lordship has said, in defence of the proposition you have here set down to defend, which you may be sure, I shall do with all the favourableness that truth will allow; since, if your Lordship makes it out to be true, it puts an end to the dispute, you have had with me: for it confutes that main proposition, which you have so much contended for; "that to lay all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear
" and

"and distinct ideas, does certainly overthrow all mysteries of faith:" unless you will say, that mysteries of faith cannot consist with what you have proved to be true.

To prove that they are more in the right, than I, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of clear and distinct ideas only, your Lordship says, "that it is a wonderful thing, in point of reason, for me P. 7. "to pretend to certainty by ideas, and not allow these ideas to be clear and "distinct." This, my Lord, looks as if I placed certainty only in obscure and confused ideas, and did not allow, it might be had, by clear and distinct ones. But I have declared myself so clearly, and so fully, to the contrary, that I doubt not, but your Lordship would think, I deserved to be asked, whether this were fair and ingenuous dealing to represent this matter, as this expression does? But the instances are so many, how apt my unlearned way of writing is to mislead your Lordship, and that always on the side least favourable to my sense, that if I should cry out, as often as I think I meet with occasion for it, your Lordship would have reason to be uneasy, at the ebullition and enlarging of my complaints.

YOUR Lordship farther asks, "how can I clearly perceive the agreement, or P. 7, 8. "disagreement, of ideas, if I have not clear and distinct ideas? For how is it "possible for a man's mind to know, whether they agree, or disagree, if there "be some parts of those ideas, we have only general and confused ideas of?" I would rather read these latter words, if your Lordship please, "if there be "some parts of those ideas, that are only general and confused;" for "parts "of ideas, that we have only general and confused ideas of," is not very clear and intelligible to me.

TAKING, then, your Lordship's question, as cleared of this obscurity, it will stand thus: "how is it possible for a man's mind to know, whether ideas "agree or disagree, if there be some parts of those ideas obscure and con- "fused". In answer to which, I crave leave to ask; "Is it possible for a man's "mind to perceive, whether ideas agree, or disagree, if no parts of those ideas "be obscure and confused;" and, by that perception, to attain certainty? If your Lordship says, no: how do you hereby prove, that they, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of only clear and distinct ideas, are more in the right than I? For they, who place certainty, where it is impossible to be had, can, in that, be no more in the right, than he who places it, in any other impossibility. If you say, yes, certainty may be attained by the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of clear and distinct ideas, you give up the main question: you grant the proposition, which, you declare, you chiefly oppose; and so all this great dispute with me is at an end. Your Lordship may take which of these two you please; if the former, the proposition here to be proved is given up; if the latter, the whole controversy is given up: one of them, it is plain, you must say.

THIS, and what your Lordship says farther, on this point, seems to me to prove nothing, but that you suppose, that either there are no such things, as obscure and confused ideas; and then, with submission, the distinction between clear and obscure, distinct and confused, is useless; and it is in vain to talk of clear and obscure, distinct and confused ideas, in opposition to one another: or else, your Lordship supposes, that an obscure and confused idea is wholly undistinguishable from all other ideas, and so, in effect, is all other ideas. For if an obscure and confused idea be not one and the same, with all other ideas, as it is impossible for it to be, then the obscure and confused idea may, and will, be so far different from some other ideas, that it may be perceived whether it agrees, or disagrees, with them, or no. For every idea in the mind, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, is but that one idea, that it is, and not another idea, that it is not; and the mind perceives it to be the idea that it is, and not another idea, that it is different from.

WHAT, therefore, I mean by obscure and confused ideas, I have at large Essay, b. ii. shewn, and shall not trouble your Lordship with a repetition of here. For c. 29. that

that there are such obscure and confused ideas, I suppose the instances, your Lordship gives, here evince: to which I shall add this one more; suppose you should, in the twilight, or in a thick mist, see two things standing upright, near the size and shape of an ordinary man; but in so dim a light, or at such a distance, that they appeared very much alike, and you could not perceive them to be, what they really were, the one a statue, the other a man; would not these two be obscure and confused ideas? And yet could not your Lordship be certain of the truth of this proposition, concerning either of them, that it was something, or did exist; and that by perceiving the agreement of that idea (as obscure and confused as it was) with that of existence, as expressed in that proposition?

THIS, my Lord, is just the case of substance, upon which you raised this argument, concerning obscure and confused ideas; which this instance shews, may have propositions made about them, of whose truth we may be certain?

HENCE I crave liberty to conclude, that I am nearer the truth, than those, who say, that "certainty is founded only in clear and distinct ideas;" if any body does say so. For no such saying of any one of those, with whom your Lordship joined me, for so saying, is, that I remember, yet produced; tho' this be that, for which they, and those, whoever they be, had, from your Lordship, the title of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning; and this be the opinion, which your Lordship declares, "you oppose, as certainly overthrowing all mysteries of faith, and excluding the notion of substance out of rational discourse." Which terrible, termagant proposition, viz. "that certainty is founded only in clear and distinct ideas," which has made such a noise, and been the cause of the spending above ten times fifty pages, and given occasion to very large ebullition of thoughts, appears not, by any thing, that has been yet produced, to be any where, in their writings, with whom, upon this score, you have had so warm a controversy, but only, in your Lordship's imagination, and what you have, at least, for this once, "writ out of your own thoughts."

BUT if this paragraph contain so little, in defence of the proposition, which your Lordship, in the beginning of it, set down, on purpose to defend; what follows, is visibly more remote from it: but, since your Lordship has been pleased to tack it on here, tho', without applying of it any way, that I see, to the defence of the proposition to be defended, which is already got clean out of sight; I am taught, that it is fit I consider it here, in this, which your Lordship has thought the proper place for it.

P. 9. In the next paragraph, your Lordship is pleased to take notice of this part of my complaint, viz. that I say, more than twice or ten times, "that you blame those, who place certainty in clear and distinct ideas, but I do not; and yet you bring me in, among them." And for this, your Lordship quotes seventeen several pages of my second letter. Whoever will give himself the trouble to turn to those pages, will see how far I am, in those places, from barely saying, "that you blame those, who place certainty," &c. and what reason you had to point to so many places, for my so saying, as a repetition of my complaint: and, I believe, they will find the proposition, about placing certainty only in clear and distinct ideas, is mentioned in them, upon several occasions, and to different purposes, as the argument required.

BE that as it will, this is a part of my complaint, and you do me a favour, that after having, as you say, met with it, in so many places, you are pleased at last to take notice of it, and promise me a full answer to it. The first part of which full answer is, in these words; that "you do not deny, but the first occasion of your Lordship's charge, was in the supposition, that clear and distinct ideas were necessary, in order to any certainty in our minds." And that the only way, "to attain this certainty, was by comparing these ideas together."

P. 9. My Lord, tho' I have faithfully set down these words, out of your second answer, yet I must own, I have printed them in something a different character from

Vind. p.
233; 234.
Answ. 1.
p. 14.

from that, which they stand in, in your letter. For your Lordship has published this sentence so, as "if the supposition, that clear and distinct ideas were necessary, in order to any certainty in our minds," were my supposition; whereas I must crave leave, to let my reader know, that that supposition is purely your Lordship's: for you neither, in your defence of the Trinity, nor in your first answer, produce any thing to prove, that that was either an assertion or supposition of mine; but your Lordship was pleased to suppose it for me: as to the latter words, "and that the only way to attain this certainty, was by comparing these ideas together:" if your Lordship means, by these ideas, ideas in general; then I acknowledge these to be my words, or to be my sense; but then, they are not any supposition in my book, tho' they are made part of the supposition here; but their sense is expressed in my Essay, at large, in more places than one. But if, by these ideas, your Lordship means only clear and distinct ideas, I crave leave to deny that to be my sense, or any supposition of mine.

YOUR Lordship goes on; "but to prove this." Prove what, I beseech you, P. 9. my Lord? That certainty was to be attained by comparing ideas, was a supposition of mine? To prove that, there needed no words, or principles, of mine, to be produced, unless your Lordship would prove, that, which was never denied.

BUT if it were to prove this, viz. that "it was a supposition of mine, that clear and distinct ideas were necessary to certainty;" and that, to prove this to be a supposition of mine, "my words were produced, and my principles of P. 9. certainty laid down, and none else;" I answer, I do not remember any words or principles of mine, produced, to shew any ground for such a supposition, that I placed certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas; and if there had been any such produced, your Lordship would have done me, and the reader, a favour, to have marked the pages, wherein one might have found them produced; unless your Lordship thinks, you make amends for quoting so many pages of my second letter, which might have been spared, by neglecting wholly to quote any of your own, where it needed. When your Lordship shall please to direct me to those places, where such words and principles of mine were produced, to prove such a supposition, I shall readily turn to them, to see how far they do really give ground for it. But my bad memory not suggesting to me any thing like it, your Lordship, I hope, will pardon me, if I do not turn over your defence of the Trinity, and your first letter, to see, whether you have any such proofs, which you yourself seem so much to doubt, or think so meanly of, that you do not so much as point out the places, where they are to be found; tho' we have, in this very page, so eminent an example, that you are not sparing of your pains, in this kind, where you have the least thought, that it might serve your Lordship, to the meanest purpose.

BUT tho' you produced no words, or principles, of mine, to prove this a supposition of mine; yet, in your next words here, your Lordship produces a reason why you yourself supposed it: for you say, "you could not imagine P. 9. that I could place certainty in the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, and not suppose those ideas to be clear and distinct:" so that, at last, the satisfaction you give me, why my book was brought into a controversy, wherein it was not concerned, is, that your Lordship imagined, I supposed in it, what I did not suppose in it. And here I crave leave to ask, whether the reader may not well suppose, that you had a great mind to bring my book into that controversy, when the only handle, you could find for it, was an imagination of a supposition to be in it, which in truth was not there?

YOUR Lordship adds, "that I finding myself joined in such company, P. 9. which I did not desire to be seen in, I rather chose to distinguish myself from them, by denying clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty."

If it might be permitted to another, to guess at your thoughts, as well as you do at mine, he perhaps would turn it thus; that your Lordship finding no readier way, as you thought, to set a mark upon my book, than, by bringing

several passages of it, into a controversy, concerning the Trinity, wherein they had nothing to do; and speaking of them, under the name of those, and them, as if your adversaries, in that dispute, had made use of those passages against the Trinity, when no one opposer of the doctrine of the Trinity, that I know, or that you have produced, ever made use of one of them. You thought fit to jumble my book, with other people's opinions, after a new way, never used by any other writer, that I ever heard of. If any one will consider, what your Lordship has said, for my satisfaction (wherein you have, as I humbly conceive I have shewn, produced nothing but imaginations of imaginations, and suppositions of suppositions) he will, I conclude, without straining of his thoughts, be carried to this conjecture.

P. 9. BUT conjectures apart, your Lordship says, "that I finding myself joined in such company, which I did not desire to be seen in, I rather chose to distinguish myself;" if keeping to my book can be called distinguishing myself. You say, "I rather chose:" rather! than what, my Lord, I beseech you? Your learned way of writing, I find, is every where beyond my capacity; and unless I will guess at your meaning (which is not very safe) beyond what I can certainly understand by your words, I often know not what to answer to. It is certain, you mean here, that I preferred "distinguishing myself from them," "I found myself joined with," to something; but to what, you do not say. If you mean, to owning that for my notion of certainty, which is not my notion of certainty, this is true; I did, and shall always, rather chuse to distinguish myself from any them, than own that for my notion, which is not my notion. If you mean that I preferred "my distinguishing myself from them, to my being joined with them;" you make me chuse, where there neither is, nor can be any choice: for what is wholly out of one's power, leaves no room for choice; and I think I should be laughed at, if I should say, "I rather chuse to distinguish myself from the Papists, than that it should rain:" for it is no more in my choice not to be joined, as your Lordship has been pleased to join me, with the unknown they, and them, than it is in my power, that it should not rain.

It is like you will say here again, this is a nice criticism; I grant, my Lord, it is about words and expressions. But since I cannot know your meaning, but by your words and expressions, if this defect in my understanding very frequently overtake me, in your writings to, and concerning me, it is troublesome, I confess; but what must I do? Must I play at blind-man's-buff? Catch at what I do not see? Answer to I know not what; to no meaning, i. e. to nothing? Or must I presume to know your meaning, when I do not?

FOR example, suppose I should presume it to be your meaning here, that I found myself joined in company, by your Lordship, with the author of Christianity not mysterious, by your Lordship's imputing the same notions of certainty to us both: that I did not desire to be seen in his company, i. e. to be thought to be of his opinion, in other things; and therefore, "I chose rather to distinguish myself from him, by denying clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty, than to be so joined with him:" if I should presume this, to be the sense of these your words here, and that by the doubtful signification of the expressions, of being joined in company, and seen in company, used equivocally, your Lordship should mean, that, because I was said to be of his opinion, in one thing, I was to be thought to be of his opinion, in all things; and, therefore, disowned to be of his opinion in that, wherein I was of his opinion, because I would not be thought of his opinion all thro'; would not your Lordship be displeased with me, for supposing you to have such a meaning as this, and ask me again, "whether I could think you a man of so little sense, to talk thus?" And yet, my Lord, this is the best I can make of these words, which seem to me rather to discover a secret, in your way of dealing with me, than anything in me, that I am ashamed of.

FOR I am not, nor ever shall be, ashamed to own any opinion, I have, because another man holds the same; and so far, as that brings me into his company, I shall

shall not be troubled to be seen in it: but I shall never think, that that intitles me to any other of his opinions, or makes me of his company, in any other sense, how much soever that be the design: for your Lordship has used no small art and pains to make me of his, and the Unitarians, company in all that they say, only, because that author has ten lines, in the beginning of his book, which agrees with something, I have said in mine: from whence we become companions, so universally united in opinion, that they must be entitled to all that I say, and I to all that they say.

My Lord, when I writ my book, I could not design "to distinguish myself from the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning," who were not then in being, nor are, that I see, yet: since I find nothing produced out of the Unitarians, nor the author of Christianity not myterious, to shew, that they make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty. And all that I have done since, has been to shew, that you had no reason to join my book with men (let them be what they, or those, you please) who founded certainty, only upon clear and distinct ideas, when my book did not found it only upon clear and distinct ideas. And I cannot tell, why the appealing to my book now, should be called "a chusing rather to distinguish myself."

My reader must pardon me here, for this uncouth phrase of joining my book with men. For as your Lordship ordered the matter (pardon me, if I say, in your new way of writing) so, as it was, if your own word may be taken in the case: for, to give me satisfaction, you insist upon this, that you did not join me with those gentlemen, in their opinions, but tell me, "they used my "notions to other purposes, than I intended them;" and so there was no need for me "to distinguish myself from them," when your Lordship had done it for me, as you plead all along: tho' here you are pleased to tell me, that I was joined with them, and that "I found myself joined in such company, as I did "not desire to be seen in."

My Lord, I could find myself joined in no company, upon this occasion, but what you joined me in. And therefore I beg leave to ask your Lordship, did you join me in company with those, in whose company, you here say, "I "do not desire to be seen?" If you own that you did, how must I understand that passage where you say, that "you must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding, from whence these notions were "borrowed, to serve other purposes, than he intended them;" which you repeat again, as matter of satisfaction to me, and as a proof of the care, you took not to be misunderstood? If you did join me with them, what is become of all the satisfaction in the point, which your Lordship has been at so much pains about? And if you did not join me with them, you could not think I found myself joined with them, or chose to distinguish myself from men, I was never joined with. For my book was innocent of what made them gentlemen of the new way of reasoning.

Vind. p. 239.

Ans. i. p. 37.

THERE seems to me, something very delicate in this matter. I should be supposed joined to them, and your Lordship should not be supposed to have joined me to them, upon so slight, or no occasion; and yet all this comes solely from your Lordship. How to do this to your satisfaction, I confess myself to be too dull: I hope, therefore, I have been at the pains to examine, how far I have this obligation to your Lordship, and how far you would be pleased to own it, that the world might understand your Lordship's, to me, incomprehensible way of writing on this occasion.

FOR if you had a mind, by a new and very dexterous way, becoming the learning and caution of a great man, to bring me into any such company, which you think "I did not desire to be seen in;" I thought such a pattern, set by such a hand, as your Lordship's, ought not to be lost, by being passed over too slightly. Besides, I hope, that you will not take it amiss, that I was willing to see, what obligation I had to your Lordship, in the favour you designed me. But I crave leave to assure your Lordship, I shall never be ashamed to own any opinion I have, because another man (of whom perhaps your Lordship, or others, have

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no very good thoughts) is of it, nor be unwilling to be, so far, seen in his company: tho' I shall always think, I have a right to demand, and shall desire to be satisfied, why any one makes to himself, or takes an occasion from thence, in a manner that favours not too much of charity, to extend this society to those opinions of that man, with which I have nothing to do; that the world may see the justice and good-will of such endeavours, and judge whether such arts favour not a little of the spirit of the inquisition.

For, if I mistake not, it is the method of that holy office, and the way of those revered guardians of, what they call, the christian faith, to raise reports, or start occasions of suspicion, concerning the orthodoxy of any one, they have no very good-will towards, and require him to clear himself; gilding all this with the care of religion, and the profession of respect and tenderness to the person himself, even when they deliver him up to be burnt, by the secular power.

I SHALL not, my Lord, say, that you have had any ill-will to me; for I never deserved any from you. But I shall be better able to answer those, who are apt to think the method, you have taken, has some conformity, so far as it has gone, with what Protestants complain of, in the inquisition, when you shall have cleared this matter, a little otherwise, and assigned a more sufficient reason, for bringing me into the party of those, that oppose the doctrine of the Trinity, than only, because the author of Christianity not mysterious has, in the beginning of his book, half a score lines, which you guess he borrowed out of mine. For that, in truth, is all the matter of fact, upon which all this dust is raised; and the matter so advanced by degrees, that now, I am told, "I should have cleared myself, by owning the doctrine of the Trinity:" as if I had been ever accused of disowning it. But that, which shews no small skill in this management, is, that I am called upon to clear myself, by the very same person, who raising the whole dispute, has himself, over and over again, cleared me; and, upon that, grounds the satisfaction, he pretends to give to me and others, in answer to my complaint of his having, without any reason at all, brought my book into the controversy concerning the Trinity. But to go on:

If the preceding part of this paragraph had nothing in it, of defence of this proposition, "that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do," &c. it is certain, that what follows, is altogether as remote from any such defence.

P. 10. YOUR Lordship says, "that certainty by sense, certainty by reason, and certainty by remembrance, are to be distinguished from the certainty" under debate, and to be shut out from it: and upon this you spend the 11th, 12th, and 13th pages. Supposing it so, how does this at all tend to the defence of this proposition, that "those, who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do?" For whether certainty by sense, by reason, and by remembrance, be, or be not, comprehended in the certainty under debate, this proposition, "that those, who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do," will not at all be confirmed, or invalidated thereby.

THE proving therefore, that "certainty by sense, by reason, and by remembrance," is to be excluded from the certainty under debate, serving nothing to the defence of the proposition to be defended, and so having nothing to do here; let us now consider it as a proposition, that your Lordship has a mind to prove, as serving to some other great purpose of your own, or, perhaps, in some other view against my book: for you seem to lay no small stress upon it, by your way of introducing it. For you very solemnly set yourself to prove, "that the certainty under debate, is the certainty of knowledge; and that a proposition, whose ideas are to be compared, as to their agreement or disagreement, is the proper object of this certainty." From whence your Lordship infers, P. 9, 10. "that therefore, this certainty is to be distinguished from a certainty by sense, by reason, and by remembrance." But by what logick this is infer'd, is not easy to me to discover: for "if a proposition, whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement, or disagreement, be the proper object of the certainty" under debate; if propositions, whose certainty we arrive at, by sense, reason, or

or remembrance, be of ideas, which may be compared as to their agreement, or disagreement; then they cannot be excluded from that certainty, which is to be had, by so comparing those ideas: unless they must be shut out, for the very same reason, that others are taken in.

1. THEN as to certainty by sense, or propositions of that kind:

"THE object of the certainty under debate, your Lordship owns, is a proposition whose ideas are to be compared, as to their agreement, or disagreement." The agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas of a proposition to be compared, may be examined and perceived by sense, and is certainty by sense: and therefore, how this certainty is to be distinguished, and shut out, from that which consists in the perceiving the agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas of any proposition, will not be easy to shew; unless one certainty is distinguished from another, by having that, which makes the other to be certainty, viz. the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, as expressed in that proposition: v. g. may I not be certain, that a ball of ivory, that lies before my eyes, is not square? And is it not my sense of seeing, that makes me perceive the disagreement of that square figure, to that round matter, which are the ideas expressed in that proposition? How then is certainty, by sense, excluded, or distinguished from that knowledge, which consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas?

2. YOUR Lordship distinguishes the certainty, which consists in the perceiving P. 11. the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, as expressed in any proposition, from certainty by reason. To have made good this distinction, I humbly conceive, you would have done well to have shewed that the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas could not be perceived by the intervention of a third, which I, and, as I guess, other people, call reasoning, or knowing by reason. As for example, cannot the sides of a given triangle be known to be equal, by the intervention of two circles, whereof one of these sides is a common radius?

To which, it is like, your Lordship will answer, what I find you do here, P. 12. about the knowledge of the existence of substance, by the intervention of the existence of modes, "that you grant, one may come to certainty of knowledge in the case; but not a certainty by ideas, but by a consequence of reason, deduced from the ideas, we have by our senses." This, my Lord, you have said, and thus you have more than once opposed reason and ideas, as inconsistent; which I should be very glad to see proved once, after these several occasions, I have given your Lordship, by excepting against that supposition. But since the word, idea, has the ill luck to be so constantly opposed by your Lordship, to reason, permit me, if you please, instead of it, to put what I mean by it, viz. the immediate objects of the mind in thinking (for that is it, which I would signify by the word, ideas) and then let us see how your answer will run. You grant that, from the sensible modes of bodies, we may come to a certain knowledge, that there are bodily substances; but this, you say, is not a certainty, by the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, "but by a consequence of reason, deduced from the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which we have by our senses." When you can prove that we can have a certainty by a consequence of reason, which certainty shall not also be, by the immediate objects of the mind, in using its reason; you may say such certainty is not by ideas, but by consequence of reason. But that I believe will not be, until you can shew, that the mind can think, or reason, or know, without immediate objects of thinking, reasoning, or knowing; all which objects, as your Lordship knows, I call ideas.

You subjoin, "and this can never prove that we have certainty by ideas, P. 12. where the ideas themselves are not clear and distinct:" the question is not, "whether we can have certainty by ideas, that are not clear and distinct?" or, whether my words (if by the particle, this, you mean my words set down in the foregoing page) prove any such thing? which, I humbly conceive, they do not: but whether certainty by reason be excluded from the certainty under de-

bate, which I humbly conceive you have not from my words, or any other way proved?

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3. THE third sort of propositions, that your Lordship excludes, are those, whose certainty we know by remembrance; but in these two, the agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas contained in them, is perceived, not always, indeed, as it was at first, by an actual view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement, or disagreement, of those, in the proposition, was at first perceived; but by other intermediate ideas, that shew the agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas contained in the proposition, whose certainty we remember.

As in the instance, you here make use of, viz. that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones: the certainty of which proposition we know by remembrance, "tho' the demonstration had slipped out of our minds;" but we know it in a different way, from what your Lordship supposes. The agreement of the two ideas, as joined in that proposition, is perceived; but it is by the intervention of other ideas, than those, which at first produced that perception. I remember, i. e. I know (for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge) that I was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things, is now the idea, that shews me; that, if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones; and hence I come to be certain, that, what was once true, in the case, is always true; what ideas once agreed, will always agree; and consequently, what I once knew to be true, I shall always know to be true, as long as I can remember, that I once knew it.

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YOUR Lordship says, "that the debate between us is about certainty of knowledge, with regard to some proposition, whose ideas are to be compared, as to their agreement, or disagreement:" out of this debate you say, certainty by sense, by reason, and by remembrance, is to be excluded. I desire you then, my Lord, to tell what sort of propositions will be within the debate, and to name me one of them; if propositions, whose certainty we know by sense, reason, or remembrance, are excluded?

HOWEVER, from what you have said concerning them, your Lordship, in the next paragraph, concludes them out of the question; your words are, "these things, then, being out of the question."

OUT of what question, I beseech you, my Lord? The question here, and that of your own proposing to be defended in the affirmative, is this, "whether those, who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do?" And how certainty by sense, by reason, and by remembrance, comes to have any particular exception, in reference to this question, it is my misfortune not to be able to find.

BUT your Lordship, leaving the examination of the question under debate, by a new state of the question, would pin upon me what I never said. Your

P. 13.

words are, "these things, then, being put out of the question, which belong not to it, the question, truly stated, is, whether we can attain to any certainty of knowledge, as to the truth of a proposition, in the way of ideas, where the ideas themselves, by which we came to that certainty, be not clear and distinct?" With submission, my Lord, that which I say in the point, is, that we may be certain of the truth of a proposition, concerning an idea, which is not in all its parts clear and distinct; and therefore, if your Lordship will have any question with me, concerning this matter, "the question, truly stated, is, whether we can frame any proposition, concerning a thing, whereof we have but an obscure and confused idea, of whose truth we can be certain?"

THAT this is the question, you will easily agree, when you will give yourself the trouble to look back to the rise of it.

YOUR Lordship having found out a strange sort of men, who had broached "a doctrine, which supposed that we must have clear and distinct ideas of
"whatever

"whatever we pretend to a certainty of, in our minds," was pleased for this, *Vindic. p.* to call them "the gentlemen of a new way of reasoning," and to make me one ²³² of them. I answered, that I placed not certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas, and so ought not to have been made one of them, being not guilty of what made "a gentleman of this new way of reasoning." It is pretended still, that I am guilty; and endeavoured to be proved. To know now, whether I am, or no, it must be considered what you lay to their charge, as the consequence of that opinion; and that is, that upon this ground, "we cannot come" to any certainty, that there is such a thing as substance." This appears by *Vindic. p.* more places than one. Your Lordship asks, "how is it possible, that we may ²⁴⁰ be certain, that there are both bodily and spiritual substances, if our reason *Ibid.* depend upon clear and distinct ideas?" And again, "how come we to be certain, that there are spiritual substances in the world, since we can have no clear and distinct ideas concerning them?" And your Lordship having set down some words, out of my book, as if they were inconsistent with my principle of certainty, founded only in clear and distinct ideas, you say, "from *Vindic. p.* whence it follows, that we may be certain of the being of a spiritual substance, tho' we have no clear and distinct ideas of it." ²⁴⁴

OTHER places might be produced, but these are enough to shew, that those, who held clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, were accused to extend it thus far, that, where any idea was obscure and confused, there no proposition could be made concerning it, of whose truth we could be certain; v. g. we could not be certain that there was, in the world, such a thing as substance, because we had but an obscure and confused idea of it.

IN this sense, therefore, I denied, that clear and distinct ideas were necessary to certainty, v. g. I denied it to be my doctrine, that where an idea was obscure and confused, there no proposition could be made concerning it, of whose truth we could be certain. For I held we might be certain of the truth of this proposition, that there was substance in the world, tho' we have but an obscure and confused idea of substance. And your Lordship endeavoured to prove we could not, as may be seen at large, in that tenth chapter of your *Vindication*, &c.

FROM all which, it is evident, that the question between us, truly stated, is this, whether we can attain certainty of the truth of a proposition, concerning any thing, whereof we have but an obscure and confused idea?

THIS being the question, the first thing you say, is, that Des Cartes was *p. 13.* of your opinion against me. *Ans.* If the question were to be decided by authority, I had rather it should be, by your Lordship's, than Des Cartes's: and, therefore, I should excuse myself to you, as not having needed, that you should have added his authority to yours, to shame me into a submission; or that you should have been at the pains, to have transcribed so much, out of him, for my sake, were it fit for me to hinder the display of the riches of your Lordship's universal reading; wherein, I doubt not, but I should take pleasure myself, if I had it to shew.

I COME, therefore, to what I think your Lordship principally aimed at; which, as I humbly conceive, was to shew, out of my book, that I founded certainty, only on clear and distinct ideas. "And yet, as you say, I have com- *P. 15.* plained of your Lordship, in near twenty places of my second letter, for charging this upon me. By this the world will judge of the justice of my complaints, and the consistency of my notion of ideas."

ANSW. "What consistency of my notion of ideas has to do here," I know not; for I do not remember that I made any complaint, concerning that. But supposing my complaints were ill-grounded, in this one case, concerning certainty; yet they might be reasonable in other points; and therefore, with submission, I humbly conceive, the inference was a little too large, to conclude from this particular, against my complaints in general.

IN the next place, I answer, that supposing the places, which your Lordship brings out of my book, did prove, what they do not, viz. that I founded certainty,

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certainly, only in clear and distinct ideas; yet, my complaints, in the case, are very just. For your Lordship, at first, brought me into the controversy, and made me one of "the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning," for founding all certainty on clear and distinct ideas, only upon a bare supposition that I did so; which, I think, your Lordship confesses in these words, where you say, "that you do not deny, but the first occasion of your charge, was the supposition that clear and distinct ideas were necessary, in order to any certainty in our minds; and that the only way to attain this certainty, was the comparing these, i. e. clear and distinct ideas, together: but to prove this, my words, your Lordship says, were produced, and my principles of certainty laid down, and none else." Answ. It is strange, that when my principles of certainty were laid down, this (if I held it) was not found among them. Having looked, therefore, I do not find, in that place, that any words, or principles, of mine were produced, to prove that I held, that the only way to attain certainty, was by comparing only clear and distinct ideas; so that all, that then made me one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, was only your supposing, that I supposed that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty. And, therefore, I had then, and have still, reason to complain, that your Lordship brought me into this controversy, upon so slight grounds, which, I humbly conceive, will always shew it to have proceeded, not so much from any thing, you had then found in my book, as from a great willingness, in your Lordship, at any rate, to do it; and of this the passages, which you have here now produced, out of my Essay, are an evident proof.

For if your Lordship had then known any thing, that seemed so much to your purpose, "when you produced, as you say, my words and my principles to prove," that I held clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty; it cannot be believed that you would have omitted these passages, either then, or in your answer to my first letter, and deferred them to this your answer to my second. These passages, therefore, now quoted here, by your Lordship, give me leave, my Lord, to suppose, have been, by a new and diligent search, found out, and are now, at last, brought, post factum, to give some colour to your way of proceeding with me; tho' these passages being, as I suppose, then unknown to you, they could not be the ground of making me one of those, who place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas.

LET us come to the passages themselves, and see what help they afford you.

B. iv. c. 18. § 8. THE first words you set down out of my Essay are these; "the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know." From these words, that which I infer, in that place, is, "that therefore the mind is sound, in such cases, to give up its assent to an unerring testimony." But your Lordship from them infers here, "therefore I make clear ideas necessary to certainty;" or therefore, by considering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, we cannot be certain that substance, (whereof we have an obscure and confused idea) doth exist. I shall leave your Lordship to make good this consequence, when you think fit, and proceed to the next passage you allege, which, you say, proves it more plainly. I believe it will be thought, it should be proved more plainly, or else it will not be proved at all.

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THIS plainer proof is out of B. iv. c. 4. § 8. in these words, "that, which is requisite, to make our knowledge certain, is the clearness of our ideas." Answ. The certainty here spoken of, is the certainty of general propositions in morality, and not of the particular existence of any thing; and therefore tends not at all, to any such position, as this, that we cannot be certain of the existence of any particular sort of being, tho' we have but an obscure and confused idea of it; tho' it doth affirm, that we cannot have any certain perception of the relations of general, moral ideas (wherein consists the certainty of general, moral propositions) any farther than those ideas are clear in our minds. And that this is so, I refer my reader to that chapter for satisfaction.

THE third place produced by your Lordship, out of B. iv. c. 12. § 14. is,
 " For it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas, where P. 50.
 " they are only imperfect, confused, or obscure; we cannot expect to have
 " certain, perfect, or clear knowledge." To understand these words aright,
 we must see, in what place they stand; and that is, in a chapter of the im-
 provement of our knowledge, and therein are brought, as a reason, to shew
 how necessary it is " for the enlarging of our knowledge, to get and settle in
 " our minds, as far as we can, clear, distinct, and constant ideas of those
 " things, we would consider and know." The reason whereof there given, is
 this; that, as far as they are only imperfect, confused, and obscure, we cannot
 expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge; i. e. that our knowledge
 will not be clear and certain, so far as the idea is imperfect and obscure.
 Which will not at all reach your Lordship's purpose, who would argue, that
 because I say, our idea of substance is obscure and confused, therefore, upon
 my grounds, we cannot know that such a thing as substance exists; because
 I placed certainty only in clear and distinct ideas. Now to this I answered;
 that I did not place all certainty, only on clear and distinct ideas, in such a
 sense as that; and, therefore, to avoid being mistaken, I said, " that my no- Answ. 2.
 " tion of certainty by ideas, is, that certainty consists in the perception of the P. 50.
 " agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; such as we have, whether they be, in
 " all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct, or no." Viz. If they are clear and
 distinct enough to be capable of having their agreement, or disagreement, with
 any other idea perceived, so far they are capable of affording us knowledge, tho',
 at the same time, they are so obscure and confused, as that there are other
 ideas, with which we can by no means so compare them, as to perceive their
 agreement, or disagreement, with them. This was the clearness and distinct-
 nesses, which I denied to be necessary to certainty.

If your Lordship would have done me the honour to have considered what I
 understood by obscure and confused ideas, and what every one must understand
 by them, who thinks clearly and distinctly concerning them, I am apt to ima-
 gine, you would have spared yourself the trouble of raising this question, and
 omitted these quotations out of my book, as not serving to your Lordship's
 purpose.

THE fourth passage, which you seem to lay most stress on, proves as little to
 your purpose, as either of the former three. The words are these: " but ob- Essay, B. IV.
 " scure and confused ideas can never produce any clear and certain knowledge; c. 2. § 15.
 " because, as far as any ideas are confused, or obscure, the mind can never per-
 " ceive clearly, whether they agree, or no." The latter part of these words are
 a plain interpretation of the former, and shew their meaning to be this; viz.
 our obscure and confused ideas, as they stand in contra-distinction to clear and
 distinct, have all of them something in them, whereby they are kept from be-
 ing wholly imperceptible, and perfectly confounded with all other ideas, and so
 their agreement, or disagreement, with (at least) some other ideas, may be per-
 ceived, and thereby produce certainty, tho' they are obscure and confused ideas.
 But, so far as they are obscure and confused, so that their agreement, or disa-
 greement, cannot be perceived, so far they cannot produce certainty; v. g. the
 idea of substance is clear and distinct enough to have its agreement, with that
 of actual existence, perceived: but yet it is so far obscure and confused, that
 there be a great many other ideas, with which, by reason of its obscurity and
 confusedness, we cannot compare it, so, as to produce such a perception; and,
 in all those cases, we necessarily come short of certainty. And that this was so,
 and that I meant so, I humbly conceive, you could not but have seen, if you
 had given yourself the trouble to reflect on that passage, which you quoted,
 viz. " that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagree- P. 7.
 " ment, of ideas, such as we have, whether they be, in their parts, perfectly
 " clear and distinct, or no." To which, what your Lordship has here brought,
 out of the second book of my Essay, is no manner of contradiction; unless it
 be a contradiction to say, that an idea, which cannot be well compared with

some ideas, from which it is not clearly and sufficiently distinguishable, is yet capable of having its agreement, or disagreement, perceived with some other idea, with which it is not so confounded, but that it may be compared: and therefore I had, and have still, reason to complain of your Lordship, for charging that upon me, which I never said, nor meant.

To make this yet more visible, give me leave to make use of an instance, in the object of the eyes, in seeing, from whence the metaphor of obscure and confused is transferred to ideas, the objects of the mind in thinking. There is no object, which the eye sees, that can be said to be perfectly obscure, for then it would not be seen at all; nor perfectly confused, for then it could not be distinguished from any other, no not from a clearer. For example, one sees in the dusk, something of that shape and size, that a man, in that degree of light and distance, would appear. This is not so obscure, that he sees nothing; nor so confused, that he cannot distinguish it from a steeple, or a star; but it is so obscure, that he cannot, tho' it be a statue, distinguish it from a man; and therefore, in regard of a man, it can produce no clear and distinct knowledge: but yet, as obscure and confused an idea as it is, this hinders not but there may many propositions be made, concerning it; as particularly that it exists, of the truth, of which we may be certain. And that without any contradiction to what I say in my Essay, viz. "that obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear and certain knowledge; because, as far as they are confused, or obscure, the mind cannot perceive clearly, whether they agree, or no." This reason, that I there give, plainly limiting it only to knowledge, where the obscurity and confusion is such, that it hinders the perception of agreement, or disagreement, which is not so great, in any obscure and confused idea; but that there are some other ideas, with which it may be perceived to agree, or disagree, and there it is capable to produce certainty in us.

AND thus I am come to the end of your defence of your first answer, as you call it, and desire the reader to consider, how much, in the eight pages employed in it, is said to defend this proposition, "that those, who offer at clear and distinct ideas, bid much fairer for certainty than I do."

BUT your Lordship having, under this head, taken occasion to examine my making clear and distinct ideas, necessary to certainty, I crave leave to consider here, what you say of it in another place. I find one argument more to prove, P. 63. that I place certainty, only in clear and distinct ideas. Your Lordship tells me, and bids me observe my own words, that I positively say, "that the mind, not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know: so that, says your Lordship, it is plain here, that I place certainty in evident knowledge, or in clear and distinct ideas, and yet my great complaint of your Lordship was, that you charged this upon me, and now you find it in my own words." Answer. I do observe my own words, but do not find in them, "or in clear and distinct ideas," tho' your Lordship has set these down, as my words. I there, indeed, say, "the mind is not certain of what it does not evidently know." Whereby I place certainty, as your Lordship says, only in evident knowledge, but evident knowledge may be had in the clear and evident perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; tho' some of them should not be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct, as is evident in this proposition, "that substance does exist."

BUT you give not off this matter so: for these words of mine, above quoted P. 15. by your Lordship, viz. "It being evident, that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas, where they are imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect P. 63. to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge;" your Lordship has here up again: and thereupon charge it on me, as a contradiction, that confessing our ideas to be imperfect, confused and obscure; I say, I do not yet place certainty in clear and distinct ideas. Answer. The reason is plain, for I do not say, that all our ideas are imperfect, confused and obscure; nor, that obscure and confused ideas are, in all their parts, so obscure and confused, that no agreement, or disagreement, between them and other ideas can be perceived; and therefore my confession

confession of imperfect, obscure, and confused ideas, takes not away all knowledge, even concerning those very ideas.

BUT, says your Lordship, "can certainty be had with imperfect and obscure ideas, and yet no certainty be had by them?" Add, if you please, my Lord, [by those parts of them, which are obscure and confused.] And then, the question will be right put, and have this easy answer: yes, my Lord; and that, without any contradiction, because an idea that is not, in all its parts, perfectly clear and distinct; and is, therefore, an obscure and confused idea, may yet, with those ideas, with which, by any obscurity it has, it is not confounded, be capable to produce knowledge by the perception of its agreement, or disagreement, with them. And yet it will hold true, that in that part, wherein it is imperfect, obscure, and confused, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

FOR example: he that has the idea of a leopard, as only of a spotted animal, must be confessed to have but a very imperfect, obscure and confused idea of that species of animals; and yet this obscure and confused idea is capable, by a perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of the clear part of it, viz. that of animal, with several other ideas, to produce certainty: tho', as far as the obscure part of it confounds it with the idea of a lynx, or other spotted animal, it can, joined with them, in many propositions, produce no knowledge.

THIS might easily be understood to be my meaning, by these words, which your Lordship quotes out of my Essay, viz. "That our knowledge consisting in P. 122. the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, its clearness, or obscurity, consists in the clearness, or obscurity, of that perception, and not in the clearness, or obscurity, of the ideas themselves." Upon which your Lordship asks, "how it is possible for the mind to have a clear perception P. 122. of the agreement of ideas, if the ideas themselves be not clear and distinct?" Answer. Just as the eyes can have a clear perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of the clear and distinct parts of a writing, with the clear parts of another, tho' one, or both of them, be so obscure and blurred in other parts, that the eye cannot perceive any agreement, or disagreement, they have one with another. And I am sorry that these words of mine, "my notion of Letter 2. certainty by ideas, is, that certainty consists in the perception of the agree- P. 50. ment, or disagreement, of ideas, such as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct, or no;" were not plain enough to make your Lordship understand my meaning, and save you all this new, and, as it seems to me, needless trouble.

IN your fifteenth page, your Lordship comes to your second of the three answers, which you say you had given, and would lay together and defend. P. 7. You say, (2) you answered, "that it is very possible the author of Christianity P. 15. nity not mysterious might mistake, or misapply, my notions; but there is too much reason to believe, he thought them the same; and we have no reason to be sorry, that he hath given me this occasion, for the explaining my meaning, and for the vindication of myself, in the matters, I apprehend, he had charged me with." These words your Lordship quotes out of the thirty-sixth page of your first letter. But, as I have already observed, they are not there given, as an answer to this, that you make me here say; and, therefore, to what purpose you repeat them here, is not easy to discern, unless it can be thought that an unsatisfactory answer, in one place, can become satisfactory, by being repeated in another, where it is, as I humbly conceive, less to the purpose, and no answer at all. It was there, indeed, given as an answer to my saying, that I did not place certainty in clear and distinct ideas, which I said to shew, that you had no reason to bring me into the controversy, because the author of Christianity not mysterious placed certainty in clear and distinct ideas. To satisfy me, for your doing so, your Lordship answers, "that it was very possible, that author might mistake, or misapply, my notions." A reason, indeed, that will equally justify your bringing my book into any controversy:

For

for there is no author so infallible, write he in what controversy he pleases, but it is possible he may mistake, or misapply my notions.

THAT was the force of this your Lordship's answer, in that place of your first Letter; but what it serves for, in this place of your second letter I have not wit enough to see. The remainder of it I have answered, in the 37th and 38th pages of my second letter, and therefore cannot but wonder to see it repeated here again, without any notice taken of what I said in answer to it, tho' you set it down here again, as you say, p. 7. on purpose to defend.

BUT all the defence made, is only to that part of my reply, which you set
 P. 16. down as a fresh complaint, that I make in these words: "This can be no reason, why I should be joined with a man that had misapplied my notions; and that no man hath so much mistaken, and misapplied my notions, as your Lordship; and therefore I ought rather to be joined with your Lordship." And then you, with some warmth, subjoin: "But is this fair and ingenuous dealing, to represent this matter so, as if your Lordship had joined us together, because he had misunderstood and misapplied my notions? Can I think your Lordship a man of so little sense to make that the reason of it?" No, Sir, says your Lordship, "It was, because he assigned no other grounds but mine, and that in my own words; however, now I would divert the meaning of them another way."

MY Lord, I did set down your words, at large, in my second letter, and therefore do not see, how I could be liable to any charge of unfair, or disingenuous dealing, in representing the matter; which, I am sure, you will allow as a proof of my not misrepresenting, since I find you use it yourself, as a sure fence
 P. 133. against any such accusation; where you tell me, "that you have set down my own words at large, that I may not complain, that your Lordship misrepresents my sense." The same answer I must desire my reader to apply for me, to your 73d and 90th pages, where your Lordship makes complaints of the like kind with this here.

THE reasons, you give, for joining me with the author of Christianity not mysterious, are put down verbatim, as you gave them; and if they did not give me that satisfaction they were designed for, am I to be blamed that I did not find them better than they were? You joined me with that author, because he placed certainty only in clear and distinct ideas: I told your Lordship, I did not do so; and, therefore, that could be no reason for your joining me with him. You answer, "Twas possible he might mistake, or misapply, my notions:" so that our agreeing in the notion of certainty (the pretended reason, for which we were joined) failing, all the reason, which is left, and which you offer in this answer, for your joining of us, is the possibility of his mistaking my notions: and I think it a very natural inference, that if the mere possibility of any one's mistaking me, be a reason for my being joined with him; any one's actual mistaking me, is a stronger reason, why I should be joined with him. But if such an inference shews (more than you would have it) the satisfactoriness and force of your answer, I hope you will not be angry with me, if I cannot change the nature of things.

Ans. 1. YOUR Lordship, indeed, adds, in that place, that "there is too much reason to believe that the author thought his notions and mine the same."
 P. 36.

ANSWER. When your Lordship shall produce that reason, it will be seen, whether it were too much, or too little. 'Till it is produced, there appears no reason at all; and such concealed reason, tho' it may be too much, can be supposed, I think, to give very little satisfaction to me, or any body else, in the case.

P. 16. BUT to make good what you have said, in your answer, your Lordship here replies, that "you did not join us together, because he had misunderstood and misapplied my notions." Ans. Neither did I say, that therefore you did join us. But this I crave leave to say, that all the reason, you there gave, for your joining us together, was the possibility of his mistaking and misapplying my notions.

BUT

BUT your Lordship now tells me, "No, Sir," this was not the reason of your P. 16. joining us; but "it was, because he assigned no other grounds but mine, and "in my own words." Answ. My Lord, I do not remember that, in that place, you give this as a reason, for your joining of us; and I could not answer, in that place, to what you did not there say, but to what you there did say. Now, your Lordship does say it here; here I shall take the liberty to answer it.

THE reason, you now give, for your joining me with that author, is, "because he assigned no other grounds, but mine;" which however tenderly expressed, is to be understood, I suppose, that he did assign my grounds. Of what, I beseech your Lordship, did he assign my grounds, and in my words? If it were not my grounds of certainty, it could be no manner of reason, for your joining me with him; because the only reason, why at first you made him (and me with him) a "gentleman of the new way of reasoning, was his supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty," which was the opinion, that you declared, you opposed. Now, my Lord, if you can shew, where that author has, in my words, assigned my grounds of certainty, there will be some grounds for what you say here: but, till your Lordship does that, it will be pretty hard to believe that, to be the ground of your joining us together; which, being no where to be found, can scarce be thought the true reason of your doing it.

YOUR Lordship adds, "however, now I would divert the meaning of them P. 16. "[i. e. those my words] another way."

ANSW. Whenever you are pleased to set down those words of mine, wherein that author assigns my grounds of certainty, it will be seen how I now divert my meaning another way; until then, they must remain, with several other of your Lordship's invisible them, which are no where to be found.

BUT to your asking me, "whether I can think your Lordship a man of P. 17. "that little sense?" I crave leave to reply, that I hope it must not be concluded, that, as often as, in your way of writing, I meet with any thing, that does not seem to me satisfactory, and I endeavour to shew that it does not prove, what it is made use of for, that "I presently think your Lordship a man of "little sense:" This would be a very hard rule, in defending one's self; especially for me, against so great and learned a man, whose reasons and meaning it is not, I find, always easy for so mean a capacity, as mine, to reach; and therefore I have taken great care to set down your words, in most places, to secure myself from the imputation of misrepresenting your sense, and to leave it fairly before the reader to judge, whether I mistake it, and how far I am to be blamed, if I do. And I would have set down your whole letter, page by page, as I answered it, would not that have made my book too big.

If I must write under this fear, that you apprehend I think meanly of you, as often as I think any reason, you make use of, is not satisfactory in the point, it is brought for, the causes of uneasiness would return too often, and it would be better, once for all, to conclude your Lordship infallible, and acquiesce in whatever you say, than, in every page, to be so rude as to tell your Lordship, "I think you have little sense;" if that be the interpretation of my endeavouring to shew, that your reasons come short, any where.

MY Lord, when you did me the honour to answer my first letter (which I thought might have passed for a submissive complaint of what I did not well understand, rather than a dispute with your Lordship) you were pleased to insert into it direct accusations against my book: which looked, as if you had a mind to enter into a direct controversy with me. This condescension in your Lordship has made me think myself under the protection of the laws of controversy, which allow a free examining and shewing the weakness of the reasons brought by the other side, without any offence. If this be not permitted me, I must confess, I have been mistaken, and have been guilty in answering you any thing at all; for how to answer, without answering, I confess I do not know.

I wish you never had writ any thing that I was particularly concerned to examine; and what I have been concerned to examine, I wish it had given me no occasion for any other answer, but an admiration of the manner and justness of your corrections, and an acknowledgment of an increase of that great opinion, which I had of your Lordship before: but I hope it is not expected from me, in this debate, that I should admit, as good and conclusive, all that drops from your pen, for fear of causing so much displeasure, as you seem here to have, upon this occasion, or for fear you should object to me the presumption of thinking you had but little sense, as often as I endeavoured to shew, that what you say is of little force.

Page 16. WHEN those words and grounds of mine are produced, that the author of Christianity not mysterious assigned, which your Lordship thinks a sufficient reason for your joining me with him, in opposing the doctrine of the Trinity; I shall consider them, and endeavour to give you satisfaction about them, as well as I have already, concerning those ten lines, which you have, more than once, quoted out of him, as taken out of my book, and which is all, that your Lordship has produced out of him of that kind: in all which there is not one syllable of clear and distinct ideas, or of certainty founded in them. In the mean time, in answer to your other question, "but is this fair and ingenious dealing?" I refer my reader to p. 35---38, of my second letter; where he may see, at large, all this whole matter, and all the unfairness and dissingenuity of it, which I submit to him, to judge, whether for any fault of that kind, it ought to have drawn, on me, the marks of so much displeasure.

Ibid. YOUR Lordship goes on here, and tells me, that "altho' you were willing to allow me all reasonable occasions for my own vindication, as appears by your words; yet you were sensible enough, that I had given too just an occasion to apply them, in that manner, as appears by the next page."

WHAT was it, I beseech you, my Lord, that I was to vindicate myself from? and what was those, them, I had given too just an occasion to apply in that manner? and what was that manner they were applied in? and what was the occasion they were so applied? for I can find none of all these, in that next page, to which your Lordship refers me. When those are set down, the world will be the better able to judge of the reason, you had to join me, after the manner you did. However, saying, my Lord, without proving, I humbly conceive, is but saying; and in such personal matter, so turned, shews more the disposition of the speaker, than any ground for what is said. Your Lordship, as a proof of your great care of me, tells me, at the top of that page, that you had said so much, that nothing could be said more for my vindication: and before you come to the bottom of it, you labour to persuade the world, that I have need to vindicate myself. Another possibly, who could find in his heart to say two such things, would have taken care, they should not have stood in the same page, where the juxtaposition might enlighten them too much, and surprize the fight. But, possibly, your Lordship is so well satisfied of the world's readiness to believe your professions of good-will to me, as a mark whereof you tell me here of your willingness "to allow me all reasonable occasions to vindicate myself;" that no body can see any thing, but kindness, in whatever you say, tho' it appears in so different shapes.

Page 16. In the following words, your Lordship accuses me of too nice a piece of criticism; and tells me it looks like chicaning. Answ. I did not expect, in a controversy, begun and managed as this, which your Lordship has been pleased to have with me, to be accused of chicaning, without great provocation; because the mentioning that word might perhaps raise in the reader's mind some odd thoughts, which were better spared. But this accusation made me look back into the places you quoted in the margin, and there find the matter to stand thus:

Ibid. To a pretty large quotation, set down out of the postscript to my first letter, you subjoin; "Which words seem to express so much of a Christian spirit and temper,

Answ. 1. p. 37. "temper,

“temper, that your Lordship cannot believe I intended to give any advantage to the enemies of the Christian faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them, to apply them, in that manner, is a thing very fit for me to consider.”

IN my answer, I take notice, that the term, them, in this passage of your Lordship's, can, in the ordinary construction of our language, be applied to nothing, but which words, in the beginning of that passage, i. e. to my words immediately preceding. This your Lordship calls chicaning; and gives this reason for it, viz. “Because any one that reads, without a design to cavil, would easily interpret them, of my words, and notions, about which the debate was.” Answer. That any one that reads that passage with, or without, design to cavil, could hardly make it intelligible, without interpreting them so, I readily grant; but that it is easy for me, or any body, to interpret any one's meaning, contrary to the necessary construction, and plain import of the words, that I crave leave to deny. I am sure it is not chicaning, to presume, that so great an author, as your Lordship, writes according to the rules of grammar, and, as another man writes, who understands our language, and would be understood: to do the contrary, would be a presumption, liable to blame, and might deserve the name of chicaning and cavil. And that, in this case, it was not easy to avoid the interpreting the term, them, as I did, the reason, you give, why I should have done it, is a farther proof. Your Lordship, to shew it was easy, says, “the postscript comes in, but as a parenthesis:” now I challenge any one living, to shew me where, in that place, the parenthesis must begin, and where end, which can make, them, applicable to any thing, but the words of my postscript. I have tried, with more care and pains, than is usually required of a reader, in such cases, and cannot, I must own, find where to make a breach in the thread of your discourse, with the imaginary parenthesis, which your Lordship mentions, and was not, I suppose, omitted by the printer, for want of marks to print it. And if this, which you gave as the key, that opens to the interpretation, that I should have made, be so hard to be found, the interpretation itself could not be so very easy, as you speak of.

BUT to avoid all blame, for understanding that passage as I did, and to secure myself, from being suspected to seek a subterfuge, in the natural import of your words, against what might be conjectured to be your sense, I added; “but if by any new way of construction, unintelligible to me, the word, them, here, shall be applied to any passages of my Essay of Human Understanding, I must humbly crave leave to observe this one thing, in the whole course of what your Lordship has designed for my satisfaction, that tho' my complaint be of your Lordship's manner of applying, what I had published in my Essay, so as to interest me in a controversy, wherein I meddled not; yet your Lordship all along tells me of others, that have misapplied, I know not what words, in my book, after I know not what manner. Now as to this matter, I beseech your Lordship to believe that, when any one, in such a manner, applies my words, contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, and me a party in that controversy, against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows, I complain your Lordship has done; I shall complain of them too, and consider, as well as I can, what satisfaction they give me and others in it.” This passage of mine your Lordship here represents thus, viz. that I say, that if, by an unintelligible new way of construction, the word, them, be applied to any passages in my book, what then? Why then, whoever they are, I intended to complain of them too. But, says your Lordship, the words, just before, tell me, who they are, viz. The enemies of the Christian faith. And then your Lordship asks, whether this be all that I intend, viz. only to complain of them, for making me a party in the controversy against the Trinity.

MY Lord, were I given to chicaning, as you call my being stopt by faults of grammar, that disturb the sense, and make the discourse incoherent and unintelligible, if we are to take it from the words as they are, I should not want matter

matter enough for such an exercise of my pen : as for example, here again, where your Lordship makes me say, that if the word, them, be applied to any P. 17. passages in my book, then whoever they are, I intend to complain, &c. these being set down for my words, I would be very glad to be able to put them into a grammatical construction, and make to myself an intelligible sense of them. But, they, being not a word, that I have an absolute power over, to place where, and for what, I will, I confess I cannot do it. For the term, they, in the words here, as your Lordship has set them down, having nothing that it can refer to, but passages, or them, which stand for words, it must be a very sudden metaphors, that must change them into persons, for it is for persons, that the word they, stands here ; and yet I crave leave to say, that, as far as I understand English, they, is a word cannot be used, without reference to something mentioned before. Your Lordship tells me, "the words, just before, tell me, who they are." The words just mentioned before, are these ; "if, by an unintelligible new way of construction, the word, them, be applied to any passage of my book:" for it is to some words before indeed, but before in the same contexture of discourse, that the word, they, must refer, to make it any where intelligible. But here are no persons, mentioned in the words, just before, tho' your Lordship tells me, the words, just before, shew who they are ; but this, just before, where the persons are mentioned, whom your Lordship intends by, they, here, is so far off, that sixteen pages of your Lordship's second letter, one hundred and seventy four pages of my second letter, and above one hundred pages of your Lordship's first letter, come between : so that one must read above two hundred and eighty pages from the enemies of the Christian faith, in the 37th page of your first letter, before one can come to the, they, which refers to them here, in the 17th page of your Lordship's second letter.

MY Lord, it is my misfortune that I cannot pretend to any figure, amongst the men of learning ; but I would not, for that reason, be rendered so despicable, that I could not write ordinary sense, in my own language : I must beg leave, therefore, to inform my reader, that what your Lordship has set down here, as mine, is neither my words, nor my sense. For,

1. I SAY not, "if, by any unintelligible new way of construction;" but I say, "if by any new way of construction, unintelligible to me:" which are far different expressions. For that may be very intelligible to others, which may be unintelligible to me. And indeed, my Lord, there are so many passages in your writing, in this controversy with me, which, for their construction, as well as otherwise, are so unintelligible to me, that if I should be so unmanly, as to measure your understanding by mine, I should not know what to think of them. In those cases, therefore, I presume not to go beyond my own capacity : I tell your Lordship often (which, I hope, modesty will permit) what my weak understanding will not reach ; but I am far from saying it is, therefore, absolutely unintelligible. I leave to others the benefit of their better judgments, to be enlightened by your Lordship, where I am not.

2. THE use your Lordship here makes of these words, "but if, by any new way of construction, unintelligible to me, the word, them, be applied to any passages in my book;" is not the principal, nor the only (as your Lordship makes it) use, for which I said them : but this ; that if your Lordship, by them, in that place, were to be understood to mean, that there were others, that misapplied passages of my book ; this was no satisfaction for what your Lordship had done, in that kind. Tho' this, I observed, was your way of defence ; that when I complained, of what your Lordship had done, you told me, that others had done so too ; as if that could be any manner of satisfaction. I added, in the close, "that, when any one, in such a manner, applies my words contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, and me a party, in that controversy, against the Trinity, as your Lordship knows, I complain your Lordship has done ; I shall complain of them too, and consider, as well as I can, what satisfaction they give me, and others, in it." Of this, any one of mine, your Lordship makes your fore-mentioned they,

Lett. 2.
p. 46.

they, whether with any advantage of sense, or clearness to my words, the reader must judge. However, this latter part of that passage, with the particular turn, your Lordship gives to it, is what your words would persuade your reader, is all that I say here: Would not your Lordship, upon such an occasion from me, cry out again, "is this fair and ingenuous dealing?" And would not you think, you had reason to do so? But let us see what we must guess, your Lordship makes me say, and your exceptions to it.

YOUR Lordship makes me say, "whoever they are, who misapply my words, as I complain your Lordship has done (for these words must be supplied, to make the sentence to me intelligible) "I intend to complain of them too:" And then you find fault with me, for the using the indefinite word, whoever; and, as a reproof for the unreasonableness of it, you say, "but the words, just before, tell me, who they are." But my words are not, "whoever they are," but my words are, "when any one, in such a manner, applies my words, contrary to what I intended them, &c." Your Lordship would here have me understand, that there are those, that have done it, and rebukes me that I speak, as if I knew not any one that had done it; and that I may not plead ignorance, you say, "your words, just before, told me, who they were, viz. the enemies of the christian faith."

WHAT must I do now to keep my word, and satisfy your Lordship? Must I complain of the enemies of the christian faith, in general, that they have applied my words as aforesaid; and then consider, as well as I can, what satisfaction they give me and others in it? For that was all I promised to do. But this would be strange, to complain of the enemies of the christian faith, for doing what, it is very likely they never all did, and what I do not know that any one of them has done. Or must I, to content your Lordship, read over all the writings of the enemies of the christian faith, to see whether any one of them has applied my words, i. e. in such a manner, as I complained, your Lordship has done, that if they have, I may complain of them too? This truly, my Lord, is more than I have time for; and if it were worth while, when it is done, I perceive I should not content your Lordship in it: for you ask me here, "is this all I intend, only to complain of them for making me a party in the controversy against the Trinity?" No, my Lord, this is not all. I promised too, "to consider as well as I can, what satisfaction (if they offer any) they give me and others, for so doing." And why should not this content your Lordship, in reference to others, as well as it does in reference to yourself? I have but one measure for your Lordship and others. When others treat me, after the manner you have done, why should it not be enough to answer them, after the same manner I have done your Lord? But perhaps your Lordship has some dextrous meaning under this, which I am not quick-sighted enough to perceive, and so do not reply right, as you would have me.

I MUST beg my reader's pardon, as well as your Lordship's, for using so many words, about passages, that seem not in themselves of that importance. I confess, that in themselves they are not; but yet it is my misfortune, that, in this controversy, your way of writing, and representing my sense, forces me to it.

YOUR Lordship's name in writing is established, above controul; and, therefore, it would be ill-breeding in one, who barely reads what you write, not to take every thing for perfect in its kind, which your Lordship says. Clearness, and force, and consistence, are to be presumed always, whatever your Lordship's words be: And there is no other remedy for an answerer, who finds it difficult, any where, to come at your meaning, or argument, but to make his excuse for it, in laying the particulars before the reader, that he may be judge, where the fault lies; especially where any matter of fact is contested, deductions from the first rise are often necessary, which cannot be made in few words, nor without several repetitions: an inconvenience, possibly, fitter to be endured, than that your Lordship, in the run of your learned notions, should be shackled with the ordinary and strict rules of language; and, in the delivery of your

sublimier speculations, be tied down to the mean and contemptible rudiments of grammar; tho' your being above these, and freed from a servile observance, in the use of trivial particles, whereon the connexion of discourse chiefly depends, cannot but cause great difficulties to the reader. And, however it may be an ease to any great man, to find himself above the ordinary rules of writing, he, who is bound to follow the connexion, and find out his meaning, will have his task much increased by it.

I AM very sensible, how much this has swelled these papers already, and yet I do not see how any thing less, than what I have said, could clear those passages, which we have hitherto examined, and set them in their due light.

17. YOUR next words are these, "but whether I have not made myself too much a party in it [i. e. the controversy against the Trinity] will appear before we have done." This is an item, for me, which your Lordship seems so very fond of, and so careful to inculcate, wherever you bring in any words, it can be tacked to, that, if one can avoid thinking it to be the main end of your writing, one cannot yet but see, that it could not be so much in the thoughts and words of a great man, who is above such personal matters, and which he knows the world soon grows weary of, unless it had some very particular business there. Whether it be the author that has prejudiced you against his book, or the book prejudiced you against the author, so it is, I perceive, that both I and my Essay are fallen under your displeasure.

I AM not unacquainted what great stress is often laid upon invidious names, by skilful disputants, to supply the want of better arguments. But give me leave, my Lord, to say, that it is too late for me now to begin to value those marks of good will, or a good cause; and therefore, I shall say nothing more to them, as fitter to be left to the examination of the thoughts, within your own breast, from what source such reasonings spring, and whither they tend.

I AM going, my Lord, to a tribunal, that has a right to judge of thoughts, and being secure, that I there shall be found of no party, but that of truth (for which there is required nothing, but the receiving truth in the love of it) I matter not much, of what party any one shall, as may best serve his turn, denominate me here. Your Lordship's is not the first pen, from which I have received such strokes as these, without any great harm; I never found freedom of stile did me any hurt with those, who knew me, and if those, who know me not, will take up borrowed prejudices, it will be more to their own harm than mine: so that in this, I shall give your Lordship little other trouble, but my thanks sometimes, where I find you skilfully and industriously recommending me to the world, under the character, you have chosen for me. Only give me leave to say, that if the Essay, I shall leave behind me, hath no other fault to sink it, but heresy, and inconsistency with the articles of the christian faith, I am apt to think it will last in the world, and do service to truth, even the truths of religion, notwithstanding that imputation laid on it, by so mighty a hand as your Lordship's.

- P. 18, 19. IN your two next paragraphs, your Lordship accuses me of cavilling, in the 43d and 44th pages of my second letter, whither, for shortness, I refer my reader. I shall only add, that, tho' in the debate about mysteries of faith, your adversaries, as you say, are not heathens; yet any one among us, whom your Lordship should speak of, as not owning the scripture to be the foundation and rule of faith, would, I presume, be thought to receive from you a character, very little different from that of a heathen. Which being a part of your compliment to me, will, I humbly conceive, excuse what I there said, from being a cavilling exception.

HITHERTO your Lordship, notwithstanding that you understood the world so well, has employed your pen in personal matters, how unacceptable soever to the world, you declare it to be: how must I behave myself in the case? If I answer nothing, my silence is so apt to be interpreted guilt, or concession, that even the deferring my answer to some points, or not giving it in the proper place,

place, is reflected on, as no small transgression, whereof there are two examples, in the two following pages. And if I do answer so at large, as your way of writing requires, and as the matter deserves, I recal to your memory "the P. 20, 21. "springs of Modena, by the ebullition of my thoughts." It is hard, my Lord, between these two, to manage one's self to your good liking: however, I shall endeavour to collect the force of your reasonings, wherever I can find it, as short as I can, and apply my answers to that, tho' with the omission of a great many incidents, deserving to be taken notice of: if my slowness, not able to keep pace, every where, with your uncommon flights, shall have mist any argument whereon you lay any stress, if you please to point it out to me. I shall not fail to endeavour to give you satisfaction therein.

In the next paragraph your Lordship says, "those, who are not sparing of P. 19. "writing, about articles of faith; and, among them, take great care to avoid "some, which have been always esteemed fundamental," &c. This seems also to contain something personal in it: but how far I am concerned in it, I shall know, when you shall be pleased to tell me, who those are, and then it will be time enough for me to answer.

THIS is what your Lordship has brought in, under your second answer, in these four pages, as a defence of it; and how much of it is a defence of that second answer, let the reader judge.

I AM now come to the third of those answers, which you said, p. 7. you P. 20. would lay together and defend. And it is this:

"THAT my grounds of certainty tend to scepticism, and that, in an age, "wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed, by the promoters of "scepticism and infidelity; it is a thing of dangerous consequence, to start "such new methods of certainty, as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before."

THIS is what you set down here, to be defended: the defence follows, wherein your Lordship tells me, that I say, "these words contain a farther accusation of my book, which shall be considered in its due place. But this "is the proper place of considering it: for your Lordship said, that hereby I "have given too just occasion, to the enemies of the christian faith, to make "use of my words and notions, as was evidently proved from my own concessions. And if this be so, however you were willing to have had me explain myself, to the general satisfaction; yet, since I decline it, you do insist upon it, that I cannot clear myself from laying that foundation, which the "author of Christianity not mysterious built upon."

In which I crave leave to acquaint your Lordship, with what I do not understand.

FIRST, I do not understand what is meant, by "this is the proper place;" for, in ordinary construction these words seem to denote this 20th page of your Lordship's second letter, which you were then writing, tho' the sense would make me think the 46th page of my second letter, which you were then answering, should be meant. This, perhaps, your Lordship may think a nice piece of criticism; but until it be cleared, I cannot tell what to say in my excuse. For it is likely your Lordship would again ask me, whether I could think you a man of so little sense, if I should understand these words, to mean the 20th page of your second letter, which no-body can conceive, your Lordship should think a proper place for me, to consider, and answer, what you had writ in your first? It would be as hard to understand, this is, to mean a place in my former letter, which was past and done; but it is no wonder for me to be mistaken in your privilege-word, this. Besides there is this farther difficulty to understand, "this is the proper place," of the 46th page of my former letter; because I do not see, why the 82d page of that letter, where I did consider and answer it, was not as proper a place of considering it, as the 46th, where I give a reason why I defend it. Farther, if I understood what you meant here, by "this is the proper place," I should, possibly, apprehend better the force of your argument, subjoined to prove this, whatever it be, to be the proper

proper place; the causal particle, for, which introduces the following words, making them a reason of those preceding. But, in the present obscurity of this matter, I confess I do not see how your having said, "that I gave occasion to the enemies of the christian faith," &c. proves any thing concerning the proper place at all.

ANOTHER thing, that I do not understand in this defence, is your inference, in the next period, where you tell me, "if this be so, you insist upon it, that I should clear myself;" for I do not see, how your having said, what you there said (for that is it which, this, here, if it be not within privilege, must signify) can be a reason, for your insisting on my clearing myself, of any thing, tho' I allow this to be your Lordship's ordinary way of proceeding, to insist upon your suggestions and suppositions, in one place, as if they were foundations to build what you pleased, on, in another.

THUS, then, stands your defence: "my grounds of certainty tend to scepticism; and to start new methods of certainty is of dangerous consequence." Because I did not consider this your accusation, in the proper place of considering it, this is the proper place of considering it: because your Lordship said, "I had given too just occasion, to the enemies of the christian faith, to make use of my words and notions;" and because your Lordship said so, therefore you insist upon it, that I clear myself, &c. This appears to me to be the connexion and force of your defence hitherto: if I am mistaken in it, your Lordship's words are set down, the reader must judge whether the construction of the words do not make it so.

BUT, before I leave them, there are some things, that I crave permission to represent to your Lordship, more particularly.

1. THAT to the accusation of scepticism, I have answered in another, and, as I think, a proper place.

Lett. 2. p.
82--95.
109.

2. THAT the accusation of dangerous consequence, I have considered and answered in my former letter; but that being, it seems, not the proper place of considering it, you have not, in this your defence, thought fit to take any notice of it.

3. THAT your Lordship has not any where proved, that my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, is apt to leave men's minds more doubtful, than they were before; which is what your accusation supposes.

4. THAT you set down those words of mine, "these words contain a farther accusation of my book, which shall be considered in its due place;" as all the answer, which I gave to that new accusation, except what you take notice of, out of my 95th page; and take no notice of what I say from page 82 to 95; where I considered it, as I promised, and, as I thought, fully answered it.

5. THAT "the too just occasion, you say, I have given to the enemies of the christian faith, to make use of my words and notions," wants to be proved.

6. THAT "what use the enemies of the christian faith have made of my words and notions," is nowhere shewn, tho' often talked of.

Lett. 2. p.
69, 85.

7. THAT "if the enemies of the christian faith have made use of my words and notions," yet that, as I have shewn, is no proof, that they are of dangerous consequence; much less is it a proof, that this proposition, "certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas," is of dangerous consequence. For some words, or notions, in a book, that are of dangerous consequence, do not make all the propositions of that book to be of dangerous consequence.

Answ. 1.
P. 37.

Lett. 2. p.
38--41.

8. THAT your Lordship tells me, "you were willing to have had me explained myself to the general satisfaction;" which is what, in the place, from which the former words are taken, you expressed thus: that "my answer did not come fully up in all things, to that, which you could wish." To which I have given an answer; and methinks your defence here should have been applied to that,

that, and not the same thing (which has been answered) set down again as part of your defence. But pray, my Lord, give me leave to ask, is not this meant for a personal matter? which, tho' the world, as you say, is soon weary of, your Lordship, it seems, is not.

9. THAT you say, "you insist upon it, that I cannot clear myself from laying that foundation, which the author of Christianity not mysterious built upon." Certainly this personal matter is of some very great consequence, that your Lordship, who understands the world so well, insists so much upon it. But if it be true, that he built upon my foundation, and it be of such moment to your Lordship's business, in the present controversy; methinks, without so much intricacy, it should not be hard to shew it: it is but proving, what foundation of certainty (for it is of that, all this dispute is) he went upon, which, as I humbly conceive, your Lordship has not done; and then shewing that to be my foundation of certainty; and the business is ended. But instead of this, your Lordship says, that "his account of reason supposes clear and distinct ideas, Vind. p. 232. necessary to certainty; that he imagined he built upon my grounds; that he Anfw. 1. thought his and my notions of certainty to be the same; that there has been p. 36. too just occasion given, for the enemies of the Christian faith, to apply my words, in I know not what manner." These, and the like arguments, to Ibid. p. 37. prove that he goes upon my grounds, your Lordship has used; but they are, I confess, too subtle and too fine for me, to feel the force of them, in a matter of fact, wherein it was so easy to produce both his and my grounds, out of our books (without all this talk, about suppositions, and imaginations, and occasions, so far remote from any direct proof) if it were a matter of that consequence, to be so insisted upon, as your Lordship professedly does.

YOUR Lordship has spent a great many pages to tie me to that author; and "you still insist upon it, that I cannot clear myself, from laying that foundation, which the author of Christianity not mysterious built upon." What this great concern, in a matter of so little moment, means, I leave the reader to guess: for, I beseech your Lordship, of what great consequence is it to the world? What great interest has any truth of religion in this, that I and another man (be he who he will) make use of the same grounds, to different purposes? This I am sure, it tends not to the clearing, or confirming, any one material truth in the world. If the foundation I have laid be true, I shall neither disown, nor dislike it, whatever this, or any other author shall build upon it; because, as your Lordship knows, ill things may be built upon a good foundation, and yet the foundation never the worse for it. And therefore, if that, or any other author hath built upon my foundation, I see nothing in it, that I ought to be concerned to clear myself from.

If you can shew that my foundation is false, or shew me a better foundation of certainty, than mine, I promise you immediately to renounce and relinquish mine, with thanks to your Lordship: but till you can prove, that he that first invented syllogism, as a rule of right reasoning, or first laid down this principle, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," is answerable for all those opinions, which have been endeavoured to be proved, by mode and figure, or have been built upon that maxim; I shall not think myself concerned, whatever any one shall build upon this foundation of mine, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of any two ideas, as they are expressed in any proportion: much less shall I think myself concerned, for what you shall please to suppose (for that, with submission, is all, you have done hitherto) any one has built upon it, tho' he were never so opposite to your Lordship, in any of the opinions, he should build on it.

IN that case, if he should prove troublesome to your Lordship, with any argument, pretended to be built upon my foundation, I humbly conceive, you have no other remedy, but to shew either the foundation false, and in that case I confess myself concerned; or his deductions from it wrong, and that I shall not be at all concerned in. But if, instead of this, your Lordship shall find another way, to subvert this foundation of certainty, but by saying, "the enemies

"of the Christian faith build on it," because you suppose one author builds on it; this, I fear, my Lord, will very little advantage the cause you defend, whilst it so visibly strengthens and gives credit to your adversaries, rather than weakens any foundation, they go upon. For the Unitarians, I imagine, will be apt to smile at such a way of arguing, viz. that they go on this ground, because the author of Christianity not mysterious goes upon it, or is supposed by your Lordship to go upon it: and by-standers will do little less than smile, to find my book brought into the Socinian controversy, and the ground of certainty, laid down in my Essay, condemned, only because that author is supposed by your Lordship to build upon it. For this, in short, is the case, and this the way your Lordship has used, in answering objections against the Trinity, in point of reason. I know your Lordship cannot be suspected of writing booty: but I fear such a way of arguing, in so great a man as your Lordship, will, "in an age, wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed, give too just an occasion to the enemies," and also to the friends, of the Christian faith, to suspect that there is a great failure somewhere.

BUT to pass by that: this I am sure is personal matter, which the world, perhaps, will think it need not have been troubled with.

P. 20, 21. YOUR defence of your third answer goes on; and to prove that the author of Christianity not mysterious built upon my foundation, you tell me, that my ground of certainty is the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, as expressed in any propositions; which are my own words. "From hence you urged, that let the proposition come to us any way, either by human, or divine authority, if our certainty depend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas contained in it. And from hence the author of Christianity not mysterious thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith, which are contained in propositions upon my grounds of certainty."

SINCE this personal matter appears of such weight to your Lordship, that it needs to be farther prosecuted; and you think this your argument, to prove that that author built upon my foundation, worth the repeating here again; I am obliged to enter again so far, into this personal matter, as to examine this passage, which I formerly passed by, as of no moment. For it is easy to shew, that, what you say, visibly proves not, that he built upon my foundation: and next, it is evident, that if it were proved that he did so; yet this is no proof, that my method of certainty is of dangerous consequence; which is what was to be defended.

As to the first of these, your Lordship would prove, that the author of Christianity not mysterious built upon my ground; and how do you prove it? viz. "because he thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith, which are contained in propositions, upon my ground." How does it appear, that he rejected them upon my grounds? Does he any where say so? No! that is not offered: there is no need of such an evidence of matter of fact, in a case, which is only of matter of fact. But "he thought he had reason to reject them, upon my grounds of certainty." How does it appear that he thought so? Very plainly: because, "let the proposition come to us by human, or divine authority, if our certainty depend upon the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of the ideas contained in it, we can be no more certain, than we have clear perception of that agreement." The consequence, I grant, is good, that if certainty, i. e. knowledge, consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, then we can certainly know the truth of no proposition further, than we perceive that agreement, or disagreement. But how does it follow from thence, that he thought he had reason, upon my grounds, to reject any proposition, that contained a mystery of faith; or, as your Lordship expresses it, "all mysteries of faith which are contained in propositions?"

WHETHER your Lordship, by the word rejecting, accuses him of not knowing, or of not believing, some proposition, that contains an article of faith; or what

what he has done, or not done, I concern not myself: that, which I deny, is the consequence above-mentioned, which I submit to your Lordship to be proved. And when you have proved it, and shewn yourself to be so familiar with the thoughts of that author, as to be able to be positive, what he thought, without his telling you; it will remain farther to be proved, that, because he thought so, therefore he built right, upon my foundation; for otherwise no prejudice will come to my foundation, by any ill use he made of it; nor will it be made good, that my method, or way of certainty, is of dangerous consequence; which is what your Lordship is here to defend. Methinks your Lordship's argument here is all one with this: Aristotle's ground of certainty (except of first principles) lies in this, that those things, which agree in a third, agree themselves: we can be certain of no proposition (excepting first principles) coming to us, either by divine, or human, authority, if our certainty depend upon this, farther than there is such an agreement: therefore the author of Christianity not mysterious thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith, which are contained in propositions, upon Aristotle's grounds. This consequence, as strange as it is, is just the same with what is in your Lordship's repeated argument against me: for let Aristotle's ground of certainty be this, that I have named, or what it will, how does it follow, that, because my ground of certainty is placed in the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, therefore the author of Christianity not mysterious rejected any proposition more, upon my grounds, than Aristotle's? And will not Aristotle, by your Lordship's way of arguing here, from the use any one may make, or think, he makes of it, be guilty also of starting a method of certainty, of dangerous consequence, whether this method be true or false, if that, or any other author, whose writings you dislike, thought he built upon it, or be supposed by your Lordship to think so? But, as I humbly conceive, propositions, speculative propositions, such as mine are, about which all this stir is made, are to be judged of, by their truth, or falsehood, and not by the use, any one shall make of them; much less by the persons, who are supposed to build on them: and, therefore, it may be justly wondered since you say, it is dangerous, why you never proved, or attempted to prove it, to be false.

BUT you complain here again, that I answered not a word to this, in the proper place. My Lord, if I offended your Lordship by passing it by, because I thought there was no argument in it; I hope I have now given you some sort of satisfaction, by shewing there is no argument in it, and letting you see, that your consequence, here, could not be inferred from your antecedent. If you think it may, I desire you to try it in a syllogism. For, whatever you are pleased to say, in another place, my way of certainty by ideas will admit of antecedents and consequents, and of syllogism, as the proper form, to try whether the inference be right, or no. I shall set down your following words, that the reader may see your Lordship's manner of reasoning, concerning this matter, in its full force and consistency, and try it in a syllogism, if he pleases. Your words are:

"By this it evidently appears, that altho' your Lordship was willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own sense; yet you by no means thought, that my words were wholly misunderstood, or misapplied, by that author; but rather that he saw into the true consequence of them, as they lie in my book." And what answer do I give to this? "Not a word, in proper place for it." P. 21.

You tell me, "you were willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own sense." If your Lordship had been conscious to yourself, that you had herein meant me any kindness, I think, I may presume, you would not have minded me here again, of a favour, which you had told me of, but in the preceding page, and, to make it an obligation, need not have been more than once talked of; unless your Lordship thought the obligation was such, that it would hardly be seen, unless I were told of it, in words at length, and in more places than one. For what favour, I beseech you, my Lord, is it to allow

allow me to do that, which needed not your allowance to be done, and I could have done (if it had been necessary) of myself, without being blamed for taking that liberty? Whatsoever, therefore, your meaning was, in these words, I cannot think you took this way, to make me sensible of your kindness.

YOUR Lordship says, "you were willing to allow me to interpret my own sense." What you were willing to allow me to do, I have done. My sense is, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; and my sense therein, I have interpreted to be the agreement, or disagreement, not only of perfectly clear and distinct ideas, but such ideas, as we have, whether they be, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct, or no. Farther, in answer to your objection, that it might be of dangerous consequence, I so explained my sense, as to shew, that certainty, in that sense, was not, nor could be of dangerous consequence. This, which was the point in question between us, your Lordship might have found, at large, explained in the 82d, and ten, or twelve following pages of my second letter, if you had been pleased to have taken notice of them.

BUT it seems you were more willing to tell me, "that tho' you were willing to allow me all ways of interpreting my own sense, yet you by no means thought that my words were wholly misunderstood, or misapplied by that author, but rather that he saw into the true consequence of them, as they lie in my book."

Anfw. I.
P. 35.

I shall here set down your Lordship's words, where (to give me and others satisfaction) you say, "you took care to prevent being misunderstood, which will best appear, by your own words, viz. that you must do that right to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Understanding, from whom these notions are borrowed, to serve other purposes than he intended them. It was too plain, that the bold writer against the mysteries of our faith took his notions and expressions from thence; and what could be said more for my Vindication, than that he turned them to other purposes, than the author intended them?" This you endeavour to prove, p. 43—46. and then conclude; "by which it is sufficiently proved, that you had reason to say, that my notion was carried beyond my intention." These words, out of your first letter, I shall leave here, set by those out of your second, that you may, at your leisure, if you think fit (for it will not become me to tell your Lordship that I am willing to allow it) explain yourself to the general satisfaction, that it may be known which of them is now your sense; for they are, I suppose, too much to be together, in any one's sense, at the same time.

Anfw. I.
P. 46.

MY intention being thus so well vindicated by your Lordship, that you think nothing could be said more for my Vindication; the misunderstanding, or not misunderstanding, of my book, by that, or any other author, is what I shall not waste my time about. If your Lordship thinks, he saw into the true consequence of this position of mine, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas (for it is from the inference, that you suppose he makes, from that my definition of knowledge, that you are here proving it to be of dangerous consequence) he is beholden to your Lordship for your good opinion of his quick sight: I take no part in that, one way or other. What consequences your Lordship's quick sight (which must be allowed to have out-done, what you suppose of that gentleman's) has found and charged on that notion as dangerous, I shall endeavour to give you satisfaction in.

Anfw. I.
P. 36.

You farther add, that "tho' I answered not a word, in the proper place, yet afterwards, lett. 2. p. 95. (for you would omit nothing, that may seem to help my cause) I offer something towards an answer."

P. 21. I SHALL be at a loss hereafter, what to do with the 82d, and following pages; to the 95th; since what is said, in those pages of my second letter, goes for nothing, because it is not in its proper place. Though, if any one will give himself the trouble to look into my second letter, he will find, that the argument I was upon, in the 46th page, obliged me to defer what I had farther to

to say to your new accusation : but that I re-assumed it in the 82d, and answered it in that and the following pages.

BUT supposing every writer had not that exactness of method, which shewed, by the natural and visible connexion of the parts of his discourse that every thing was laid in its proper place ; is it a sufficient answer, not to take any notice of it ? The reason, why I put this question, is, because if this be a rule in controversy, I humbly conceive, I might have passed over the greatest part of what your Lordship has said to me, because the disposition it has, under numerical figures, is so far from giving me a view of the orderly connexion of the parts of your discourse, that I have often been tempted to suspect the negligence of the printer, for misplacing your Lordship's numbers ; since, so ranked as they are, they do, to me, who am confounded by them, lose all order and connection quite.

THE next thing in the defence, which you go on with, is an exception to my use of the word certainty. In the close of the answer, I had made in the pages you pass over, I add, " that tho' the laws of disputation allow bare Lett. 2. p. denial, as a sufficient answer, to sayings, without any offer of a proof ; yet, 95. " my Lord, to shew how willing I am to give your Lordship all satisfaction in " what you apprehend, may be of dangerous consequence in my book, as to " that article, I shall not stand still fully, and put your Lordship upon the " difficulty of shewing, wherein that danger lies ; but shall, on the other side, " endeavour to shew your Lordship, that that definition of mine, whether " true or false, right or wrong, can be of no dangerous consequence to that " article of faith. The reason which I shall offer for it, is this ; because it can " be of no consequence to it, at all." And the reason of it was clear, from what I had said before, that knowing and believing were two different acts of Lett. 2. p. the mind : and that my placing of certainty, in the perception of the agree- 90. ment, or disagreement, of ideas, i. e. that my definition of knowledge, one of those acts of the mind, would not at all alter, or shake, the definition of faith, which was another act of the mind distinct from it : and, therefore, I added, " that the certainty of faith (if your Lordship thinks fit to call it so) has no- Lett. 2. p. " thing to do, with the certainty of knowledge. And to talk of the certainty 95. " of faith, seems all one to me, as to talk of the knowledge of believing ; a " way of speaking, not easy to me to understand."

THESE and other words to this purpose, in the following paragraphs, your Lordship lays hold on, and sets down, as liable to no small exception ; though, as you tell me, " the main strength of my defence lies in it." Let P. 23. what strength you please lie in it, my defence was strong enough without it. For to your bare saying, " my method of certainty might be of dangerous consequence to any article of the christian faith," without proving it, it was a defence strong enough, barely to deny, and put you upon shewing, wherein that danger lies ; which, therefore, this main strength of my defence, as you call it, apart, I insist on.

BUT, as to your exception to what I said, on this occasion, it consists in this, that there is a certainty of faith, and therefore you set down my saying, " that to talk of the certainty of faith, seems all one, as to talk of the knowledge of believing ;" as that, " which shews the inconsistency of my notion of " ideas with the articles of the christian faith." These are your words here, P. 23. and yet you tell me, " that it is not my way of ideas, but my way of cer- P. 74. tainty by ideas, that your Lordship is unsatisfied about." What must I do now, in the case, when your words are expressly, that my nature of ideas have an inconsistency with the articles of the christian faith ? Must I presume that your Lordship means my notion of certainty ? All that I can do, is to search out your meaning, the best I can, and then shew, where I apprehend it not conclusive. But this uncertainty, in most places, what you mean, makes me so much work, that a great deal is omitted, and yet my answer is too long.

YOUR Lordship asks, in the next paragraph, " how comes the certainty of P. 23. " faith to be so hard a point with me ?" Answ. I suppose you ask this question,

more to give others hard thoughts of my opinion of faith, than to be informed yourself. For you cannot be ignorant that, all along in my Essay, I use certainty for knowledge; so that for you to ask me, "how comes the certainty of faith to become so hard a point with me?" is the same thing, as for you to ask, how comes the knowledge of faith, or if you please, the knowledge of believing, to be so hard a point with me? A question which, I suppose, you will think needs no answer, let your meaning, in that doubtful phrase, be what it will.

I USED in my book the term certainty, for knowledge, so generally, that no body, that has read my book, tho' much less attentively than your Lordship, can doubt of it. That I used it in that sense there, I shall refer my reader
 B. iv. c. i. but to two places, amongst many, to convince him. This, I am sure, your
 § 1. and Lordship could not be ignorant of, that by certainty, I mean knowledge, since I
 c. 11. § 9. have so used it in my letters to you, instances whereof are not a few; some of
 Lett. 1. p. them may be found, in the places marked in the margin: and in my second
 81, 82, 107, letter, what I say in the leaf, immediately preceding that, which you quote
 111, 115, upon this occasion, would have put it past a possibility, for any one, to make
 118, 131, shew of a doubt of it, had not that been amongst those pages of my answer,
 138, 158, which, for, its being out of its proper place, it seems you were resolved not to
 171, 185. take notice of, and, therefore, I hope it will not be besides my purpose here, to mind you of it again.

AFTER having said something to shew, why I used certainty, and knowledge, for the same thing, I added, "that your Lordship could not but take
 Lett. 2. notice of this, in the 18th sect. of chap. iv. of my fourth book, it being a
 P. 93. passage you had quoted, and runs thus; "Wherever we perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge, and
 "wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is
 "certain real knowledge: of which having given the marks, I think I have
 "shewn, wherein certainty, real certainty, consists." And I farther add, in the
 immediately following words; "that my definition of knowledge, in the beginning of the fourth book of my Essay, stands thus: knowledge seems to be
 P. 94. nothing, but the perception of the connection, and agreement, or disagreement, and repugnancy of any of our ideas." Which is the very definition of certainty, that your Lordship is here contesting.

SINCE, then, you could not but know that, in this discourse, certainty with me stood for, or was the same thing with, knowledge; may not one justly wonder, how you come to ask me such a question, as this, "how comes the knowledge of believing, to become so hard a point with me?" For that was, in effect, the question that you asked, when you put in the term certainty, since you knew, as undoubtedly, that I meant knowledge, by certainty, as that I meant believing, by faith; i. e. you could doubt of neither. And that you did not doubt of it, is plain, from what you say in the next page, where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of speaking.

WHETHER it be a proper way of speaking, I allow to be a fair question. But when you knew what I meant, tho' I expressed it improperly, to put questions in a word of mine, used in a sense different from mine, which could not but be apt to insinuate to the reader, that my notion of certainty, derogated from the *πληροπρεπία* or full assurance of faith, as the scripture calls it: is what, I guess, in another, would make your Lordship ask again, "is this fair and ingenuous dealing?"

Heb. x. 22. My Lord, my bible expresses the highest degree of faith, which the apostle recommended to believers in his time, by full assurance. But assurance of faith, tho' it be what assurance soever, will by no means down with your Lordship, in
 P. 26. my writing. You say, I allow assurance of faith, God forbid, I should do otherwise: but then you ask, "why not certainty as well as assurance?" My Lord, I think it may be a reason not misbecoming a poor layman, and such, as he might presume, would satisfy a bishop of the church of England, that he found his bible to speak so. I find my bible speaks of the assurance of faith, but no where, that I can remember, of the certainty of faith, tho', in many places,
 it

it speaks of the certainty of knowledge, and therefore I speak so too; and shall not, I think, be condemned for keeping close to the expressions of our bible, tho' the scripture-language, as it is, does not so well serve your Lordship's turn, in the present case. When I shall see, in an authentick translation of our bible, the phrase changed, it will then be time enough for me, to change it too, and call it not the assurance, but certainty of faith: but, till then, I shall not be ashamed of it, notwithstanding you reproach me with it, by terming it, the assurance of faith, as I call it; when you might as well have termed it, the P. 31. assurance of faith, as our bible calls it.

It being plain, that by certainty I meant knowledge, and by faith, the act of believing; that these words where you ask, "how comes the certainty of faith to P. 23. become so hard a point with me?" and where you tell me, "I will allow no P. 26. certainty of faith;" may make no wrong impression in men's minds, who may be apt to understand them, of the object, and not merely of the act of believing; I crave leave to say with Mr. Chillingworth, "that I do heartily acknowledge and believe the articles of our faith, to be in themselves truths, as certain and infallible, as the very common principles of geometry and metaphysics. C. 6. § 3. But that there is not required of us a knowledge of them, and an adherence to them, as certain as that of sense, or science:" and that for this reason (amongst others, given both by Mr. Chillingworth, and Mr. Hooker) viz. "that faith is not knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently contained in it: so that he that knows, believes, and something more; but he, that believes, many times does not; nay, if he doth barely and merely believe, he doth never know." These are Mr. Chillingworth's own C. 6. § 2. words.

THAT this assurance of faith may approach very near to certainty, and not come short of it, in a sure and steady influence on the mind, I have so plainly declared, that no body, I think, can question it. In my chapter of reason, Essay, B. IV. which has received the honour of your Lordship's animadversions, I say of C. 17. § 16. some propositions wherein knowledge, [i. e. in my sense, certainty,] fails us, "that their probability is so clear and strong, that assent as necessarily follows it, as knowledge does demonstration." Does your Lordship ascribe any greater certainty than this, to an article of mere faith? If you do not, we are, it seems, agreed in the thing; and so, all that you have so emphatically said about it, is but to correct a mistake of mine, in the English tongue, if it prove to be one: a weighty point, and well worth your Lordship's bestowing so many pages upon! I say, mere faith, because tho' a man may be a christian, who merely believes that there is a God; yet that is not an article of mere faith, because it may be demonstrated that there is a God, and so may certainly be known.

YOUR Lordship goes on to ask, "have not all mankind, who have talked of P. 23. matters of faith, allowed a certainty of faith, as well as a certainty of knowledge?" To answer a question, concerning what all mankind, who have talked of faith, have done, may be within the reach of your great learning: as for me, my reading reaches not so far. The apostles and the evangelists, I can answer, have talked of matters of faith; but I do not find, in my bible, that they have any where spoke (for it is of speaking, here, the question is) of the certainty of faith; and what they allow, which they do not speak of, I cannot tell. I say, in my bible, meaning the English translation, used in our church: tho' what all mankind, who speak not of faith in English, can do, towards the deciding of this question, I do not see; it being about the signification of an English word. And whether, in propriety of speech, it can be applied to faith, can only be decided by those, who understand English, which all mankind, who have talked of matters of faith, I humbly conceive, did not.

To prove that certainty in English may be applied to faith, you say, that P. 24. among the Romans it was opposed to doubting; and, for that, you bring this Latin sentence, "Nil tam certum est, quam quod de dubio certum." Answ. Certum, among the Romans, might be opposed to doubting, and yet not

not be applied to faith, because knowledge, as well as believing, is opposed to doubting: and therefore, unless it had pleased your Lordship to have quoted the author, out of which this Latin sentence is taken, one cannot tell, whether certum be not in it spoken of a thing known, and not of a thing believed: tho', if it were so, I humbly conceive, it would not prove what you say, viz. that it, i. e. the word certainty, (for to that, it, must refer here, or to nothing, that I understand) was among the Romans, applied to faith; for, as I take it, they never used the English word, certainty: and tho' it be true, that the English word, certainty, be taken from the Latin word, certus; yet that, therefore, certainty, in English, is used exactly in the same sense, that certus is in Latin, that I think you will not say; for then certainty in English must signify purpose and resolution of mind, for to that certus is applied in Latin.

P. 24. You are pleased here to tell me, "that, in my former letter," I said, "that
" if we knew the original of words, we should be much helped to the ideas,
" they were first applied to, and made to stand for." I grant it true, nor shall I
unsay it here. For I said not, that a word, that had its original in one language,
kept always exactly the same signification, in another language, into which it
was from thence transplanted. But if you will give me leave to remind you

Vind. p. 237. of it, I remember that you, my Lord, say in the same place, "that little
" weight is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology, when a word is
" used in another sense, by the best authors." And I think you could not have
brought a more proper instance, to verify that saying, than that which you pro-
duce here.

BUT pray, my Lord, why so far about? Why are we sent to the antient Ro-
mans? Why must we consult (which is no easy task) all mankind who have
talked of faith, to know whether certainty be properly used for faith, or no;
when, to determine it between your Lordship and me, there is so sure a reme-
dy, and so near at hand? It is but for you to say, wherein certainty consists.
This, when I gently offered to your Lordship in my first letter, you interpreted
it to be a design, to draw you out of your way.

Answ. 1.
P. 69.

I AM sorry, my Lord, you should think it out of your way, to put an end,
a short end, to a controversy, which you think of such moment: methinks it
should not be out of your way, with one blow, finally to overthrow an asser-
tion, which you think "to be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith,
" which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend." I proposed the same again,
where I say; "for this there is a very easy remedy: it is but for your Lordship
" to set aside this definition of knowledge, by giving us a better, and this dan-
" ger is over. But you chuse rather to have a controversy with my book,
" for having it in it, and to put me upon the defence of it." This is so ex-
press, that your taking no notice of it, puts me at a loss what to think. To
say that a man, so great in letters, does not know, wherein certainty consists, is
a greater presumption, than I will be guilty of; and yet to think that you do
know, and will not tell, is yet harder. Who can think, or will dare to say,
that your Lordship, so much concerned for the articles of faith, and engaged
in this dispute with me, by your duty, for the preservation of them, should
chuse to keep up a controversy with me, rather than remove that danger, which
my wrong notion of certainty threatens to the articles of faith? For, my Lord,
since the question is moved, and it is brought by your Lordship to a publick
dispute, wherein certainty consists, a great many knowing no better, may
take up with what I have said, and, rather than have no notion of certainty,
at all, will stick by mine, till a better be shewed them. And if mine tends to
scepticism, as you say, and you will not furnish them with one that does not,
what is it but to give way to scepticism, and let it quietly prevail on men, as
either having my notion of certainty, or none at all? Your Lordship, indeed,
says something in excuse, in your 75th page; which, that my answer may be
in the proper place, shall be considered, when we come there.

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YOUR

YOUR Lordship declares, "that you are utterly against any private mints of P. 25. words." I know not what the publick may do, for your particular satisfaction in the case; but till publick mints of words are erected, I know no remedy for it, but that you must patiently suffer this matter to go on, in the same course, that I think it has gone in, ever since language has been in use. Here, in this island, as far as my knowledge reaches, I do not find, that, ever since the Saxons time, in all the alterations that have been made, in our language, that any one word, or phrase, has had its authority from the great seal, or passed by act of parliament.

WHEN the dazzling metaphor of the mint, and new milled words, &c. (which mightily, as it seems, delighted your Lordship, when you were writing that paragraph) will give you leave to consider this matter, plainly as it is, you will find, that the coining of money, in publicly authorized mints, affords no manner of argument against private men's meddling, in the introducing new, or changing the signification of old, words; every one of which alterations always has its rise, from some private mint. The case in short, is this; money, by virtue of the stamp, received in the publick mint, which vouches its intrinsic worth, has authority to pass. This use of the publick stamp would be lost, if private men were suffered to offer money, stamped by themselves. On the contrary, words are offered to the publick, by every private man, coined in his private mint, as he pleases; but it is the receiving of them by others, their very passing, that gives them their authority and currency, and not the mint, they come out of. Horace, I think, has given a true account of this matter, in a De Arte country, very jealous of any usurpation upon the publick authority: Poet.

"Multa renascentur, quæ jam cecidere, cadentque,
 "Quæ nunc sunt in honore, vocabula, si volet usus,
 "Quem penes arbitrium est & jus & norma loquendi."

But yet, whatever change is made in the signification, or credit of any word, by publick use, this change has always its beginning, in some private mint; so Horace tells us, it was in the Roman language, quite down to his time:

— "Ego cur acquirere pauca
 "Si possum, invideo? quum lingua Catonis & Enni
 "Sermonem patrium ditaverit, & nova rerum
 "Nomina protulerit? Licuit, semperque licebit,
 "Signatum præsentem notâ procudere nomen."

HERE we see Horace expressly says, that private mints of words were always licensed; and, with Horace, I humbly conceive, so they will always continue, how utterly soever your Lordship may be against them. And, therefore, he that offers, to the publick, new-milled words, from his own private mint, is not always, in that, so bold an invader of the publick authority, as you would make him.

THIS, I say, not to excuse myself in the present case; for I deny, that I have at all changed the signification of the word, certainty. And, therefore, if you had pleased, you might, my Lord, have spared your saying on this occasion, "that it seems our old words must not now pass, in the current sense; P. 24, 25. and those persons assume too much authority to themselves, who will not suffer common words to pass in their general acceptation:" and other things, to the same purpose, in this paragraph, till you had proved, that, in strict propriety of speech, it could be said, that a man was certain of that, which he did not know, but only believed.

If you had had time, in the heat of dispute, to have made a little reflection, on the use of the English word, certainty, in strict speaking, perhaps your Lordship would not have been so forward to have made my using it, only for pre-

cise knowledge, so enormous an impropriety; at least, you would not have accused it of weakening the credibility of any article of faith.

IT is true, indeed, people commonly say, they are certain of what they barely believe, without doubting. But it is as true, that they as commonly say, that they know it too. But no body from thence concludes, that believing is knowing. As little can they conclude, from the like vulgar way of speaking, that believing is certainty. All that is meant thereby, is no more but this, that the full assurance of their faith as steadily determines their assent, to the embracing of that truth, as if they actually knew it.

BUT, however such phrases, as these, are used to shew the steadiness and assurance of their faith, who thus speak; yet they alter not the propriety of our language, which, I think, appropriates certainty, only to knowledge, when, in strict and philosophical discourse, it is, upon that account, contra-distinguished to faith; as, in this case, here, your Lordship knows it is: whereof there is an

P. 115. express evidence, in my first letter, where I say, "that I speak of belief, and
" your Lordship of certainty; and that I meant belief, and not certainty.
" And that I made not an improper, nor unjustifiable use of the word, cer-
" tainty, in contra-distinguishing it thus to faith, I think I have an unques-
" tionable authority, in the learned and cautious Dr. Cudworth, who so uses it:
" what essence, says he, is to generation, the same is certainty of truth, or
" knowledge, to faith, p. $\frac{1}{8} \frac{3}{4}$.

P. 25. YOUR Lordship says, "certainty is common to both knowledge and faith,
" unless I think it impossible to be certain, upon any testimony whatsoever."
I think it is possible to be certain upon the testimony of God (for that, I sup-
pose, you mean) where I know that it is the testimony of God: because, in
such a case, that testimony is capable, not only to make me believe, but,
if I consider it right, to make me know the thing to be so; and so I may be
certain. For the veracity of God is as capable of making me know a propo-
sition to be true, as any other way of proof can be; and, therefore, I do not,
in such a case, barely believe, but know such a proposition to be true, and at-
tain certainty.

P. 26. THE sum of your accusation is drawn up thus: "that I have appropriated
" certainty to the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, in
" any proposition; and now I find this will not hold, as to articles of faith;
" and, therefore, I will allow no certainty of faith; which you think is not
" for the advantage of my cause." The truth of the matter of fact is, in short,
this; that I have placed knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or dis-
agreement, of ideas. This definition of knowledge, your Lordship said,
" might be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which you have
" endeavoured to defend." This I denied, and gave this reason for it, viz.
that a definition of knowledge, whether a good or bad, true or false definition,
could not be of ill, or any consequence to an article of faith: because a defini-
tion of knowledge, which was one act of the mind, did not at all concern faith,
which was another act of the mind, quite distinct from it. To this then, which
was the proposition in question between us, your Lordship, I humbly conceive,
should have answered. But, instead of that, your Lordship, by the use of the
word, certainty, in a sense that I used it not, (for you knew, I used it, only for
knowledge) would represent me, as having strange notions of faith. Whether
this be for the advantage of your cause, your Lordship will do well to con-
sider.

UPON such a use of the word, certainty, in a different sense, from what I
use it in, the force of all your Lordship says, under your first head, contained
in the two or three next paragraphs, depends, as I think; for I must own
(pardon my dulness) that I do not clearly comprehend the force of what your
Lordship there says: and it will take up too many pages, to examine it, period
by period. In short, therefore, I take your Lordship's meaning to be this:

" THAT there are some articles of faith, viz. the fundamental principles of
" natural religion, which mankind may attain to a certainty in, by reason,
" without

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“ without Revelation ; which, because a man, that proceeds upon my grounds, cannot attain to a certainty in, by reason, their credibility to him, when they are considered as purely matters of faith, will be weakened.” Those which your Lordship instances in, are the being of a God, providence, and the rewards and punishments of a future state.

THIS is the way, as I humbly conceive, your Lordship takes here, to prove my grounds of certainty (for so you call my definition of knowledge) to be of dangerous consequence to the articles of faith.

To avoid ambiguity and confusion, in the examining this argument of your Lordship's, the best way, I humbly conceive, will be to lay by the term, certainty ; which your Lordship and I using in different senses, is the less fit to make what we say to one another, clearly understood ; and instead thereof, to use the term knowledge, which, with me, your Lordship knows, is equivalent.

YOUR Lordship's proposition then, as far as it has any opposition to me, is this, that if knowledge be supposed to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, a man cannot attain to the knowledge, that these propositions, viz. “ that there is a God, a providence, and rewards and punishments in a future state, are true ; and therefore the credibility of these articles, considered purely as matters of faith, will be weakened to him.” Wherein there are these things to be proved by your Lordship.

1. THAT, upon my grounds of knowledge, i. e. upon a supposition that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of either of those propositions, viz. “ that there is a God, providence, and rewards and punishments in a future state.”

2. YOUR Lordship is to prove, that the not knowing the truth of any proposition, lessens the credibility of it ; which, in short amounts to this, that want of knowledge lessens faith, in any proposition proposed. This is the proposition to be proved, if your Lordship uses certainty, in the sense, I use it, i. e. for knowledge ; in which only use of it, will it here bear upon me.

BUT since I find your Lordship, in these two or three paragraphs, to use the word, certainty, in so uncertain a sense, as sometimes to signify knowledge by it, and sometimes believing, in general, i. e. any degree of believing ; give me leave to add, that if your Lordship means by these words, “ let us suppose a P. 27. “ person, by natural reason, to attain to a certainty, as to the being of a God, “ &c. i. e. attain to a belief, that there is a God, &c. or the soul's immortality,” I say, if you take certainty in such a sense, then it will be incumbent upon your Lordship to prove, that if a man finds the natural reason, whereupon he entertained the belief of a God, or of the immortality of the soul, uncertain, that will weaken the credibility of those fundamental articles, as matters of faith, or, which is in effect the same, that the weakness of the credibility of any article of faith from reason, weakens the credibility of it from Revelation. For it is this, which these following words of yours import : “ for before, there was P. 28. “ a natural credibility in them, on the account of reason : but by going on “ wrong grounds of certainty, all that is lost.”

To prove the first of these propositions, viz. that upon the supposition, that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this proposition, that there is a God ; your Lordship urges, that I have said, “ that no idea proves the existence of the thing, without itself ;” which argument, reduced to form, will stand thus ; if it be true, as I say, that no idea proves the existence of the thing without itself, then upon the supposition that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this proposition, “ that there is a God ;” which argument so manifestly proves not, that there needs no more to be said to it, than to desire that consequence to be proved.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, as to the immortality of the soul, your Lordship urges, that I have P. 28. said, that I cannot know but that "matter may think;" therefore upon my ground of knowledge, i. e. upon a supposition, that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, there is an end of the soul's immortality. This consequence I must also desire your Lordship to prove: only I crave leave, by the by, to point out some things, in these paragraphs, too remarkable to be passed over, without any notice.

P. 28. ONE is, that you "suppose a man is made certain, upon my general grounds of certainty," i. e. knows by the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, that there is a God, and yet "upon a further examination of my method, he finds that the way of ideas will not do." Here, my Lord, if by my grounds of certainty, my method, and my way of ideas, you mean one and the same thing; then your words will have a consistency, and tend to the same point. But then, I must beg your Lordship to consider, that your supposition carries a contradiction in it, viz. that your Lordship supposes, that by my grounds, my method, and my way of certainty, a man is made certain, and not made certain, that there is a God. If your Lordship means here, by my grounds of certainty, my method, and my way of ideas, different things (as it seems to me, you do) then, whatever your Lordship may suppose here, it makes nothing to the point in hand, which is to shew, that, by this my ground of certainty, viz. that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; a man first attains to a knowledge that there is a God, and afterwards, by the same grounds of certainty, he comes to lose the knowledge that there is a God, which, to me, seems little less than a contradiction.

'Tis likely your Lordship will say, you mean no such thing; for you allege this proposition, "that no idea proves the existence of any thing, without itself," and give that as an instance, that my way of ideas will not do, i. e. will not prove the being of a God. 'Tis true, your Lordship does so. But withal, my Lord, 'tis as true, that this proposition, supposing it to be mine (for it is not here set down, in my words) contains not my method, or way, or notion of certainty; tho' 'tis, in that sense alone, that it can here be useful to your Lordship, to call it my method, or the way by ideas.

YOUR Lordship undertakes to shew, that my defining knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, "weakens the credibility of this fundamental article of faith," that there is a God: what is your Lordship's proof of it? Just this: the saying that no idea proves the existence of the thing, without itself, will not do; ergo, the saying that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundamental article. This, my Lord, seems to me no proof; and all that I can find, that is offered to make it a proof, is only your calling these propositions "my general grounds of certainty, my method of proceeding, the way of ideas, and my own principles in point of reason;" as if that made these two propositions the same thing, and whatsoever were a consequence of one, may be charged as a consequence of the other: tho' it be visible, that tho' the latter of these be ever so false, or ever so far from being a proof of a God, yet it will by no means thence follow, that the former of them, viz. that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of that fundamental article. But it is but for your Lordship to call them both, "the way of ideas," and that is enough.

THAT I may not be accused by your Lordship "for unfair and disingenuous dealing, for representing this matter so;" I shall here set down your Lordship's P. 27. words at large: "let us now suppose a person, by natural reason, to attain to a certainty, as to the being of God, and immortality of the soul; and he proceeds upon J. L.'s general grounds of certainty, from the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; and so from the ideas of God and the soul, he is made certain of these two points before-mentioned. But let us again suppose, that such a person, upon a farther examination of J. L.'s method of proceeding, finds that the way of ideas, in these cases, will not do;" for no idea proves the existence of

"the thing without itself, any more than the picture of man proves his being, or the visions of a dream make a true history (which are J. L.'s own expressions) and, for the soul, he cannot be certain, but that matter may think, (as J. L. affirms) and then, what becomes of the soul's immateriality (and consequently immortality) from its operations? But for all this, says J. L. his assurance of faith remains firm, on its own basis. Now you appeal to any man of sense, whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles, which he went upon in point of reason, doth not weaken the credibility of these fundamental articles, when they are considered purely as matters of faith? For before, there was a natural credibility in them, on the account of reason; but by going on wrong grounds of certainty, all that is lost; and, instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever." These are your Lordship's own words; and now I appeal to any man of sense, whether they contain any other argument against my placing of certainty, as I do, but this, viz. a man mistakes, and thinks that this proposition, no idea proves the existence of the thing without itself, shews that, in the way of ideas, one cannot prove a God; ergo, this proposition, "certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundamental article, that there is a God." And so, of the immortality of the soul; because, I say, I know not but matter may think; your Lordship would infer, ergo, my definition of certainty weakens the credibility of the revelation of the soul's immortality.

YOUR Lordship is pleased here to call this proposition, "that knowledge, or certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas," my general grounds of certainty; as if I had some more particular grounds of certainty. Whereas I have no other ground, or notion, of certainty but this one alone; all my notion of certainty is contained in that one particular proposition: but, perhaps your Lordship did it, that you might make the proposition above-quoted, viz. "no idea proves the existence of the thing without itself, under the title, you give it, of the way of ideas, pass for one of my particular grounds of certainty;" whereas it is no more any ground of certainty of mine, or definition of knowledge, than any other proposition in my book.

ANOTHER thing, very remarkable, in what your Lordship here says, is, that you make the failing to attain knowledge, by any way of certainty, in some particular instances, to be the finding the uncertainty of the way itself; which is all one as to say, that if a man misses by algebra, the certain knowledge of some propositions in mathematics, therefore he finds the way, or principles, of algebra to be uncertain, or false. This is your Lordship's way of reasoning here: your Lordship quotes out of me, "that I say, no idea proves the existence of the thing, without itself;" and that I say, "that one cannot be certain, that matter cannot think:" From whence your Lordship argues, that he, who says so, cannot attain to certainty, that there is a God, or that the soul is immortal; and thereupon your Lordship concludes, "he finds the uncertainty of the principles he went upon, in point of reason," i. e. that he P. 28. finds this principle, or ground of certainty, he went upon, in reasoning, viz. that certainty, or knowledge, consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, to be uncertain. For if your Lordship means here, "by principles he went upon, in point of reason," any thing else, but that definition of knowledge, which your Lordship calls, my way, method, grounds, &c. of certainty, which I and others, to the endangering some articles of faith, go upon; I crave leave to say, it concerns nothing at all the argument, your Lordship is upon, which is to prove, that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas may be of dangerous consequence to any article of faith.

YOUR Lordship, in the next place, says, "before we can believe any thing, P. 29, 30. upon the account of revelation, we must suppose there is a God." What else does your Lordship make of this? Your Lordship thus argues; but by my way of

certainty, a man is made uncertain, whether there be a God, or no: for that P. 29. to me is the meaning of those words, "how can his faith stand firm, as to divine revelation, when he is made uncertain, by his own way, whether there be a God, or no? or they can to me mean nothing, to the question in hand." What is the conclusion from hence? This it must be, or nothing to the purpose; ergo, my definition of knowledge, or, which is the same thing, my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, leaves not the articles of faith the same credibility they had before.

To excuse my dulness, in not being able to comprehend this consequence, Ibid. pray, my Lord, consider, that your Lordship says: "before we can believe any thing, upon the account of revelation, it must be supposed that there is a God." But cannot he, who places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, suppose there is a God?

But your Lordship means by suppose, that one must be certain that there is a God. Let it be so, and let it be your Lordship's privilege in controversy, to use one word for another, tho' of a different signification, as, I think, to suppose, and be certain, are; cannot one that places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, be certain there is a God? I can assure you, my Lord, I am certain there is a God; and yet, I own, that I place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas: Nay, I dare venture to say to your Lordship, that I have proved there is a God, and see no inconsistency at all, between these two propositions, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, and that it is certain there is a God. So that this my notion of certainty, this definition of knowledge, for any thing your Lordship has said to the contrary, leaves, to this fundamental article, the same credibility, and the same certainty it had before.

P. 29. YOUR Lordship says farther, "to suppose divine revelation, we must be certain, that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world." Here again, my Lord, your way of writing makes work for my ignorance; and before I can either admit, or deny this proposition, or judge what force it has, to prove the proposition in question, I must distinguish it into these different senses, which, I think, your Lordship's way of speaking may comprehend. For your Lordship may mean it thus; "to suppose divine revelation, we must be certain, i. e. we must believe, that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world." Or your Lordship may mean thus, "we must be certain, i. e. we must know, that there is something above matter and motion in the world." In the next place, your Lordship may mean, by something above matter and motion, either simply an intelligent being; for knowledge, without determining, what being it is in, is a principle above matter and motion: or your Lordship may mean an immaterial, intelligent being. So that this undetermined way of expressing, includes, at least, four distinct propositions, whereof some are true, and others not so. For,

1. My Lord, if your Lordship means, that to suppose a divine revelation, a man must be certain, i. e. must certainly know, that there is an intelligent being in the world, and that that intelligent being is immaterial, from whence that revelation comes; I deny it. For a man may suppose revelation, upon the belief of an intelligent being, from whence it comes, without being able to make out to himself, by a scientific reasoning, that there is such a being. A proof whereof, I humbly conceive, are the Anthropomorphites among the christians, heretofore, who, nevertheless, rejected not the revelation of the New Testament: and he that will talk with illiterate people, in this age, will, I doubt not, find many, who believe the bible to be the word of God, though they imagine God himself, in the shape of an old man sitting in heaven; which they could not do, if they knew, i. e. had examined and understood any demonstration, whereby he is proved to be immaterial, without which they cannot know it.

2. If your Lordship means, that to suppose a divine revelation, it is necessary to know, that there is simply an intelligent being; this also I deny. For to suppose a divine revelation, is not necessary that a man should know that there is such an intelligent being in the world: I say, know, i. e. from things, that he does know, demonstratively deduce the proof of such a being: it is enough, for the receiving divine revelation, to believe, that there is such a being, without having, by demonstration, attained to the knowledge that there is a God. Every one, that believes right, does not always reason exactly, especially in abstract, metaphysical speculations: and if no-body can believe the bible to be of divine revelation, but he, that clearly comprehends the whole deduction, and sees the evidence of the demonstration, wherein the existence of an intelligent being, on whose will all other beings depend, is scientifically proved; there are, I fear, but few christians, among illiterate people, to look no farther. He that believes there is a God, tho' he does no more than believe it, and has not attained to the certainty of knowledge, i. e. does not see the evident demonstration of it, has ground enough to admit of divine revelation. The apostle tells us, "that he that will come to God, must believe that he is;" but I do not remember the scripture any where says, that he must know that he is.

3. In the next place, if your Lordship means, that "to suppose divine revelation, a man must be certain," i. e. explicitly believe, that there is a perfectly immaterial being; I shall leave it to your Lordship's consideration, whether it may not be ground enough for the supposition of a revelation, to believe that there is an all-knowing, unerring being, who can neither deceive, nor be deceived, without a man's precisely determining in his thoughts, whether that unerring, omniscient being be immaterial, or no. It is past all doubt, that every one, that examines and reasons right, may come to a certainty that God is perfectly immaterial: but it may be a question, whether every one who believes a revelation to be from God, may have entered into the disquisition of the immateriality of his being: whether, I say, every ignorant day-labourer, who believes the bible to be the word of God, has, in his mind, considered materiality and immateriality, and does explicitly believe God to be immaterial, I shall leave to your Lordship to determine, if you think fit, more expressly than your words do here.

4. If your Lordship means, "that to suppose a divine revelation, a man must be certain, i. e. believe, that there is a supreme, intelligent being," from whence it comes, who can neither deceive, nor be deceived; I grant it to be true.

THESE being the several propositions, either of which may be meant, in your Lordship's so general, and, to me, doubtful, way of expressing yourself; to avoid the length, which, a particular answer to each of them, would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture to answer, to an ambiguous proposition in one sense, when the author has the liberty of saying, he meant it in another; a great convenience of general, loose, and doubtful expressions! I will, I say, venture) to answer to it, in the sense, I guess most suited to your Lordship's purpose; and see what your Lordship proves by it. I will, therefore, suppose your Lordship's reasoning to be this; that,

"To suppose divine revelation, a man must be certain, i. e. believe, that there is a principle above matter and motion, i. e. an immaterial, intelligent being, in the world." Let it be so; what does your Lordship infer? "Therefore upon the principle of certainty, by ideas, he [i. e. he that places P. 29. certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas] cannot be certain of [i. e. believe] this." This consequence seems a little strange, but your Lordship proves it thus; "because he does not know, but matter may think:" which argument, put into form, will stand thus;

If one, who places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, does not know, but matter may think; then, whoever

places

places certainty so, cannot believe, there is an immaterial, intelligent being, in the world.

BUT there is one, who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, does not know, but matter may think :

ERGO, whoever places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, cannot believe that there is an intelligent, immaterial being.

P. 29. THIS argumentation is so defective, in every part of it, that, for fear I should be thought to make an argument, for your Lordship, in requital for the answer your Lordship made for me, I must desire the reader to consider, your Lordship says, " we must be certain ; he cannot be certain, because he doth not know : " which, in short, is, we cannot, because he cannot ; and he cannot, because he doth not. This considered, will justify the syllogism I have made, to contain your Lordship's argument, in its full force.

I COME, therefore, to the syllogism itself, and there first, I deny the minor, which is this :

" THERE is one who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, doth not know, but matter may think."

I BEGIN with this, because this is the foundation of all your Lordship's argument ; and, therefore, I desire your Lordship would produce any one, who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, does not know but matter may think.

P. 29. THE reason, why I press this, is, because, I suppose, your Lordship means me here, and would have it thought, that I say, I do not know but that matter may think : but that I do not say so ; nor any thing else, from whence may be inferred, what your Lordship adds, in the annexed words, if they can be inferred from it ; " and consequently, all revelation may be nothing, but the effects of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a disordered imagination, as Spinoza affirmed : "

B. iv. c. 10. § 10. On the contrary, I do say, " it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with, or without, motion, could have originally in, and from, itself perception and knowledge." And, having in that chapter established this truth,

B. iv. c. 3. § 6. that there is an eternal, immaterial, knowing being ; I think no body, but your Lordship, could have imputed to me, the doubting, that there was such a being, because, I say, in another place, and to another purpose, " it is impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking, immaterial substance : it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehensions, to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our idea of matter, a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it, another substance, with a faculty of thinking." From my saying thus, that God (whom I have proved to be an immaterial being) by his omnipotency, may, for ought we know, superadd, to some parts of matter, a faculty of thinking, it requires some skill, for any one, to represent me, as your Lordship does here, as one ignorant, or doubtful, whether matter may not think ; to that degree, " that I am not certain, or I do not believe that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world ; and consequently all revelation may be nothing, but the effects of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a disordered imagination, as Spinoza affirmed." For thus I, or somebody else (whom I desire your Lordship to produce) stands painted, in this your Lordship's argument, from the supposition of a divine revelation ; which your Lordship brings here to prove, that the defining of knowledge, as I do, to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of the articles of the christian faith.

BUT if your Lordship thinks it so dangerous a position to say, " it is not much harder for us to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd, to matter, a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it, another substance,

“ substance, with a faculty of thinking;” (which is the utmost I have said, concerning the faculty of thinking in matter:) I humble conceive, it would be more to your purpose to prove, that the infinite, omnipotent Creator of all things, out of nothing, cannot, if he pleases, superadd to some parcels of matter, disposed as he sees fit, a faculty of thinking, which the rest of matter has not; rather than to represent me, with that candour, your Lordship does, as one, who so far makes matter a thinking thing, as thereby to question the being of a principle, above matter and motion, in the world, and consequently to take away all revelation: which, how natural and genuine a representation it is of my sense, expressed in the passages of my Essay, which I have above set down, I humbly submit to the reader's judgment, and your Lordship's zeal for truth, to determine; and shall not stay to examine, whether man may not have an exalted fancy, and the heats of a disordered imagination, equally overthrowing divine revelation, tho' the power of thinking be placed only in an immaterial substance.

I COME now to the sequel of your major, which is this:

“ If any one, who places certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, does not know, but matter may think; then, who ever places certainty so, cannot believe there is an immaterial, intelligent being in the world.”

THE consequence here is from does not, to cannot, which I cannot but wonder to find, in an argument of your Lordship's. For he that does not, to day, believe, or know, that matter cannot be so ordered by God's omnipotency, as to think (if that subverts the belief of an immaterial, intelligent being in the world) may know, or believe, it to-morrow; or, if he should never know, or believe it, yet others, who define knowledge, as he does, may know, or believe it: unless your Lordship can prove, that it is impossible for any one, who defines knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, to know, or believe, that matter cannot think. But this, as I remember, your Lordship has not, any where, attempted to prove. And yet without this, your Lordship's way of reasoning is no more, than to argue, that one cannot do a thing, because another does not do it. And yet, upon this strange consequence, is built all, that your Lordship brings here to prove, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of articles of faith, v. g.

IT weakens the credibility of this fundamental article of faith, that there is a God! How so? Because I, who have so defined knowledge, say in my Essay, “ That the knowledge of the existence of any other thing [but of God] we can have only by sensation: For there being no necessary connexion, of real existence, with any idea, a man hath in his memory, nor of any other existence, but that of God, with the existence of any particular man; no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him: for the having the idea of any thing, in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.” For so are the words of my book, and not, as your Lordship has been pleased to set them down here: and they were well chosen by your Lordship, to shew, that the way of ideas would not do; i. e. in my way by ideas, I cannot prove there is a God.

BUT supposing I had said in that place, or any other, that which would hinder the proof of a God, as I have not, might I not see my error, and alter, or renounce; that opinion, without changing my definition of knowledge? Or could not another man, who defined knowledge, as I do, avoid thinking, as your Lordship says, I say, “ that no idea proves the existence of the thing, without “ itself;” and so be able, notwithstanding my saying so, to prove that there is a God?

AGAIN, your Lordship argues, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of the articles of faith, because it takes away revelation; and

your proof of that is, "because I do not know, whether matter may not think."

THE same sort of argumentation your Lordship goes on with, in the next P. 30. page, where you say; "again, before there can be any such thing, as assurance of faith, upon divine revelation, there must be a certainty, as to sense and tradition; for there can be no revelation pretended now, without immediate inspiration; and the basis of our faith is a revelation, contained in an ancient book, whereof the parts were delivered at distant times, but conveyed down to us, by an universal tradition. But now, what if my grounds of certainty can give us no assurance, as to these things? Your Lordship says, you do not mean, that they cannot demonstrate matters of fact, which it were most unreasonable to expect, but that these grounds of certainty make all things uncertain; for your Lordship thinks, you have proved, that this way of ideas cannot give a satisfactory account, as to the existence of the plainest objects of sense;" because reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas: "how then can we arrive to any certainty, in perceiving those objects by their ideas?"

ALL the force of which argument lies in this, that I have said (or am supposed to have said, or to hold; for that I ever said so, I do not remember) that "reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas:" Ergo, whoever holds that knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, cannot have any assurance of faith, upon divine revelation.

MY Lord, let that proposition, viz. "that reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas," be mine, as much as your Lordship pleases, and let it be as inconsistent, as you please, with the assurance of faith, upon divine revelation; how will it follow, from thence, that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, is the cause, that "there cannot be any such thing, as the assurance of faith, upon divine revelation," to any body? Tho' I, who hold knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, have the misfortune to run into this error, viz. "that reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas," which is inconsistent with the assurance of faith upon divine revelation; yet it is not necessary that all others, who with me hold, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, should also hold, "that reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas," or that I myself should always hold it: unless your Lordship will say, that whoever places certainty, as I do, in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, must necessarily hold all the errors that I do, which are inconsistent with, or weaken, the belief of any article of faith, and hold them incorrigibly. Which has as much consequence, as if I should argue, that because your Lordship, who lives at Worcester, does, sometime, mistake in quoting me; therefore, no body, who lives at Worcester, can quote my words right, or your Lordship can never mend your wrong quotations. For, my Lord, the holding certainty to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, is no more a necessary cause of holding those erroneous propositions, which your Lordship imputes to me, as weakening the credibility of the mentioned articles of faith, than the place of your Lordship's dwelling is a necessary cause of wrong quoting.

I SHALL not here go about to trouble your Lordship, with divining again, what may be your Lordship's precise meaning, in several of the propositions, contained in the passage above set down; especially that remarkably ambiguous, and, to me, obscure, one, viz. "there must be a certainty, as to sense and tradition." I fear, I have wasted too much of your Lordship's, and my reader's time, in that employment already; and there would be no end, if I should endeavour to explain, whatever I am at a loss about the determined sense of, in any of your Lordship's expressions.

ONLY I will crave leave to beg my reader to observe, that, in this first head, P. 27---31. which we are upon, your Lordship has used the terms, certain, and certainty, near twenty times, but without determining, in any of them, whether you mean knowledge, or the full assurance of faith, or any degree of believing; tho' it be evident, that, in these pages, your Lordship uses certainty, for all these three: which ambiguous use of the main word, in that discourse, cannot but render your Lordship's sense clear and perspicuous, and your argument very cogent; and no doubt will do so, to any one, who will be but at the pains to reduce that one word to a clear, determined sense, all thro' these few paragraphs.

YOUR Lordship says, "have not all mankind, who have talked of matters P. 23. "of faith, allowed a certainty of faith, as well as a certainty of knowledge?" Answ. But did ever any one, of all that mankind, allow it as tolerable way of speaking, that believing, in general (for which your Lordship has used it) which contains in it the lowest degree of faith, should be called certainty? Could he, who said, "I believe; Lord, help my unbelief," or any one, who is weak in faith, or of little faith; be properly said to be certain, or "de dubio certus," of what he believes, but with a weak degree of assent? I shall not question what your Lordship's great learning may authorize; but I imagine, every one hath not skill, or will not assume the liberty to speak so.

IF a witness before a judge, asked upon his oath, whether he were certain of such a thing, should answer, yes, he was certain; and, upon further demand, should give this account of his certainty, that he believed it; would he not make the court and auditors believe strangely of him? For to say, that a man is certain, when he barely believes, and that, perhaps, with no great assurance of faith, is to say that he is certain, where he owns an uncertainty. For he that says, he barely believes, acknowledges that he assents to a proposition, as true, upon bare probability. And where any one assents thus, to any proposition, his assent excludes not a possibility, that it may be otherwise; and where, in any one's judgment, there is a possibility to be otherwise, there one cannot deny, but there is some uncertainty; and the less cogent the probabilities appear, upon which he assents, the greater the uncertainty. So that all barely probable proofs, which procure assent, always containing some visible possibility, that it may be otherwise (or else it would be demonstration) and consequently the weaker the probability appears, the weaker the assent, and the more the uncertainty; it thence follows, that, where there is such a mixture of uncertainty, there a man is so far uncertain: and therefore to say, that a man is certain, where he barely believes, or assents but weakly, tho' he does believe, seems to me to say, that he is certain and uncertain together. But tho' bare belief always includes some degrees of uncertainty, yet it does not, therefore, necessarily include any degree of wavering; the evidently strong probability may as steadily determine the man to assent to the truth, or make him take the proposition for true, and act accordingly, as knowledge makes him see, or be certain, that it is true. And he that doth so, as to truths revealed in the scripture, will shew his faith by his works; and has, for ought I can see, all the faith necessary to a Christian, and required to salvation.

MY Lord, when I consider the length of my answer here, to these few pages of your Lordship's, I cannot but bemoan my own dulness, and own my unsuitness to deal with so learned an adversary, as your Lordship, in controversy: for I know not how to answer, but to a proposition of a determined sense. Whilst it is vague and uncertain, in a general, or equivocal, use of any of the terms, I cannot tell what to say to it. I know not but such comprehensive ways of expressing one's self, may do well enough in declamation; but, in reasoning, there can be no judgment made, till one can get to some positive determined sense of the speaker. If your Lordship had pleased to have descended so far to my low capacity, as to have delivered your meaning here, determined to any one of the senses above set down, or any other, that you may have in these words, I gathered them from, it would have saved me a great deal

deal of writing, and your Lordship's loss of time in reading. I should not say this here to your Lordship, were it only in this one place, that I find this inconvenience: it is every where, in all your Lordship's reasonings, that my want of understanding causes me this difficulty, and, against my will, multiplies the words of my answer: for notwithstanding all that great deal, that I have already said, to these few pages of your Lordship's; yet my defence is not clear, and set in its due light, unless I shew in particular, of every one of those propositions (some whereof I admit as true, others I deny, as not so) that it will not prove, what is to be proved, viz. That my placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, lessens the credibility of any article of faith, which it had before.

P. 31. YOUR Lordship having done with the fundamental article of natural religion, you come, in the next place, to those of revelation; to enquire, as your Lordship says, "whether those, who embrace the articles of faith, in the way of ideas, can retain their certainty of those articles, when these ideas are quitted?" What this inquiry is, I know not very well, because I neither understand what it is, to embrace articles of faith in the way of ideas, nor know what your Lordship means by retaining their certainty of those articles, when these ideas are quitted. But it is no strange thing, for my short fight, not always distinctly to discern your Lordship's meaning: yet here I presume to know, that this is the thing to be proved, viz. "that my definition of knowledge does not leave to the articles of the Christian faith, the same credibility, they had before." The articles your Lordship instances in, are,

P. 32: 1. THE resurrection of the dead. And here your Lordship proceeds, just in the same method of arguing, as you did in the former: your Lordship brings several passages, concerning identity, out of my Essay, which you suppose inconsistent with the belief of the resurrection of the same body; and this is your argument to prove, that my defining of knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, "alters the foundation of this article of faith, and leaves it not the same credibility, it had before." Now, my Lord, granting all that your Lordship has here quoted, out of my chapter of identity and diversity, to be as false, as your Lordship pleases, and as inconsistent as your Lordship would have it, with the article of the resurrection from the dead; nay, granting all the rest of my whole Essay to be false; how will it follow from thence, that the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of this article of faith, that the dead shall rise? Let it be, that I, who place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, am guilty of errors, that weaken the credibility of this article of faith; others, who place certainty in the same perception, may not run into those errors, and so not have their belief of this article at all shaken.

YOUR Lordship, therefore, by all the long discourse, you have made here, against my notion of personal identity, to prove that it weakens the credibility of the resurrection of the dead, should you have proved it ever so clearly, has not, I humbly conceive, said therein any one word, towards the proving, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of this article of faith. For, this, my Lord, is the proposition to be proved, as your Lordship cannot but remember, if you please to recollect what is said, in your 21st and following pages, and what, in the 95th page of my second letter, quoted by your Lordship, it was designed as an answer to. And so I proceed to the next articles of faith, your Lordship instances in. Your Lordship says,

P. 44: 2. "THE next articles of faith, which my notion of ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the Trinity, and the incarnation of our Saviour." Where I must humbly crave leave to observe to your Lordship, that in this second head, here, your Lordship has changed the question from my notion of certainty, to my notion of ideas. For the question, as I have often had occasion to observe to your Lordship, is, whether my notion of certainty, i. e. my placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement,

disagreement, of ideas, alters the foundation, and lessens the credibility of any article of faith? This being the question, between your Lordship and me, ought, I humbly conceive, most especially to have been kept close to, in this article of the Trinity; because it was upon the account of my notion of certainty, as prejudicial to the doctrine of the Trinity, that my book was first brought into this dispute. But your Lordship offers nothing, that I can find, to prove that my definition of knowledge, or certainty, does any way lessen the credibility of either of the articles, here mentioned, unless your insisting upon some supposed errors of mine, about nature and person, must be taken for proofs of this proposition, that my definition of certainty lessens the credibility of the articles of the Trinity, and our Saviour's incarnation. And then the answer, I have already given, to the same way of argumentation, used by your Lordship, concerning the articles of a God, revelation, and the resurrection, I think may suffice.

HAVING, as I beg leave to think, shewn that your Lordship has not in the least proved this proposition, that the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, weakens the credibility of any one article of faith, which was your former accusation against this (as your Lordship is pleased to call it) "new method of certainty, of so dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend;" and all that your terrible representation of it, being, as I humbly conceive, come to just nothing; I come now to vindicate my book from your new accusation, in your last letter, and to shew, that you no more prove the passages, you allege out of my Essay, to have any inconsistency with the articles of the Christian faith, you oppose them to, than you have proved by them, that my definition of knowledge weakens the credibility of any of those articles.

I. "THE article of the Christian faith your Lordship begins with, is that of the resurrection of the dead;" and concerning that, you say, "the reason of believing the resurrection of the same body, upon my grounds, is from the idea of identity." Ans^r. Give me leave, my Lord, to say, that the reason P. 32. of believing any article of the Christian faith (such as your Lordship is here speaking of) to me, and upon my grounds, is its being a part of divine revelation. Upon this ground I believed it, before I either writ that chapter of identity and diversity; and before I ever thought of those propositions, which your Lordship quotes out of that chapter: and, upon the same ground, I believe it still; and not from my idea of identity. This saying of your Lordship's, therefore, being a proposition neither self-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your foundation failing, all your large superstructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

BUT, my Lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to represent to your Lordship, that I thought you undertook to make out, that my notion of ideas was inconsistent with the articles of the Christian faith. But that, which your Lordship instances in here, is not, that I yet know, an article of the Christian faith. The resurrection of the dead, I acknowledge to be an article of the Christian faith: but that the resurrection of the same body, in your Lordship's sense of the same body, is an article of the Christian faith, is what, I confess, I do not yet know.

IN the New Testament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the Christian faith) I find our Saviour and the Apostles to preach the resurrection of the dead, and the resurrection from the dead, in many places: but I do not remember any place, where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember, in any place of the New Testament (where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of) any such expression, as the resurrection of the body, much less of the same body. "And it may seem to be, not without some special reason, that where St. Paul's discourse was particularly, concerning the body, and so led him to name it; yet when he speaks of the resurrection, he says, you, and not your bodies," 1 Cor. vi. 14.

I SAY, the general resurrection at the last day; because where the resurrection of some particular persons, presently upon our Saviour's resurrection, is mentioned, the words are, "The graves were opened, and many bodies of "faints, which slept, arose, and came out of the graves, after his resurrection, "and went into the holy city, and appeared to many." Of which peculiar way of speaking of this resurrection, the passage itself gives a reason in these words, "appeared to many;" i. e. those who slept appeared, so as to be known to be risen. But this could not be known, unless they brought with them the evidence, that they were those, who had been dead, whereof there were these two proofs; their graves were opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the same to those, who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been those, who had been dead so long, that all, who knew them once alive, were now gone, those, to whom they appeared might have known them to be men, but could not have known they were risen from the dead, because they never knew they had been dead. All that, by their appearing, they could have known, was, that they were so many living strangers, of whose resurrection they knew nothing. It was necessary, therefore, that they should come in such bodies, as might, in make and size, &c. appear to be the same they had before, that they might be known to those of their acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable, they were such as were newly dead, whose bodies were not yet dissolved and dissipated; and, therefore, it is particularly said here (differently from what is said of the general resurrection) that "their bodies arose;" because they were the same, that were then lying in their graves, the moment before they arose.

BUT your Lordship endeavours to prove, it must be the same body: and let us grant, that your Lordship, nay, and others too, think you have proved, it must be the same body; will you therefore say, that he holds, what is inconsistent with an article of faith, who having never seen this your Lordship's interpretation of the scripture, nor your reasons for the same body, in your sense of same body; or, if he has seen them, yet not understanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the scripture proposes to him, viz. that, at the last day, the dead shall be raised, without determining, whether it shall be with the very same bodies, or no?

I KNOW, your Lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of scripture, into articles of faith; and, if you do not, he that believes the dead shall be raised, believes that article of faith, which the scripture proposes; and cannot be accused of holding any thing inconsistent with it, if it should happen, that what he holds, is inconsistent with another proposition, viz. "that the dead shall be raised with the same bodies," in your Lordship's sense; which I do not find proposed in Holy Writ, as an article of faith.

P. 34. 35. BUT your Lordship argues, "it must be the same body;" which, as you explain same body, "is not the same individual particles of matter, which were "united at the point of death; nor the same particles of matter, that the sinner "had, at the time of the commission of his sins: but that it must be the same "material substance, which was vitally united to the soul here;" i. e. as I understand it, the same individual particles of matter, which were, some time or other, during his life here, vitally united to his soul.

P. 37. YOUR first argument, to prove that it must be the same body, in this sense
John v. 28, of the same body, is taken from these words of our Saviour: "All that are in
29. "the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth." From whence your Lordship argues, that these words, "all that are in their graves," relate to no other substance than what was united to the soul, in life; because "a different "substance cannot be said to be in the graves, and to come out of them." Which words of your Lordship's, if they prove any thing, prove that the soul too is lodged in the grave, and raised out of it, at the last day. For your Lordship says, "can a different substance be said to be in their graves, and come out of "them?" So that, according to this interpretation of these words of our Saviour,

no other substance, being raised, but what hears his voice; and no other substance hearing his voice, but what being called, comes out of the grave; and no other substance coming out of the grave, but what was in the grave; any one must conclude, that the soul, unless it be in the grave, will make no part of the person that is raised, unless, as your Lordship argues against me, "you can make it out that a substance, which never was in the grave, may P. 37. "come out of it," or, that the soul is no substance.

BUT setting aside the substance of the soul; another thing, that will make any one doubt, whether this your interpretation of our Saviour's words be necessarily to be received, as their true sense, is, that it will not be very easily reconciled to your saying, you do not mean, by the same body, "the same P. 34. "individual particles, which were united, at the point of death." And yet, by this interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other particles, but such as were united at the point of death; because you mean no other substance, but what comes out of the grave, and no substance, no particles come out, you say, but what were in the grave: and I think your Lordship will not say, that the particles, that were separate from the body by perspiration, before the point of death, were laid up in the grave.

BUT your Lordship, I find, has an answer to this; viz. "that, by comparing P. 37. "this with other places, you find that the words [of our Saviour above quoted] are "to be understood of the substance of the body, to which the soul was united; "and not to (I suppose your Lordship writ, of) those individual particles" i. e. those individual particles, that are in the grave, at the resurrection; for so they must be read, to make your Lordship's sense entire, and to the purpose of your answer here. And then, methinks, this last sense of our Saviour's words, given by your Lordship, wholly overturns the sense which you have given of them above; where, from those words, you press the belief of the resurrection of the same body, by this strong argument, that a substance could not, upon hearing the voice of Christ, "come out of the grave, which was never in "the grave;" there (as far as I can understand your words) your Lordship argues, that our Saviour's words must be understood of the particles in the grave, "unless, as your Lordship says, one can make it out, that a substance, which "never was in the grave, may come out of it." And here your Lordship expressly says, that "our Saviour's words are to be understood of the substance of "that body, to which the soul was [at any time] united, and not to those "individual particles, that are in the grave." Which, put together, seems to me to say, that our Saviour's words are to be understood of those particles only that are in the grave, and not of those particles only, which are in the grave; but of others also, which have, at any time, been vitally united to the soul, but never were in the grave.

THE next text your Lordship brings, to make the resurrection of the same body, in your sense, an article of faith, are these words of St. Paul: "For we 2Cor. v. 10. "must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive "the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be "good or bad." To which your Lordship subjoins this question; "can these P. 38. "words be understood of any other material substance, but that body, in "which these things were done?" Answer. A man may suspend his determining the meaning of the apostle to be, that a sinner shall suffer for his sins in the very same body, wherein he committed them; because St. Paul does not say he shall have the very same body, when he suffers, that he had, when he sinned. The apostle says indeed, "done in his body." The body he had, and did things in, at five, or fifteen, was no doubt his body, as much as that, which he did things in, at fifty, was his body, tho' his body were not the very same body, at those different ages: and so will the body, which he shall have, after the resurrection, be his body, tho' it be not the very same with that, which he had at five, or fifteen, or fifty. He that at threescore is broke on the wheel, for a murder he committed at twenty, is punished for what he did in his body; tho' the body he has, i. e. his body at threescore, be not the same, i. e. made up of the same individual

individual particles of matter, that that body was, which he had forty years before. When your Lordship has resolved with yourself, what that same immutable, he, is, which at the last judgment shall receive the things done in his body; your Lordship will easily see, that the body he had, when an embryo in the womb, when a child playing in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when bed-ridden, dying of a consumption, and, at last, which he shall have after his resurrection; are each of them, his body, tho' neither of them be the same body, the one with the other.

BUT farther, to your Lordship's question; "can these words be understood of any other material substance, but that body, in which these things were done?" I answer, these words of St. Paul may be understood of another material substance, than that body, in which these things were done; because your Lordship teaches me, and gives me a strong reason, so to understand them.

- P. 34. Your Lordship says, that, "you do not say the same particles of matter, which the sinner had, at the very time of the commission of his sins, shall be raised at the last day." And your Lordship gives this reason for it: "for then a long sinner must have a vast body, considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration." Now, my Lord, if the apostle's words, as your Lordship would argue, cannot be understood of any other material substance, but that body, in which these things were done; and no body, upon the removal, or change, of some of the particles that, at any time, make it up, is the same material substance, or the same body: it will, I think, thence follow, that either the sinner must have all the same individual particles, vitally united to his soul when he is raised, that he had vitally united to his soul, when he sinned: or else St. Paul's words, here, cannot be understood to mean "the same body, in which the things were done." For if there were other particles of matter, in the body, wherein the things were done, than in that, which is raised, that which is raised, cannot be the same body, in which they were done: unless that alone, which has just all the same individual particles, when any action is done, being the same body, wherein it was done, that also, which has not the same individual particles, wherein that action was done, can be the same body, wherein it was done; which is, in effect, to make the same body, sometimes to be the same, and sometimes not the same.

YOUR Lordship thinks it suffices to make the same body, to have not all, but no other particles of matter, but such as were some time, or other, vitally united to the soul before: but such a body, made up of part of the particles some time, or other, vitally united to the soul, is no more the same body, wherein the actions were done, in the distant parts of the long sinner's life, than that is the same body, in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters, of the same particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example; a sinner has acted here, in his body, an hundred years; he is raised at the last day; but with what body? The same, says your Lordship, that he acted in; because St. Paul says, "he must receive the things done in his body." What, therefore, must his body at the resurrection consist of? Must it consist of all the particles of matter, that have ever been vitally united to his soul? For they, in succession, have, all of them, made up his body, wherein he did

- P. 35. these things. No, says your Lordship, that would make his body too vast; it suffices to make the same body, in which the things were done, that it consists of some of the particles, and no other, but such as were, some time, during his life, vitally united to his soul. But, according to this account, his body at the resurrection being, as your Lordship seems to limit it, near the same size it was, in some part of his life; it will be no more the same body, in which the things were done, in the distant parts of his life, than that is the same body, in which half, or three quarters, or more of the individual matter, that then made it up, is now wanting. For example; let his body, at fifty years old, consist of a million of parts; five hundred thousand at least of those parts will be different from those, which made up his body at ten years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical particles, that made

up

up his body at fifty, or any other season of his life; or to gather them promiscuously out of those, which at different times, have successively been vitally united to his soul; they will no more make the same body, which was his, wherein some of his actions were done, than that is the same body, which has but half the same particles: and yet all your Lordship's argument, here, for the same body, is, because St. Paul says it must be his body, in which these things were done; which it could not be, "if any other substance were joined to it," i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body, which were not vitally united to the soul, when the action was done.

AGAIN, your Lordship says, "that you do not say the same individual P. 34. particles [shall make up the body at the resurrection] which were united at the point of death; for there must be a great alteration in them, in a lingering disease, as, if a fat man falls into a consumption." Because it is likely your Lordship thinks these particles of a decrepit, wasted, withered body would be too few, or unfit to make such a plump, strong, vigorous, well-sized body, as it has pleased your Lordship to proportion out, in your thoughts, to men, at the resurrection; and therefore, some small portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's soul, shall be re-assumed to make up his body to the bulk, your Lordship judges convenient: but the greatest part of them shall be left out, to avoid the making his body more vast, than your Lordship thinks will be fit, as appears, by these your Lordship's words, immediately following, viz. "that you do not say, the same particles the sinner had, at the P. 35. very time of commission of his sins; for then a long sinner must have a vast body."

BUT then pray, my Lord, what must an embryo do, who, dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his soul, has no particles of matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his body, of that size and proportion, which your Lordship seems to require, in bodies at the resurrection? or must we believe he shall remain content with that small pittance of matter, and that yet imperfect body, to eternity; because it is an article of faith, to believe the resurrection of the very same body? i. e. made up of only such particles, as have been vitally united to the soul. For if it be so, as your Lordship says, "that life is the result of the union of soul and body," it will follow, that the body of an embryo, dying in the P. 43. womb, may be very little, not the thousandth part of any ordinary man. For since, from the first conception and beginning of formation, it has life, and "life is the result of the union of the soul with the body;" an embryo, that shall die, either by the untimely death of the mother, or by any other accident, presently after it has life, must, according to your Lordship's doctrine, remain a man, not an inch long, to eternity; because there are not particles of matter, formerly united to his soul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made use of, to that purpose: tho' what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with particles of matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that should be demanded.

By these, and not a few other the like consequences, one may see, what service they do to religion, and the christian doctrine, who raise questions, and make articles of faith, about the resurrection of the same body, where the scripture says nothing of the same body; or, if it does, it is with no small repugnance to those, who make such an enquiry. "But some man will say, 1 Cor. xv, how are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou 35, &c. fool, that, which thou sowest, is not quickened, except it die. And that, which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but bare grain; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him." Words, I should think, sufficient to deter us from determining any thing for, or against, the same body's being raised at the last day. It suffices, that all the dead shall be raised, and every one appear and

answer for the things done in this life; and receive according to the things, he hath done in his body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has said nothing inconsistent herewith, I presume, may, and must, be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the dead.

P. 38. BUT your Lordship, to prove the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith, farther asks, "how could it be said, if any other substance be joined to the soul, at the resurrection, as its body, that they were the things done in, or by the body?" Answ. Just as it may be said of a man, at an hundred years old, that hath then another substance joined to his soul, than he had at twenty, that the murder, or drunkenness, he was guilty of, at twenty, were things done in the body: how, by the body, comes in here, I do not see.

YOUR Lordship adds, "and St. Paul's dispute, about the manner of raising the body, might soon have ended, if there were no necessity of the same body." Answ. When I understand what argument there is in these words, to prove the resurrection of the same body, without the mixture of one new atom of matter, I shall know what to say to it. In the mean time, this I understand, that St. Paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about this matter, if he had said, that there was a necessity of the same body, or that it should be the same body.

2 COR. xv. 16. P. 38. THE next text of scripture you bring, for the same body, is, "if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is not Christ raised." From which your Lordship argues; "it seems, then, other bodies are to be raised, as his was." I grant other dead, as certainly raised, as Christ was; for else his resurrection would be of no use to mankind: but I do not see how it follows, that they should be raised with the same body, as Christ was raised with the same body, as your Lordship infers, in these words annexed; "and can there be any doubt, whether his body was the same material substance, which was united to his soul before?" I answer, none at all; nor that it had just the same undistinguished lineaments and marks; yea, and the same wounds, that it had at the time of his death. If, therefore, your Lordship will argue, from other bodies being raised, as his was, that they must keep proportion with his, in sameness; then we must believe, that every man shall be raised with the same lineaments, and other notes of distinction, he had, at the time of his death, even with his wounds yet open, if he had any, because our Saviour was so raised; which seems, to me, scarce reconcilable with what your Lordship says

P. 34. of a fat man falling into a consumption, and dying.

BUT whether it will consist, or no, with your Lordship's meaning in that place, this to me seems a consequence, that will need to be better proved, viz. that our bodies must be raised the same, just as our Saviour's was; because St. Paul says, "if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is not Christ risen." For it may be a good consequence, Christ is risen; and, therefore, there shall be a resurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good consequence, Christ was raised with the same body he had at his death, therefore all men shall be raised with the same body they had at their death, contrary to what your Lordship says, concerning a fat man dying of a consumption. But the case I think far different, betwixt our Saviour, and those to be raised at the last day.

1. HIS body saw not corruption, and, therefore, to give him another body, new moulded, mixed with other particles, which were not contained in it, as it lay in the grave, whole and entire, as it was laid there, had been to destroy his body, to frame him a new one, without any need. But why with the remaining particles of a man's body, long since dissolved, and mouldered into dust and atoms (whereof, possibly, a great part may have undergone variety of changes, and entered into other concretions, even in the bodies of other men) other new particles of matter mixed with them, may not serve to make his body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the

the old, did, in the compass of his life, make his body; I think no reason can be given.

THIS may serve to shew, why, tho' the materials of our Saviour's body, were not changed at his resurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man, dead and rotten in his grave, or burnt, may, at the last day, have several new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience: since, whatever matter is vitally united to his soul, is his body, as much as is that, which was united to it, when he was born, or in any other part of his life.

2. In the next place, the size, shape, figure, and lineaments of our Saviour's body, even to his wounds, into which doubting Thomas put his fingers and his hand, were to be kept, in the raised body of our Saviour, the same they were at his death, to be a conviction to his disciples, to whom he shewed himself, and who were to be witnesses of his resurrection, that their master, the very same man, was crucified, dead and buried, and raised again; and, therefore, he was handled by them, and eat before them, after he was risen, to give them, in all points, full satisfaction, that it was really he, the same, and not another, nor a spectre, or apparition, of him: tho' I do not think your Lordship will thence argue, that because others are to be raised, as he was, therefore it is necessary to believe, that because he eat after his resurrection, others, at the last day, shall eat and drink, after they are raised from the dead; which seems to me, as good an argument, as because his undissolved body was raised out of the grave, just as it there lay, entire, without the mixture of any new particles, therefore the corrupted and consumed bodies of the dead, at the resurrection, shall be new framed, only out of those scattered particles, which were once vitally united to their souls, without the least mixture of any one single atom of new matter. But, at the last day, when all men are raised, there will be no need to be assured of any one particular man's resurrection. It is enough, that every one shall appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done, in his former life; but, in what sort of body he shall appear, or of what particles made up, the scripture having said nothing, but that it shall be a spiritual body, raised in incorruption, it is not for me to determine.

YOUR Lordship asks, "were they [who saw our Saviour after his resurrection] P. 39. "witnesses only of some material substance, then united to his soul?" In answer, I beg your Lordship to consider, whether you suppose our Saviour was to be known, to be the same man (to the witnesses, that were to see him, and testify his resurrection) by his soul, that could neither be seen, nor known to be the same; or by his body, that could be seen, and by the discernible structure and marks of it, be known to be the same? When your Lordship has resolved that, all that you say in that page will answer itself. But, because one man cannot know another to be the same, but by the outward, visible lineaments, and sensible marks, he has been wont to be known and distinguished by; will your Lordship therefore argue, that the great judge, at the last day, who gives to each man, whom he raises, his new body, shall not be able to know who is who, unless he give to every one of them a body, just of the same figure, size, and features, and made up of the very same individual particles, he had in his former life? Whether such a way of arguing for the resurrection of the same body, to be an article of faith, contributes much to the strengthening the credibility of the article of the resurrection of the dead, I shall leave to the judgment of others.

FARTHER, for the proving the resurrection of the same body, to be an article of faith, your Lordship says; "but the apostle insists upon the resurrection of P. 40. "Christ, not merely as an argument of the possibility of ours, but of the certainty of it; because he rose, as the first fruits; Christ the first-fruits, after- 1 Cor. xv. "wards they that are Christ's at his coming." Answ. No doubt the resurrection 20, 23. of Christ is a proof of the certainty of our resurrection. But is it, therefore,

a proof of the resurrection of the same body, consisting of the same individual particles, which concurred to the making up of our body, here, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter? I confess, I see no such consequence.

P. 40. BUT your Lordship goes on: "St. Paul was aware of the objections, in men's minds, about the resurrection of the same body; and it is of great consequence, as to this article, to shew upon what grounds he proceeds. But some men will say, how are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come? First, he shews, that the seminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation." Answ. I do not perfectly understand what it is, "for the seminal parts of plants to be wonderfully improved, by the ordinary providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation;" or else, perhaps, I should better see, how this here tends to the proof of the resurrection of the same body, in your Lordship's sense.

P. 40. IT continues, "they sow bare grain of wheat, or of some other grain, but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body, Here, says your Lordship, is an identity of the material substance supposed."

Ver. 37. It may be so: but to me a diversity of the material substance, i. e. of the component particles, is here supposed, or in direct words said. For the words of St. Paul, taken all together, run thus; "that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body, which shall be, but bare grain:" and so on, as your Lordship has set down the remainder of them. From which words of St. Paul, the natural argument seems to me to stand thus: if the body, that is put in the earth, in sowing, is not that body which shall be; then the body, that is put in the grave, is not that, i. e. the same body that shall be.

P. 40. BUT your Lordship proves it to be the same body, by these three Greek Words of the text, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, which your Lordship interprets thus, "that proper body, which belongs to it." Answ. Indeed by those Greek words, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, whether our translators have rightly rendered them, "his own body," or your Lordship more rightly, "that proper body, which belongs to it," I formerly understood no more but this; that, in the production of wheat, and other grain, from seed, God continued every species distinct; so that, from grains of wheat sown, root, stalk, blade, ear, and grains of wheat were produced, and not those of barley, and so of the rest; which I took to be the meaning of "to every seed his own body." No, says your Lordship, these words prove, that to every plant of wheat, and to every grain of wheat, produced in it, is given the proper body, that belongs to it, which is the same body with the grain that was sown. Answ. This, I confess, I do not understand; because I do not understand, how one individual grain can be the same with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual grains, for such, sometimes, is the increase.

P. 40. BUT your Lordship proves it. For, says your Lordship, "every seed, having that body in little, which is afterwards so much enlarged; and, in grain, the seed is corrupted, before its germination; but it hath its proper organical parts, which make it the same body with that, which it grows up to. For, altho' grain be not divided into lobes, as other seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most accurate observations, that, upon separating the membranes, these seminal parts are discerned in them, which afterwards grow up to that body, which we call corn." In which words I crave leave to observe, that your Lordship supposes, that a body may be enlarged by the addition of a hundred, or a thousand, times as much in bulk, as its own matter, and yet continue the same body; which, I confess I cannot understand.

BUT, in the next place, if that could be so, and that the plant, in its full growth, at harvest, increased by a thousand, or a million, of times as much new matter added to it, as it had, when it lay in little, concealed in the grain that was sown, was the very same body; yet I do not think, that your Lord-

ship

ship will say, that every minute, insensible and inconceivably small grain of the hundred grains, contained in that little, organized, seminal plant, is every one of them the very same with that grain, which contains that whole little seminal plant, and all those invisible grains in it: for then it will follow, that one grain is the same with an hundred, and an hundred, distinct grains, the same with one; which I shall be able to assent to, when I can conceive that all the wheat in the world is but one grain.

For I beseech you, my Lord, consider, what it is St. Paul here speaks of; it is plain he speaks of that, which is sown and dies, i. e. the grain, that the husbandman takes out of his barn, to sow in his field. And of this grain, St. Paul says, "that it is not that body that shall be." These two, viz. "that which is sown, and that body, that shall be," are all the bodies, that St. Paul here speaks of, to represent the agreement or difference of men's bodies after the resurrection, with those they had, before they died. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, which of these two is that little, invisible seminal plant, which your Lordship here speaks of? Does your Lordship mean by it, the grain, that is sown? But that is not, what St. Paul speaks of; he could not mean this embryonated, little plant, for he could not denote it by these words, "that which thou sowest," for that, he says, must die; but this little embryonated plant, contained in the seed that is sown, dies not: or does your Lordship mean by it, "the body that shall be?" But neither by these words, "the body that shall be," can St. Paul be supposed to denote this, insensible, little, embryonated plant; for that is already in being, contained in the seed that is sown; and, therefore, could not be spoke of, under the name of the body that shall be. And, therefore, I confess, I cannot see, of what use it is to your Lordship, to introduce, here, this third body, which St. Paul mentions not; and to make that the same, or not the same, with any other, when those, which St. Paul speaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, these two, visible, sensible bodies, the grain sown, and the corn grown up to ear; with neither of which this insensible, embryonated plant can be the same body, unless an insensible body can be the same body with a sensible body, and a little body can be the same body with one ten thousand, or an hundred thousand times, as big as itself. So that yet, I confess, I see not the resurrection of the same body proved, from these words of St. Paul, to be an article of faith.

YOUR Lordship goes on; "St. Paul indeed saith, that we sow not that body that shall be; but he speaks not of the identity, but the perfection of it." Here my understanding fails me again: for I cannot understand St. Paul to say, that the same, identical, sensible grain of wheat, which was sown at seed-time, is the very same, with every grain of wheat, in the ear, at harvest, that sprang from it: yet so I must understand it, to make it prove, that the same, sensible body, that is laid in the grave, shall be the very same with that, which shall be raised at the resurrection. For I do not know of any seminal body in little, contained in the dead carcase of any man, or woman; which, as your Lordship says, in seeds, having its proper organical parts, shall afterwards be enlarged, and, at the resurrection, grow up into the same man. For I never thought of any seed, or seminal parts, either of plant, or animal, "so wonderfully improved" by the providence of God, whereby the same plant or animal, should beget itself; nor ever heard, that it was, by divine providence, designed to produce the same individual, but for the producing of future and distinct individuals, for the continuation of the same species.

YOUR Lordship's next words are, "and altho' there be such a difference, P. 41. "from the grain itself, when it comes up to be perfect corn, with root, stalk, blade and ear, that it may be said, to outward appearance, not to be the same body; yet, with regard to the seminal and organical parts, it is as much the same, as a man, grown up, is the same with the embryo in the womb." Answ. It does not appear, by any thing, I can find in the text, that St. Paul here compared the body produced, with the seminal and organical parts contained in the grain, it sprang from, but with the whole, sensible grain, that was sown.

Microscopes had not then discovered the little embryo plant in the seed; and supposing it should have been revealed to St. Paul (tho', in the scripture, we find little revelation of natural philosophy) yet an argument, taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be of no manner of use to them, nor serve at all, either to instruct, or convince them. But granting that those, St. Paul writ to, knew it, as well as Mr. Lewenhooke; yet your Lordship thereby proves not the raising of the same body: your Lordship says, it is as much the same [I crave leave to add, body] "as a man grown up is the same (same what, I beseech your Lordship?) with the embryo in the womb." For that the body of the embryo in the womb, and body of the man grown up, is the same body, I think no one will say, unless he can persuade himself that a body, that is not the hundredth part of another, is the same with that other; which, I think, no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous way by ideas, of thinking and reasoning, he has learnt to say that a part and the whole are the same.

- P. 41. YOUR Lordship goes on: "and altho' many arguments may be used to prove, that a man is not the same; because life, which depends upon the course of the blood, and the manner of respiration and nutrition is so different in both states; yet that man would be thought ridiculous, that should seriously affirm, that it was not the same man. And your Lordship says, I grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants, alters not the identity; and
 Essay, b. ii. "and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one
 c. 27. § 4. "common life, makes the identity of a plant." Answ. My Lord, I think the question is not about the same man, but the same body: for tho' I do say (somewhat differently from what your Lordship sets down, as my words, here) that that, which has such an organization, as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of a plant, in which consists the vegetable life; continues to be the same plant, as long as it partakes of the same life, tho' that life be communicated to new particles of matter, vitally united to the living plant:" yet I do not remember that I any where say, that a plant, which was once no bigger than an oat-staw, and afterwards grows to be above a fathom about, is the same body, tho' it be still the same plant.

THE well-known tree in Epping-forest, called the King's-oak, which, from not weighing an ounce at first, grew to have many tuns of timber in it, was all along the same oak, the very same plant; but no body, I think, will say it was the same body, when it weighed a tun, as it was when it weighed but an ounce; unless he has a mind to signalize himself, by saying, that that is the same body, which has a thousand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the same; which is no better than to say, that a thousand different particles are but one and the same particle, and one and the same particle is a thousand different particles; a thousand times a greater absurdity, than to say, half is the whole, or the whole is the same with the half. Which will be improved ten thousand times yet farther, if a man shall say (as your Lordship seems to me, to argue here) that that great oak is the very same body with the acorn, it sprang from, because there was, in that acorn, an oak in little, which was afterwards (as your Lordship expresses it) so much enlarged, as to make that mighty tree: for this embryo, if I may so call it, or oak in little, being not the hundredth or perhaps the thousandth, part of the acorn, and the acorn being not the thousandth part of the grown oak; it will be very extraordinary, to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the same body, by a way, wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one particle of an hundred thousand, or a million, is the same in the one body, that it was in the other. From which way of reasoning, it will follow, that a nurse and her sucking child have the same body; and be past doubt, that a mother and her infant have the same body. But this is a way of certainty, found out to establish the articles of faith, and to overturn the new method of certainty, that your Lordship says, "I have started, which is apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before."

AND

AND now I desire your Lordship to consider, of what use it is to you, in the present case, to quote out of my Essay these words, "that partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant;" since the question is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body; it being a very different thing, to be the same plant, and to be the same body: for that, which makes the same plant, does not make the same body; the one being the partaking in the same, continued, vegetable life, the other the consisting of the same numerical particles of matter. And, therefore, your Lordship's inference from my words above quoted, in these which you subjoin, seems to me a very strange one, viz. "so that, in things capable of any sort of life, the identity is consistent with a continued succession of parts; and so the wheat, grown up, is the same body, with the grain that was sown:" for, I believe if my words, from which you infer, "and so the wheat, grown up, is the same body with the grain that was sown," were put into a syllogism, this would hardly be brought to be the conclusion.

BUT your Lordship goes on, with consequence upon consequence, tho' I have not eyes acute enough, every where to see the connexion, until you bring it to the resurrection of the same body. The connexion of your Lordship's words is as followeth: "and thus the alteration of the parts of the body, at the resurrection, is consistent with its identity, if its organization and life be the same; and this is a real identity of the body, which depends not upon consciousness: from whence it follows, that to make the same body, no more is required, but restoring life to the organized parts of it." If the question were about raising the same plant, I do not say, but there might be some appearance, for making such an inference from my words as this; "whence it follows, that to make the same plant, no more is required, but to restore life to the organized parts of it." But this deduction, wherein, from those words of mine, that speak only of the identity of a plant, your Lordship infers, there is no more required to make the same body, than to make the same plant; being too subtle for me, I leave to my reader to find out.

YOUR Lordship goes on, and says, "that I grant likewise, that the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession, vitally united to the same organized body." Answ. I speak, in these words, of the identity of the same man; and your Lordship thence roundly concludes, "so that there is no difficulty of the sameness of the body." But your Lordship knows, that I do not take these two sounds, man and body, to stand for the same thing; nor the identity of the man to be the same, with the identity of the body.

BUT let us read out your Lordship's words: "so that there is no difficulty, as to the sameness of the body, if life were continued; and if, by divine power, life be restored to that material substance, which was before united, by a re-union of the soul to it, there is no reason to deny the identity of the body: not from the consciousness of the soul, but from that life, which is the result of the union of the soul and body."

IF I understand your Lordship right, you, in these words, from the passages above quoted out of my book, argue, that, from those words of mine, it will follow, that it is, or may be, the same body, that is raised at the resurrection. If so, my Lord, your Lordship has then proved, that my book is not inconsistent with, but conformable to this article of the resurrection of the same body, which your Lordship contends for, and will have to be an article of faith: for tho' I do, by no means, deny that the same bodies shall be raised at the last day, yet I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith.

BUT your Lordship goes on, with your proofs, and says; "but St. Paul still supposes, that it must be that material substance, to which the soul was before united. For, saith he, "it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory, it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. Can such

- “such a material substance, which was never united to the body, be said to be sown in corruption, and weakness, and dishonour? Either, therefore, he must speak of the same body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended. I answer, can such a material substance, which was never laid in the grave, be said to be sown,” &c? For your Lordship says, “you do not say the same individual particles, which were united at the point of death, shall be raised at the last day;” and no other particles are laid in the grave, but such as are united at the point of death; either, therefore, your Lordship must speak of another body, different from that, which was sown, which shall be raised; or else your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended.
- P. 34. BUT, whatever be your meaning, your Lordship proves it to be St. Paul's meaning, that the same body shall be raised, which was sown, in these following words; “for what does all this relate to a conscious principle?” Answer. The scripture being express, that the same persons should be raised, and appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive, according to what he had done in his body; it was very well suited to common apprehensions (which refined not, “about particles, that had been vitally united to the “foul”) to speak of the body, which each one was to have, after the resurrection, as he would be apt to speak of it, himself. For it being his body, both before and after the resurrection, every one ordinarily speaks of his body, as the same, tho' in a strict and philosophical sense, as your Lordship speaks, it be not the very same. Thus it is no impropriety of speech to say, “this body of mine, which was formerly strong and plump, is now weak and wasted;” tho' in such a sense as you are speaking here, it be not the same body. Revelation declares nothing, any where, concerning the same body, in your Lordship's sense of the same body, which appears not to have been then thought of. The apostle directly proposes nothing for, or against, the same body, as necessary to be believed: that which he is plain and direct in, is his opposing and condemning such curious questions about the body, which could serve only to perplex, not to confirm, what was material and necessary for them to believe, viz. a day of judgment, and retribution to men in a future state; and, therefore, it is no wonder that, mentioning their bodies, he should use a way of speaking, suited to vulgar notions, from which it would be hard positively to conclude any thing, for the determining of this question (especially against expressions, in the same discourse, that plainly incline to the other side) in a matter which, as it appears, the apostle thought not necessary to determine, and the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's curiosity in.
- P. 43. BUT your Lordship says, “the apostle speaks plainly of that body, which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to corruption, and is to be restored with more noble qualities.” I wish your Lordship had quoted the words of St. Paul, wherein he speaks plainly of that numerical body, that was once quickened; they would presently decide this question. But your Lordship proves it, by these following words of St. Paul; “for this corruption must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality;” to which your Lordship adds, “that you do not see how he could more expressly affirm “the identity of this corruptible body, with that after the resurrection.” How expressly it is affirmed by the apostle, shall be considered by and by. In the mean time, it is past doubt, that your Lordship best knows, what you do, or do not see: but this I will be bold to say, that if St. Paul had any where, in this chapter (where there are so many occasions for it, if it had been necessary to have been believed) but said in express words, that the same bodies should be raised; every one else, who thinks of it, will see, he had more expressly affirmed the identity of the bodies, which men now have, with those, they shall have, after the resurrection.
- P. 44. THE remainder of your Lordship's period, is; “and that without any respect to the principle of self-consciousness.” Answer. These words, I doubt not, have some meaning, but, I must own, I know not what; either, towards the proof of the resurrection of the same body, or to shew that any thing

I have said, concerning self-consciousness, is inconsistent: for I do not remember, that I have any where said, that the identity of body consisted in self-consciousness.

FROM your preceding words, your Lordship concludes thus: "and so, if the p. 44. scripture be the sole foundation of our faith, this is an article of it." My Lord, to make the conclusion unquestionable, I humbly conceive, the words must run thus; "and so, if the scripture, and your Lordship's interpretation of it, be the sole foundation of our faith; the resurrection of the same body is an article of it." For, with submission, your Lordship has neither produced express words of scripture for it, nor so proved that to be the meaning of any of those words of scripture, which you have produced for it, that a man, who reads, and sincerely endeavours, to understand the scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe, as expressly, "that the same bodies of the dead," in your Lordship's sense, shall be raised, as "that the dead shall be raised." And I crave leave to give your Lordship this one reason for it:

HE who reads, with attention, this discourse of St. Paul, where he discourses 1 Cor. xv. of the resurrection, will see, that he plainly distinguishes between the dead, that shall be raised, and the bodies of the dead. For it is *νεκροί, πάντες, ἔτι*, are the Ver. 15, 22, nominative cases to *ἐγερθήσονται, ζωοποιθήσονται, ἐγερθήσονται*, all along, and not *σώματα*, 23, 29, 32, 35, 52. bodies; which one may, with reason, think, would, somewhere or other, have been expressed, if all this had been said, to propose it, as an article of faith, that the very same bodies should be raised. The same manner of speaking, the Spirit of God observes, all thro' the New Testament, where it is said, "raise * the dead, quicken, or make alive, the dead, the resurrection of the dead." Nay, these very words of our † Saviour, urged by your Lordship, for the resurrection of the same body, run thus: *πάντες ὁ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀκούσονται τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται, ἐκ τῶν ἀψάβη ποιήσασθαι ἐκ ἀνέκτων ζῶντες, ὅτι ὁ παῦλος ἀπέχαιρε ἐκ ἀνέκτων κρῖτους*. Would a well-meaning searcher of the scriptures be apt to think, that if the thing, here intended by our Saviour, were to teach and propose it as an article of faith, necessary to be believed by every one, that the very same bodies of the dead should be raised; would not, I say, any one be apt to think, that, if our Saviour meant so, the words should rather have been, *πάντα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις*, i. e. "all the bodies, that are in the graves," rather than "all, who are in the graves;" which must denote persons, and not precisely bodies?

ANOTHER evidence, that St. Paul makes a distinction between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, so that the dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. xv. to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead, are these words of the apostle; "but some man will say, how are the dead raised? and with what bodies do Ver. 35. they come?" Which words, dead, and, they, if supposed to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead, the question will run thus: "how are the dead bodies raised? and, with what bodies do the dead bodies come?" which seems to have no very agreeable sense.

THIS, therefore, being so, that the Spirit of God keeps so expressly to this phrase, or form of speaking, in the New Testament, "of raising, quickening, rising, resurrection, &c. of the dead," where the resurrection at the last day is spoken of; and that the body is not mentioned, but in answer to this question, "with what bodies shall those dead, who are raised, come? So that, by the dead, cannot precisely be meant, the dead bodies; I do not see but a good Christian, who reads the scripture, with an intention to believe all, that is there revealed to him, concerning the resurrection, may acquit himself of his duty therein, without entering into the inquiry, whether the dead shall have the very same bodies, or no; which sort of inquiry, the apostle, by the appellation he bestows here, on him that makes it, seems not much to encourage. Nor, if he shall think himself bound to determine, concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead, raised at the last day; will he, by the remainder of

* Mat. xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26. John v. 21. Acts xxvi. 7. Rom. iv. 17. 2 Cor. i. 9. 1 Thess. iv. 14, 16. † John v. 28, 29.

1 Cor. xv.
50.

St. Paul's answer, find the determination of the apostle, to be much in favour of the very same body; unless the being told, that the body, down, is not that body, that shall be; that the body raised is as different, from that which was laid down, as the flesh of man is from the flesh of beasts, fishes, and birds, or as the sun, moon, and stars, are different one from another; or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, immortal body; and lastly, as different as a body, that is flesh and blood, is from a body that is not flesh and blood; "for flesh and blood cannot," says St. Paul, in this very place, inherit the kingdom of God: unless, I say, all this, which is contained in St. Paul's words, can be supposed to be the way to deliver this, as an article of faith, which is required to be believed by every one, viz. "that the dead should be raised, with the very same bodies that they had before, in this life;" which article, proposed in these, or the like plain and express words, could have left no room for doubt, in the meanest capacities, nor for contest, in the most perverse minds.

P. 44.

YOUR Lordship adds, in the next words; "and so it hath been always understood, by the christian church, viz. that the resurrection of the same body, in your Lordship's sense of same body, is an article of faith." Answ. What the christian church has always understood, is beyond my knowledge. But for those who, coming short of your Lordship's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith, from the understanding of all the whole christian church, ever since the preaching of the Gospel (who make the far greater part of Christians, I think I may say, nine hundred ninety and nine of a thousand) but are forced to have recourse to the scripture, to find them there; I do not see, that they will easily find there, this proposed as an article of faith, that there shall be a resurrection of the same body; but that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, without explicitly determining, that they shall be raised with bodies, made up wholly of the same particles, which were once vitally united to their souls, in their former life; without the mixture of any one other particle of matter: which is that, which your Lordship means, by the same body.

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BUT supposing your Lordship to have demonstrated this to be an article of faith, tho' I crave leave to own, that I do not see, that all that your Lordship has said, here, makes it so much as probable; what is all this to me? Yes, says your Lordship, in the following words, "my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it; for it makes the same body, which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection. But any material substance, united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body."

THIS is an argument of your Lordship's, which I am obliged to answer to. But is it not fit, I should first understand it, before I answer it? Now, here I do not well know, what it is "to make a thing not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection." But to help myself out, the best I can, with a guess, I will conjecture (which, in disputing with learned men, is not very safe) your Lordship's meaning is, that "my idea of personal identity makes it not necessary, that, for the raising the same person, the body should be the same."

YOUR Lordship's next word is, but; to which I am ready to reply, but what? What does my idea of personal identity do? for something of that kind the adverbative particle, but, should, in the ordinary construction of our language, introduce, to make the proposition clear and intelligible: but here is no such thing; but, is one of your Lordship's privileged particles, which I must not meddle with, for fear your Lordship complain of me again, "as so severe a censure, that for the least ambiguity in any particle, fill up pages in my answer, to make my book look considerable, for the bulk of it." But since this proposition here, "my idea of personal identity makes the same body, which was here united to the soul, not necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection; but, any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness,

"consciousness, makes the same body, is brought to prove my idea of personal identity inconsistent with the article of the resurrection." I must make it out, in some direct sense, or other, that I may see, whether it be both true and conclusive. I therefore venture to read it thus, "my idea of personal identity makes the same body, which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary at the resurrection; but allows, that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body: Ergo, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the same body."

If this be your Lordship's sense, in this passage, as I here have guessed it to be; or else I know not what it is: I answer,

1. "THAT my idea of personal identity does not allow, that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body." I say no such thing in my book, nor any thing, from whence it may be inferred; and your Lordship would have done me a favour, to have set down the words, where I say so, or those from which you infer so, and shewed how it follows from any thing I have said.

2. GRANTING that it were a consequence from my idea of personal identity, that "any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body;" this would not prove that my idea of personal identity was inconsistent with this proposition, "that the same body shall be raised;" but, on the contrary, affirms it; since if I affirm, as I do, that the same persons shall be raised, and it be a consequence of my idea of personal identity, that "any material substance, being united to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body;" it follows, that, if the same person be raised, the same body must be: and so I have herein not only said nothing, inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, but have said more for it, than your Lordship. For there can be nothing plainer, than that, in the scripture, it is revealed, that the same persons shall be raised, and appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to answer for what they have done in their bodies. If, therefore, whatever matter be joined to the same principle of consciousness, makes the same body; it is demonstration, that if the same persons are raised, they have the same bodies.

How, then, your Lordship makes this an inconsistency with the resurrection, is beyond my conception. "Yes, says your Lordship, it is inconsistent with P. 44: "it; for it makes the same body, which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary."

3. I ANSWER, therefore, thirdly, that this is the first time, I ever learnt, that not necessary, was the same with, inconsistent. I say, that a body, made up of the same numerical parts of matter, is not necessary to the making of the same person; from whence it will, indeed, follow, that, to the resurrection of the same person, the same numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your Lordship infer from hence? to wit, this; therefore, he, who thinks that the same particles of matter are not necessary to the making of the same person, cannot believe that the same persons shall be raised with bodies, made of the very same particles of matter, if God should reveal that it shall be so, viz. that the same persons shall be raised, with the same bodies they had before: which is all one as to say, that he, who thought the blowing of rams-horns was not necessary, in itself, to the falling down of the walls of Jericho, could not believe that they should fall, upon the blowing of rams-horns, when God had declared it should be so.

YOUR Lordship says, "my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection;" the reason you ground it on is this, because it makes not the same body necessary, to the making the same person. Let us grant your Lordship's consequence to be good, what will follow from it? No less than this, that your Lordship's notion (for I dare not say your Lordship has any so dangerous things, as ideas) of personal identity, is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. The demonstration of it is thus; your Lordship P. 34, 35: says,

P. 44.

says, it is not necessary that the body, to be raised at the last day, "should consist of the same particles of matter, which were united at the point of death; for there must be a great alteration in them, in a lingering disease; as if a fat man falls into a consumption: you do not say, the same particles, which the sinner had, at the very time of commission of his sins; for then a long sinner must have a vast body, considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration." And again, here your Lordship says, "you allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man, under several changes of matter." From which words it is evident, that your Lordship supposes a person, in this world, may be continued and preserved the same, in a body, not consisting of the same individual particles of matter; and hence it demonstratively follows, that, let your Lordship's notion of personal identity be what it will, it makes "the same body not to be necessary to the same person;" and therefore it is, by your Lordship's rule, inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. When your Lordship shall think fit to clear your own notion of personal identity, from this inconsistency with the article of the resurrection, I do not doubt, but my idea of personal identity will be thereby cleared too. 'Till then, all inconsistency with that article, which your Lordship has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your Lordship's too.

BUT, for the clearing of both, give me leave to say, my Lord, that whatsoever is not necessary, does not thereby become inconsistent. It is not necessary to the same person, that his body should always consist of the same numerical particles; this is demonstration, because the particles of the bodies of the same persons, in this life, change every moment, and your Lordship cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not inconsistent with God's preserving, if he thinks fit, to the same persons, bodies consisting of the same numerical particles always, from the resurrection to eternity. And so likewise, tho' I say any thing, that supposes it not necessary, that the same numerical particles, which were vitally united to the soul in this life, should be re-united to it, at the resurrection, and constitute the body it shall then have; yet it is not inconsistent with this, that God may, if he pleases, give to every one a body, consisting only of such particles, as were before vitally united to his soul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my book from all that inconsistency, which your Lordship charges on it, and would persuade the world it has, with the article of the resurrection of the dead.

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ONLY before I leave it, I will set down the remainder of what your Lordship says, upon this head, that, tho' I see not the coherence, nor tendency of it, nor the force of any argument in it, against me; yet nothing may be omitted, that your Lordship has thought fit to entertain your reader with, on this new point, nor any one have reason to suspect, that I have passed by any word of your Lordship's (on this now first introduced subject) wherein he might find, your Lordship had proved what you had promised in your title page. Your remaining words are these: "the dispute is not how far personal identity in itself may consist, in the very same material substance; for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man, under several changes of matter; but, whether it doth not depend upon a vital union between the soul and body, and the life, which is consequent upon it: and, therefore, in the resurrection, the same material substance must be re-united, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation; i.e. it may be a new life, but not a raising the body from the dead." I confess, I do not see how what is here ushered in, by the words, and therefore, is a consequence from the preceding words; but, as to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much questioned, that, if the same man rise, who was dead, it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead; which is the language of the scripture.

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I MUST not part with this article of the resurrection, without returning my thanks to your Lordship, for making me take notice of a fault, in my Essay. When I writ that book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not, but many others

others have done, that the scripture had mentioned, in express terms, "the resurrection of the body:" But, upon the occasion, your Lordship has given me, in your last letter, to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared, concerning the resurrection, and finding no such express words in the scripture, as that "the body shall rise, or be raised, or the resurrection of the body;" I shall, in the next edition of it, change these words of my book, *Essay, B. 4* "the dead bodies of men shall rise," into these of the scripture, "the dead shall C. 18. §. 7. rise." Not that I question, that the dead shall be raised with bodies: But, in matters of revelation, I think it not only safest, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words of the scripture; unless he will assume to himself the authority of one inspired, or make himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself. If I had spoke of the resurrection, in precisely scripture terms, I had avoided giving your Lordship the occasion, of making here such a verbal reflection on my words; "What! not if there be an idea P. 63. of identity as to the body?"

I COME now to your Lordship's second head of accusation: Your Lordship P. 44. says,

"2. THE next articles of faith, which my notion of ideas is inconsistent with, are no less, than those of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of our Saviour." But all the proof of inconsistency, your Lordship here brings, being drawn from my notions of nature and person, whereof so much has been said already, the swelling my answer into too great a volume, will excuse me from setting down, at large, all that you have said hereupon, so particularly, as I have done, in the preceding article of the resurrection, which is wholly new.

YOUR Lordship's way of proving, "that my ideas of nature and person can- P. 45, 46. not consist" with the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, is, as far as I can understand it, this; that, I say, we have no simple ideas, but by sensation and reflection; "but, says your Lordship, we cannot have any simple ideas of P. 45: nature and person, by sensation and reflection; ergo, we can come to no certainty, about the distinction of nature and person, in my way of ideas." Answer. If your Lordship had concluded from thence, that, therefore, in my way of ideas, we can have no ideas at all, of nature and person, it would have had some appearance of a consequence; but, as it is, it seems to me such an argument as this: No simple colours, in Sir Godfrey Kneller's way of painting, come into his exact and lively pictures, but by his pencil; but no simple colours, of a ship and a man, come into his picture, by his pencil; ergo, "we can come to no certainty about the distinction of a ship and a man, in Sir P. 45: Godfrey Kneller's way of painting."

YOUR Lordship says, "it is not possible for us to have any simple ideas of nature and person, by sensation and reflection," and I say so too; as impossible as it is to have a true picture of a rainbow, in one simple colour, which consists in the arrangement of many colours. The ideas, signified by the sounds, nature and person, are each of them complex ideas; and, therefore, it is as impossible to have a simple idea of either of them, as to have a multitude in one, or a composition in a simple. But if your Lordship means, that, by sensation and reflection, we cannot have the simple ideas, of which the complex ones, of nature and person, are compounded; that I must crave leave to dissent from, 'till your Lordship can produce a definition (in intelligible words) either of nature, or person, in which, all that is contained cannot ultimately be resolved into simple ideas of sensation and reflection.

YOUR Lordship's definition of person, is, "that it is a compleat, intelligent Vind. p. 261; substance, with a peculiar manner of subsistence." And my definition of person, which your Lordship quotes, out of my *Essay*, is, "that person stands for P. 59. a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider "it self as it self, the same thinking thing, in different times and places." When your Lordship shall shew any repugnancy in this my idea (which I denote by the sound, person) to the incarnation of our Saviour, with which your Lordship's notion of person may not be equally charged; I shall give your Lordship an answer to it. This I say, in answer to these words, "which is repugnant to the P. 46.

"article of the incarnation of our Saviour:" For the preceding reasoning, to which they refer, I must own, I do not understand.

THE word, person, naturally signifies nothing that you allow; your Lordship, in your definition of it, makes it stand for a general, abstract idea. Person then, in your Lordship, is liable to the same default, which you lay on it, in me, viz.

- P. 52. That "it is no more, than a notion in the mind." The same will be so, of the word, nature, when ever your Lordship pleases to define it; without which you can have no notion of it. And then the consequence, which you there draw, from their being no more, than notions of the mind, will hold, as much in respect of your Lordship's notion of nature and person, as of mine, viz. "that one nature and three persons can be no more." This I crave leave to say, in answer to all that your Lordship has been pleased to urge, from page 46, to these words of your Lordship's, p. 52.

Ibid. GENERAL terms (as nature and person, are in their ordinary use, in our language) are the signs of general ideas, and general ideas exist only in the mind; but particular things (which are the foundations of these general ideas, if they are abstracted, as they should be) do, or may exist, conformable to those general ideas, and so fall under those general names; as he, that writes this paper, is a person to him, i. e. may be denominated a person by him, to whose abstract idea, of person, he bears a conformity; just as what I here write, is to him a book, or a letter, to whose abstract idea of a book, or a letter, it agrees. This is what I have said, concerning this matter, all along, and what, I humbly conceive, will serve for an answer to those words of your

- P. 54. Lordship, where you say, "you affirm that those, who make nature and person to be only abstract and complex ideas, can neither defend nor reasonably believe the doctrine of the Trinity;" and to all that you say, p. 52---58. Only give me leave to wish, that what your Lordship, out of a mistake of what I say, concerning the ideas of nature and person, has urged, as you pretend, against them, do not furnish your adversaries, in that dispute, with such arguments against you, as your Lordship will not easily answer.

- P. 53. YOUR Lordship sets down these words of mine, "person, in itself, signifies nothing; but as soon as the common use of any language has appropriated it to any idea, then, that is the true idea of a person," which words your Lordship interprets thus: i. e. "men may call a person, what they please, for there is nothing, but common use, required to it: they may call a horse, or a tree, or a stone, a person, if they think fit." Answ. Men, before common use had appropriated this name, to that complex idea, which they now signify by the sound, person, might have denoted it by the sound, stone, and vice versa: but can your Lordship thence argue, as you do here, men are at the same liberty, in a country, where those words are already in common use? there, he that will speak properly, and so as to be understood, must appropriate each sound, used in that language, to an idea in his mind (which to himself is defining the word) which is, in some degree, conformable to the idea, that others apply to it.

- P. 59. YOUR Lordship, in the next paragraph, sets down my definition of the word, person, viz. "that person stands for a thinking, intelligent being, that hath reason and reflection, and can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking being, in different times and places;" and then asks many questions,

Vind. p. 261. upon it. I shall set down your Lordship's definition of person, which is this: "A person is a complete, intelligent substance, with a peculiar manner of subsistence" and then crave leave to ask your Lordship the same question, concerning it, which your Lordship here asks me concerning mine; "how comes person to stand for this, and nothing else? from whence comes complete substance, or peculiar manner of subsistence, to make up the idea of a person? Whether it be true, or false, I am not now to enquire; but how it comes into this idea of a person? Has common use of our language appropriated it to this sense? If not, this seems to be a mere arbitrary idea; and may as well be deny'd as affirm'd. And what a fine pass are

"we

“ are come to, (in your Lordship’s way) if a mere arbitrary idea must be
 “ taken into the only true method of certainty?—But if this be the true
 “ idea of a person, then there can be no union of two natures in one person.
 “ For if a compleat, intelligent substance be the idea of a person, and
 “ the divine and human natures be compleat, intelligent substances;
 “ then the doctrine of the union of two natures and one person is quite
 “ sunk, for here must be two persons, in this way of your Lordship’s.
 “ Again, if this be the idea of a person, then where there are three persons,
 “ there must be three distinct, complete, intelligent substances; and so there
 “ cannot be three persons in the same individual essence. And thus both these
 “ doctrines of the Trinity, and Incarnation, are, past recovery, gone, if this
 “ way (of your Lordship’s) hold.” These, my Lord, are your Lordship’s
 very words; what force there is in them, I will not enquire; but I must beseech
 your Lordship to take them, as objections I make, against your notion of person,
 to shew the danger of it, and the inconsistency, it has with the doctrine of the
 Trinity and Incarnation of our Saviour; and when your Lordship has remov’d
 the objections, that are in them, against your own definition of person, mine
 also, by the very same answers, will be clear’d.

YOUR Lordship’s argument, in the following words, to page 65. seems to P. 61—65.
 me (as far as I can collect) to lie thus: Your Lordship tells me, that I say, P. 61.
 “ That in propositions, whose certainty is built on clear and perfect ideas,
 “ and evident deductions of reason, there no proposition can be receiv’d for
 “ divine revelation, which contradicts them.” This proposition, not serving
 your Lordship’s turn so well, for the conclusion you design’d to draw from it,
 your Lordship is pleas’d to enlarge it: For you ask, “ But, suppose I have ideas P. 62.
 “ sufficient for certainty, what is to be done then?” From which words, and
 your following discourse, if I can understand it, it seems to me, that your Lord-
 ship supposes it reasonable for me to hold, That where-ever we are, any how,
 certain of any propositions, whether their certainty be built on clear and
 perfect ideas, or no, there no proposition can be received for divine revelation,
 which contradicts them. And thence your Lordship concludes, That because P. 64.
 I say, we may make some propositions, of whose truth we may be certain,
 concerning things, whereof we have not ideas, in all their parts perfectly clear
 and distinct; “ therefore my notion, of certainty by ideas, must overthrow
 “ the credibility of a matter of faith, in all such propositions, which are of-
 “ fered to be believed on the account of divine revelation:” a conclusion, which
 I am not so unfortunate, as not to find, how it follows, from your Lordship’s
 premises; because I cannot any way bring them into mode, and figure, with such
 a conclusion. But this being no strange thing to me, in my want of skill, in
 your Lordship’s way of writing, I, in the mean time, crave leave to ask, whether
 there be any propositions, your Lordship can be certain of, that are not divinely
 revealed? And here I will presume, that your Lordship is not so sceptical, but that
 you can allow certainty, attainable in many things, by your natural faculties.
 Give me leave, then, to ask your Lordship, whether, where there be propo-
 sitions, of whose truth you have certain knowledge, you can receive any propo-
 sition for divine revelation, which contradicts that certainty? whether that cer-
 tainty be built upon the agreement of ideas, such as we have, or on whatever
 else your Lordship builds it? If you cannot, as I presume your Lordship will
 say you cannot, I make bold to return you your Lordship’s questions, here, to me,
 in your own words: “ Let us, now, suppose that you are to judge of a proposition, P. 4.
 “ delivered as a matter of faith, where you have a certainty, by reason, from your
 “ grounds, such as they are: can you, my Lord, assent to this as a matter of
 “ faith, when you are already certain of the contrary, by your way? how is
 “ this possible? can you believe that to be true, which you are certain is not
 “ true? Suppose it be, that there are two natures in one person, the question
 “ is, whether you can assent to this, as a matter of faith? If you should say,
 “ where there are only probabilities, on the other side, I grant that you then
 “ allow revelation is to prevail. But when you say, you have certainty by ideas,
 “ or

" or without ideas to the contrary, I do not see how it is possible for you
 " to assent to a matter of faith, as true, when you are certain, from your meth-
 " od, that it is not true. For how can you believe against certainty,---be-
 " cause the mind is actually determined by certainty. And so your Lordship's
 " notion of certainty by ideas, or without ideas, be it what it will, must over-
 " throw the credibility of a matter of faith, in all such propositions, which are
 " offered to be believed on the account of divine revelation." This argumentation
 and conclusion is good against your Lordship, if it be good against me: for cer-
 tainty is certainty, and he that is certain, is certain, and cannot assent to " that
 " as true, which he is certain is not true," whether he supposes certainty to con-
 sist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, such as a man
 has, or in any thing else. For whether those, who have attained certainty, not by
 the way of ideas, can believe against certainty, any more than those, who have at-
 tained certainty by ideas, we shall then see, when your Lordship shall be pleased
 to shew the world your way to certainty, without ideas.

INDEED, if what your Lordship insinuates, in the beginning of this passage,
 which we are now upon, be true, your Lordship is safer (in your way without
 ideas, i. e. without immediate objects of the mind in thinking, if there be any
 such way) as to the understanding divine revelation right, than those, who make
 use of ideas: but yet you are still as far, as they, from assenting to that as true,
 P. 60. which you are certain is not true. Your Lordship's words are: " So great a
 " difference is there between forming ideas first, and then judging of revelation by
 " them, and the believing of revelation on its proper grounds, and the interpreting
 " the sense of it, by the due measures of reason." If it be the privilege of those al-
 one, who renounce ideas, i. e. the immediate objects of the mind in thinking,
 to believe revelation on its proper grounds, and the interpreting the sense of it,
 by the due measures of reason; I shall not think it strange, that any one, who
 undertakes to interpret the sense of revelation, should renounce ideas, i. e.
 that he who would think right of the meaning of any text of scripture,
 should renounce, and lay by, all immediate objects of the mind in thinking.

BUT, perhaps, your Lordship does not here extend this difference of be-
 lieving revelation, on its proper grounds, and not on its proper grounds, to all
 those, who are not, and all those, who are, for ideas. But your Lordship
 makes this comparison here, only between your Lordship and me, who, you
 think, am guilty of forming ideas first, and then judging of revelation by
 them. Answer. If so, then this lays the blame not on my doctrine of ideas,
 but on my particular ill use of them. That, then, which your Lordship
 would insinuate of me here, as a dangerous way, to mistaking the sense of
 the scripture, is, " that I form ideas first, and then judge of revelation by
 " them;" i. e. in plain English, that I get to myself, the best I can, the
 signification of the words, wherein the revelation is delivered, and so endeavour
 to understand the sense of the revelation delivered in them. And pray, my
 Lord, does your Lordship do otherwise? Does the believing of revelation up-
 on its proper grounds, and the due measures of reason, teach you to judge
 of revelation, before you understand the words it is delivered in; i. e. be-
 fore you have formed the ideas in your mind, as well as you can, which
 those words stand for? If the due measures of reason teach your Lordship
 this, I beg the favour of your Lordship to tell me those due measures of
 reason, that I may leave those undue measures of reason, which I have hitherto
 followed, in the interpreting the sense of the scripture, whose sense, it seems,
 I should have interpreted first, and understood the signification of the words
 afterwards.

MY Lord, I read the revelation of the holy scriptures, with a full assurance,
 that all it delivers is true: and tho' this be a submission to the writings of those
 inspired authors, which I neither have, nor can have, for those of any other men;
 yet I use (and know not how to help it, 'till your Lordship shew me a better
 method, in those due measures of reason, which you mention) the same way
 to interpret to myself the sense of that book, that I do of any other. First,

I endeavour to understand the words and phrases of the language I read it in, i. e. to form ideas they stand for. If your Lordship means any thing else, by forming ideas first, I confess I understand it not. And if there be any word, or expression, which, in that author, or in that place of that author, seems to have a peculiar meaning, i. e. to stand for an idea, which is different from that, which the common use of that language has made it a sign of, that idea, also, I endeavour to form in my mind, by comparing this author with himself, and observing the design of his discourse, that so, as far as I can, by a sincere endeavour, I may have the same ideas, in every place, when I read the words, which the author had, when he writ them. But here, my Lord, I take care not to take those for words of divine revelation, which are not the words of inspired writers: nor think myself concerned with that submission to receive the expressions of fallible men, and to labour to find out their meaning, or, as your Lordship phrases it, interpret their sense, as if they were the expressions of the Spirit of God, by the mouths or pens of men, inspired and guided by that infallible Spirit. This, my Lord, is the method I use, in interpreting the sense of the revelation of the scriptures; if your Lordship knows that I do otherwise, I desire you to convince me of it; and if your Lordship does otherwise, I desire you to shew me, wherein your method differs from mine, that I may reform, upon so good a pattern: for, as for what you accuse me of, in the following words, it is that which either has no fault in it, or if it has, your Lordship, I humbly conceive, is as guilty as I. Your words are,

“ I MAY pretend what I please, that I hold the assurance of faith, and the P. 60.
 “ certainty by ideas, to go upon very different grounds; but when a proposition is offered me out of scripture to be believed, and I doubt about
 “ the sense of it, is not recourse to be made to my ideas?” Give me leave, my Lord, with all submission, to return your Lordship the same words. “ Your
 “ Lordship may pretend what you please, that you hold the assurance of faith,
 “ and the certainty of knowledge to stand upon different grounds” (for I presume your Lordship will not say, that believing and knowing stand upon the same grounds, for that would, I think, be to say, that probability and demonstration are the same thing) “ but when a proposition is offered you out of
 “ scripture to be believed, and you doubt about the sense of it, is not recourse
 “ to be made to your notions?” What, my Lord, is the difference here between your Lordship’s, and my way, in the case? I must have recourse to my ideas, and your Lordship must have recourse to your notions. For, I think, you cannot believe a proposition, contrary to your own notions, for then you would have the same, and different notions, at the same time. So that all the difference between your Lordship and me, is, that we do both the same thing; only your Lordship shews a great dislike to my using the term, idea.

But the instance your Lordship here gives, is beyond my comprehension. You say, “ a proposition is offered me out of scripture to be believed, and P. 60.
 “ I doubt about the sense of it.—As in the present case, whether there can
 “ be three persons in one nature, or two natures and one person.” My Lord, my bible is faulty again; for I do not remember that I ever read in it, either of these propositions, in these precise words, “ there are three persons in one nature, or, there are two natures and one person.” When your Lordship shall shew me a bible, wherein they are so set down, I shall then think them a good instance of propositions, offered me out of scripture; till then, whoever shall say, that they are propositions in the scripture, when there are no such words, so put together, to be found in holy writ, seems to me to make a new scripture in words and propositions, that the Holy Ghost dictated not. I do not here question their truth, nor deny that they may be drawn from the scripture: but I deny, that these very propositions are, in express words, in my bible. For that is the only thing I deny here; if your Lordship can shew them me, in your’s, I beg you to do it.

IN the mean time, taking them to be as true, as if they were the very words of divine revelation; the question then is, how must we interpret the sense of them? For supposing them to be divine revelation, to ask, as your Lordship here does, what resolution I, or any one, can come to, about their possibility, seems to me to involve a contradiction in it. For whoever admits a proposition to be of divine revelation, supposes it not only to be possible, but true. Your Lordship's question then can mean only this, what sense can I, upon my principles, come to, of either of these propositions, but in the way of ideas? And I crave leave to ask your Lordship, what sense of them can your Lordship, upon your principles, come to, but in the way of notions? Which, in plain English, amounts to no more than this; that your Lordship must understand them according to the sense, you have of those terms, they are made up of, and I according to the sense, I have of those terms. Nor can it be otherwise, unless your Lordship can take a term, in any proposition, to have one sense, and yet understand it in another: and thus we see, that in effect, men have differently understood and interpreted the sense of these propositions; whether they used the way of ideas, or not, i. e. whether they called what any word stood for, notion, or sense, or meaning, or idea.

P. 61.

I THINK myself obliged to return your Lordship my thanks, for the news you write me here, of one who has found a secret way, how the same body may be in distant places at once. It making no part, that I can see, of the reasoning your Lordship was then upon, I can take it only for a piece of news: and the favour was the greater, that your Lordship was pleased to stop yourself, in the midst of so serious an argument, as the articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, to tell it me. And, methinks, it is a pity that that author had not used some of the words of my book, which might have served to have tied him and me together. For his secret, about a body, in two places at once, which he does keep up; and, "my secret about certainty, which your Lordship thinks had been better kept up too," being all your words; bring me into his company but very untowardly. If your Lordship would be pleased to shew, that my secret about certainty (as you think fit to call it) is false, or erroneous, the world would see a good reason, why you should think it better kept up; 'till then, perhaps, they may be apt to suspect, that the fault is not so much in my published secret about certainty, as somewhere else. But since your Lordship thinks it had been better kept up, I promise, that, as soon as you shall do me the favour, to make publick a better notion of certainty, than mine, I will, by a publick retraction, call in mine: which, I hope, your Lordship will do, for, I dare say, no body will think it good, or friendly advice, to your Lordship, if you have such a secret, that you should keep it up.

P. 63.

YOUR Lordship, with some emphasis, bids me observe my own words, that I here positively say, "that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know. So that it is plain here, that I place certainty only in evident knowledge, or in clear and distinct ideas; and yet my great complaint of your Lordship, was, that you charged this upon me; and now your Lordship finds it in my own words." Answ. My own words, in that place, are, "the mind is not certain of what it doth not evidently know;" but in them, or that passage, as set down by your Lordship, there is not the least mention of clear and distinct ideas: and, therefore, I should wonder to hear your Lordship so solemnly call them my own words, when they are but what your Lordship would have to be a consequence of my words; were it not, as I humbly conceive, a way, not unfrequent with your Lordship, to speak of that, which you think a consequence from any thing said, as if it were the very thing said. It rests, therefore, upon your Lordship to prove, that evident knowledge can be only, where the ideas, concerning which it is, are perfectly clear and distinct. I am certain, that I have evident knowledge, that the substance of my soul and body exists; tho' I am as certain, that I have but a very obscure and confused idea of any substance at all: so that my complaint of your Lordship,

ship, upon that account, remains very well founded, notwithstanding any thing you allege here.

YOUR Lordship, summing up the force of what you have said; adds, " that P. 65. " you have pleaded, (1.) That my method of certainty shakes the belief of " revelation in general. (2.) That it shakes the belief of particular propositions, " or articles of faith, which depend upon the sense of words contained in " scripture."

THAT your Lordship has pleaded, I grant: but with submission, I deny that you have proved,

(1.) THAT my definition of knowledge, which is that, which your Lordship calls my method of certainty, shakes the belief of revelation in general. For all, that your Lordship offers for proof of it, is only the alleging some other passages out of my book, quite different from that my definition of knowledge, which, you endeavour to shew, to shake the belief of revelation in general: but, indeed, have not, nor, I humbly conceive, cannot shew, that they do any ways shake the belief of revelation in general. But, if they did, it does not at all follow from thence, that my definition of knowledge; i.e. my method of certainty, at all shakes the belief of revelation in general, which was what your Lordship undertook to prove.

(2.) AS to the shaking the belief of particular propositions, or articles of P. 65. faith, which depend, as you here say, upon the sense of words; I think I have sufficiently cleared myself from that charge, as will yet be more evident from what your Lordship here farther urges.

YOUR Lordship says, " My placing certainty in the perception of the agree- " ment or disagreement of ideas, shakes the foundations of the articles of faith " [above-mentioned] which depend upon the sense of words, contained in the " scripture:" and the reason your Lordship gives for it, is this, " because I do " not say, we are to believe all, that we find there expressed." My Lord, upon reading these words, I consulted the errata, to see whether the printer had injured you: for I could not easily believe, that your Lordship should reason after a fashion, that would justify such a conclusion as this, viz. your Lordship, in your Letter to me, " does not say, that we are to believe all, that we find expressed in scripture;" therefore your notion of certainty shakes the belief of this article of faith, that Jesus Christ descended into hell. This, I think, will scarce hold for a good consequence, till the not saying any truth, be the denying of it: and then if my not saying, in my book, that we are to believe all there expressed, be to deny, that we are to believe all that we find there expressed, I fear many of your Lordship's books will be found to shake the belief of several, or all the articles of our faith. But, supposing this consequence to be good, viz. I do not say, therefore I deny, and thereby I shake the belief of some articles of faith; how does this prove, that my placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, shakes any article of faith? unless my saying, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, B. iv. chap. 12. § 6. of my Essay, be a proof, that I do not say, in any other part of that book, " that we are to believe all, that we find " expressed in scripture."

BUT, perhaps, the remaining words of the period will help us out, in your P. 65. Lordship's argument, which all together stands thus: " because I do not say; " we are to believe all that we find there expressed; but [I do say] in case we " have any clear and distinct ideas, which limit the sense another way, than " the words seem to carry it, we are to judge that to be the true sense." My Lord, I do not remember, where I say, what, in the latter part of this period, your Lordship makes me say; and your Lordship would have done me a favour, to have quoted the place. Indeed I do say, in the chapter your Lordship seems to be upon, " that no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or ob- " tain the assent, due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear, intuitive " knowledge." This is what I there say, and all that I there say; which, in effect, is this, that no proposition can be received for divine revelation, which

is contradictory to a self-evident proposition; and if that be it, which your Lordship makes me say here, in the foregoing words, I agree to it, and would be glad to know, whether your Lordship differs in opinion from me, in it. But this not answering your purpose, your Lordship would, in the following

P. 65. words of this paragraph, change self-evident proposition, into a proposition, we have attained certainty of, tho' by imperfect ideas: in which sense, the proposition your Lordship argues from, as mine, will stand thus, that no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent, due to all such, if it be contradictory to any proposition, of whose truth we are, by any way, certain. And, then, I desire your Lordship to name the two contradictory propositions, the one of divine revelation, I do not assent to; the other, that I have attained to a certainty of, by my imperfect ideas, which makes me reject, or not assent to that of divine revelation. The very setting down of these two contradictory propositions, will be demonstration against me, and if your Lordship cannot (as I humbly conceive you cannot) name any two such propositions, it is an evidence, that all this dust, that is raised, is only a great deal of talk about what your Lordship cannot prove: for that your Lordship has not yet proved any such thing, I am humbly of opinion I have already shewn.

P. 66--69. YOUR Lordship's discourse of Des Cartes, in the following pages, is, I think, as far as I am concerned in it, to shew, that certainty cannot be had by ideas; because Des Cartes, using the term, idea, missed of it. Answ. The question between your Lordship and me, not being about Des Cartes's, but my notion of certainty, your Lordship will put an end to my notion of certainty by ideas, whenever your Lordship shall prove, that certainty cannot be attained, any way, by the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, i. e. by ideas; or that certainty does not consist in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; or lastly, when your Lordship shall shew us what else certainty does consist in. When your Lordship shall do either of these three, I promise your Lordship to renounce my notion, or way, or method, or grounds (or whatever else your Lordship has been pleased to call it) of certainty by ideas.

P. 69, 70. THE next paragraph is to shew the inclination your Lordship has to favour me in the words, it may be. I shall be always sorry to have mistaken any one's, especially your Lordship's, inclination to favour me: but since the press has published this to the world, the world must now be judge of your Lordship's inclination to favour me.

P. 70--74. THE three or four following pages are to shew, that your Lordship's exception against ideas, was not against the term, ideas, and that I mistook you in it. Answ. My Lord, I must own that there are very few pages of your Letters, when I come to examine, what is the precise meaning of your words, either as making distinct propositions, or a continued discourse, wherein I do not think myself in danger to be mistaken; but whether, in the present case, one much more learned than I, would not have understood your Lordship, as I did, must be left to those, who will be at the pains to consider your words, and my reply to them. Your Lordship saying, "as I have stated my notion of ideas, it may

Answer 1.
P. 133. "be of dangerous consequence," seemed to me to say no more, but that my book, in general, might be of dangerous consequence. This seeming too general an accusation, I endeavoured to find what it was more particularly in it, which your Lordship thought might be of dangerous consequence. And the first thing I thought you excepted against, was the use of the term, idea: but your Lordship tells me here, I was mistaken, it was not the term, idea, you excepted against, but the way of certainty by ideas. To excuse my mistake, I have this to say for myself, that reading, in your first letter, these express words;

P. 72. "When new terms are made use of, by ill men, to promote scepticism and infidelity, and to overthrow the mysteries of our faith, we have then reason to enquire into them, and to examine the foundation and tendency of them;" it could not be very strange, if I understood, them, to refer to terms; but, it seems, I was mistaken, and should have understood by them, "my way of certainty by ideas," and should have read your Lordship's words thus: "When

Answer 1.
P. 23.

"When new terms are made use of, by ill men, to promote scepticism and infidelity, and to overthrow the mysteries of faith, we have then reason to inquire into them," i. e. Mr. L's definition of knowledge, (for that is my way of certainty by ideas) "and then to examine the foundation and tendency of them," i. e. this proposition, viz. that knowledge, or certainty, consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas. Them, in your Lordship's words, as I thought (for I am scarce ever sure, what your Lordship means, by them) necessarily referring to what ill men made use of, for the promoting of scepticism and infidelity, I thought it had referred to terms. Why so? says your Lordship: "Your quarrel, you say, was not with the term ideas. But that, which you insisted upon, was the way of certainty by ideas, and the new terms, as employed to that purpose;" and, therefore, 'tis that which your Lordship must be understood to mean, by what ill men make use of, &c. Now I appeal to my reader, whether I may not be excused, if I took, them, rather to refer to terms, a word in the plural number, preceding in the same period, than to way of certainty by ideas, which is of the singular number, and neither preceding, nor so much as expressed in the same sentence? And if, by my ignorance in the use of the pronoun, them, 'tis my misfortune to be often at a loss, in the understanding of your Lordship's writing, I hope I shall be excused.

ANOTHER excuse, for my understanding that one of the things in my book, which your Lordship thought might be of dangerous consequence, was the term, idea, may be found in these words of your Lordship: "But what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty, true and real certainty by ideas: if, after all, it comes only to this, that our ideas only present to such things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things? But the world has been strangely amused with ideas of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done, by the help of ideas, and yet these ideas at last come to be common notions of things, which we must make use of, in our reasoning." I shall offer one passage more, for my excuse, out of the same page. I had said, in my chapter about the existence of God, I thought it most proper to express myself, in the most usual and familiar way, by common words and expressions: "Your Lordship wishes, I had done so, quite thro' my book; for then, I had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith, to take up my new way of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) against the mysteries of the christian faith. But I might have enjoyed the satisfaction of my ideas, long enough, before your Lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them employed in doing mischief." Thus this passage stands, in your Lordship's former letter, tho' here your Lordship gives us but a part of it; and that part your Lordship breaks off into two, and gives us inverted, and in other words. Perhaps those, who observe this, and better understand the arts of controversy than I do, may find some skill in it. But your Lordship breaks off the former passage, at these words, "strange things might be done by the help of ideas;" and then adding these new ones, i. e. "as to matter of certainty," leave out those which contain your wish, "that I had expressed myself, in the most usual way, by common words and expressions, quite through my book," as I had done in my chapter of the existence of a God; for then, says your Lordship, "I had not given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up my new way of ideas, as an effectual battery, &c." Which wish of your Lordship's is, that I had all along left out the term idea, as is plain from my words, which you refer to, in your wish, as they stand in my first letter, viz. "I thought it most proper to express myself, in the most usual and familiar way, — by common words, and known ways of expression; and therefore, as I think, I have scarce used the word, idea, in that whole chapter." Now I must again appeal to my reader, whether your Lordship, having so plainly wished, that I had used common words and expressions, in opposition to the term idea, I am not excusable, if I took you to mean that term? tho'

Anfw. i. p. 92, 93.

Anfw. i. p. 93.

P. 72, 73.

P. 72.

Anf. i. p. 93.

Lett. i. p. 127.

your Lordship leaves out the wish, and instead of it, puts in, i. e. "as to matter of certainty," words which were not in your former letter; tho' it be for mistaking you, in my answer to that letter, that you here blame me. I must own, my Lord, my dulness will be very apt to mistake you in expressions, seeming so plain as these, 'till I can presume myself quick-sighted enough to understand men's meaning, in their writings, not by their expressions; which I confess I am not, and is an art, I find myself too old now to learn.

P. 73. BUT bare mistake is not all; your Lordship accuses me also of unfairness and disingenuity, in understanding these words of your's, "the world has been strangely amused with ideas, and yet these ideas at last come to be only common notions of things, as if in them your Lordship owned ideas to be only common notions of things." To this, my Lord, I must humbly crave leave to answer, that there was no unfairness, or disingenuity, in my saying your Lordship owned ideas for such, because I understood you to speak, in that place, in your own sense; and thereby to shew that the new term, idea, need not be introduced, when it signified only the common notion of things, i. e. signified no more than notion doth, which is a more usual word. This I took to be your meaning, in that place; and whether I, or any one, might not so understand it, without deserving to be told, that "this is a way of turning things upon your Lordship, which you did not expect from me," or such a solemn appeal as this, "judge now, how fair and ingenuous this answer is;" I leave to any one, who will but do me the favour to cast his eye on the passage above quoted, as it stands in your Lordship's own words, in your first letter.

Ans. 1.
P. 92, 93.

For I humbly beg leave to say, that I cannot but wonder to find, that when your Lordship is charging me, with want of fairness and ingenuity, you should leave out, in the quoting of your own words, those which served most to justify the sense, I had taken them in, and put others in the stead of them. In Anf. 1. p. 93. your first letter they stand thus: "But the world has been strangely amused with ideas of late, and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet these ideas, at last, come to be only common notions of things, which we must make use of, in our reasoning;" and so on, to the end of what is above set down: all which I quoted, to secure myself from being suspected to turn things upon your Lordship, in a Lett. 1. p. 62. sense which your words (that the reader had before him) would not bear: and, in your second letter, in the place now under consideration, they stand thus; "but the world hath been strangely amused with ideas of late, and we have been told, that strange things may be done with ideas, i. e. as to matter of certainty;" and there your Lordship ends. Will your Lordship give me leave now to use your own words, "judge now, how fair and ingenuous this is!" words which I should not use, but that I find them used by your Lordship, in this very passage, and upon this very occasion.

P. 73.

I GRANT myself, a mortal man, very liable to mistakes, especially in your writings; but that, in my mistakes, I am guilty of any unfairness, or disingenuity, your Lordship will, I humbly conceive, pardon me, if I think it will pass for want of fairness and ingenuity, in any one, without clear evidence, to accuse me. To avoid any such suspicion, in my first letter, I set down every word, contained in those pages of your book, which I was concerned in; and in my second, I set down most of the passages of your Lordship's first answer, that I replied to. But because the doing it all along in this, would, I find, too much increase the bulk of my book; I earnestly beg every one, who will think this, my reply, worth his perusal, to lay your Lordship's letter before him, that he may see whether in these pages, I direct my answer to, without setting them down at large, there be any thing material unanswered, or unfairly, or disingenuously represented.

P. 73.

YOUR Lordship, in the next words, gives a reason, why I ought to have understood your words, as a consequence of my assertion, and not as your own sense, viz. "because you, all along, distinguish the way of reason, by deducing one thing from another, from my way of certainty in the agreement,

"or

"or disagreement of ideas." *Ans.* I know your Lordship does all along talk of reason, and my way by ideas, as distinct or opposite: But this is the thing I have, and do complain of, that your Lordship does speak of them, as distinct, without shewing, wherein they are different; since the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of ideas, which is my way of certainty, is also the way of reason. For the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, is either by an immediate comparison of two ideas, as in self-evident propositions; which way of knowledge of truth, is the way of reason; or, by the intervention of intermediate ideas, i. e. by the deduction of one thing from another, which is also the way of reason, as I have shewn; where I answer to *Lett. 1. p. 128.* your speaking of certainty placed in good and sound reason, and not in ideas. In which place, as in several others, your Lordship opposes ideas and reason, which your Lordship calls here distinguishing them. But to continue to speak frequently of two things, as different, or of two ways, as opposite, without ever shewing any difference, or opposition, in them, after it has been pressed for, is a way of ingenuity, which your Lordship will pardon to my ignorance, if I have not formerly been acquainted with; and therefore, when you shall have shewn, that reasoning about ideas, or by ideas, is not the same way of reasoning, as that about, or by notions, or conceptions, and that what I mean by ideas, is not the same, that your Lordship means by notions; you will have some reason to blame me, for mistaking you, in the *pag. P. 73.* pages above quoted.

For if your Lordship, in those words, does not except against the term, ideas, but allows it to have the same signification with notions, or conceptions, or apprehensions; then your Lordship's words will run thus: "But what need all this great noise about notions, or conceptions, or apprehensions? and the world has been strangely amused with notions, or conceptions, or apprehensions of late;" which, whether it be that, which your Lordship will own to be your meaning, I must leave to your consideration.

Your Lordship proceeds to examine my new method of certainty, as you *P. 74.* are pleased to call it.

To my asking, "whether there be any other, or older, method of certainty? your Lordship answers, that is not the point; but whether mine be any *P. 75.* at all: which your Lordship denies." *Ans.* I grant, to him that barely denies it to be any at all, it is not the point, whether there be any older; but to him, that calls it a new method, I humbly conceive it will not be thought wholly besides the point, to shew an older; at least, that it ought to have prevented these following words of your Lordship's, viz. "that your Lordship did never pretend to inform the world of new methods;" which, being in answer to my desire, that you would be pleased to shew me an older, or another method, plainly imply, that your Lordship supposes, that whoever will inform the world of another method of certainty, than mine, can do it only by informing them of a new one. But since this is the answer, your Lordship pleases to make to my request, I crave leave to consider it a little.

Your Lordship having pronounced, concerning my definition of knowledge, which you call my method of certainty, that it might be of dangerous consequence to an article of the christian faith; I desired you to shew in what *Lett. 1. p. 87,* certainty lies: and desired it of your Lordship by these pressing considerations, 88. that it would secure that article of faith against any dangerous consequence from my way, and be a great service to truth in general. To which your Lordship replies here, that you did never pretend to inform the world of new *P. 75.* methods; and therefore are not bound to go any farther, than what you found fault with, which was my new method.

Ans. My Lord, I did not desire any new method of you; I observed your Lordship, in more places than one, reflected on me, for writing out of my own thoughts; and, therefore, I could not expect, from your Lordship, what you so much condemn in another. Besides, one of the faults, you found with my method, was, that it was new: and therefore, if your Lordship

Lett. 2. p.
83.

ship will look again into that passage, where I desire you to set the world right, in a thing of that great consequence, as it is to know, wherein certainty consists; you will not find, that I mention any thing, of a new method of certainty; my words were another, whether old or new, was indifferent. In truth, all that I requested, was, only such a method of certainty, as your Lordship approved of, and was secure in; and therefore I do not see, how your not pretending to inform the world, in any new method, can be any way alleged as a reason, for refusing so useful and so charitable a thing.

P. 75.

YOUR Lordship farther adds, "that you are not bound to go any farther, than what you found fault with." Answ. I suppose your Lordship means, "that you are not bound, by the law of disputation;" nor are you, as I humbly conceive, by this law forbid; or if you were, the law of the schools could not dispense with the eternal divine law of charity. The law of disputing, whence had it its so mighty a sanction? it is at best but the law of wrangling, if it shut out the great ends of information and instruction; and serves only to flatter a little guilty vanity, in a victory over an adversary, less skilful in this art of fencing. Who can believe, that, upon so slight an account, your Lordship should neglect your design, of writing against me? the great motives of your concern, for an article of the christian faith, and of that duty, which, you profess, has made you do, what you have done, will be believed to work more uniformly in your Lordship, than to let a father of the church, and a teacher in Israel, not tell one, who asks him, which is the right and safe way, if he knows it. No, no, my Lord, a character so much to the prejudice of your charity, no-body will receive, of your Lordship; no, not from yourself: whatever your Lordship may say, the world will believe, that you would have given a better method of certainty, if you had had one; when thereby you would have secured men from the danger of running into errors, in articles of faith, and effectually have recalled them from my way of certainty, which leads, as your Lordship says, to scepticism and infidelity. For to turn men from a way, they are in, the bare telling them it is dangerous, puts but a short stop to their going on, in it: there is nothing effectual to set them a-going right, but to shew them, which is the safe and sure way; a piece of humanity, which, when asked, no-body, as far as he knows, refuses another; and this I have earnestly asked of your Lordship.

P. 75.

YOUR Lordship represents to me the unsatisfactoriness and inconsistency of my way of certainty, by telling me, "that it seems still a strange thing to you, that I should talk so much of a new method of certainty by ideas; and yet allow, as I do, such a want of ideas, so much imperfection in them, and such a want of connection between our ideas, and the things themselves." Answ. This objection being so visibly against the extent of our knowledge, and not the certainty of it, by ideas, would need no other answer, but this, that it proved nothing to the point; which was to shew, "that my way by ideas, was no way to certainty at all; not to true certainty," which is a term your Lordship uses here, which I shall be able to conceive, what you mean by, when you shall be pleased to tell me, what false certainty is.

P. 76.

BUT because what you say here, is in short, what you ground your charge of scepticism on, in your former letter, I shall here, according to my promise, consider, what your Lordship says there, and hope you will allow this to be no unfit place.

Answ. 1. p.
125---131.

YOUR charge of scepticism, in your former letter, is as followeth.

YOUR Lordship's first argument consists in these propositions, viz.

1. THAT I say, Book IV. Chap. I. that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas.

2. THAT I go about to prove, that there are very many more beings, of which we have no ideas, than those, of which we have; from whence your Lordship draws this conclusion, "that we are excluded from attaining any knowledge, as to the far greatest part of the universe;" which I agree to. But, with submission, this is not the proposition to be proved, but this, viz. that

that my way by ideas, or my way of certainty by ideas, for to that your Lordship reduces it; i. e. my placing of certainty, in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas; leads to scepticism.

FARTHER, from my saying, that the intellectual world is greater and more beautiful, certainly, than the material, your Lordship argues, that if certainty may be had, by general reasons, without particular ideas, in one, it may also, in other cases. *Answ. 1. p. 126.* *Anfw. It may, no doubt: but this is nothing against any thing I have said; for I have neither said, nor suppose, that certainty, by general reasons, or any reasons, can be had, without ideas; no more than I say, or suppose, that we can reason, without thinking, or think, without immediate objects of our minds in thinking, i. e. think without ideas. But your Lordship asks, "whence comes this certainty (for I say certainly) where there "be no particular ideas," if knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas? I answer, we have ideas, as far as we are certain; and beyond that, we have neither certainty, nor probability. Every thing, which we either know, or believe, is some proposition: now no proposition can be framed, as the object of our knowledge, or assent, wherein two ideas are not joined to, or separated from one another. As for example, when I affirm that "something exists in the world, whereof I have no idea," existence is affirmed of something, some being: and I have as clear an idea of existence, and something, the two things joined in that proposition, as I have of them in this proposition, "something exists in the world, whereof I have an "idea." When, therefore, I affirm, that the intellectual world is greater and more beautiful than the material; whether I should know the truth of this proposition, either by divine revelation, or should assert it, as highly probable (which is all I do, in that chapter, out of which this instance is brought) it means no more but this, viz. that there are more, and more beautiful beings, whereof we have no ideas, than there are, of which we have ideas; of which beings, whereof we have no ideas, we can, for want of ideas, have no farther knowledge, but that such beings do exist.* *Essay, B. 4. C. 3.*

If your Lordship shall now ask me, "how I know there are such beings?" *Essay, B. 4. C. 3.* I answer, that, in that chapter of the extent of our knowledge, I do not say I know, but I endeavour to shew, that it is most highly probable: but yet a man is capable of knowing it to be true, because he is capable of having it revealed to him by God, that this proposition is true, viz. that, in the works of God, there are more, and more beautiful beings, whereof we have no ideas, than there are, whereof we have ideas. If God, instead of shewing the very things to St. Paul, had only revealed to him, that this proposition was true, viz. that there were things in heaven, "which neither eye had seen, nor ear had heard, nor had entered into the heart of man to conceive;" would he not have known the truth of that proposition, of whose terms he had ideas, viz. of beings, whereof he had no other ideas, but barely as something, and of existence; tho', in the want of other ideas of them, he could attain no other knowledge of them, but barely that they existed? So that, in what I have there said, there is no contradiction, nor shadow of a contradiction, to my placing knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of ideas.

BUT if I should any where mistake, and say any thing inconsistent with that way of certainty of mine; how, I beseech your Lordship, could you conclude from thence, that the placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, tends to scepticism? that which is the proposition here to be proved, would remain still unproved: for I might say things inconsistent with this proposition, that "knowledge consists in the perception of the "connexion, and agreement, or disagreement, and repugnancy of our ideas;" and yet that proposition be true, and very far from tending to scepticism, unless your Lordship will argue that every proposition, that is inconsistent with what a man any where says, tends to scepticism; and then I should be tempted to infer, that many propositions, in the letters your Lordship has honoured me with, will tend to scepticism.

Ans^w. I. p. 126, 167. YOUR Lordship's second argument is, from my saying, "we have no ideas of the mechanical affections of the minute particles of bodies, which hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths, concerning natural bodies:" from whence your Lordship concludes, "that since we can attain to no science, as to bodies or spirits, our knowledge must be confined to a very narrow compass." I grant it; but I crave leave to mind your Lordship again, that this is not the proposition to be proved: a little knowledge is still knowledge, and not scepticism. But let me have affirmed our knowledge to be comparatively very little; how, I beseech your Lordship, does that any way prove, that this proposition, "knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of our ideas," any way tends to scepticism? which was the proposition to be proved. But the inference, your Lordship shuts up this head with, in these words: "so that all certainty is given up, in the way of knowledge, as to the visible and invisible world, or at least the greatest part of them;" shewing, in the first part of it, what your Lordship should have inferred, and was willing to infer, does at last, by these words in the close, "or at least the greatest part of them," I guess come just to nothing: I say, I guess; for what them, by grammatical construction, is to be referred to, seems not clear to me.

Ans^w. I. p. 127. YOUR third argument being just of the same kind with the former, only to shew, that I reduce our knowledge to a very narrow compass, in respect of the whole extent of beings; is already answered.

Ans^w. I. p. 129. IN the fourth place, your Lordship sets down some words of mine concerning reasoning and demonstration; and then concludes, "but, if there be no way of coming to demonstration but this, I doubt we must be content without it." Which being nothing but a declaration of your doubt, is, I grant, a very short way of proving any proposition, and I shall leave to your Lordship the satisfaction you have, in such a proof, since, I think, it will scarce convince others.

Ans^w. I. p. 129---131. IN the last place, your Lordship argues, that because I say, that the idea in the mind proves not the existence of that thing, whereof it is an idea, therefore we cannot know the actual existence of any thing, by our senses; because we know nothing, but by the perceived agreement of ideas. But if you had been pleased to have considered my answer there, to the scepticks, whose cause you here seem, with no small vigour, to manage; you would, I humbly conceive, have found that you mistake one thing for another, viz. the idea that has by a former sensation, been lodged in the mind, for actually receiving any idea, i. e. actual sensation; which, I think, I need not go about to prove, are two distinct things, after what you have here quoted out of my book. Now the two ideas, that, in this case, are perceived to agree, and do thereby produce knowledge, are the idea of actual sensation (which is an action whereof I have a clear and distinct idea) and the idea of actual existence of something without me, that causes that sensation. And what other certainty your Lordship has, by your senses, of the existing of any thing without you, but the perceived connexion of those two ideas, I would gladly know. When you have destroyed this certainty, which I conceive is the utmost, as to this matter, which our infinitely wise and bountiful maker has made us capable of, in this state; your Lordship will have well assisted the scepticks, in carrying their arguments against certainty by sense, beyond what they could have expected.

I CANNOT but fear, my Lord, that what you have said here, in favour of scepticism, against certainty by sense (for it is not at all against me, 'till you shew we can have no idea of actual sensation) without the proper antidote annexed, in shewing, wherein that certainty consists (if the account, I give, be not true) after you have so strenuously endeavoured to destroy, what I have said for it; will, by your authority, have laid no small foundation of scepticism; which they will not fail to lay hold of, with advantage to their cause, who have any disposition that way. For I desire any one to read this your fifth argument, and then judge, which of us two is a promoter of scepticism; I, who have endeavoured, and, as I think, proved certainty by our senses; or your Lordship,

who

who has (in your thoughts at least) destroyed these proofs, without giving us any other to supply their place. All your other arguments amount to no more but this; that I have given instances to shew, that the extent of our knowledge, in comparison of the whole extent of being, is very little and narrow: which, when "your Lordship writ your vindication of the doctrine of the Trinity, were very fair and ingenuous confessions, of the shortness of human understanding, with respect to the nature and manner of such things, which we are most certain of the being of, by constant and undoubted experience:" tho' since, you have shewed your dislike of them, in more places than one; particularly p. 33. and again, more at large, p. 43. and, at last, you have thought fit to represent them, as arguments for scepticism. And thus I have acquitted myself, I hope to your Lordship's satisfaction, of my promise to answer your accusation of a tendency to scepticism. Vind. p. 244. Anf. 1. p. 33. Ib. p. 43--45.

BUT to return to your second letter, where I left off; in the following pages, you have another argument, "to prove my way of certainty to be none, but to lead to scepticism," which, after a serious perusal of it, seems to me to amount to no more but this, that Des Cartes and I go both, in the way of ideas, and we differ; ergo, the placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, is no way of certainty, but leads to scepticism: which is a consequence I cannot admit, and I think is no better, than this; your Lordship and I differ, and yet we both go, in the way of ideas; ergo, the placing of knowledge in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, is no way of certainty at all, but leads to scepticism. P. 76--78.

YOUR Lordship will, perhaps, think I say more than I can justify, when I say your Lordship goes, in the way of ideas; for you will tell me, you do not place certainty in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas. Anf. No more does Des Cartes; and therefore, in that respect, he and I went no more in the same way of ideas, than your Lordship and I do. From whence it follows, that how much soever he, and I, may differ, in other points, our difference is no more an argument against this proposition, that knowledge, or certainty, consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, than your Lordship's and my difference, in any other point, is an argument against the truth of that my definition of knowledge, or that it tends to scepticism.

BUT you will say, that Des Cartes built his system of philosophy upon ideas; and so, I say, does your Lordship too, and every one else, as much as he, that has any system of that, or any other, part of knowledge. For ideas are nothing, but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking; and your Lordship, I conclude, in building your system of any part of knowledge, thinks on something; and, therefore, you can no more build, or have any system of knowledge, without ideas, than you can think, without some immediate objects of thinking. Indeed, you do not so often use the word, ideas, as Des Cartes, or I, have done; but using the things signified by that term, as much as either of us (unless you can think, without an immediate object of thinking) your's also is the way of ideas, as much as his, or mine. Your condemning the way of ideas, in those general terms, which one meets with, so often, in your writings, on this occasion, amounts, at last, to no more but an exception, against a poor sound of three syllables, tho' your Lordship thinks fit not to own, that you have any exception to it.

IF, besides this, these ten or twelve pages have any other argument in them, which I have not seen, I humbly desire, you would be pleased to put it into a syllogism, to convince my reader that I have silently passed by an argument of importance, and then I promise an answer to it: and the same request and promise I make to your Lordship, in reference to all other passages, in your letter, wherein you think there is any thing of moment unanswered.

YOUR Lordship comes to answer what was in my former letter, to shew, that what you had said, concerning nature and person, was to me, and several others, whom I had talked with, about it, hard to be understood. To this purpose

- P. 87--103. purpose the sixteen next pages are chiefly employed, to shew what Aristotle and others have said, about *physis* and *natura*, a Greek and a Latin word; neither of which is the English word, nature, nor can it concern it at all, 'till it be proved that nature, in English, has, in the propriety of our tongue, precisely the same signification, that *physis* had among the Greeks, and *natura* among the Romans.
- P. 92. & 96. For would it not be pretty harsh to an English ear, to say with Aristotle, "that nature is a corporeal substance, or a corporeal substance is nature?" to instance but in this one, among those many various senses, which your Lordship proves, he used the term *physis* in: or with Anaximander, "that nature is matter, or matter nature? or with Sextus Empericus, that nature is a principle of life, or a principle of life is nature?" so that, tho' the philosophers of old, of all kinds, did understand the sense of the terms *physis*, and *natura*, in the languages of their countries, yet it does not follow, what you would here conclude from thence, that they understood the proper signification of the term, nature, in English: nor has an Englishman any more need to consult those Grecians, in their use of the sound *physis*, to know what nature signifies in English, than those Grecians had need to consult our writings, or bring instances of the use of the word, nature, in English authors, to justify their using of the term *physis*, in any sense, they had used it in Greek. The like may be said of what is brought out of the Greek christian writers; for, I think, an Englishman could scarce be justified in saying in English, "that the angels were natures;" because Theodoret and St. Basil call them *physis*. "To these, I think, there might be added other senses, wherein the word *physis* may be found, made use of by the Greeks, which are not taken notice of, by your Lordship: As particularly Aristotle, if I mistake not, uses it for a plastick power, or a kind of *anima mundi*, presiding over the material world, and producing the order and regularity of motions, formations and generations in it."
- P. 66.
P. 98.
P. 99.
P. 90, 100.
P. 102.

INDEED, your Lordship brings a proof from an authority, that is proper in the case, and would go a great way in it; for it is of an Englishman, who, writing of nature, gives an account of the signification of the word nature, in English. But the mischief is, that, among eight significations of the word, nature, which he gives, that is not to be found, which you quote him for, and had need of. For he says not that nature, in English, is used for substance, which is the sense your Lordship has used it in, and would justify, by the authority of that ingenious and honourable person: and to make it out, you tell us, "Mr. Boyle says the word, essence, is of great affinity to nature, if not of an adequate import; to which your Lordship adds, but the real essence of a thing is a substance." So that, in fine, the authority of this excellent person, and philosopher, amounts to thus much, that he says that nature and essence are two terms, that have a great affinity; and you say, that nature and substance are two terms, that have a great affinity. For the learned Mr. Boyle says no such thing, nor can it appear, that he ever thought so, 'till it can be shewn, that he has said that essence and substance have the same signification.

- I HUMBLY conceive, it would have been a strange way in any body, but your Lordship, to have quoted an author for saying, that nature and substance had the same signification, when one of those terms, viz. substance, he does not, upon that occasion, so much as name. But your Lordship has this privilege, it seems, to speak of your inferences, as if they were other men's words, whereof, I think, I have given several instances; I am sure, I have given one, where you seem to speak of clear and distinct ideas, as my words, when they are only your words; there infer'd from my words, evident knowledge: and other the like instances might be produced, were there any need.
- P. 63.

HAD your Lordship produced Mr. Boyle's testimony, that nature, in our tongue, had the same signification with substance, I should presently have submitted to so great an authority, and taken it for proper English, and a clear way of expressing one's self, to use nature and substance promiscuously, one for another. But since, I think, there is no instance of any one, who ever did

did so, and therefore it must be a new, and consequently no very clear, way of speaking; give me leave, my Lord, to wonder, why, in all this dispute, about the term, nature, upon the clear and right understanding whereof, you lay so much stress, you have not been pleased to define it; which would put an end to all disputes, about the meaning of it, and leave no doubtfulness, no obscurity, in your use of it, nor any room for any dispute, what you mean by it. This would have saved many pages of paper, tho' perhaps it would have made us lose your learned account, of what the ancients have said, concerning *physis*, and the several acceptations they used it in.

ALL the other authors, Greek and Latin, your Lordship has quoted, may, for ought I know, have used the terms *physis* and *natura*, properly, in their languages; and have discoursed very clearly and intelligibly about what those terms, in their countries signified. But how that proves, there were no difficulties, in the sense, or construction, in that discourse of your's, concerning nature, which I, and those I consulted upon it, did not understand; is hard to see. Your Lordship's discourse was obscure, and too difficult, then, for me, and so I must own it is still. Whether my friend be any better enlightened by what you have said to him here, out of so many ancient authors, I am too remote from him at the writing of this, to know, and so shall not trouble your Lordship with any conversation, which perhaps, when we meet again, we may have upon it.

THE next passage of your vindication, which was complained of, to be very Vind. p. 253. hard to be understood, was this, where you say, "that you grant that, by " sensation and reflection, we come to know the powers and properties of " things; but our reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these, " because it is impossible, they should subsist by themselves. So that the na- " ture of things properly belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas." To rectify the mistake, that had been made in my first letter, p. 157. in taking reason, here, to mean the faculty of reason, you tell me, "I might easily have Answ. i. p. " seen, that, by reason, your Lordship understood principles of reason allowed 101. " by mankind." To which it was replied, that then this passage of your's must be read thus, viz. "that your Lordship grants that by sensation, and re- Lett. 2. p. " flection, we come to know the properties of things; but our reason, i. e. 125, 126. " the principles of reason allowed by mankind, are satisfied that there must be " something beyond these; because it is impossible, they should subsist by them- " selves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason," i. e. to the principles of reason allowed by mankind, "and not to mere ideas; which " made it seem more unintelligible, than it was before."

To the complaint was made, of the unintelligibleness of this passage, in this last sense, given by your Lordship, you answer nothing. So that we [i. e. my friends, whom I consulted, and I] are still excusable, if not understanding what is signified by these expressions; "the principles of reason, allowed by " mankind are satisfied, and the nature of things properly belongs to the prin- " ciples of reason, allowed by mankind," we see not the connexion of the pro- positions here tyed together, by the words, so that, which was the thing com- plained of, in these words, viz. "that the inference here, both for its con- Lett. 2. p. " nexion and expression, seemed hard to be understood;" and more to the 121. purpose, which your Lordship takes no notice of.

INDEED, your Lordship repeats these words of mine, "That, in both " senses, of the word, reason, either taken for a faculty, or for the principles " of reason, allowed by mankind, reason, and ideas, may consist together:" and then subjoins, "that this leads your Lordship to the examination of that, P. 105. " which may be of some use, viz. to shew the difference of my method of " certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reason." Which, how it any ways justifies your opposing ideas, and reason, as you here, and else- where, often do; or shews, that ideas are inconsistent with the principles of reason, allowed by mankind; I leave to the reader to judge. Your Lordship, for the clearing of what you had said in your vindication, &c. from obscurity

and unintelligibleness, which were complained of, in it, is to prove, that ideas are inconsistent with the principles of reason, allowed by mankind; and, in answer to this, you say, "you will shew the difference of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty by reason."

My Lord, as I remember, the expression in question was not, "that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason, and not to my method of certainty by ideas; but this, that the nature of things belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas. So that the thing, you were here to shew, was, that reason, i. e. the principles of reason, allowed by mankind, and ideas, and not the principles of reason, and my method of certainty by ideas, cannot consist together:" for the principles of reason, allowed by mankind, and ideas, may consist together; tho', perhaps, my method of certainty by ideas, should prove inconsistent with those principles. So that if all, that you say, from this to the 153d page, i. e. forty eight pages, were as clear demonstration, as I humbly conceive it is the contrary; yet it does nothing to clear the passage in hand, but leaves that part of your discourse, concerning nature, lying full under the objection was made against it, as much as if you had not said one word.

BUT since I am not unwilling that my method of certainty should be examin'd, and I should be glad (if there be any faults in it) to learn the defects of that my definition of knowledge, from so great a master as your Lordship; I will consider what you here say, "to shew the difference of my method of certainty by ideas, and the method of certainty by reason."

P. 105. Your Lordship says, "that the way of certainty, by reason, lies in two things:"

"1. THE certainty of principles.

"2. THE certainty of deductions."

I GRANT, that a part of that, which is called certainty of reason, lies in the certainty of principles; which principles, I presume, your Lordship and I are agreed, are several propositions.

IN, then, these principles are propositions, 'to shew the difference between your Lordship's way of certainty by reason, and my way of certainty by ideas; I think it is visible, that you ought to shew, wherein the certainty of those propositions consists, in your way by reason, different from that, wherein I make it consist, in my way by ideas. As for example: your Lordship and I are agreed, that this proposition, whatsoever is, is; is a principle of reason, or a maxim. Now my way of certainty, by ideas, is, that the certainty of this proposition consists in this, that there is a perceivable connexion, or agreement, between the idea of being and the idea of being, or between the idea of existence and the idea of existence, as is expressed in that proposition. But now, in your way of reason, pray, wherein does the certainty of this proposition consist? If it be, in any thing, different from that perceivable agreement of the ideas, affirmed of one another in it, I beseech your Lordship to tell it me; if not, I beg leave to conclude, that your way of certainty by reason, and my way of certainty by ideas, in this case, are just the same.

BUT, instead of saying any thing, to shew wherein the certainty of principles is different in the way of reason, from the certainty of principles, in the way of ideas, upon my friend's shewing, that you had no ground to say, as you did, that I had no idea of reason, as it stands for principles of reason; your Lordship takes occasion (as, what will not, in a skilful hand, serve to introduce any thing, one has a mind to?) to tell me, "what ideas I have of them, must appear from my book, and you do there find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims, which you cannot but think extraordinary for the design of it, which is thus summed in the conclusion, viz. that it was to shew, that these maxims, as they are of little use, where we have clear and distinct ideas, so they are of dangerous use, where our ideas are not clear and distinct. And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordship, that my way of ideas is very consistent with the certainty of reason, when the way of

P. 106.
B. 4. C. 7.
§. 20.

"reason

"reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon general principles, and I assert them to be useless and dangerous?"

IN which words I crave leave to observe,

1. THAT the pronoun, *them*, here, seems to have reference to self-evident propositions, to maxims, and to principles, as terms used by your Lordship and me; tho' it be certain, that you and I use them, in a far different sense: for, if I mistake not, you use them all three promiscuously, one for another, whereas 'tis plain, that, in that chapter, out of which you bring your quotations *Essay, B. 4. C. 7.* here, I distinguish self-evident propositions, from those, which I there mention, under the name of maxims, which are principally these two, "whatsoever is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." Farther it is plain out of the same place, that, by maxims, I there mean general propositions, which are so universally received, under the name of maxims, or axioms, that they are looked upon, as innate; the two chief whereof, principally there meant, are those above-mentioned: but what the propositions are, which you comprehend, under maxims, or principles of reason, cannot be determined, since your Lordship neither defines, nor enumerates them; and so, 'tis impossible precisely, to know what you mean, by them, here: and that, which makes me more at a loss, is, that, in this argument, you set down for principles, or maxims, propositions, that are not so much as self-evident, *P. 103.* viz. this, "that the essential properties of a man, are to reason and discourse, &c."

2. I CRAVE leave to observe, that you tell me, that in my book, "you find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims;" whereas I find no such chapter in my book: I have in it, indeed, a chapter of maxims, but never an one intitled, "of self-evident propositions and maxims." This, 'tis possible, your Lordship will call a nice criticism; but yet it is such an one, as is very necessary in the case: for in that chapter, I, as is before observed, expressly distinguish self-evident propositions, from the received maxims, or axioms, which I there speak of: whereas it seems to me, to be your design (in joining them, in a title of a chapter, contrary to what I had done) to have it thought, that I treated of them, as one and the same thing; and so, all that I said there, of the uselessness of some few general propositions, under the title of received maxims, might be applied to all self-evident propositions; the quite contrary whereof, was the design of that chapter. For that, which I endeavour to shew there, is, that all our knowledge is not built on those few, received, general propositions, which are ordinarily called maxims, or axioms; but that there are a great many truths may be known, without them: but that there is any knowledge, without self-evident propositions, I am so far from denying, that I am accused by your Lordship, for requiring in demonstration, more such than you think are necessary. This seems, I say, to be your design; and I wish your Lordship, by intitling my chapter, as I myself did, and not as it would best serve your turn, had not made it necessary for me, to make this nice criticism. This is certain, that, without thus confounding maxims and self-evident propositions, what you here say, would not so much, as in appearance, concern me: for,

3. I CRAVE leave to observe, that all the argument, your Lordship uses here against me, to prove, that my way of certainty by ideas, is inconsistent with "the way of certainty by reason, which lies in the certainty of principles, is this; that the way of reason hath been always supposed to proceed, upon general principles, and I assert them to be useless and dangerous." Be pleased, my Lord, to define, or enumerate, your general principles; and, then, we shall see, whether I assert them to be useless and dangerous, and whether they, who supposed the way of reason was to proceed upon general principles, differed from me; and if they did differ, whether their's was more the way of reason than mine: but to talk thus of general principles, which have always been supposed the way of reason, without telling so much, as which, or what they are, is not so much, as by authority to shew, that my way of certainty by ideas, is inconsistent with the way of certainty by reason; much less is it,

it, in reality, to prove it. Because, admitting I had said any thing contrary to what, as you say, has been always supposed, its being supposed, proves it not to be true; because we know that several things have been, for many ages, generally supposed, which, at last, upon examination, have been found not to be true.

WHAT hath been always supposed, is fit only for your Lordship's great reading to declare; but such arguments, I confess, are wholly lost upon me, who have not time, or occasion, to examine, what has always been supposed; especially in those questions, which concern truths, that are to be known from the nature of things; because, I think, they cannot be established by majority of votes, not easy to be collected; nor, if they were collected, can convey certainty, till it can be supposed, that the greater part of mankind are always in the right. In matters of fact, I own, we must govern ourselves, by the testimonies of others; but, in matters of speculation, to suppose on, as others have supposed before us, is supposed, by many, to be only a way to learned ignorance, which enables to talk much, and know but little. The truths, which the penetration and labours of others, before us, have discovered and made out, I own we are infinitely indebted to them for; and some of them are of that consequence, that we cannot acknowledge too much the advantages, we receive from those great masters in knowledge: but where they only supposed, they left it to us to search and advance farther. And, in those things, I think, it becomes our industry to employ itself, for the improvement of the knowledge, and adding to the stock of discoveries, left us by our inquisitive and thinking predecessors.

P. 106.

4. ONE thing more, I crave leave to observe, viz. that, to these words, "these maxims, as they are of little use, where we have clear and distinct ideas, so they are of dangerous use, where our ideas are not clear and distinct," quoted out of my Essay; you subjoin, and is not this a fair way to convince your Lordship, that my way of ideas is very consistent with the "certainty of reason?" Answ. My Lord, my Essay, and those words in it, were writ many years, before I dreamt that you, or any body else, would ever question the consistency of my way of certainty, by ideas, with the way of certainty by reason; and so could not be intended to convince your Lordship, in this point: and since you first said, that these two ways are inconsistent, I never brought those words to convince you, "that my way is consistent with the certainty of reason;" and therefore, why you ask, whether that be a fair way to convince you, which was never made use of, as any way to convince you, of any such thing, is hard to imagine.

P. 106, 107.
Essay, B. 4.
C. 7. §. 4.

BUT your Lordship goes on, in the following words, with the like kind of argument, where you tell me, that I say, "that my first design is to prove, that the consideration of those general maxims adds nothing to the evidence, or certainty, of knowledge; which, says your Lordship, overthrows all that, which hath been accounted science and demonstration, and must lay the foundation of scepticism; because our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principle of reason. To make this plain, you say, you will put a case, grounded upon my words; which are, that I have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied, that they are men. These words J. S. understands, as spoken of themselves, and charges them with very ill consequences; but you think they are capable of another meaning: however, says your Lordship, let us put the case, that men did in earnest question, whether they were men or not; and then you do not see, if I set aside general maxims, how I can convince them, that they are men. For the way, your Lordship looks on, as most apt to prevail, upon such extraordinary sceptical men, is by general maxims and principles of reason."

ANSW. I can, neither in that paragraph, nor chapter, find that I say, "that my first design is to prove, that these general maxims" (i. e. those, which your Lordship calls general principles of reason) add nothing to the evidence and certainty of knowledge in general: for so these words must be understood,

to

to make good the consequence, which your Lordship charges on them, viz. "that they overthrow all, that has been accounted science and demonstration, and lay the foundation of scepticism."

WHAT my design in that place is, is evident from these words, in the foregoing paragraph; "let us consider, whether this self-evidence be peculiar only *Essay*, B. 4. to those propositions, which are received for maxims, and have the dignity C. 7. §. 3. of axioms allowed: and here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them, in this self-evidence. Which shews, that my design, there, was to evince, that there were truths, that are not called maxims, that are as self-evident, as those received maxims. Pursuant to this design, I say, "that the consideration of these axioms [i. e. what-§. 4. soever is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be] can add nothing to the evidence and certainty of its [i. e. the mind's] knowledge;" [i. e. of the truth of more particular propositions, concerning identity.] These are my words, in that place, and that the sense of them is according to the limitation, annexed to them, between those crotchets, I refer my reader to that fourth section; where he will find that all, that I say, amounts to no more, but what is expressed in these words, in the close of it: "I appeal to every one's own mind, whether this proposition, a circle is a circle, be not as self-evident a proposition, as that consisting of more general terms, what-soever is, is: and again, whether this proposition, blue is not red, be not a proposition, that the mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; and so of all the like." And now I ask your Lordship, whether you do affirm of this, that "it overthrows all, that, which hath been counted science and demonstration, and must lay the foundation of scepticism?" If you do, I shall desire you to prove it; if you do not, I must desire you to consider, how fairly my sense has been represented.

BUT, supposing you had represented my sense right, and that the little, or dangerous use, which I there limit to certain maxims, had been meant of all principles of reason, in general, in your sense; what had this been, my Lord, to the question under debate? Your Lordship undertakes to shew, that your way of certainty, by reason, is different from my way of certainty, by ideas. To do this, you say, in the preceding page, "that certainty, by reason, lies, 1. in certainty of principles; 2. in certainty of deductions." The first of these, P. 105. you are upon here; and if, in order to what you had undertaken, your Lordship had shewn, that, in your way, by reason, those principles were certain; but, in my way, by ideas, we could not attain to any certainty, concerning them; this, indeed, had been to shew a difference, between my way of certainty, which you call the way, by ideas, and your's, which you call the way, by reason, in this part of certainty, that lies in the certainty of principles. I have said, in the words quoted by your Lordship, that the consideration of those two maxims, "what is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" are not of use, to add any thing to the evidence, or certainty, of our knowledge of the truth of identical predications; but I never said those maxims were, in the least, uncertain: I may, perhaps, think otherwise of their use, than your Lordship does, but I think no otherwise of their truth and certainty, than you do; they are left in their full force and certainty, for your use, if you can make any better use of them, than what, I think, can be made. So that, in respect of the allowed certainty of those principles, my way differs not at all from your Lordship's.

PRAY, my Lord, look over that chapter again, and see, whether I bring their truth and certainty, any more into question, than you yourself do; and 'tis about their certainty, and not use, that the question, here, is between your Lordship and me: we both agree, that they are both undoubtedly certain; all, then, that you bring, in the following pages, about their use, is nothing to the present question, about the certainty of principles, which your Lordship is upon, in this place: and you will prove, that your way of certainty, by reason, is dif-

ferent from my way of certainty, by ideas, when you can shew, that you are certain of the truth of those, or any other, maxims, any otherwise, than by the perception of the agreement or disagreement, of ideas, as expressed in them.

BUT your Lordship, passing by that wholly, endeavours to prove, that my saying, that the consideration of those two general maxims can add nothing to the evidence, and certainty, of knowledge, in identical predications, (for that is all, that I there say) "overthrows all, that has been accounted science and "demonstration, and must lay the foundation of scepticism;" and, 'tis by a very remarkable proof, viz. "because our true grounds of certainty depend upon "on some general principles of reason;" which is the very thing I there, not only deny, but have disproved; and, therefore, should not, I humbly conceive, have been rested on, as a proof of any thing else, till my arguments against it had been answered.

P. 107.

BUT instead of that, your Lordship says, you will put a case, that shall make it plain, which is the business of the six following pages, which are spent in this case.

B. vi. c. 7.
§. 17.

THE case is founded upon a supposition, which you seem willing to have thought that you borrowed either from J. S. or from me; whereas truly, that supposition is neither that gentleman's, nor mine, but purely your Lordship's own. For however grossly Mr. J. S. has mistaken (which he has since acknowledged in print) the obvious sense of those words of my Essay, on which you say, you ground your case; yet I must do him right herein, that he himself supposed not, that any man, in his wits, ever, in earnest, questioned, whether he himself were a man, or no: tho', by a mistake, (which I cannot but wonder at, in one so much exercised in controversy, as Mr. J. S.) he charged me with saying it.

P. 107.

YOUR Lordship, indeed, says, "that you think my words there may have "another meaning." Would you thereby insinuate, that you think it possible, they should have that meaning, which J. S. once gave them? If you do not, my Lord, Mr. J. S. and his understanding them so, is in vain brought in, here, to countenance your making such a supposition. If you do think those words of my Essay, capable of such a meaning, as J. S. gave them, there will appear a strange harmony between your Lordship's and Mr. J. S.'s understanding, when he mistakes, what is said in my book, whether it will continue, now Mr. J. S. takes me right, I know not: but let us come to the case, as you put it. Your words are,

P. 107.

"LET us put the case, that men did in earnest question, whether they "were men or not. Your Lordship says, you do not then see, if I set aside "general maxims, how I can convince them, that they are men." Answ. And do you, my Lord, see that, with maxims, you can convince them, of that, or any thing else? I confess, whatever you should do, I should think it scarce worth while, to reason with them, about any thing. I believe you are the first, that ever supposed a man so much beside himself, as to question, whether he were a man, or no, and yet so rational, as to be thought capable of being convinced of that, or any thing, by discourse of reason. This, methinks, is little different from supposing a man in, and out of his wits, at the same time.

BUT, let us suppose your Lordship so lucky with your maxims, that you do convince a man (that doubts of it) that he is a man; what proof, I beseech you, my Lord, is that of this proposition, "that our true grounds of certainty "depend upon some general principles of reason?"

ON the contrary, suppose it should happen, as is the more likely, that your setting upon him, with your maxims, cannot convince him; are we not, by this your case, to take this for a proof, "that general principles of reason are "not the grounds of certainty?" for 'tis upon the success, or not success of your endeavours, to convince such a man with maxims, that your Lordship puts the proof of this proposition, "that our true grounds of certainty depend "upon general principles of reason;" the issue whereof must remain in suspense, 'till

'till you have found such a man, to bring it to trial; and so the proof is far enough off, unless you think the case so plain, that every one sees such a man will be presently convinced by your maxims, tho' I should think it probable that most people may think, he will not.

YOUR Lordship adds, "for the way, you look on, as most apt to prevail P. 107. "upon such extraordinary sceptical men, is by general maxims and principles of "reason." Answ. This, indeed, is a reason, why your Lordship should use maxims, when you have to do with such extraordinary sceptical men; because you look on it, as the likeliest way to prevail. But pray, my Lord, is your looking on it as the best way, to prevail on such extraordinary sceptical men, any proof, that "our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principles of reason?" for it was to make this plain, that this case was put.

FARTHER, my Lord, give me leave to ask, what have we here to do, with the ways of convincing others, of what they do not know, or assent to? Your Lordship and I are not, as I think, disputing of the methods of persuading others, of what they are ignorant of, and do not yet assent to; but our debate here, is about the ground of certainty, in what they do know, and assent to.

HOWEVER, you go on to set down several maxims, which you look on, as most apt to prevail, upon your extraordinary sceptical man, to convince him, that he exists, and that he is a man. The maxims are,

"THAT nothing can have no operation.

P. 108.

"THAT all different sorts of being are distinguished by essential properties.

"THAT the essential properties of a man, are reason, discourse, &c.

"THAT these properties cannot subsist by themselves, without a real substance."

I WILL not question, whether a man cannot know, that he exists, or be certain (for 'tis of knowledge, and certainty, the question here is) that he is a man, without the help of these maxims. I will only crave leave to ask, how you know that these are maxims? For methinks this, "that the essential properties of a man are reason, discourse, &c." an imperfect proposition, with, and so forth, at the end of it, is a pretty sort of maxim. That, therefore, which I desire to be informed here, is, how your Lordship knows these, or any other, propositions to be maxims? and how propositions, that are maxims, are to be distinguished from propositions that are not maxims? and the reason, why I insist upon it, is this: because this, and this only, would shew, whether, what I have said, in my chapter about maxims, "overthrows all, that has "been accounted science and demonstration, and lays the foundation of scepticism." But I fear my request, that you would be pleased to tell me, what you mean, by maxims, that I may know what propositions, according to your Lordship, are, and what are not maxims, will not easily be granted me; because it would presently put an end to all, that you impute to me, as said in that chapter, against maxims, in a sense, that I use not the word there.

YOUR Lordship makes me, out of my book, answer to the use, you make P. 109. of the four above-mentioned propositions, which you call maxims, as if I were declared of an opinion, that maxims could not be of any use, in arguing with others: which, methinks, you should not have done, if you had considered my chapter of maxims, which you so often quote. For I there say, "maxims are Essay, B. vi. "useful to stop the mouths of wranglers, — to shew, that wrong opinions C. 7. §. 11, "lead to absurdities, &c."

YOUR Lordship, nevertheless, goes on to prove, that "without the help of P. 109. "these principles, or maxims, I cannot prove, to any, that doubt it, that they "are men, in my way of ideas." Answ. I beseech you, my Lord, to give me leave to mind you again, that the question is not, what I can prove; but whether, in my way, by ideas, I cannot, without the help of these principles, know that I am a man; and be certain of the truth of that, and several other propositions; I say, of several other propositions: For I do not think you, in your way of certainty, by reason, pretend to be certain of all truths; or to be able to prove (to those

those who doubt) all propositions, or so much as be able to convince every one of the truth of every proposition, that you yourself are certain of. There be many propositions, in Mr. Newton's excellent book, which there are thousands of people, and those a little more rational, than such as should deny themselves to be men, whom Mr. Newton himself would not be able, with, or without, the use of maxims, used in mathematicks, to convince of the truth of: and yet this would be no argument, against his method of certainty, whereby he came to the knowledge, that they are true. What, therefore, you can conclude, as to my way of certainty, from a supposition of my not being able, in my way by ideas, to convince those, who doubt of it, that they are men, I do not see. But your Lordship is resolved to prove, that I cannot, so you go on.

P. 110.

YOUR Lordship says, that "I suppose, that we must have a clear and distinct idea of that we are certain of;" and this you prove, out of my chapter of maxims, where I say, "that every one knows the ideas, that he has, and that distinctly and unconfusedly, one from another." Answ. I suspected all along, that you mistook what I meant, by confused ideas. If your Lordship C. 29. §. 4. pleases to turn to my chapter of distinct and confused ideas, you will there find, that an idea, which is distinguish'd in the mind from all others, may yet be confused: the confusion being made, by a careless application of distinct names, to ideas, that are not sufficiently distinct. Which having explain'd at large, in that chapter, I shall not need here again to repeat. Only permit me to set down an instance: he that has the idea of the liquor that, circulating thro' the heart of a sheep, keeps that animal alive, and he, that has the idea of the liquor that circulates thro' the heart of a lobster, has two different ideas; as distinct as an idea of an aqueous, pellucid, cold liquor, is from the idea of a red, opaque, hot liquor: but yet, these two may be confounded, by giving the name blood, to this vital, circulating liquor of a lobster.

THIS being considered, will shew, how what I have said, there, may consist with my saying, that to certainty, ideas are not required, that are, in all their parts, perfectly clear and distinct: because certainty being spoken there, of the knowledge of the truth of any proposition; and propositions being made in words, it may be true, that, notwithstanding all the ideas we have, in our minds, are, as far as we have them there, clear and distinct, yet those, which we would suppose the terms, in the proposition, to stand for, may not be clear and distinct: either,

1. By making the term stand for an uncertain idea, which we have not yet precisely determined in our minds, whereby it comes to stand, sometimes for one idea, sometimes for another. Which tho', when we reflect on them, they are distinct in our minds, yet by this use of a name, undetermined in its signification, come to be confounded. Or,

2. By supposing the name to stand for something more, than really is in the idea, in our minds, which we make it a sign of; v. g. let us suppose, that a man, many years since, when he was young, eat a fruit, whose shape, size, consistency, and colour, he has a perfect remembrance of; but the particular taste, he has forgot, and only remembers, that it very much delighted him: this complex idea, as far as it is in his mind, 'tis evident, is there; and, as far as he perceives it, when he reflects on it, is, in all its parts, clear and distinct: but when he calls it a pine-apple, and will suppose, that name stands for the same, precise, complex idea, for which another man, (who newly eat of that fruit, and has the idea of the taste of it, also, fresh in his mind) uses it, or for which he himself used it, when he had the taste fresh in his memory; 'tis plain his complex idea, in that part, which consists in the taste, is very obscure.

P. 110.

To apply this, to what your Lordship here makes me suppose, I answer, I. I do not suppose, that to certainty it is requisite, that an idea should be, in all its parts, clear and distinct. I can be certain, that a pine-apple is not an artichoke, tho' my idea, which I suppose that name to stand for, be in me obscure and confused, in regard of its taste.

2. I DO not deny, but on the contrary, I affirm, that I can have a clear and distinct idea of a man (i. e. the idea, I give the name, man, to, may be clear and distinct) tho' it should be true, that men are not yet agreed on the determined idea, that the name man shall stand for. Whatever confusion, there may be, in the idea, to which that name is indeterminately applied; I do allow and affirm, that every one, if he pleases, may have a clear and distinct idea of a man, to himself, i. e. which he makes the word, man, stand for; which, if he makes known to others, in his discourse with them, about man, all verbal dispute will cease, and he cannot be mistaken, when he uses the term, man, and if this were but done, with most of the glittering terms, brandished in disputes, it would often be seen, how little some men have to say, who with equivocal words and expressions, make no small noise in controversy.

YOUR Lordship concludes this part by saying, "thus you have shewed, how P. 114. "inconsistent my way of ideas is, with true certainty, and of what use and "necessity these general principles of reason are." Answ. By the laws of disputation, which, in another place, you express such a regard to, one is bound not to change the terms of the question. This I crave leave humbly to offer to your Lordship, because, as far as I have looked into controversy, I do not remember to have met with any one so apt, shall I say? to forget, or change, the question, as your Lordship. This, my Lord, I should not venture to say, but upon very good grounds, which I shall be ready to give you an account of, whenever you shall demand it of me. One example of it, we have here: you say, "you have shewed how inconsistent my way of ideas is with true P. 114. "certainty, and of what use and necessity these general principles of reason are:" my Lord, if you please to look back to the 105th page, you will see, what you there promised, was, "to shew the difference of my method of certainty, by "ideas, and the method of certainty, by reason:" and particularly, in the pages between that and this, the certainty of principles, which you say, is one of those two things, wherein the way of certainty, by reason, lies. Instead of that, your Lordship concludes here, that you have shewed two things:

"1. How inconsistent my way of ideas is with true certainty." Whereas it should be "to shew the inconsistency, or difference, of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reason;" which are two very different propositions. And, before you undertake to shew, that my method of certainty is inconsistent with true certainty, it will be necessary for you to define, and tell us wherein true certainty consists, which your Lordship hitherto has shewn no great forwardness to do.

2. ANOTHER thing, which, you say, you have done, is, that "you have "shewn of what Use and Necessity these general Principles of reason are." Answ. Whether, by these general principles, you mean those propositions, which you set down, p. 108. and call there maxims, or any other propositions, which you have not any where set down, I cannot tell. But, whatsoever they are, that you mean here, by these, I know not how the Usefulness of these, your general principles, be they what they will, came to be a question between your Lordship and me, here. If you have a mind to shew any mistakes of mine, in my chapter of maxims, which, you say, you think extraordinary, for the design of it, I shall not be unwilling to be rectified; but that the usefulness of principles is not, what is here under debate between us, I, with submission, affirm. That, which your Lordship is here to prove, is, that the certainty of principles, which is the way of certainty, by reason, is different from my way of certainty, by ideas. Upon the whole, I crave leave to say, in your words, that "thus I have," I humbly conceive, made it appear, that you have not "shewed any difference, much less any inconsistency of my method of certainty, "by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reason," in that first part, which you assign of certainty by reason, viz. certainty of principles.

I COME now to the second part, which you assign of certainty, by reason, P. 105. viz. certainty of deductions. I only crave leave first to set down these words,

in the latter end of your discourse, which we have been considering, where your Lordship says, "you begin to think J. S. was in the right, when he made me say, That I had discoursed with very rational men, who denied themselves to be men." Answ. I do not know what may be done, by those, who have such a command over the pronouns they, and them, as to put they themselves, for they. I shall, therefore, desire my reader to turn to that passage of my book, and see, whether he too can be so lucky, as your Lordship, and can, with you, begin to think, that by these words, "who have actually denied, that they, i. e. infants and changelings, are men," I meant, who actually denied, that they themselves were men.

Essay, b. iv.
c. 7. § 17.

YOUR Lordship, to prove my method of certainty, by ideas, to be different from, and inconsistent with your second part of the certainty, by reason, which, P. 114. you say, lies in the certainty of deductions, begins thus: "that you come now to the certainty of reason, in making deductions; and here you shall briefly lay down the grounds of certainty, which the antient philosophers went upon, and then compare my way of ideas, with them." To which give me leave, my Lord, to reply;

(1.) THAT, I humbly conceive, it should have been grounds of certainty [in making deductions] which the antient philosophers went upon; or else, they will be nothing to the proposition, which your Lordship has undertaken here to prove. Now, of the certainty, in making deductions, I see none of the antients, produced by your Lordship, who say any thing to shew, wherein it P. 116. consists, but Aristotle; who, as you say, "in his method of inferring one thing from another, went upon this common principle of reason, that what things agree in a third, agree among themselves." And it so falls out, that so far as he goes, towards the shewing, wherein the certainty of deductions consists, he and I agree, as is evident, by what I say in my Essay. And if Aristotle had gone any farther to shew, how we are certain, that those two things agree with a third, he would have placed that certainty in the perception of that agreement, as I have done, and then he and I should have perfectly agreed. I presume to say, if Aristotle had gone farther in this matter, he would have placed our knowledge, or certainty of the agreement of any two things, in the perception of their agreement: and let not any one from hence think, I attribute too much to myself, in saying, that that acute and judicious philosopher, if he had gone farther in that matter, would have done, as I have done. For if he omitted it, I imagine it was not, that he did not see it, but that it was so obvious and evident, that it appeared superfluous to name it. For who can doubt, that the knowledge, or being certain, that any two things agree, consists in the perception of their agreement? What else can it possibly consist in? It is so obvious, that it would be a little extraordinary to think, that he that went so far, could miss it. And I should wonder, if any one should allow the certainty of deduction to consist, in the agreement of two things in a third, and yet should deny, that the knowledge, or certainty, of that agreement consisted in the perception of it.

(2.) IN the next place, my Lord, supposing my method of certainty, in making deductions, were different from those of the antients; this, at best, would be only, that which I call "argumentum ad verecundiam;" which proves Essay, b. 4. not, on which side reason is, tho' I, in modesty, should answer nothing to c. 17. § 19. their authorities.

(3.) THE antients, as it seems by your Lordship, not agreeing, one among another, about the grounds of certainty; what can their authorities signify, in the case? or, how will it appear, that I differ from reason, in differing from any of them, more than that they differ from reason, in differing one from another? And therefore, after all the different authorities, produced by you, out of your great measure of reading, the matter will, at last, reduce it self to this point, that your Lordship should tell us, wherein the certainty of reason, in making deductions, consists; and then shew, wherein my method of making

making deductions, differs from it; which, whether you have done, or no, we shall see in what follows.

YOUR Lordship closes your very learned, and, to other purposes, very useful, account of the opinions of the antients, concerning certainty, with these words; "that thus you have, in as few words as you could, laid together P. 120. "those old methods of certainty, which have obtained greatest reputation in "the world." Whereupon I must crave leave to mind you again, that the proposition you are here upon, and have undertaken to prove, in this place, is concerning the certainty of deductions, and not concerning certainty, in general. I say not this, that I am willing to decline the examination of my method of certainty in general, any way, or in any place: but I say it to observe, that, in discourses of this nature, the laws of disputation have wisely ordered the proposition under debate, to be kept to, and that, in the same terms, to avoid wandering, obscurity and confusion.

I, THEREFORE, proceed now to consider, what use your Lordship makes of the antients, against my way of certainty in general; since you think fit to make no use of them, as to the certainty of reason, in making deductions: tho' it is under this, your second branch of certainty, by reason, that you bring them in.

YOUR first objection here, is that old one again, that my way of certainty, *Ibid.* by ideas, is new. Answ. Your calling of it new, does not prove it to be different from that of reason: but your Lordship proves it to be new;

"1. BECAUSE here [i. e. in my way] we have no general principles." *Ibid.* Answ. I do, as your Lordship knows, own the truth and certainty of the received, general maxims; and I contend for the usefulness and necessity of self-evident propositions, in all certainty, whether of institution or demonstration. What therefore, those general principles are, which you have not, in my way of certainty, by ideas, which your Lordship has, in your way of certainty, by reason, I beseech you to tell, and thereby to make good this assertion against me.

2. YOUR Lordship says, "that here [i. e. in my way] we have no antecedents and consequents, no syllogistical methods of demonstration." Answ. If your Lordship here means, that there be no antecedents, and consequents, in my book, or that I speak not, or allow not, of syllogism, as a form of argumentation, that has its use, I humbly conceive, the contrary is plain. But if by, "here, we have no antecedents and consequents, no syllogistical methods of demonstration," you mean, that I do not place certainty, in having antecedents and consequents, or in making of syllogisms, I grant, I do not; I have said syllogisms, instead of your words, syllogistical methods of demonstration; which examined, amount here to no more, than syllogisms: for syllogistical methods are nothing, but mode and figure, i. e. syllogisms; and the rules of syllogisms are the same, whether the syllogisms be used in demonstration, or in probability. But it was convenient for you to say, "syllogistical methods of demonstration," if you would have it thought, that certainty is placed in it: for to have named bare syllogism, without annexing demonstration to it, would have spoiled all, since every one, who knows what syllogism is, knows, it may as well be used in topical, or fallacious arguments, as in demonstration.

YOUR Lordship charges me then, that in my way, by ideas, I do not place certainty, in having antecedents and consequents: and pray, my Lord, do you, in your way, by reason, do so? If you do, this is certain, that every body has, or may have certainty, in every thing, he discourses about: for every one, in any discourse he makes, has, or may, if he pleases, have antecedents and consequents.

AGAIN, your Lordship charges me, that I do not place certainty in syllogism. I crave leave to ask again, and does your Lordship? And is this the difference between your way of certainty, by reason, and my way of certainty, by ideas? Why else is it objected to me, that I do not, if your Lordship does not, place certainty in syllogism? And if you do, I know nothing so requisite,

requisite, as that you should advise all people, women and all, to betake themselves immediately to the universities, and to the learning of logick; to put themselves out of the dangerous state of scepticism: for there young lads, by being taught syllogism, arrive at certainty; whereas, without mode and figure, the world is in perfect ignorance and uncertainty, and is sure of nothing. The merchant cannot be certain that his account is right cast up, nor the lady, that her coach is not a wheel-barrow; nor her dairy-maid, that one and one pound of butter are two pounds of butter, and two and two four; and all for want of mode and figure: nay, according to this rule, whoever lived before Aristotle, or him, whoever it was, that first introduced syllogism, could not be certain of any thing; no, not that there was a God, which will be the present state of the far greatest part of mankind (to pass by whole nations of the east, as China and Indostan, &c.) even in the christian world, who, to this day, have not the syllogistical methods of demonstration, and so cannot be certain of any thing.

3. YOUR Lordship farther says, that "in my way of certainty by ideas, we have no criterion." Answ. To perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, and not to perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of two ideas, is, I think, a criterion to distinguish, what a man is certain of, from what he is not certain of. Has your Lordship any other, or better, criterion, to distinguish certainty from uncertainty? If you have, I repeat again my earnest request, that you would be pleased to do that right to your way of certainty, by reason, as not to conceal it. If your Lordship has not, why is the want of a criterion, when I have so plain a one, objected to my way of certainty, and my way so often accused of a tendency to scepticism, and infidelity, when you yourself have not a better? And I think I may take the liberty to say, if yours be not the same, you have not one so good.

PERHAPS, your Lordship will censure me here, and think it is more than becomes me, to press you so hard, concerning your own way; and to ask, whether your way of certainty lies in having antecedents and consequents, and syllogisms; and whether it has any other, or better, criterion, than what I have given? Your Lordship, will, possibly, think it enough, that "you have laid down the grounds of certainty, which the antient Grecians went upon." My Lord, if you think so, I must be satisfied with it; tho', perhaps, others will think it strange, that, in a dispute, about a method of certainty, which, for its supposed coming short of certainty, you charge with a tendency to scepticism and infidelity, you should produce only the different opinions of other men, concerning certainty, to make good this charge, without declaring any of those different opinions, or grounds, of certainty, to be true, or false: and some may be apt to suspect, that you your self are not yet resolved, wherein to place it.

BUT, my Lord, I know too well, what your distance above me requires of me, to say any such thing to your Lordship. Your own opinions are to your self, and your not discovering them, must pass for a sufficient reason for your not discovering them: and, if you think fit to overlay a poor, infant, modern notion, with the great and weighty names of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and the like; and heaps of quotations, out of the antients; who is not presently to think it dead, and that there is an end of it? Especially, when it will have too much envy, for any one, to open his mouth, in defence of a notion, which is declared, by your Lordship, to be different from what those great men said, whose words are to be taken, without any more ado, and who are not to be thought ignorant, or mistaken, in any thing. Tho' I crave leave to say, that however infallible oracles they were, to take things, barely upon their, or any man's authority, is barely to believe, but not to know, or be certain.

THUS your Lordship has sufficiently proved my way of certainty, by ideas, to be inconsistent, with the way of certainty, by reason, by proving it new; which you prove only by saying, that "it is so wholly new, that here we have
no

"no general principles; no criterion; no antecedents and consequents; no syllogistical methods of demonstration: and, yet we are told of a better way of certainty, to be attained, merely by the help of ideas;" add, if your Lordship pleases, signified by words: which put into propositions, whereof some are general principles, some are, or may be, antecedents, and some consequents, and some put together in mode and figure, syllogistical methods of demonstration. For, pray, my Lord, may not words, that stand for ideas, be put into propositions, as well as any other? And may not those propositions, wherein the terms stand for ideas, be as well put into antecedents and consequents, or syllogisms, and make maxims, as well as any other propositions, whose terms stand not for ideas, if your Lordship can find any such? And, if thus ideas can be brought into maxims, antecedents, and consequents, and syllogistical methods of demonstration, what inconsistency has the way of certainty by ideas, with those ways of certainty, by reason, if, at last, your Lordship will say, that certainty consists in propositions, put together, as antecedents, and consequents, and in mode and figure? For as for principles, or maxims, we shall know, whether your principles, or maxims, are a way to certainty, when you shall please to tell us, what it is that, to your Lordship, makes a maxim, or principle, and distinguishes it from other propositions; and whether it be any thing, but an immediate perception of the agreement, or disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in that proposition. To conclude, by all, that your Lordship has alleged out of the antients, you have not, as I humbly conceive, proved, that my way of certainty is new, or that they had any way of certainty, different from mine; much less have you proved, that my way of certainty, by ideas, is inconsistent with the way of certainty, by reason, which was the proposition to be proved.

YOUR Lordship having thought it enough, against my way of certainty, by ideas, thus to prove its newness, you betake yourself presently, to your old topic, of obscure and confused ideas; and ask, "but, how comes there to be such a way of certainty, by ideas, and yet the ideas themselves are so uncertain and obscure?" *Ans.* No idea, as it is in the mind, is uncertain; tho' to those, who use names uncertainly, it may be uncertain, what idea that name stands for. And, as to obscure and confused ideas, no idea is so obscure, in all its parts, or so confounded with all other ideas, but that one, who in a proposition joins it with another, in that part, which is clear and distinct, may perceive its agreement, or disagreement, as expressed in that proposition: tho' when names are used for ideas, which are, in some part obscure, or confounded with other ideas, there can be no propositions made, which can produce certainty concerning that, wherein the idea is obscure and confused. And therefore, to your Lordship's question, "how is it possible for us, to have a clear perception of the agreement of ideas, if the ideas themselves be not clear and distinct?" I answer, very well; because an obscure, or confused idea, i. e. that is not perfectly clear and distinct, in all its parts, may be compared with another, in that part of it, which is clear and distinct; which will, I humbly conceive, remove all those difficulties, inconsistencies, and contradictions, which your Lordship seems to be troubled with, from my words, quoted in those two pages.

YOUR Lordship having, as it seems, quite forgot, that you were to shew, wherein the certainty of deductions, in the way of ideas, was inconsistent with the certainty of deductions, in the way of reason, brings here a new charge upon my way of certainty, viz. "that I have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtful ideas, from true and certain." Your Lordship says, the Academics went upon ideas, or representations of things to their minds; and pray, my Lord, does not your Lordship do so too? Or has Mr. J. S. so won upon your Lordship, by his solid philosophy, against the fancies of the ideists, that you begin to think him in the right, in this too; where he says, "that notions are the materials of our knowledge; and that a notion is the very thing, itself, existing in the understanding?" For since I make no doubt but that, in all your Lordship's knowledge, you will allow, that you have some immediate objects

P. 120.

P. 122.

P. 121, 122.

P. 122.

P. 123.

Solid Philosophy, p. 24, and 27.

of your thoughts, which are the materials of that knowledge, about which it is employed, those immediate objects, if they are not, as Mr. J. S. says, the very things themselves, must be ideas. Not thinking your Lordship, therefore, yet to perfect a convert of Mr. J. S.'s, that you are persuaded, that, as often as you think of your cathedral church, or of Des Cartes's vortices, that the very cathedral church at Worcester, or the motion of those vortices, itself, exists in your understanding; when one of them never existed, but in that one place, at Worcester, and the other never existed any where, in *rerum natura*; I conclude your Lordship has immediate objects of your mind, which are not the very things themselves, existing in your understanding; which if, with the Academics, you will please to call representations, as I suppose you will, rather than, with me, ideas, it will make no difference.

THIS being so, I must, then, make the same objection, against your way of certainty by reason, that your Lordship does, against my way of certainty, by ideas (for, upon the comparison of these two, we now are) and then I re-
 P. 122, 123. turn your words here again, viz. "that you have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtful representations, from true and certain; how, then, can any man be secure, that he is not imposed upon, in your Lordship's way of representations?"

P. 124, 125. YOUR Lordship says, "I tell you, of a way of certainty, by ideas, and never offer any such method, for examining them, as the Academics required for their probability." Answ. I was not, I confess, so well acquainted with what the Academics went upon, for the criterion of a greater probability, as your Lordship is; or if I had, I writing, as your Lordship knows, out of my own thoughts, could not well transcribe out of them. But that you should tell me, I never offer any criterion, to distinguish false, from true ideas; I cannot but wonder; and therefore crave leave to beg your Lordship, to look again into b. ii. c. 32. of my Essay; and there, I persuade myself, you will find a criterion, whereby true and false ideas may be distinguished.

P. 125. YOUR Lordship brings, for instance, the idea of solidity; but what it is an
 P. 122. instance of, I confess, I do not see. "Your Lordship charges, on my way of certainty, that I have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtful ideas, from true and certain; which is followed by an account you give, how the Academics examined their ideas, or representations, before they allowed
 P. 123, 124. them, to prevail on them, to give an assent, as to a greater probability."
 P. 125. And then you tell me, that "I never offer any such method for examining them, as the Academics required for their probability." To which your Lordship subjoins these words; "as for instance, my first idea, which I go upon, of solidity." Would not one now expect, that this should be an instance, to make good your Lordship's charge, that I had no criterion to distinguish, whether my idea of solidity were false and doubtful, or true and certain?

To shew that I have no such criterion, your Lordship asks me two questions; the first is, "how my idea of solidity comes to be clear and distinct?" I will suppose, for once, that I know not, how it comes to be clear and distinct: how will this prove, that I have no criterion, to know whether it be true or false? For the question here is not about knowing, how an idea comes to be clear and distinct; but how I shall know, whether it be true, or false? But your Lordship's following words seem to aim at a farther objection; your words all together are, "how this idea" [i. e. my idea of solidity, which consists in repletion of space, with an exclusion of all other solid substances] "comes to be clear and distinct to me, when others, who go in the same way of ideas, have quite another idea of it?" My Lord, I desire your Lordship to name, who those others are, who go in the same way of ideas with me, who have quite another idea of this my idea, than I have; for to this idea, I could be sure, that it, in any other writer but your Lordship, must here refer: but, my Lord, it is one of your privileged particles, and I have nothing to say to it. But, let it be so, that others have quite another idea of it, than I; how does that

that prove, that I have no criterion, to distinguish, whether my idea of solidity be true, or no?

YOUR Lordship farther adds, "that those others think, that they have as P. 125. "plain and distinct an idea, that extension and body are the same:" and then your Lordship asks, "now what criterion is there, to come to a certainty in "this matter?" Anfw. In what matter, I beseech your Lordship? If it be, whether my idea of solidity be a true idea, which is the matter here in question, in this matter, I have given a criterion to know, in my Essay: if it be to decide the question, whether the word, body, more properly stands for the simple idea of space, or for the complex idea of space and solidity together, that is not the question here; nor can there be any other criterion to decide it by, but the propriety of our language.

BUT your Lordship adds, "ideas can have no way of certainty in themselves, P. 126. "if it be possible, for even philosophical and rational men to fall into such contrary ideas about the same thing; and both sides think their ideas to be clear "and distinct." If this were so, I do not see, how this would any way prove, that I had no criterion, whereby it might be discerned, whether my idea of solidity were true, or no? which was to be proved.

BUT at last, this, which your Lordship calls "contrary ideas, about the same "thing," is nothing, but a difference about a name. For I think no-body will say, that the idea of extension, and the idea of solidity, are the same ideas: all the difference, then, between those philosophical and rational men, which your Lordship mentions here, is no more but this, whether the simple idea of pure extension shall be called body, or whether the complex ideas of extension and solidity, joined together, shall be called body; which will be no more than a bare verbal dispute to any one, who does not take sounds for things, and make the word, body, something more than a sign of what the speaker would signify by it. But what the speaker makes the term, body, stand for, cannot be precisely known, till he has determined it in his own mind, and made it known to another; and then there can, between them, be no longer a dispute, about the signification of the word: v. g. if one of those philosophical rational men tells your Lordship, that he makes the term, body, to stand precisely for the simple idea of pure extension, your Lordship, or he, can be in no doubt, or uncertainty, concerning this thing; but, whenever he uses the word, body, your Lordship must suppose, in his mind, the simple idea of extension, as the thing he means, by body. If, on the other side, another of those philosophical rational men shall tell your Lordship, that he makes the term, body, to stand precisely for a complex idea, made up of the simple ideas, of extension and solidity joined together; your Lordship, or he, can be in no doubt, or uncertainty, concerning this thing: but, whenever he uses the word, body, your Lordship must think on, and allow the idea, belonging to it, to be that complex one.

As your Lordship can allow this different use of the term, body, in these different men, without changing any idea, or any thing, in your own mind, but the application of the same term, to different ideas, which changes neither the truth, nor certainty, of any of your Lordship's ideas, from what it was before: so those two philosophical, rational men may, in discourse one with another, agree to use that term, body, for either of those two ideas, which they please, without at all making their ideas, on either side, false or uncertain. But if they will contest, which of these ideas, the sound, body, ought to stand for, it is visible their difference is not about any reality of things, but the propriety of speech; and their dispute and doubt is only about the signification of a word.

YOUR Lordship's second question is, "whether, by this idea of solidity, we P. 126. "may come to know what it is?" Anfw. I must ask you here again, what you mean by, it? If your Lordship by, it, means solidity, then your question runs thus: "whether by this [i. e. my] idea of solidity, we may come to know "what solidity is?" Anfw. Without doubt, if your Lordship means by the term, solidity, what I mean by the term, solidity; for then I have told you B. ii. c. 4. what it is, in the chapter above-cited by your Lordship: if you mean any thing else,

elfe, by the term, solidity, when your Lordship will please to tell me, what you mean by it, I will tell your Lordship what solidity is. This, I humbly conceive, you will find yourself obliged to do, if what I have said, of solidity, does not satisfy you what it is. For you will not think it reasonable, I should tell your Lordship what a thing is, when expressed by you, in a term, which I do not know, what your Lordship means by, nor what you make it stand for.

P. 126. But your Lordship asks, "wherein it consists?" If you mean, wherein the idea of it consists, that I have already told your Lordship, in the chapter of my Essay above-mentioned. If your Lordship means, what is the real, internal constitution, that physically makes solidity in things; if I answer, I do not know, that will no more make my idea of solidity, not to be true, or certain (if your Lordship thinks certainty may be attributed to single ideas) than the not knowing the physical constitution, whereby the parts of bodies are so framed, as to cohere, makes my idea of cohesion not true, or certain.

B. ii. c. 2. To my saying, in my Essay, "that, if any one ask me, what this solidity is, § 6. "I send him to his senses, to inform him;" your Lordship replies, "you thought

P. 226. "the design of my book would have sent him to his ideas, for certainty; and "are we, says your Lordship, sent back again from our ideas, to our senses?" Answ. I cannot help it, if your Lordship mistakes the design of my book: for what concerns certainty, i. e. the knowledge of the truth of propositions, my book sends every one to his ideas; but, for the getting of simple ideas of sensation, my book sends him only to his senses. But your Lordship uses, certainty, here, in a sense, I never used it, nor do understand it in; for what the certainty of any simple idea is, I confess I do not know, and shall be glad you would tell me, what you mean by it.

P. 127. HOWEVER, in this sense, you ask me, and that, as if your question carried a demonstration of my contradicting myself; "and are we sent back again, "from our ideas to our senses?" Answ. My Lord, every one is sent to his senses, to get the simple ideas of sensation, because they are no other way to be got.

Ibid. YOUR Lordship presses on, with this farther question, "what do these ideas "signify, then?" i. e. if a man be sent to his senses, for the idea of solidity. I answer, to shew him the certainty of propositions, wherein the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas is perceived; which is the certainty I speak of, and no other: but what the certainty is, which your Lordship speaks of, in this and P. 127, 128. the following page, I confess I do not understand. For,

P. 127. YOUR Lordship adds, that I say farther, "that if this be not a sufficient explication of solidity, I promise to tell any one, what it is, when he tells me, "what thinking is; or explains to me, what extension and motion are." "Are "we not, now, in the true way to certainty, when such things, as these, are "given over, of which we have the clearest evidence, by sensation and reflection? For here I make it as impossible, to come to certain, clear, and distinct "notions of these things, as to discourse into a blind man the ideas of light and "colours. Is not this a rare way of certainty?" Answ. What things, my Lord, I beseech you, are those, which you here tell me, are given over, of which we have the clearest evidence, by sensation, or reflection? It is likely you will tell me, they are extension and motion. But, my Lord, I crave the liberty to say, that, when you have considered again, you will be satisfied, there are no things given over, in the case, but only the names, extension and motion; and, concerning them too, nothing is given over, but a power of defining them. When you will be pleased to lay by, a little, the warmth of those questions of triumph, which I meet with, in this passage, and tell me, what things your Lordship makes these names, extension and motion, to stand for; you perhaps will not find, that I make it impossible for those, who have their senses, to get the simple ideas, signified by these names, very clear and distinct, by their senses: tho' I do say, that these, as well as all other names of simple ideas, cannot be defined; nor any simple ideas be brought into our minds, by words, any more, than the ideas of light and colours can be discoursed into a blind man; which is all I do say, in those words of mine, which

which your Lordship quotes, as such, wherein I have given over things, whereof we have the clearest evidence. And so, from my being of opinion, that the names of simple ideas cannot be defined, nor those ideas got, by any words whatsoever, which is all that I there say; your Lordship very pathetically expresses your self, as if in my way, all were gone, certainty were lost; and if my method should be allowed, there is an end of all knowledge in the world.

THE reason, your Lordship gives, against my way of certainty, is, "That P. 127.
" I here make it as impossible to come to certain, clear, and distinct notions of these things, [i. e. extension and motion] as to discourse, into a " blind man, the idea of light and colours." Answ. What clear and distinct notions, or ideas, are, I do understand: but what your Lordship means, by certain notions, speaking here, as you do, of simple ideas, I must own, I do not understand. That, for the attaining those simple ideas, I send men to their senses, I shall think, I am in the right, 'till I hear, from your Lordship, better arguments, to convince me of my mistake, than these: " Are we not P. 127.

" now in the true way to certainty? Is not this a rare way of certainty?" And, if your Lordship has a better way, to get clear and distinct simple ideas, than by the senses, you will oblige me, and, I think, the world too, by a discovery of it. "Till then, I shall continue in the same mind I was of, when I writ that passage, viz. That words can do nothing towards it, Essay, B. 2. c. 4. §. 5, 6. P. 127.
and that for the reason, which I there promised, and is to be found, Essay, b. iii. c. 4. §. 7. &c. And therefore, to your Lordship's saying, " That thus " you have shewed, that I have no security against false and uncertain " ideas, no criterion, to judge them by;" I think I may securely reply, that, with submission, thus shewing it, is no shewing it at all; nor ever will shew, that I have no such criterion, even, when we shall add your Lordship's farther inference, " now here again our ideas deceive us." Which supposing it a good inference from these words of mine, " that most of our " simple ideas are not the likeness of things without us;" yet it seems to me, to come in here, a little out of season; because the proposition to be proved, is, as I humbly conceive, not that our ideas deceive us, but that " I have " not a criterion to distinguish true from false ideas."

If it be brought to prove, that I have no criterion, I have this to say, that I neither well understand, what it is, for our ideas to deceive us, in the way of certainty; nor, in the best sense, that I can give it, do I see, how it proves that I have no criterion; nor, lastly, how it follows from my saying, that most of our simple ideas are not resemblances.

YOUR Lordship seems, by the following words, to mean, that, in this way, P. 128.
by ideas, which are confessed not to be resemblances, men are hindered and cannot go far in the knowledge of what they desire to know, of the nature of those objects, of which we have the ideas, in our minds. If this should be so, what is this, I beseech your Lordship, to your shewing, that I have no criterion? but that this is a fault, in the way, by ideas, I shall be convinced, when your Lordship shall be pleased to shew me, how, in your way of certainty, by reason, we can know more of the nature of things, without us; or of that, which causes these ideas, or perceptions in us. But, I humbly conceive, 'tis no objection, to the way of ideas, if any one will deceive himself, and expect certainty, by ideas, in things, where certainty is not to be had; because he is told how knowledge, or certainty, is got by ideas, as far as men attain to it. And, since your Lordship is here comparing the ways of certainty, by ideas, and by reason, as two different and inconsistent ways, I humbly crave leave to add, that, when you can shew me any one proposition, which you have attained to a certainty of, in your way of certainty, by reason, which I cannot attain to a certainty of, in my way of certainty, by ideas; I will acknowledge my Essay to be guilty of whatever your Lordship pleases.

YOUR Lordship concludes, " so that these ideas are really nothing but P. 128.
" names if they be not representations." Answ. This does not yet shew, that

that I have no criterion, to distinguish true from false ideas; the thing, that your Lordship is thus shewing. For I may have a criterion to distinguish true from false ideas, tho' that criterion concerns not names at all. For your Lordship, in this proposition, allowing none to be ideas, but what are representations; the other, which you say are nothing, but names, are not concerned in the criterion, that is to distinguish true from false ideas; because it relates to nothing but ideas, and the distinguishing of them, one from another; unless true and false ideas can be any thing, but ideas, i. e. ideas and not ideas, at the same time.

BUT further, I crave leave to answer, that your Lordship's proposition, viz. "that these ideas are really nothing but names, if they be not the representations of things," seems to me no consequence from my words, to which it is subjoined, tho' introduced with, so that; for, methinks, it carries something like a contradiction in it. I say, "most of our simple ideas of sensation, are not the likeness of something without us." Your Lordship infers, if so, "these ideas are really nothing but names;" which, as it seems to me, is as much as to say, these ideas, that are ideas, are not ideas, but names only. Methinks they might be allowed to be ideas, and that is all they pretend to be, tho' they do not resemble that which produces them. I cannot help thinking, a son something really more, than a bare name, tho' he has not the luck to resemble his father, who begot him: and the black and blue, which I see, I cannot conclude but to be something besides the words, black and blue, (where-ever your Lordship shall place that something, either in my perception only, or in my skin) tho' it resembles not at all the stone, that with a knock produced it.

SHOULD your Lordship put your two hands, whereof one is hot and the other cold, into lukewarm water, it would be hard to think, that the idea of heat produced in you, by one of your hands, and the idea of cold, by the other, were the likenesses and very resemblances of something, in the same water, since the same water could not be capable of having, at the same time, such real contrarieties. Wherefore since, as 'tis evident, they cannot be representations of any thing, in the water, it follows, by your Lordship's doctrine, here, that if you should declare, what you feel, viz. that you feel heat and cold, in that water, viz. heat by one hand, and cold by the other, you mean nothing, by heat and cold: heat and cold, in the case, are nothing but names; and your Lordship, in truth, feels nothing, but these two names.

P. 129.

YOUR Lordship, in the next place, proceeds to examine my way of demonstration. Whether you do this, to shew, that I have no criterion, whereby to distinguish true from false ideas; or to shew, "that my way of certainty, by ideas, is inconsistent with the certainty of deductions, by reason," (for these were the things, you seemed to me, to have undertaken to shew, and therefore to be upon, in this place) does not appear; but this appears, by the words, wherewith you introduce this examen, that it is to avoid doing me wrong.

Ibid.

YOUR Lordship, as if you had been sensible that your former discourse had led you, towards doing me wrong, breaks it off, of a sudden, and begins this new one of demonstration, by telling me, "you will do me no wrong." Can it be thought now, that you forget this promise, before you get half through your examen? or, is a mis citing my words, and misrepresenting my sense, no wrong? Your Lordship, in this very examen, sets down a long quotation out of my Essay; and in the close you tell me; "these are my own words, which your Lordship has set down at large, that I may not complain, that you misrepresent my sense." This one would think guaranty enough, in a less man than your Lordship: and yet, my Lord, I must crave leave to complain, that not only my sense, but my very words, are, in that quotation, misrepresented.

P. 133.

To shew that my complaint is not groundless, give me leave, my Lord, to set down my words, as I read them, in that place of my book, which your Lordship quotes for them, and as I find them, here in your second letter.

Essay, b. iv.
c. 7. §. 10.
Answ. 2. p.
132.

‘ If we add all the self-evident propositions, may
‘ be made, about all our distinct ideas, principles will
‘ be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men
‘ arrive to the knowledge of, at different ages ; and
‘ a great many of these innate principles, they never
‘ come to know, all their lives. But whether they
‘ come in view of the mind, earlier or later, this is
‘ true of them, that they are all known, by their
‘ native evidence, are wholly independent, receive
‘ no light, nor are capable of any proof, one from
‘ another, &c.

‘ That it is true, of
‘ our particular, dis-
‘ tinct ideas, that they
‘ are all known, by their
‘ native evidence, are
‘ wholly independent,
‘ receive no light, nor
‘ are capable of any
‘ proof, one from an-
‘ other, &c.

By their standing thus together, the reader will, without any pains, see whether those, your Lordship has set down, in your letter, are my own words ; and whether, in that place, which speaks only of self-evident propositions, or principles, I have any thing, in words, or in sense like this, “ that “ our particular, distinct ideas are known, by their native evidence,” &c. Tho’ your Lordship closes the quotation, with that solemn declaration above-mentioned, “ That they are my own words, which you have set down at “ large, that I may not complain you misrepresent my sense.” And yet no-thing can more misrepresent my sense, than they do, applying all that, to particular ideas, which I speak there, only, of self-evident propositions, or principles ; and that so plainly, that I think, I may venture any one’s mistaking it, in my own words : And, upon this misrepresentation of my sense, your Lordship raises a discourse, and manages a dispute for, I think, a dozen pages P. 133-146. following, against my placing demonstration, on self-evident ideas ; tho’ self-evident ideas are things wholly unknown to me, and are no where, in my book, nor were ever in my thoughts.

But let us come to your exceptions, against my way of demonstration, which P. 129. your Lordship is pleased to call demonstration, without principles. Answ. If P. 130. you mean by principles, self-evident propositions, then you know my demon-stration is not without principles, in that sense of the term, principles : For your Lordship, in the next page, blames my way ; because I suppose every interme-diate idea, in demonstration, to have a self-evident connection with the other idea ; for two such ideas, as have a self-evident connection, joined together in a proposition, make a self-evident proposition. If your Lordship means by prin- Essay, B. iv.
c. 2. §. 8.
ciples, those, which in the place, there quoted, by your Lordship, I mean, viz. “ whatever is, is ; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to “ be ;” and such other general propositions, as are received under the name of maxims ; I grant, that I do say, that they are not absolutely requisite in every demonstration ; and I think I have shewn, that there be demonstrations, which may be made without them : tho’ I do not, that I remember, say, that they are excluded, and cannot be made use of, in demonstration.

YOUR Lordship’s first argument against my way of demonstration, is, “ that P. 129. “ it must suppose self-evidence must be, in the ideas of my mind ; and that “ every intermediate idea, which I take to demonstrate any thing by, must “ have a self-evident connection with the others.” Answ. Taking self-evidence, with the ideas of the mind, to mean, in the perceived agreement, or disagree-ment, of ideas, in the mind ; I grant, I do not only suppose but say so.

To prove it not to be so in demonstration, your Lordship says, “ that it P. 130. “ is such a way of demonstration, as the old philosophers never thought of.” Answ. No body, I think, will question, that your Lordship is very well read in the old philosophers : but he, that will answer for what the old philosophers
ever

ever did, or did not think of, must not only understand their extant writings, better than any man ever did, but must have ways to know their thoughts, that other men have not: for all of them thought more than they writ; some of them writ not at all, and others writ a great deal more, than ever came to us. But if it should happen, that any of them placed the proof of any proposition, in the agreement of two things in a third, as, I think, some of them did; then it will, I humbly conceive, appear, that they did think of my way of demonstration; unless your Lordship can shew, that they could see, that two things agreed in a third, without perceiving their agreement with that third; and if they did, in every syllogism of a demonstration perceive, that agreement, then there was a self-evident connexion; which is that which your Lordship says, they never thought of.

BUT, supposing they never thought of it, must we put out our eyes, and not see whatever they over-looked? Are all the discoveries, made by Galileo, my Lord Bacon, Mr. Boyle, and Mr. Newton, &c. to be rejected, as false, because they teach us, what the old philosophers never thought of? Mistake me not, my Lord, in thinking, that I have the vanity here to rank myself, on this occasion, with these great discoverers of truth and advancers of knowledge. On the contrary, I contend, that my way of certainty, my way of demonstration, which your Lordship so often condemns, for its newness, is not new, but is the very same, that has always been used, both by ancients and moderns. I am only considering, here, your Lordship's argument, of never having been thought of, by the old philosophers; which is an argument, that will make nothing for, or against, the truth of any proposition, advanced by a modern writer, 'till your Lordship has proved, that those old philosophers (let the happy age of old philosophers determine, where your Lordship pleases) did discover all truth, or that they had the sole privilege to search after it; and, besides them, no body was to study nature, no body was to think, or reason, for himself, but every one was to be barely a reading philosopher, with an implicit faith.

P. 130.

YOUR objection, in the next words, that, then, every demonstration carries its own light with it, shews, that your way, by reason, is what I do not understand. For this I thought, heretofore, was the property of demonstration, and not a proof, that it was not a demonstration, that it carried its own light with it: but yet, tho' in every demonstration, there is a self-evident connexion of the ideas, by which it is made; yet that it does not follow, from thence, as your Lordship here objects, that, then, every demonstration would be as clear and unquestionable, as that two and two make four, your Lordship may see, in the same chapter, and the reason of it.

Essay, B. iv.
c. 2. §. 45
6.

P. 130.

YOU seem, in the following words, to allow, that there is such a connexion of the intermediate ideas in mathematical demonstrations, but say, "you should be glad to see any demonstration (not about figures and numbers) of this kind." And if that be a good argument against it, I crave leave to use it too, on my side; and to say, "that I would be glad to see any demonstration (not about figures and numbers) not of this kind," i. e. wherein there is not a self-evident connexion of all the intermediate ideas. If you have any such, I earnestly beg your Lordship to favour me with it; for I crave liberty to say, that the reason, and form, and way of evidence, in demonstration, where-ever there is demonstration, is always the same.

Ibid.

BUT you say, "THIS is a quite different case from mine." I suppose your Lordship means, by THIS, mathematical demonstration, the thing mentioned in the preceeding period; and then your sense will run thus: mathematical demonstration, wherein certainty is to be had, by the intuition of the self-evident connexion of all the intermediate ideas, are different from that demonstration, which I am there treating of. If you mean not so, I must own, I know not what you mean, by saying, "THIS is a quite different case from mine." And if your Lordship does mean so, I do not see, how it can be so, as you say: your words taken altogether run thus; "My principal ground is
" from

Ibid.

“ from mathematical demonstrations, and my examples are brought from them. “ But this is quite a different case from mine;” i. e. I am speaking, in that chapter of my Essay, concerning demonstration, in general, and the certainty we have by it. The examples I use, are brought from mathematics, and yet you say, “ mathematical demonstrations are quite a different case from mine.” If I here misunderstand your Lordship’s, this, I must beg your pardon for it; it is one of your privileged particles, and I am not master of it. Misrepresent your sense, I cannot; for your very words are set down, and let the reader judge.

BUT your Lordship gives a reason for what you had said, in these words P. 130. subjoined, where you say, “ I grant that those ideas, on which mathematical “ demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the mind, and do not relate to the existence of things; but our debate goes upon a certainty of knowledge of “ things, as really existing.” In which words there are these things remarkable:

1. THAT your Lordship’s exception here, is against what I have said, concerning demonstration, in my Essay, and not against any thing, I have said, in either of my letters to your Lordship. If, therefore, your Lordship and I have since, in our letters, had any debate, about the certainty of the knowledge of things, as really existing; that which was writ, before that debate, could have no relation to it, nor be limited by it. If, therefore, your Lordship makes any exception (as you do) to my way of demonstration, as proposed in my Essay, you must, as I humbly conceive, take it, as delivered there, comprehending mathematical demonstrations; which cannot be excluded, because your Lordship says, “ our debate now goes upon a certainty of the knowledge of things, “ as really existing, supposing mathematical demonstrations did not afford a “ certainty of knowledge of things, as really existing.”

2. BUT, in the next place, mathematical demonstrations do afford a certainty of the knowledge of things, as really existing, as much as any other demonstrations whatsoever; and therefore they afford your Lordship no ground upon that account to separate them, as you do here, from demonstrations in other subjects.

YOUR Lordship, indeed, thinks I have given you sufficient grounds to charge me with the contrary: for you say, “ I grant that those ideas, on which mathematical demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the mind,” (this indeed I grant) “ and do not relate to the existence of things;” but these latter words I do not remember, that I any where say; and I wish you had quoted the place, where I grant any such thing: I am sure it is not, in that place, where it is likeliest to be found; I mean, where I examine, whether the knowledge we have of mathematical truths, be the knowledge of things, as really existing: there I say (and I think I have proved) that it is, tho’ it consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, that are only in the mind; because it takes in all those things, really existing, which answer those ideas. Upon which ground it was, that I there affirmed moral knowledge also, capable of certainty. And pray, my Lord, what other way can your Lordship proceed, in any demonstration you would make, about any other thing, but figures and numbers, but the same that you do in demonstrations about figures and numbers? If you would demonstrate any thing, concerning man, or murder, must not you first settle, in your mind, the idea, or notion, you have of that animal, or that action, and then shew what you would demonstrate necessarily to belong to that idea, in your mind, and to things existing, only as they correspond with, and answer that idea in your mind? How else you can make any general proposition, that shall contain the knowledge of things, as really existing, I, that am ignorant, should be glad to learn, when your Lordship shall do me the favour to shew me any such.

In the mean time, there is no reason why you should except demonstrations about figures and numbers, from demonstrations about other subjects, upon the account, that I grant, “ that those ideas, on which mathematical demonstrations “ proceed, are wholly in the mind,” when I say the same, of all other demonstrations. For the ideas, that other demonstrations proceed on, are wholly in

P. 131.

the mind; and no demonstration whatsoever concerns things, as really existing, any farther, than as they correspond with, and answer, those ideas in the mind, which the demonstration proceeds on. This distinction, therefore, here, of your Lordship's, between mathematical and other demonstrations, having no foundation, your inference founded on it, falls with it; viz. "So that, altho' we should grant all that I say about the intuition of ideas, in mathematical demonstrations, yet it comes not at all to my business, unless I can prove, that we have as clear and distinct ideas of beings, as we have of numbers and figures." Tho' how beings here, and numbers and figures, come to be opposed against one another, I shall not be able to conceive, till I am better instructed, than hitherto I am, that numbers and figures are no beings; and that the mathematicians and philosophers, old ones and all, have, in all the pains taken about them, employed their thoughts about nothing. And I would be glad to know what those things are, which your Lordship says, "our debate goes upon, here, as really existing," that are beings more than numbers and figures.

P. 131.

YOUR Lordship's next exception, against my way of demonstration, is, that "in it I am inconsistent with my self." For proof of it, you say, "I design to prove demonstrations, without general principles; and yet every one knows, that general principles are supposed in mathematics." Answ. Every one may know that general principles are supposed in mathematic, without knowing, or ever being able to know, that I, who say also that mathematicians do often make use of them, am inconsistent with my self; tho' I also say, that a demonstration about numbers and figures may be made without them.

P. 131.

To prove me inconsistent with myself, you add; "and that person would be thought ridiculous, who should go about to prove, that general principles are of little, or of dangerous use, in mathematical demonstrations." Answ. A man may make other ridiculous faults, in writing, besides inconsistency, and there are instances enough of it: but, by good luck, I am, in this place, clear of what would be thought ridiculous, which yet is no proof of inconsistency: for I never went "about to prove, that general principles are of little or dangerous use in mathematical demonstrations."

To prove me inconsistent with myself, your Lordship uses one argument more, and that is, that "I confess, that the way of demonstration in morality, is from principles, as those of mathematics, by necessary consequences." Answ. With submission, my Lord, I do not say, in the place, quoted by your Lordship, "that the way of demonstration in morality is from principles, as those of the mathematics, by necessary consequences:" but this is that, which I say, "that I doubt not, but in morality, from principles, as inconsistent, as those of the mathematics, by necessary consequences, the measures of right and wrong might be made out." Which words, I humbly conceive, have no inconsistency with my saying, there may be demonstrations, without the help of maxims; whatever inconsistency the words, which you here set down for mine, may have with it.

B. iv. c. 3.
§ 18.

My Lord, the words you bring out of my book, are so often different from those I read in the places, which you refer to, that I am sometimes ready to think, you have got some strange copy of it, whereof I know nothing, since it so seldom agrees with mine. Pardon me, my Lord, if, with some care, I examine the objection of inconsistency with myself; that, if I find any, I may retract the one part, or the other of it. Human frailty, I grant, and variety of thoughts, in long discourses, may make a man, unwittingly, advance inconsistencies. This may consist with ingenuity, and deserve to be excused: but for any one to persist in it, when it is shewed him, is to give himself the lie; which cannot but stick closer to him, in the sense of all rational men, than if he received it from another.

I own, I have said, in my Essay, that there be demonstrations, which may be made, without those general maxims, that I there treated of. But I cannot recollect, that I ever said, that those general maxims could not be made

made use of, in demonstration: for they are no more shut out of my way of demonstration, than any other self-evident propositions. And, therefore, there is no inconsistency in those two propositions, which are mine, viz. "Some demonstrations may be made, without the help of those general maxims;" and "morality, I doubt not, may be demonstrated from principles;" whatever inconsistency may be, in these two following propositions, which are your Lordship's, and not mine, viz. "the way of demonstration in morality is from principles; and general maxims are not the way to proceed on in, demonstration, as to other parts of knowledge." For to admit self-evident propositions, which is what I mean by principles, in the place of my Essay, which your Lordship quotes, for the first of my inconsistent propositions, and to say (as I § 18. do, in the other place, quoted by your Lordship) "that those magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge;" has § 10. no manner of inconsistency. For tho' I think them not necessary to every demonstration, so neither do I exclude them, any more, than other self-evident propositions, out of any demonstration, wherein any one should make use of them.

THE next objection against my way of demonstration, from my placing P. 133. demonstration on the self-evidence of ideas, having been already answered, I shall need to say nothing in defence of it; or in answer to any thing raised against it, in your twelve or thirteen following pages, upon that topic. But that your Lordship may not think, I do not pay a due respect to all that you say, I shall not wholly pass those pages over in silence.

1. YOUR Lordship says, that "I confess that some of the most obvious ideas P. 134. are far from being self-evident." Answ. Supposing I did say so, how, I beseech your Lordship, does it prove, that "it is impossible to come to a demonstration, about real beings, in this way of intuition, by ideas?" Which is the proposition you promise to make appear, and you bring this, as the first reason, to make it appear. For should I confess a thousand times over, "that some of the most obvious ideas are far from being self-evident;" and should I, which I do not, make self-evident ideas, necessary to demonstration; how will it thence follow, that it is impossible to come to a demonstration, &c. since, tho' I should confess some of the most obvious ideas not to be self-evident, yet my confession, being but of some, it will not follow from my confession, but that there may be also some self-evident: and so still it might be possible to come to a demonstration, by intuition, because some, in my use of the word, never signifies all.

IN the next place, give me leave to ask, where it is, that I confess, that "some ideas are not self-evident?" Nay, where it is, that I once mention any such thing, as a self-evident idea? For self-evident is an epithet, that I do not remember, I ever gave to any idea, or thought belonged, at all, to ideas. In all the places, you have produced, out of my Essay, concerning matter, motion, time, duration, and light; which are those ideas, your Lordship is pleased to instance in, to prove, that "I have confessed it of some;" I crave leave humbly to offer it to your Lordship, that there is not any such confession. However, you go on to prove it. The proposition, then, to be proved, is, that "I confess, that these are far from being self-evident ideas." It is necessary to set it down, and carry it in our minds; for the proposition to be proved, is, I find, a very slippery thing, and apt to slide out of the way.

YOUR Lordship's proof is, that, according to me, "we can have no intuition of these things, which are so obvious to us, and consequently we can have no self-evident ideas of them." The force of which proof, I confess, I do not understand. "We have no intuition of the obvious thing, matter, and the obvious thing, motion; ergo, we have no self-evident ideas of them." Granting that they are obvious things, and that, obvious as they are, we have, as you express it, no intuition of them; it will not follow from thence, that we have no intuition of the ideas, we signify by the names, matter and motion, and so have no self-evident ideas of them. For, whoever has in his mind, an idea, which he makes the name, matter, or motion, stand for, has, no doubt, that idea,

idea, there, and sees, or has, in your phrase, an intuition of it there; and so has a self-evident idea of it, if intuition, according to your Lordship, makes a self-evident idea (for of self-evident ideas, as I have before remarked, I have said nothing, nor made any such distinction, as self-evident and not self-evident ideas) and if intuition of an idea does not make a self-evident idea, the want of it is in vain brought here, to prove the idea of matter, or motion, not self-evident.

- BUT your Lordship proceeds to instances; and your first instance is in matter: and here, for fear of mistaking, let us remember, what the proposition to be proved, is, viz. that "according to me, we have no intuition, as you call it, of the idea of matter." Your Lordship begins and tells me, that I give this account of the idea of matter, that "it consists in a solid substance, every where the same." Whereupon you tell me, "you would be glad to come to a certain knowledge of these two things; first, the manner of the cohesion of the parts of matter, and the demonstration of the divisibility of it, in the way of ideas." Answ. It happened just as I feared, the proposition to be proved is slipped already, quite out of sight: you own that I say, matter is a solid substance, every where the same. This idea, which is the idea I signify, by the word, matter, I have in my mind, and have an intuition of it, there: how then does this prove, that, according to me, "there can be no intuition of the idea of matter!" Leaving, therefore, this proposition, which was to be proved, you bring places out of my book to shew, that we do not know, wherein the union and cohesion of the parts of matter consist; and that the divisibility of matter involves us in difficulties: neither of which, either is, or proves, that, according to me, we cannot have an intuition of the idea of matter; which was the proposition to be proved, and seems quite forgotten, during the three following pages, wholly employed upon this instance of matter. You ask, indeed, "whether I can imagine, that we have intuition into the idea of matter?" But those words seem to me to signify, quite another thing, than having an intuition of the idea of matter, as appears by your explication of them, in these words subjoined; "or that it is possible to come to a demonstration, about it, by the help of any intervening ideas:" whereby it seems to me plain, that, by intuition into it, your Lordship means "demonstration about it," i. e. some knowledge concerning matter, and not a bare view, or intuition, of the idea, you have of it. And that your Lordship speaks of knowledge, concerning some affection of matter, in this and the following question, and not of the bare intuition of the idea of matter, is farther evident from the introduction of your two questions, wherein you say, "there are two things concerning matter, that you would be glad to come to a certain knowledge of." So that all, that can follow, or, in your sense of them, does follow, from my words, quoted by you, is, that I own, that the cohesion of its parts is an affection of matter, that is hard to be explained; but from them, it can neither be inferred, nor does your Lordship attempt to infer, that any one cannot view, or have, an intuition of the idea, he has in his own mind, which he signifies to others, by the word, matter: and that you did not make any such inference, from them, is farther plain, by your asking, in the place above quoted, not only, "whether I can imagine, that it is possible to come to a demonstration about it?" But your Lordship also adds, "by the help of any intervening ideas." For I do not think, you demand a demonstration, by the help of intervening ideas, to make you so see, i. e. have an intuition of, your own idea of matter. It would misbecome me, to understand your Lordship, in so strange a sense: for, then, you might have just occasion, to ask me again, "whether I could think you a man of so little sense?" I therefore suppose, as your words import, that you demand a demonstration, by the help of intervening ideas, to shew you, how the parts of that thing, which you represent to yourself, by that idea, to which you give the name, matter, cohere together; which is nothing to the question, of the intuition of the idea: tho', to cover the change of the question, as dexterously as might be, "intuition of the idea," is changed into "intuition into

"into the idea;" as if there were no difference, between looking upon a watch, and looking into a watch, i. e. between the idea that, taken from an obvious view, I signify, by the name, watch, and have in my mind, when I use the word, watch; and the being able to resolve any question, that may be proposed to me, concerning the inward make and contrivance of a watch. The idea, which, taken from the outward, visible parts, I give the name, watch, to, I perceive, or have an intuition, of, in my mind equally, whether or no, I know any thing more of a watch, than what is represented in that idea.

UPON this change of the question, all that follows, to the bottom of the next P. 137 page, being to shew, that, from what I say, it follows, that there be many difficulties, concerning matter, which I cannot resolve; many questions concerning it, which, I think, cannot be demonstratively decided; and, not to shew, that any one cannot perceive, or have an intuition, as you call it, of his own idea of matter, I think, I need not trouble your Lordship with an answer to it.

In this one instance of matter, you have been pleased to ask me two hard questions. To shorten your trouble, concerning this business, of intuition of ideas, will you, my Lord, give me leave to ask you this one easy question, concerning all your four instances, matter, motion, duration and light, viz. What you mean, by these four words? That your Lordship may not suspect it to be, either captious, or impertinent, I will tell you the use, I shall make of it: If your Lordship tell me, what you mean by these names, I shall presently reply, that there, then, are the ideas, that you have of them, in your mind; and 'tis plain, you see, or have an intuition of, them, as they are in your mind, or, as I should have expressed it, perceive them, as they are there, because you can tell them to another. And so it is with every one, who can tell what he means, by those words; and therefore, to all such (amongst which I crave leave to be one) there can be no doubt, of the intuition of those ideas. But if your Lordship will not tell me, what you mean, by these terms, I fear, you will be thought to use very hard measure, in disputing, by demanding to be satisfied, concerning questions, put in terms, which you yourself cannot tell the meaning of.

THIS considered, will perhaps serve to shew, that all that you say, in the following paragraphs, to n. 2. p. 141. contains nothing, against intuition of ideas, which is what you are upon, tho' it be no notion of mine; much less, does it contain any thing, against my way of demonstration, by ideas, which, is the point under proof. For,

1. WHAT your Lordship has said, about the idea of matter, hath been considered already.

2. FROM motion, which is your second instance, your argument stands P. 138. thus; that because I say, the definitions, I meet with, of motion, are insignificant, therefore the idea fails us. This seems to me a strange consequence, and all one as to say, that a deaf and dumb man, because he could not understand the words, used in the definitions, that are given, of motion, therefore he could not have the idea of motion, or the idea of motion failed him. And yet, this consequence, as foreign as it is to that antecedent, is forced from it, to no purpose: the proposition to be inferred, being this, that then "we can have no intuition of the idea of motion."

3. As to time, tho' the intuition of the idea of time, be not my way of speaking, yet what your Lordship here infers, from my words, granting it to be a right inference, with submission, proves nothing against the intuition of that idea. The proposition to be proved, is, "that we can have no intuition of the idea of time;" and the proposition, which, from my words, you infer, is, "that we have not the knowledge of the idea of time, by intuition, but by rational deduction." What can be more remote than these two propositions? The one of them signifying (if it signifies any thing) the view the mind has of it; the other, as I guess, the original and rise of it. For "what it is to have the knowledge of an idea, not by intuition, but by deduc- P. 139.

"tion of reason," I confess, I do not well understand; only I am sure, in terms, it is not the same, with having the intuition of an idea: but if changing of terms were not some men's privilege, perhaps so much controversy would not be written. The meaning of either of these propositions, I concern not myself about, for neither of them is mine: I only here shew, that you do not prove the proposition, that you yourself, framed, and undertook to prove.

P. 139.

SINCE, my Lord, you are so favourable to me, as to seem willing to correct, whatever you can find any way amiss, in my Essay; therefore I shall endeavour to satisfy you, concerning the rise of our idea of duration, from the succession of ideas, in our minds. Against this, tho' it be nothing to the matter in hand, you object, "that some people reckon succession of time, right by knots, and notches, and figures, without ever thinking of ideas." Answ. 'Tis certain, that men, who wanted better ways, might, by knots, or notches, keep accounts of the numbers of certain stated lengths of time, as well as of the numbers of men, in their country, or of any other numbers; and that too, without ever considering the immediate objects of their thoughts, under the name of ideas: but that they should count time, without ever thinking of something, is very hard to me to conceive; and the things, they thought on, or were present in their minds, when they thought, are what I call ideas: thus much in answer, to what your Lordship says. But to any one, that shall put the objection stronger, and say, many have had the idea of time, who never reflected on the constant train of ideas, succeeding one another in their minds, whilst waking; I grant it: but add, that want of reflection makes not any thing cease to be: if it did, many men's actions would have no cause, nor rise, nor manner; because many men never reflect so far, on their own actions, as to consider what they are bottomed on, or how they are performed. A man may measure duration by motion, of which he has no other idea, but of a constant succession of ideas in train; and yet never reflect on that succession of ideas, in his mind. A man may guess at the length of his stay by himself, in the dark; here is no succession to measure by, but that of his own thoughts; and without some succession, I think there is no measure of duration. But though in this case, he measures the length of the duration, by the train of his ideas, yet he may never reflect on that, but conclude, he does it, he knows not how.

P. 140.

You add, "but, besides such arbitrary measures of time, what need any recourse to ideas, when the returns of days, and months, and years, by the planetary motions, are so easy and so universal?" Such here, as I suppose, refers to the knots, and notches, and figures before-mentioned: if it does not, I know not what it refers to; and if it does, it makes those knots, and notches, measures of time, which I humbly conceive, they are not, but only arbitrary ways of recording (as all other ways of recording are) certain numbers of known lengths of time. For though any one sets down, by arbitrary marks, as notches on a stick, or strokes of chalk on a trenchard, or figures on paper, the number of yards of cloth, or pints of milk, that are delivered to a customer; yet I suppose, no body thinks, that the cloth, or milk, were measured by those notches, strokes of chalk, or figures, which therefore are by no means the arbitrary measures of those things. But what this is against, I confess I do not see: This, I am sure, it is not against any thing I have said. For, as I remember, I have said: (though not the planetary motions, yet) that the motions of the sun and the moon are the best measures of time. But if you mean, that the idea of duration is rather taken from the planetary motions, than from the succession of ideas in our minds, I crave leave, to doubt of that; because motion no other way, discovers itself to us, but by a succession of ideas.

Ibid.

Your next argument, against my thinking the idea of time to be derived from the train of ideas succeeding one another, in our minds, is, that your Lordship thinks the contrary. This, I must own, is an argument, by way of authority, and I humbly submit to it; though I think such arguments produce no certainty

certainty, either in my way of certainty, by ideas, or in your way of certainty, by reason.

4. As to your fourth instance, you having set down my exceptions to the P. 141.
Peripatetick and Cartesian definitions of light, you subjoin this question: "And is this a self-evident idea of light?" I beg leave to answer, in the same way, by a question, And who ever said, or thought, that it was, or meant that it should be? He must have a strange notion of self-evident ideas, let them be what they will (for I know them not) who can think, that the shewing others definition of light to be unintelligible, is a self-evident idea of light. But further, my Lord, what, I beseech you, has a self evident idea of light, to do here? I thought, in this your instance of light, you were making good what you undertook to prove from myself, that we can have no intuition of light. But P. 134.
because that, perhaps, would have sounded pretty odly, you thought fit (which I, with all submission, crave leave sometimes to take notice of) to change the question; but the misfortune is, that put as it is, not concerning our intuition, but the self-evidence of the idea of light, the one is no better proved than the other: and yet your Lordship concludes this your first head, according to your usual form: "Thus we have seen what account the author of the Essay him- P. 147.
self has given of these self-evident ideas, which are the ground-work of demonstration." With submission, my Lord, he must have good eyes, who has seen an account, I have given, in my Essay, of self-evident ideas, when neither, in all that your Lordship has quoted out of it, no nor in my whole Essay, self-evident ideas are so much as once mentioned. And where the account I have given of a thing, which I never thought upon, is to be seen, I cannot imagine. What your Lordship farther tells me, concerning them, viz. "that self-evident ideas are the ground-work of demonstration," I also assure you, is perfect news to me, which I never met with, any where, but in your Lordship: tho' if I had made them the ground-work of demonstration, as you say, I think they might remain so, notwithstanding any thing your Lordship has produced to the contrary.

We are now come to your second head, where I expected to have found *Ibid.*
this consequence made good, "that there may be contradictory opinions, about ideas, which I account most clear and distinct; ergo, it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings in the way of intuition of ideas." P. 134.
For this, you told me, was your second reason to prove this proposition. This consequence, your Lordship, it seems, looks upon as so clear, that it needs no proof; I can find none here, where you take it up again. To prove something, you say, "suppose an idea happen to be thought, by some, to be clear and P. 141.
distinct, and others should think the contrary to be so." In obedience to your Lordship, I do suppose it. But when it is supposed, will not make good the above-mentioned consequence? You, yourself, my Lord, do not so much as pretend it; but in this question subjoined, ["What hopes of demonstration *Ibid.*
by clear and distinct ideas then?"] infer a quite different proposition. For, "it is impossible to come to a demonstration, about real beings, in the way of intuition of ideas; and, there is no hopes of demonstration by clear and distinct ideas;" appear to me two very different propositions.

THERE appears something to me, yet more incomprehensible, in your way of managing this argument here. Your reason is, as we have seen, in these words, "there may be contradictory opinions about some ideas, that I account most clear and distinct:" and your instance of it is in these words, "suppose an idea happen to be thought, by some, to be clear and distinct, and others should think the contrary to be so?" Answ. So they may, without having any contradictory opinions about any idea, that I account most clear and distinct. A man may think his idea of heat to be clear and distinct, and another may think his idea of cold (which I take to be the contrary idea to that of heat) to be clear and distinct, and be both in the right, without the least appearance of any contradictory opinions. All, therefore, that your Lordship says, in the remaining part of this paragraph, having nothing in it, of contradictory opinions,

Essay, B. iv.
c. 7. § 12.

P. 143.

Ibid.

P. 134.

P. 143.

opinions, about ideas, that I think most clear, serves not at all to make good your second reason. The truth is, all that you say here, concerning Des Cartes's idea of space, and another man's idea of space, amounts to no more but this; that different men may signify different ideas, by the same name, and will never fix on me, what your Lordship would persuade the world I say, "that both parts of a contradiction may be true." Tho' I do say, that in such a loose use of the terms, body and vacuum, it may be demonstrated both that there is, and is not a vacuum: which is a contradiction in words, and is apt to impose, as if it were so in sense, on those, who mistake words for things; who are a kind of reasoners, whereof I perceive there is a greater number, than I thought there had been. All that I have said, in that place, quoted by your Lordship, is nothing but to shew the danger of relying upon maxims, without a careful guard upon the use of words, without which they will serve to make demonstrations, on both sides. That this is so, I dare appeal to any reader, should your Lordship press me again, as you do here, with all the force of these words, "Say you so? what, demonstrations on both sides? and in the way of ideas too? This is extraordinary indeed!"

THAT all the opposition between Des Cartes and those others, is only about the naming of ideas, I think may be made appear, from these words of your Lordship, in the next paragraph; "in the ideas of space and body, the question supposed is, whether they be the same, or no?" That this is a question only about names, and not about ideas themselves, is evident from hence, that no body can doubt, whether the single idea of pure distance, and the two ideas of distance and solidity, are one and the same idea, or different ideas, any more than he can doubt whether one and two are different. The question then, in the case, is not whether extension considered separately by itself, or extension and solidity together, be the same idea, or no; but, whether the simple idea of extension alone shall be called body, or the complex idea, of solidity and extension together, shall be called body. For that these ideas themselves are different, I think, I need not go about to prove, to any one, who ever thought of emptiness, or fullness: for whether, in fact, the bottle in a man's hand be empty, or no, or can by him be emptied, or no; this, I think, is plain, that his idea of fullness, and his idea of emptiness, are not the same. This, the very dispute concerning a vacuum supposes; for if men's idea of pure space were not different from their idea of solidity, and space together, they could never so far separate them in their thoughts, as to make a question, whether they did always exist together, any more, than they could question, whether the same thing existed with itself. Motion cannot be separated in existence from space; and yet no body ever took the idea of space and the idea of motion to be the same. Solidity likewise cannot exist without space; but will any one from thence say, the idea of solidity and the idea of space are one and the same?

YOUR Lordship's third reason, to prove that "it is impossible to come to a demonstration, about real beings, in this way of intuition of ideas, is, that granting the ideas to be true, there is no self-evidence of the connexion of them, which is necessary to make a demonstration." This, I must own, is to me as incomprehensible a consequence; as the former; as also is that, which your Lordship says, to make it out, which I shall set down, in your own words, that its force may be left entire to the reader: "But granting the ideas to be true, yet when their connexion is not self-evident, then an intermediate idea must compleat the demonstration. But how doth it appear, that this middle idea is self-evidently connected with them? For it is said, if that intermediate idea be not known by intuition, that must need a proof; and so there can be no demonstration, which your Lordship is very apt to believe, in this way of ideas; unless these ideas get more light by being put between two others." Whatever there be, in these words, to prove the proposition in question, I leave the reader to find out; but that he may not be led into a mistake, that there is any thing, in my words, that may be

be serviceable to it, I must crave leave to acquaint him, that these words set down by your Lordship, as out of my Essay, are not to be found, in that place, nor any where in my book, or any thing to this purpose, "that the intermediate idea is to be known by intuition;" but this, that there must be an intuitive knowledge, or perception, of the agreement, or disagreement, of the intermediate idea, with those, whose agreement, or disagreement, by its intervention, it demonstrates. B. 4. c. 2. 7.

LEAVING, therefore, all that your Lordship brings, out of Gassendus, the Cartesians, Morinus, and Bernier, in their argument, from motion, for, or against a vacuum, as not being at all concerned in it; I shall only crave leave to observe, that you seem to make use here, of the same way of argumentation, which I think I may call your main, if not only one, it occurs so often, viz. that when I have said any thing to shew, wherein certainty, or demonstration, &c. consists, you think it sufficiently overthrown, if you can produce any instance out of my book, of any thing advanced by me, which comes short of certainty, or demonstration: whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, it is no proof, against my notion of certainty, or my way of demonstration, that I cannot attain to them, in all cases I only tell, wherein they consist, wherever they are; but if I miss of either of them, either by reason of the nature of the subject, or by inadvertency, in my way of proof, that is no objection to the truth of my notions of them: for I never undertook that my way of certainty, or demonstration, if it ought to be called my way, should make me, or any one, omniscient, or infallible.

THAT, which makes it necessary for me, here again, to take notice of this your way of reasoning, is the question, wherewith you wind up the account, you have given of the dispute of the parties, above-named, about a vacuum; "and is it possible to imagine, that there should be a self-evident connexion in the case?" P. 145. Answ. It concerns not me to examine, whether, or on which side, in that dispute, such a self-evident connexion is, or is not possible: but this I take the liberty to say, that wherever it is not, there is no demonstration, whether it be the Cartesians, or the Gassendists, that failed in this point. And I humbly conceive, that to conclude, from any one's failing in this, or any other case, of a self-evident connexion, in each step of his proof, that, therefore, it is not necessary in demonstration, is a conclusion without grounds, and a way of arguing that proves nothing.

In the next paragraph, you came to wind up the argument, which you have been so long upon, viz. to make good what you undertook; i. e. "to shew the difference of my method of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reason;" in answer to my saying, I can find no opposition between them: which opposition, according to the account, you give of it, after forty pages spent in it, amounts at last to this: P. 105.

(1.) THAT I affirm, that general principles and maxims of reason are of little or no use; and your Lordship says, "they are of very great use, and the only proper foundation of certainty." To which I crave leave to say, that if by principles and maxims, your Lordship means all self-evident propositions, our ways are, even in this part, the same; for, as you know, my Lord, I make my self-evident propositions necessary to certainty, and found all certainty only in them. If, by principles and maxims, you mean a select number of self-evident propositions, distinguished from the rest, by the name of maxims, which is the sense, in which I use the term, maxims, in my Essay; then, to bring it to a decision, which of us two, in this point, is in the right, it will be necessary for your Lordship, to give a list of those maxims; and then to shew, that a man can be certain of no truth, without the help of those maxims. For to affirm maxims to be the only foundation of certainty, and yet not to tell, which are those maxims, or how they may be known; is, I humbly conceive, so far from laying any sure grounds of certainty, that it leaves even the very foundations of it uncertain. When your Lordship has thus settled the grounds, of your way of certainty, by reason, one may be

able to examine, whether it be truly the way of reason, and how far my way of certainty, by ideas, differs from it.

P. 146.

THE second difference that you assign, between my way of certainty by ideas, and your's by reason, is, that "I say, that demonstration is by way of intuition of ideas, and that reason is only the faculty employed in discovering and comparing ideas with themselves, or with others intervening; and that this is the only way of certainty." Whereas your Lordship "affirms, and, as you say, have proved, that there can be no demonstration, by intuition of ideas; but that all the certainty, we can attain to, is from general principles of reason, and necessary deductions, made from them." Answ. I have said, that demonstration consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of the intermediate idea, with those, whose agreement, or disagreement it is to shew, in each step of the demonstration: and, if you will say this is different from the way of demonstration, by reason, it will then be, to the point above-mentioned, which you have been so long upon. If this be your meaning here, it seems pretty strangely expressed, and remains to be proved; but if any thing else be your meaning, that meaning not being the proposition to be proved, it matters not, whether you have proved it, or no.

Ibid.

YOUR Lordship further says here, "that all the certainty, we can attain to, is from general principles of reason, and necessary deductions made from them." This, you say, "you have proved." What has been proved, is to be seen, in what has been already considered: but if your proof, "that all the certainty, we can attain to, is from general principles of reason, and necessary deductions made from them," were as clear and cogent, as it seems to me the contrary; this will not reach to the point in debate, till your Lordship has proved that this is opposite to my way of certainty, by ideas. 'Tis strange (and perhaps to some may be matter of thought) that in an argument, wherein you lay so much stress on maxims, general principles of reason, and necessary deductions from them, you should never once tell us, what, in your account, a maxim or general principle of reason is, nor the marks it is to be known by; nor offer to shew what a necessary deduction is, nor how it is to be made, or may be known. For I have seen men please themselves, with deductions upon deductions, and spin consequences, it mattered not, whether out of their own, or other men's thoughts, which, when looked into, were visibly nothing but mere ropes of sand.

P. 114.

'Tis, true, your Lordship says, "you now come to certainty of reason, by deductions." But when all that truly-learned discourse, which follows, is read over and over again, I would be glad to be told, what it is your Lordship calls a necessary deduction; and by what criterion, you distinguish it, from such deductions, as come short of certainty, or even of truth itself. I confess I have read over those pages, more than once, and can find no such criterion laid down in them, by your Lordship, though a criterion be there much talked of. But, whether it be my want of capacity, for your way of writing, that makes me not find any light, given by your Lordship, into this matter; or whether, in truth, you have not shewed, wherein, what you call, a necessary deduction consists, and how it may be known, from what is not so, the reader must judge. This I crave leave to say, that, when you have shewn what general principles of reason, and necessary deductions, are, the world will then see, and not till then, whether this your way of certainty, by reason, from general principles, and necessary deductions, made from them, be opposite to, or so much as different from, my way of certainty, by ideas; which was the thing to be shewn.

P. 145.

In the paragraph, under consideration, you blame me, that, in my chapter, concerning reason, I have treated it only as a faculty, and not in the other senses, which I there give, of that word. This exception to my book, is, I suppose, only from your Lordship's general care, of letting nothing pass, in my Essay, which you think needs an amendment. For any particular reason, that brings it in here, or ties it on, to this part of your discourse, I confess I do not see. However, to this I answer,

1. THE

I. THE understanding, as a faculty, being the subject of my Essay, it carried me to treat directly of reason, no otherwise, than as a faculty. But yet reason, as standing for true and clear principles, and also, as standing for clear and fair deductions from those principles, I have not wholly omitted; as is manifest, from what I have said of self-evident propositions, intuitive knowledge, and demonstration, in other parts of my Essay. So that your question, "why, in a P. 145. chapter of reason, are the two other senses of the word neglected?" blaming me for no other fault, that I am really guilty of, but want of order, and not putting every thing in its proper place; does not appear to be of so mighty weight, but that I should have thought, it might have been left to the little nibblers in controversy, without being made use of, by so great a man, as your Lordship. But the putting things out of their proper place, being that, which your Lordship thinks fit to except against, in my writings, it so falls out, that to this too, I can plead, not guilty. For, in that very chapter, of reason, I have not omitted to treat of principles and deductions; and, what I have said § 2, 3, 4, there, I presume, is enough to let others see, that I have not neglected to de- 14, 15, 16, 17, 18. clare my poor sense, about self-evident propositions, and the cogency and evidence of demonstrative, or probable, deductions of reason: tho' what I have said there, not being backed with authorities, nor warranted by the names of ancient philosophers, was not worth your Lordship's taking notice of.

I HAVE, I confess, been so unwary, to write out of my own thoughts, which your Lordship has, more than once, with some sort of reprimand, taken notice of. I own it, your Lordship is much in the right; the safer way is, never to declare one's own sense, in any material point. If I had filled my book, with quotations and collections of other men's opinions, it had shewn much more learning, and had much more security in it; and I myself had been safe from the attacks of the men of arms, in the commonwealth of letters: but, in writing my book, I had no thoughts of war, my eye was fixed only on truth, and that with so sincere and unbiaſſed an endeavour, that I thought, I should not have incurred much blame, even where I had missed it. This I perceive, too late, was the wrong way: I should have kept myself still safe upon the reserve. Had I learnt this wisdom of Thraſo, in Terence, and resolved with myself, "Hic ego ero post principia;" perhaps I might have deserved the commendation was given him, "illuc est sapere, ut hos instruxit, ipſus ſibi cavit loco." But I deserved to be soundly corrected, for not having profited by reading, so much as this comes to.

BUT to return to your accusation here, which all together stands thus: "why, P. 145. in a chapter of reason, are the other two senses neglected? We might have expected, here, full satisfaction, as to the principles of reason, as distinct from the faculty, but the author of the Essay wholly avoids it." What I guess these words accuse me to have avoided, I think I have shewn, already, that I did not avoid.

"BEFORE you conclude, you say, you must observe that I prove, that de- P. 146. monstration must be by intuition, in an extraordinary manner, from the sense of the word." He that will be at the pains to read that paragraph, which Essay, B. iv. you quote for it, will see that I do not prove, that it must be by intuition, because it is called demonstration; but that it is called demonstration, because it is by intuition. And, as to the propriety of it, what your Lordship says, in the following words, "it would be most proper for ocular demonstration, or by the P. 147. finger," will not hinder it from being proper, also; in mental demonstration, as long as the perception of the mind is properly expressed by seeing.

AGAINST my observing, that the notation of the word imported shewing, or making to see, your Lordship farther says, "demonstration among some philo- P. 152. sophers, signified only the conclusion of an argument, whereby we are brought from something we did perceive, to something we did not;" which seems to me to agree with what I say, in the case, viz. that, by the agreement of ideas, which we do perceive, we are brought to perceive the agreement of ideas, which before we did not perceive. To which, no doubt, will be answered, as in a like

- P. 152. like case, "not by way of intuition, but by a deduction of reason;" i. e. we perceive not, in a way, that affords us intuition, or a sight, but by deductions of reason, wherein we see nothing. Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, that the force of a deduction of reason consists in this, that, in each step of it, we see what a connection it has, i. e. have an intuition of the certain agreement or disagreement, of the ideas, as in demonstration; or an intuition, or perception, that they have a probable, or not so much as a probable, connexion, as in other deductions of reason.
- P. 147. You farther overthrow the necessity of intuitive knowledge, in every step of a demonstration, by the authority of Aristotle, who says, "things, that are self-evident, cannot be demonstrated." And so I say too, in several places of my Essay. When your Lordship can shew any inconsistency between these two propositions, viz. "that intuitive knowledge is necessary, in each step of a demonstration, and things that are self-evident cannot be demonstrated;" then I shall own you have overthrown the necessity of intuition, in every step of a demonstration, by reason, as well as by Aristotle's authority.
- B. iv. c. 7.
§ 10, 19.
and elsewhere.
B. iv. c. 2.
- P. 148, 150. IN the remainder of this paragraph, I meet with nothing, but your Lordship finding fault with some, who, in this age, have made use of mathematical demonstrations, in natural philosophy. Your Lordship's two reasons against this way of advancing knowledge, upon the sure grounds of mathematical demonstration, are these;
- P. 148. (1.) "THAT Des Cartes, a mathematical man, has been guilty of mistakes, in his system." Ans^r. When mathematical men will build systems upon fancy, and not upon demonstration, they are as liable to mistakes as others. And that Des Cartes was not led into his mistakes, by mathematical demonstrations, but for want of them, I think, has been demonstrated by * some of those mathematicians, who seem to be meant here.
- (2.) YOUR second argument against accommodating mathematics to the nature of material things, is, "that mathematicians cannot be certain of the manner and degrees of force, given to bodies, so far distant as the fixed stars; nor of the laws of motion, in other systems." A very good argument, why they should not proceed demonstratively, in this our system, upon laws of motion, observed to be established here: a reason, that may persuade us, to put out our eyes, for fear they should mislead us, in what we do see, because there be things out of our sight.
- P. 149. It is great pity, Aristotle had not understood mathematics, as well as Mr. Newton, and made use of it, in natural philosophy, with as good success: his example had then authorized the accommodating of it to material things: but it is not to be ventured, by a man of this age, to go out of the method, which Aristotle has prescribed, and which your Lordship, out of him, has set down, in the following pages, as that, which should be kept to; for it is a dangerous presumption to go out of a track, chalked out by that supposed dictator, in the commonwealth of letters, tho' it led him to the eternity of the world. I say not this, that I do not think him a very great man; he made himself so, by not keeping precisely to beaten tracks; which servile subjection of the mind, if we take my Lord Bacon's word for it, kept the little knowledge the world had, from growing greater, for more than a few ages. That the breaking loose from it, in this age, is a fault, is not directly said; but there is enough said, to shew, there is no great approbation of such a liberty. Mathematics in gross, it is plain, are a grievance in natural philosophy: and with reason; for mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and will be touched with nothing but strict reasoning. Mathematical proofs are out of the reach of topical arguments, and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of words, or declamation, that make so great a part of other discourses; nay, even of controversies. How well you have proved my way, by ideas, guilty of any tendency to scepticism, the reader will see; but this I will crave leave to say, that the excluding mathematical reasoning from philosophy; and, instead
- P. 150, 153.

* Mr. Newton, Phil. Natur. Princip. Mathematic. 1. 2. § 9.

thereof, reducing it to Aristotelian rules and sayings, will not be thought to be much in favour of knowledge against scepticism.

YOUR Lordship, indeed, says, "you did not, by any means, take off from P. 149. "the laudable endeavours of those, who have gone about to reduce natural "speculation to mathematical certainty." What can we understand by this, but your Lordship's great complaisance and moderation? who, notwithstanding you spend four pages to shew, that the endeavours of "mathematical men, to "accommodate the principles of that science, to the nature of material things, "has been the occasion of great mistakes, in the philosophy of this age;" and that, therefore, Aristotle's method is to be followed: yet you make this compliment to the mathematicians, that you leave them to their liberty, to go on, if they please, "in their laudable endeavours, to reduce natural speculations to "mathematical certainty."

AND thus we are come to the end of your Lordship's clearing this passage; "that you grant that, by sensation and reflection, we come to know the powers "and properties of things; but our reason [i. e. the principles of reason, agreed "on by mankind] is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible, they should subsist by themselves: so that the nature of "things properly belongs to reason [i. e. the principles of reason, agreed on by "mankind] and not to mere ideas." Which, if any one be so lucky as to understand, by these your Lordship's fifty pages, spent upon it, better than my friend did, when he confessed himself gruelled by it, as it stands here recited, he ought to enjoy the advantage of his happy genius, whilst I miss that satisfaction, by the dulness of mine; which hinders me also, from seeing, how the opposition of the way of certainty, by ideas, and the way of certainty, by reason, comes in, in the explication of this passage; or, at least, if it does belong to it, yet I must own, what is a greater misfortune, that I do not see what the opposition, or difference, is, which your Lordship has so much talked of, between the way of certainty, by ideas, and the method of certainty, by reason. For my excuse, I think others will be as much in the dark as I, since you nowhere tell, wherein you yourself, my Lord, place certainty. So that to talk of a difference, between certainty by ideas, and certainty that is not by ideas, without declaring, in what that other certainty consists, is like to have no better success, than might be expected from one, who would compare two things together, the one whereof is not known.

YOU now return to your discourse of nature and person, and tell me, that, P. 154. to what you said, about the general nature, in distinct individuals, I object these three things:

(1.) "THAT I cannot put together one and the same and distinct:" this I own to be my objection; "and consequently there is no foundation for the distinction of nature and person." This, with submission, I deny to be any objection of mine, either in the place, quoted by your Lordship, or any where *Letter 2.* else. There may be foundation enough for distinction, as there is, of these *P. 127.* two, and yet they may be treated of, in a way so obscure, so confused, or, perhaps, so sublime, that an ordinary capacity may not from thence get, as your Lordship expresses it, "clear and distinct apprehensions of them." This was that which my friend and I complained of, in that place, want of clearness in your Lordship's discourse, not of want of distinction, in the things themselves.

(2.) "THAT what your Lordship said about common nature, and particular "substance in individuals, was wholly unintelligible to me and my friends." To which, my Lord, you may add, if you please, that it is still so to me.

(3.) THAT I said, "that to speak truly and precisely of this matter, as in "reality it is, there is no such thing as one and the same common nature, in several individuals; for all that in truth is in them, is particular, and nothing "but particular, &c." Answ. This was said, to shew how unapt these expressions, "the same common nature, in several individuals; and several individuals being in the same common nature;" were to give true and clear notions

P. 156. of nature. To this your Lordship answers, that other, and those very rational men, have spoken so: to which I shall say no more, but that it is an argument, with which any thing may be defended, and all the jargon of the schools be justified; but, I presume, not strong enough to bring it back again, let men ever so rational make use of it.

P. 146. YOUR Lordship adds, "but now, it seems, nothing is intelligible, but what suits with the new way of ideas." My Lord, the new way of ideas, and the old way of speaking intelligibly, was always, and ever will be, the same. And if I may take the liberty to declare my sense of it, herein it consists: (1.) That a man use no words, but such as he makes the signs of certain, determined objects of his mind, in thinking, which he can make known to another. (2.) Next, that he use the same word steadily, for the sign of the same, immediate object of his mind, in thinking. (3.) That he join those words together, in propositions, according to the grammatical rules of that language, he speaks in. (4.) That he unite those sentences, in a coherent discourse. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preserve himself from the confines and suspicion of jargon, whether he pleases to call those immediate objects of his mind, which his words do, or should stand for, ideas, or no.

P. 156. You again accuse the way of ideas, to make a common nature no more than a common name. That, my Lord, is not my way, by ideas. When your Lordship shews me, where I have said so, I promise your Lordship to strike it out: and the like I promise, when you shew me, where "I presume that we are not to judge of things, by the general principles of reason," which you call my fundamental mistake. "These principles of reason, you say, must be the standard to mankind." If they are of such consequence, would it not have been convenient, we should have been instructed, something more particularly, about them, than by barely being told their name; that we might be able to know what are, and what are not principles of reason?

Ibid. BUT, be they what they will, because they must be the standard to mankind, your Lordship says, "you shall, in this debate, proceed upon the following principles, to make it appear, that the difference, between nature and person, is not imaginary and fictitious; but grounded upon the real nature of things." With submission, my Lord, you need not be at the pains, to draw up your great artillery, of so many maxims, where you meet with no opposition. The thing in debate, whether in this debate, or no, I know not, but what led into this debate, was about these expressions; "one common nature, in several individuals; and several individuals, in one common nature:" and the question, I thought, was, whether a general, or common nature, could be in particulars, i. e. exist in individuals? But, since your Lordship turns your artillery against those, who deny that there is any foundation of distinction, between nature and person, I am out of gun-shot; for I am none of those, who ever said, or thought, there was no foundation of distinction between nature and person.

P. 158. THE maxims you lay down in the following paragraph, are to make me understand, how one and the same and distinct may consist: I confess, I do not see how your Lordship's words, there, at all make it out. This, indeed, I do understand, that several particular beings may have a conformity, in them, to one general, abstract idea, which may, if you please, be called their general, or common nature: but how that idea, or general nature, can be the same and distinct, is still past my comprehension.

P. 159. To my saying, that your Lordship had not told me, what nature is, I am told, that "if I had a mind to understand you, I could not but see, that by nature you meant the subject of essential properties." A lady asking a learned physician what the spleen was, received this answer, that it was the receptacle of the melancholy humour. She had a mind to understand what the spleen was, but, by this definition of it, found herself not much enlightened; and, therefore, went on to ask, what the melancholy humour was: and, by the doctor's answer, found that the spleen and the melancholy humour had a relation

relation one to another; but what the spleen was, she knew not one jot better than she did before, he told her any thing about it. My Lord, relative definitions of terms, that are not relative, usually do no more, than lead us into a circuit, to the same place, from whence we set out, and there leave us in the same ignorance, we were in at first. So, I fear, it would fall out with me here, if I, willing as I am to understand, what your Lordship means, by nature, should go on to ask, what you mean by essential properties?

THE three or four next pages, I hope, your Lordship does not think contain any serious answer, to what my friend said, concerning Peter, James, and John; and as for the pleasantry of your countryman, I shall not pretend to meddle with that, since your Lordship, who knows, better than any body, his way of chopping of logick, was fain to give it off, because it was growing too rough. What work such a dangerous chopper of logick would make, with an argument, that supposed the names, Peter, James, and John, to stand for men, and then without scruple affirmed, that the nature of men was in them, if he were let loose upon it, who can tell? especially, if he might have the liberty strenuously to use the phrase, "for his life," and to observe what a turn the chiming of words, without determined ideas annexed to them, give to the understanding, when they are gone deep into a man's head, and pass there for things.

To shew, that the common, or general, nature of man could not be in Peter, or James, I alleged, that whatever existed (as whatever was in Peter, or James, did) was particular, and that it confounded my understanding, to make a general, a particular. In answer, your Lordship tells me, that to make me understand this, you had told me, in your answer to my first letter, "that we are to consider beings, as God had ordered them, in their several forts and ranks," &c. And thereupon you ask me, "why it was not answered in the proper place for it?" Answ. I own, I am not always so fortunate, as to say things in that, which your Lordship thinks the proper place; but having been rebuked for repetitions, I thought your Lordship could not be ignorant, that, "I had considered beings, as God had ordered them, in their several forts and ranks," &c. since you could not but have read these words of mine: "I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature, the production of things, makes several of them alike. There is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed, &c." And I have expressed my sense in this point, so fully, here, and in other places, particularly B. iii. c. 6. that I dare leave it to my reader, without any farther explication.

YOUR Lordship farther asks, "Is not that a real nature, which is the subject of real properties? And is not the nature really in those, who have the essential properties?" I answer to both these questions, Yes; such as is the reality of the subject, such is the reality of its properties: the abstract, general idea is really in the mind of him, that has it, and the properties, that it has, are really and inseparably annexed to it; let this reality be whatever your Lordship pleases: But this will never prove, that this general nature exists in Peter, or James. Those properties, with submission, do not, as your Lordship supposes, exist in Peter and James: those qualities, indeed, may exist in them, which your Lordship calls properties; but they are not properties, in either of them, but are properties only, of that specific, abstract nature, which Peter and James, for their supposed conformity to it, are ranked under. For example, rationality, as much a property as it is, of a man, is no property of Peter. He was rational, a good part of his life, could write and read, and was a sharp fellow at a bargain; but about thirty, a knock so altered him, that for these twenty years past he has been able to do none of these things: there is, to this day, not so much appearance of reason in him, as in his horse, or monkey, and yet he is Peter still.

YOUR Lordship asks, "is not that a real nature, that is the subject of real properties? And is not that nature really in those, who have the same essential" P. 165.

"tial

"tial properties?" Give me leave, I beseech you, to ask, are not those distinct, real natures, that are the subjects of distinct, essential properties? For example, the nature of an animal is the subject of essential properties of an animal, with the exclusion of those of a man, or a horse; or else the nature of an animal, and the nature of a man, and the nature of a horse would be the same: and so wherever the subject of the essential properties of an animal is, there also would be the subject of the essential properties of a man, and of a horse; and so, in effect, whatever is an animal, would be a man; the real nature of an animal, and the real nature of a man, being the same. To avoid this, there is no other way (if this reality, your Lordship builds so much on, be any thing, beyond the reality of two abstract distinct ideas, in the mind) but that there be one real nature of an animal, the subject of the essential properties of an animal, and another real nature of a man, the subject of the essential properties of a man: both which real natures must be in Peter, to make him a man. So that every individual man, or beast, must, according to this account, have two real natures in him, to make him what he is; nay, if this be so, two will not serve the turn. Bucephalus must have the real natures of ens, or beings and the real nature of body, and the real nature of vivens, and the real nature of animal, and the real nature of a horse, i. e. five distinct real natures in him, to make him Bucephalus: for these are all really distinct, common natures, whereof one is not the subject of precisely the same essential properties as the other. This, tho' very hard to my understanding, must be really so, if every distinct, common, or general nature, be a real being, that really exists any where, but in the understanding: "common nature, taken in my way of ideas, your Lordship truly says, will not make me understand such a common nature, as you speak of, which subsists in several individuals, because I can have no ideas of real subsistances, but such as are particular; all others are only abstract ideas, and made only by the act of the mind." But what your Lordship farther promises there, I find, to my sorrow, does not hold, viz. that in your Lordship's way (as far as you have discovered it) which you call the way of reason, "I may come to a better understanding of this matter."

P. 164.

P. 166.

YOUR Lordship, in the next paragraph, declares yourself really ashamed to be put to explain these things, that, which you had said, being so very plain and easy: and yet I am not ashamed to own, "that, for my life," I cannot understand them, as they are now farther explained. Your Lordship thinks it proved, that every common nature, is a real being: let it be so, that it is the subject of real properties, and that thereby it is demonstrated to be a real being, this makes it harder for me, to conceive, that this common nature of a man, which is a real being, and but one, should yet be really in Peter, in James, and in John. Had Amphitruo been able to conceive this, he had not been so much puzzled, or thought Sofia to talk idly, when he told him, "domi ego sum, inquam, & apud te adsum, Sofia idem." For the common nature of man, is a real being, as your Lordship says, and Sofia is no more: and he that can conceive any one, and the same real being to be in divers places at once, can have no difficulty to conceive it of another real being. And so Sofia may at the same time be at home, and with his master abroad: and Amphitruo might have been ashamed to demand the explication of so plain a matter; or at least, if he had stuck a little at here, and there, too, ought he not to have been satisfied, as soon as Sofia had told him, I am another distinct, I, here, from the same I, that I was there? Which, no doubt, Sofia could have made out: let your Lordship's countryman chop logick with him, and try whether he cannot. Countryman. But how is it possible, Sofia, that thou, the real same, as thou sayest, should be at home and here too? Sofia. Very easily, because I am really the same, and yet distinct. Countryman. How can this be? Sofia. By a trick that I have. Countryman. Canst thou teach me the trick? Sofia. Yes; 'tis but for thee to get a particular subsistence, proper to thy real self, at home, and another particular subsistence, proper to thy same real self abroad, and the business is done: thou wilt, then, easily be the same real thing, and distinct from thyself; and thou mayest be, in as many places together, as thou canst get particular

ticular subsistences, and be still the same, one, real being. Countrym. But what is that particular subsistence? Sofia. Hold ye, hold ye, friend, that's the secret! I thought once it was particular existence, but that I find is an ineffectual drug, and will not do: every one sees it will not make the same real being, distinct from itself; nor bring it into two different places at once, and therefore it is laid aside, and subsistence is taken to do the feat.

Countrym. Existence, my boy's schoolmaster, made me understand, the other day, when my grey mare foled. For he told me that a horse, that never was before, began then to exist; and when the poor foal died, he told me the same horse ceased to exist.

Sofia. But did he tell thee, what became of the real, common nature of an horse, that was in it, when the foal died? Countrym. No: but this I know, that my real horse, was really destroyed.

Sofia. There's now thy ignorance! So much of thy horse, as had a real existence, was really destroyed, that's true: but there was something in thy horse, which having a real, particular subsistence, was not destroyed; nay, and the best part of thy horse too: for it was that, which had in it all those properties, that made thy horse better than a broomstick.

Countrym. Thou tell'st me wonders of this same, subsistence; what, I pray thee, is it? Sofia. I beg your pardon for that; it is the very philosopher's stone; those who are adepts, and can do strange things with it, are wiser than to tell what it is.

Countrym. Where may it be bought, then? Sofia. That I know not: but I will tell thee, where thou mayest meet with it.

Countrym. Where? Sofia. In some of the shady thickets of the schoolmen; and 'tis worth the looking after. For if particular subsistence has such a power, over a real being, as to make one and the same real being, to be distinct, and in divers places, at once, it may perhaps be able to give thee an account, what becomes of that real nature of thy horse, after thy horse is dead; and if thou canst but find, whither that retires, who knows but thou mayst get as useful thing, as thy horse, again? since to that real nature of thy horse, inseparably adheres the shape, and motion, and other properties of thy horse.

I HOPE, my Lord, your countryman will not be displeased to have met with Sofia to chop logick with, who, I think, has made it as intelligible, how his real self might be the same, and distinct, and be really, in distinct places, at once, by the help of a particular subsistence, proper to him, in each place; as it is intelligible, how any real being, under the name of a common nature, or under any other name, bestowed upon it, may be the same and distinct, and really be in divers places, at once, by the help of a particular subsistence, proper to each of those distinct natures. At least, if I may answer for myself, I understand one as well as the other: and if my head be turned from common sense (as I find your Lordship very apt to think) so that it is great news to you, that P. 169. I understand any thing; if in my way of ideas, I cannot understand words, that appear to me, either to stand for no ideas, or to be so joined, that they put inconsistent ideas together; I think your Lordship uses me right to turn me off for desperate, and "leave me, as you do, to the reader's understanding." P. 169.

To your Lordship's many questions, concerning men and drills, in the paragraph, where you begin to explain, what my friend and I found difficult, in your discourse, concerning person; I answer, that these two names, man and drill, are perfectly arbitrary, whether founded on real, distinct properties, or no; so perfectly arbitrary, that, if men had pleased, drill might have stood for what man now does, and vice versa. I answer, further, that these two names stand for two abstract ideas, which are (to those, who know what they mean, by these two names) the distinct essences of two distinct kinds; and as particular existences, or things existing, are found by men (who know what they mean, by these names) to agree to either of those ideas, which these names stand for; these names respectively are applied to those particular things, and the things said to be of that kind. This I have so fully and at large explained, in my Essay, that I should have thought it needless to have said any thing again of it

here, had it not been to shew my readines to answer any questions, you shall be pleased to ask, concerning any thing I have writ, which your Lordship either finds difficult, or has forgot.

Vind. p. 259. In the next place, your Lordship comes to clear what you had said, in answer to this question, put by yourself, "what is this distinction of Peter, James,

Ibid. "and John, founded upon?" To which you answered, "that they may be distinguished from each other, by our senses, as to difference of features, distance of place, &c. But that is not all; for supposing there was no external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several individuals, in the same common nature." These words, when my friend and I came to consider, we owned, as your Lordship here takes notice, that we could understand,

P. 171. no more by them, but this; "that the ground of distinction, between several individuals, in the same common nature, is, that they are several individuals

Ibid. "in the same common nature." Hereupon your Lordship tells me, "the question now is, what this distinction is founded upon? whether on our observing the difference of features, distance of place, &c. or on some antecedent ground?"

PURSUANT hereunto, as if this were the question, you, in the next paragraph, (as far as I can understand it) make the ground of the distinction between these individuals, or the principium individuationis, to be the union of the soul and body. But with submission, my Lord, the question is, whether I and my friend were to blame; because, when your Lordship, in the words above-cited, having removed all other grounds of distinction, said, "there was yet a difference, between Peter and James, as several individuals in the same common nature;" we could understand no more by it, but this, "that the ground of distinction between several individuals in the same common nature, is, that they are several individuals in the same common nature."

Ibid. LET the ground, that your Lordship now assigns of the distinction of individuals, be what it will, or let what you say be as clear, as you please, viz. That the ground of their distinction is in the union of soul and body; it will, I humbly conceive, be nevertheless true, that what you said before, might amount to no more but this, "that the ground of the distinction between several individuals, in the same common nature, is, that they are several individuals in the same common nature:" and therefore, we might not be to blame for so understanding it. For the words, which our understandings were, then, employed about, were those, which you had there said, and not those, which you would say five months after: tho' I must own, that those, which your Lordship here says, concerning the distinction of individuals, leave it as much in the dark to me, as what you said before. But, perhaps, I do not understand your Lordship's words right; because I conceive that the principium individuationis is the same, in all the several species of creatures, men as well as others; and therefore, if the union of soul and body be that, which distinguishes two individuals, in the human species, one from another, I know not how two cherries, or two atoms of matter, can be distinct individuals; since, I think, there is, in them, no union of a soul and body. And, upon this ground, it will be very hard to tell, what made the soul and the body individuals (as certainly they were) before their union.

BUT I shall leave what your Lordship says, concerning this matter, to the examination of those, whose health and leisure allows them more time, than I have, for this weighty question, wherein the distinction of two men, or two cherries, consists: for I fear, I should make your Lordship's countryman a little wonder again, to find a grave philosopher make a serious question of it.

P. 173. 174. TO your next paragraph, I answer, that if the true idea of a person, or the true signification of the word, person, lies in this, that supposing there was no other difference, in the several individuals, of the same kind; yet there is a difference between them as several individuals in the same common nature; it will follow from hence, that the name, person, will agree to Bucephalus and Podargus, as well to Alexander and Hector. But whether this consequence will agree, with what your Lordship says, concerning person

person, in another place, I am not concerned; I am only answerable for this consequence.

YOUR Lordship is pleased here to call my endeavour to find out the meaning P. 173. of your words, as you had put them together, "trifling exceptions." To which I must say, that I am heartily sorry, that either my understanding, or your Lordship's way of writing, obliges me so often to such trifling. I cannot, as I have said, answer to what I do not understand; and I hope, here, my trifling, in searching out your Lordship's meaning, was not much out of the way, because, I think, every one will see, by the steps I took, that the sense I found out by it, was that which your words implied; and your Lordship does not disown it, but only replies, that I should not have drawn that, which was the natural consequence from it, because that consequence would not well consist with what you had said, in another place.

WHAT your Lordship adds farther, to clear your saying, "that an indivi- P. 174, 175. dual, intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making of a person, than the proper definition of it;" tho', in your definition of person, you put a compleat, intelligent substance; must have its effect upon others understandings: I must suffer under the short-sightedness of my own, who neither understood it, as it stood in your first answer, nor do I now, as it is explained in your second.

YOUR Lordship being here, as you say, come to the end of this debate, I P. 176. should here have ended too; and it was time, my letter being grown already to too great a bulk: but I being engaged, by promise, to answer some things, in your first letter, which, in my reply to it, I had omitted, I now come to them, and shall endeavour to give your Lordship satisfaction in those points; tho' to make room for them, I leave out a great deal that I had writ, in answer to this your Lordship's second letter. And if, after all, my answer seems too long, I must beg your Lordship, and my reader to excuse it, and impute it to those occasions of length, which I have mentioned in more places than one, as they have occurred.

THE original and main question, between your Lordship and me, being, "whether there were any thing in my Essay repugnant to the doctrine of the Trinity?" I endeavoured, by examining the grounds and manner of your Lordship's drawing my book into that controversy, to bring that question to a decision. And, therefore, in my answer to your Lordship's first letter, I insisted particularly, on what had a relation to that point. This method your Lordship, in your second letter, censured, as if it contained only personal matters, which were fit to be laid aside. And, by mixing new matter, and charging my book with new accusations, before the first was made out, avoided the decision of what was, in debate, between us; a strong presumption to me, that your Lordship had little to say, to support what began the controversy, which you were so willing to have me let fall; whilst, on the other side, my silence to other points, which I had promised an answer to, was often reflected on, and I rebuked for not answering in the proper place.

YOUR Lordship's calling upon me, on this occasion, shall not be lost; it is fit your expectation should be satisfied, and your objections considered; which, for the reasons above-mentioned, were not examined in my former answer: and which, whether true, or false, as I humbly conceive, make nothing for, or against, the doctrine of the Trinity. I shall, therefore, consider them barely, as so many philosophical questions, and endeavour to shew your Lordship where, and upon what grounds it is I stick; and what it is, that hinders me from the satisfaction, it would be to me, to be in every one of them of your mind.

YOUR Lordship tells me, "whether I do own substance, or not, is not the Answer 1. point before us; but whether, by virtue of these principles, I can come to P. 7. any certainty of reason about it. And your Lordship says, the very places, I produce, do prove the contrary; which you shall, therefore, set down, in my own words, both as to corporeal and spiritual substances."

HERE

HERE again, my Lord, I must beg your pardon, that I do not distinctly comprehend your meaning in these words, viz. "that, by virtue of these principles, one cannot come to certainty of reason, about substance:" for it is not very clear to me, whether your Lordship means, that we cannot come to certainty, that there is such a thing in the world, as substance; or, whether we cannot make any other proposition, about substance, of which we can be certain; or whether we cannot, by my principles, establish any idea of substance, of which we can be certain. For to come to certainty of reason, about substance, may signify either of these, which are far different propositions: and I shall waste your Lordship's time, my reader's, and my own (neither of which would I willingly do) by taking it in one sense, when you mean it in another, lest I should meet with some such reproof as this; that "I misrepresent your meaning, or might have understood it, if I had a mind to it," &c. And, therefore, cannot but wish, that you had so far condescended to the lowness of my apprehension, as to have given me your sense so determined, that I might not trouble you with answers, to what was not your precise meaning.

Answer I.
p. 13.

To avoid it, in the present case, and to find in what sense, I was here to take these words, "come to no certainty of reason, about substance," I looked into what followed, and when I came to the 13th page, I thought I had there got a clear explication of your Lordship's meaning, and that by no certainty of reason about substance, your Lordship here meant no certain idea of substance. Your Lordship's words are, "I do not charge them" (i. e. me, as one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning) "with discarding the notion of substance, because they have but an imperfect idea of it; but, because, upon those principles, there can be no certain idea, at all, of it." Here I thought myself sure, and that these words plainly interpreted the meaning of your proposition, p. 7. to be, "that, upon my principles, there can be no certain idea, at all, of substance." But, before I came to the end of that paragraph, I found my myself at a loss again; for that paragraph goes on, in these words: "whereas your Lordship asserts it to be one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds, because it is a repugnance to our first conception of things, that modes, or accidents, should subsist by themselves; and, therefore, you said, the rational idea of substance is one of the first ideas, in our minds: and how ever imperfect and obscure our notion be, yet we are as certain that substances are, and must be, as that there are any beings in the world." Here the certainty, which your words seem to mean, is "certainty of the being of substance."

Answer I.
p. 7, 8.

In this sense, therefore, I shall take it, till your Lordship shall determine it otherwise: and the reason, why I take it so, is, because what your Lordship goes on to say, seems to me to look most that way. The proposition, then, that your Lordship undertakes to prove, is this; "that, by virtue of my principles, we cannot come to any certainty of reason, that there is any such thing as substance:" and your Lordship tells me, "that the very places I produce do prove the contrary; which you, therefore, will set down, in my own words, both as to corporeal and spiritual substances."

Answer I.
p. 7.

Answer I.
p. 6.

THE first your Lordship brings, are these words of mine: "When we talk, or think, of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. tho' the idea we have of either of them be but the complication, or collection, of those several, simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing, called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name, substance; tho' it be certain, we have no clear and distinct idea of that thing, we suppose a support." And again, "The same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we considering, not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending, how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which

" we

"we call spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea, or notion, of matter, but something, wherein those many sensible qualities, which affect our senses, do subsist; by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist; we have as clear a notion of the nature, or substance, of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas, we have from without; and the other supposed (with alike ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations, which we experiment in ourselves."

BUT how these words prove, "that, upon my principles, we cannot come to any certainty of reason, that there is any such thing, as substance, in the world;" I confess I do not see, nor has your Lordship, as I humbly conceive, shewn. And I think it would be a hard matter, from these words of mine, to make a syllogism, whose conclusion should be, ergo, "from my principles we cannot come to any certainty of reason, that there is any substance in the world."

YOUR Lordship, indeed, tells me, that I say, "that these and the like Answer 1. fashions of speaking, that substance is always supposed something;" and P. 9. grant that I say over and over, that substance is supposed: but that, your Lordship says, is not what you looked for, but something in the way of certainty, by reason.

WHAT your Lordship looks for, is not, I find, always easy for me to guess. But what I brought that, and some other passages, to the same purpose, for, out of my Essay, that, I think, they prove, viz. that "I did not discard, nor almost discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world:" for he, that supposes, in every species of material beings, substance, to be always something, doth not discard, or almost discard, it out of the world, or deny any such thing to be. The passages alleged, I think, prove this; which was all I brought them for. And, if they should happen to prove no more, I think, you can hardly infer from thence, "that, therefore, upon my principles, we can come to no certainty, that there is any such thing, as substance, in the world."

YOUR Lordship goes on to insist mightily, upon my supposing; and to these Answer 1. words of mine, "we cannot conceive, how these sensible qualities should sub- P. 9. sist alone; and, therefore, we suppose a substance to support them," your Lordship replies, "it is but supposing still; because we cannot conceive it otherwise: but what certainty follows from not being barely able to conceive?" Answer 1. The same certainty that follows from the repugnancy, to our first concep- tions of things, upon which your Lordship grounds the relative idea of substance. Your words are, "it is a mere effect of reason, because it is a repug- P. 25. nancy to our first conceptions of things, that modes, or accidents, should subsist by themselves." Your Lordship then, if I understand your reasoning here, concludes, that there is substance, "because it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things" (for whether that repugnancy be to our first, or second conceptions, I think that is all one) "that modes, or accidents, should subsist by themselves;" and I conclude the same thing, because we cannot conceive how sensible qualities should subsist by themselves. Now what the difference of certainty is, from a repugnancy to our conceptions, and from our not being able to conceive; I confess, my Lord, I am not acute enough to discern. And, therefore, it seems to me, that I have laid down the same certainty of the being of substance, that your Lordship has done.

YOUR Lordship adds, "are there not multitudes of things, which we are Answer 1. not able to conceive? and yet it would not be allowed us to suppose, what P. 9. we think fit, upon that account." Answer. Your Lordship's is certainly a very just rule; it is pity it does not reach the case. "But, because it is not allowed us to suppose, what we think fit, in things, which we are not able to conceive;" it does not, therefore, follow, that we may not with certainty suppose, or infer, that which is a natural and undeniable consequence of such an inability to conceive, as I call it, or repugnancy to our conceptions, as you call

Answer I.
p. 9.

it. We cannot conceive the foundation of Harlem church to stand upon nothing; but, because it is not allowed us to suppose what we think fit, viz. that it is laid upon a rock of diamond, or supported by furies, yet I think all the world will allow the infallible certainty of this supposition from thence, that it rests upon something. This I take to be the present case; and, therefore, your next words, I think, do less concern Mr. L. than my Lord B. of W. I shall set them down, that the reader may apply them, to which of the two he thinks they most belong. They are, "I could hardly conceive that Mr. L. would have brought such evidence as this against himself; but I must suppose some unknown substratum, in this case." For these words, that your Lordship has last quoted of mine, do not only not prove, "that, upon my principles we cannot come to any certainty, that there is any such thing, as substance, in the world;" but prove the contrary, that there must certainly be substance in the world; and, upon the very same grounds, that your Lordship takes it to be certain.

Answer I.
p. 10.

Ibid.

YOUR next paragraph, which is to the same purpose, I have read, more than once, and can never forbear, as often as I read it, to wish myself young again; or that a liveness of fancy, suitable to that age, would teach me to sport with words, for the diversion of my readers. This I find your Lordship thinks so necessary, to the quickning of controversy, that you will not trust the debate, to the greatness of your learning, nor the gravity of your subject, without it, whatever authority the dignity of your character might give, to what your Lordship says: for you, having quoted these words of mine; "as long as there is any simple idea, or sensible quality left, according to my way of arguing, substance cannot be discarded; because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with them the supposition of a substratum, to exist in, and a substance, wherein they inhere;" you add, "what is the meaning of carrying with them a supposition of a substratum, and a substance? Have these simple ideas the notion of a substance in them? No, but they carry it with them: How so? Do sensible qualities carry a corporeal substance along with them? Then a corporeal substance must be intromitted by the senses, together with them: no, but they carry the supposition with them; and, truly, that is burden enough for them. But which way do they carry it? It seems, it is only, because we cannot conceive it otherwise: What is this conceiving? It may be said, it is an act of the mind, not built on simple ideas, but lies in the comparing the ideas of accident and substance together; and, from thence, finding that an accident must carry substance along with it: but this will not clear it; for the ideas of accidents are simple ideas, and carry nothing along with them, but the impression made by sensible objects."

In this passage, I conclude, your Lordship had some regard to the entertainment of that part of your readers, who would be thought men, as well by being risible, as rational creatures. For I cannot imagine, you meant this for an argument; if you did, I have this plain simple answer, that, "by carrying with them a supposition," I mean, according to the ordinary import of the phrase, that sensible qualities imply a substratum, to exist in. And, if your Lordship please to change one of these equivalent expressions, into the other, all the argument here, I think, will be at an end: what will become of the sport and smiling, I will not answer.

HITHERTO, I do not see any thing, in my words, brought by your Lordship that proves, "that, upon my principles, we can come to no certainty of reason, that there is substance in the world;" but the contrary.

Answer I.
p. 11, 12.

B. ii. c. 13.
§ 19.

YOUR Lordship's next words are to tell the world, that my simile, about the elephant and tortoise, "is to ridicule the notion of substance, and the European philosophers for asserting it." But, if your Lordship please to turn again, to my Essay, you will find those passages were not intended to ridicule the notion of substance, or those who asserted it, whatever that, it, signifies: but to shew, that tho' substance did support accidents, yet philosophers, who had found such a support necessary, had no more a clear idea, of what that support was, than

the

the Indian had, of that, which supported his tortoise, tho' sure he was, it was something. Had your pen, which quoted so much of the nineteenth section Answer, 1. of the thirteenth chapter of my second book, but set down the remaining line and a half of that paragraph, you would, by these words, which follow there, "so that, of substance, we have no idea, of what it is, but only a confused and "obscure one of what it does;" have put it past doubt, what I meant. But your Lordship was pleased to take only those, which you thought would serve best to your purpose; and I crave leave to add, now, these remaining ones, to shew my reader what was mine.

'Tis to the same purpose, I use the same illustration again, in that other place, B. 2. c. 23. which you are pleased to cite likewise; which your Lordship says, you did, §. 2. "only to shew that it was a deliberate, and (as I thought) lucky similitude." It was upon serious consideration, I own, that I entertained the opinion, that we had no clear and distinct idea of substance. But, as to that similitude, I do not remember that it was much deliberated on; such inaccurate writers as I am, who aim at nothing but plainness, do not much study similes: and, for the fault of repetition, you have been pleased to pardon it. But, supposing you had proved, that that simile was to ridicule the notion of substance, published in the writings of some European philosophers; it will, by no means, follow from thence, "that, upon my principles, we cannot come to any certainty of reason, that there "is any such thing, as substance in the world." Men's notions of a thing may be laugh'd at, by those, whose principles established the certainty of the thing itself; and one may laugh at Aristotle's notion of an orb of fire, under the sphere of the moon, without principles, that will make him uncertain, whether there be any such thing as fire. My simile did, perhaps, serve to shew, that there were philosophers, whose knowledge, was not so clear, nor so great, as they pretended. If your Lordship thereupon thought, that the vanity of such a pretension had something ridiculous in it, I shall not contest your judgment in the case: for, as human nature is framed, 'tis not impossible that whoever is discovered to pretend to know more, than really he does, will be in danger to be laugh'd at.

In the next paragraph, your Lordship bestows the epithet, of dull, on Bur- Answer, 1. gerfidiucius, and Sanderfon, and the tribe of logicians. I will not question your P. 12. right to call any body dull, whom you please: but if your Lordship does it, to insinuate that I did so, I hope I may be allowed to say thus much, in my own defence, that I am neither so stupid, or ill-natured, to discredit those, whom I quote, for being of the same opinion with me. And he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth pages of my Reply, which your Lordship refers to, will find, that I am very far from calling them dull, or speaking diminishingly of them. But if I had been so ill-bred, or foolish, as to have called them dull; I do not see how that does at all serve to prove this proposition, "that, upon my principles, we cannot come to a certainty of reason, that there "is any such thing, as substance;" any more than what follows, in the next paragraph.

Your Lordship in it asks me, as if it were of some great importance, to the Answer, 1. proposition to be proved, "whether, there be no difference between the bare P. 13. "being of a thing, and its subsistence by itself?" Answ. Yes, there is a difference, as I understand those terms: and then I beseech your Lordship to make use of it, to prove the proposition before us. But because you seem, by this question, to conclude, "that the idea of a thing, that subsists by itself, is a "clear and distinct idea of substance," I beg leave to ask, is the idea of the manner of subsistence of a thing, the idea of the thing itself? If it be not, we may have a clear and distinct idea of the manner, and yet have none but a very obscure and confused one of the thing. For example, I tell your Lordship, that I know a thing, that cannot subsist without a support, and I know another thing that does subsist without a support, and say no more of them; can you, by having the clear and distinct ideas of having a support, and not having a support, say, that you have a clear and distinct idea of the thing, that I know, which

which has, and of the thing, that I know, which has not, a support? If your Lordship can, I beseech you to give me the clear and distinct ideas of these, which I only call, by the general name, things, that have or have not supports: for such there are, and such I shall give your Lordship clear and distinct ideas of, when you shall please to call upon me, for them; tho', I think, your Lordship will scarce find them, by the general and confused idea, of things, nor in the clearer and more distinct idea, of having, or not having, a support.

To shew a blind man, that he has no clear and distinct idea of scarlet, I tell him, that his notion of it, that it is a thing, or being, does not prove, he has any clear, or distinct idea of it; but barely, that he takes it to be something, he knows not what. He replies, that he knows more than that; v. g. he knows that it subsists, or inheres, in another thing: "and is there no difference, says he, in your Lordship's words, between the bare being of a thing, and its substance in another?" Yes, say I to him, a great deal; but they are very different ideas. But for all that, you have no clear and distinct idea of scarlet, not such a one as I have, who see and know it, and have another kind of idea of it, besides that of inherence.

YOUR Lordship has the idea of subsisting by itself, and, therefore, you conclude, you have a clear and distinct idea of the thing, that subsists by itself; which, methinks, is all one, as if your countryman should say, he hath an idea of a cedar of Lebanon, that it is a tree of a nature to need no prop to lean on, for its support, therefore he hath a clear and distinct idea of a cedar of Lebanon; which clear and distinct idea, when he comes to examine, is nothing, but a general one of a tree, with which his indetermined idea of a cedar is confounded. Just so, is the idea of substance, which, however called clear and distinct, is confounded with the general, indetermined idea of something. But suppose, that the manner of subsisting by itself, give us a clear and distinct idea of substance, how does that prove, "that, upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reason, that there is any such thing, as substance in the world?" which is the proposition to be proved.

Answer, I.
P. 13.

In what follows, your Lordship says, "you do not charge any one with discarding the notion of substance; because he has but an imperfect idea of it; but because, upon those principles, there can be no certain idea, at all, of it."

YOUR Lordship says here, those principles, and in other places, these principles, without particularly setting them down, that I know. I am sure, without laying down propositions, that are mine, and proving that, those granted, "we cannot come to any certainty, that there is any such thing, as substance," which is the thing to be proved; your Lordship proves nothing, in the case, against me. What, therefore, the certain idea, which I do not understand, or idea of substance, has to do here, is not easy to see. For that which I am charged with, is the discarding substance. But the discarding substance, is not the discarding the notion of substance. Mr. Newton has discarded Des Cartes's vortices, i. e. laid down principles, from which he proves, there is no such thing; but he has not thereby discarded the notion, or ideas of those vortices, for that he had, when he confused their being, and every one, who now reads and understands him, will have. But as I have already observed, your Lordship here, I know not upon what ground, nor with what intention, confounds the ideas of substance, and substance itself: for, to the words above set down, your Lordship subjoins, "that

Answer, I.
P. 13, 14.

"you assert it to be one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds; because it is a repugnance to our first conception of things, that modes, or accidents, should subsist by themselves; and, therefore, your Lordship said, the rational idea of substance is one of the first ideas in our minds; and, however imperfect and obscure our notion be, yet we are as certain that substances are, and must be, as that there are any beings in the world." Herein I tell your Lordship, that I agree with you, and therefore, I hope this is no objection against the Trinity. "Your Lordship says, you never thought it was: but to lay all foundations of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and distinct ideas, which was the opinion you opposed, does certainly over-throw

" throw all mysteries of faith, and excludes the notion of substance, out of
 " rational discourse, which your Lordship affirms to have been your mean-
 " ing."

How these words, as to matters of faith, came in, or what they had to do against me, in an answer only to me, I do not see; neither will I here examine what it is to be " one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds." But be it what it will, this I am sure, that neither that, nor any thing else, contained in this paragraph, any way proves, that, " upon my principles, we cannot come to any certainty, that there is any such thing, as substance, in the world?" which was the proposition to be proved.

IN the next place, then, I crave leave to consider, how that is proved, which, tho' nothing to the proposition to be proved, is yet, what you here assert; viz. " that the idea of substance is one of the most natural and certain ideas in our minds?" Your proof of it is this, " because it is a repugnancy to our first conception of things, that modes and accidents should subsist by themselves, and therefore the rational idea substance is one of the first ideas in our minds." From whence, I grant it to be a good consequence, that to those, who find this repugnance, the idea of a support is very necessary; or, if you please to call it so, very rational: but a clear and distinct idea of the thing itself, which is the support, will not thence be proved to be one of the first ideas in our minds; or, that any such idea is ever there at all. He that is satisfied that Pendennis-castle, if it were not supported, would fall into the sea, must think of a support, that sustains it: but whether the thing, that it rests on, be timber, or brick, or stone, he has, by his bare idea of the necessity of some support, that props it up, no clear and distinct idea at all.

IN this paragraph you farther say, " that the laying all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, on clear and distinct ideas, does certainly exclude the notion of substance, out of rational discourse." Answ. This is a proposition, that will need a proof; because every body, at first sight, will think it hard to be proved. For it is obvious, that let certainty, in matters of faith, or any matters whatsoever, be laid on what it will, it excludes not the notion of substance certainly out of rational discourse; unless it be certainly true, that we can rationally discourse of nothing, but what we certainly know. But whether it be a proposition easy, or not easy, to be proved, this is certain, that it concerns not me; for " I lay not all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and distinct ideas:" and therefore, if it does discard substance out of the reasonable part of the world, as your Lordship phrases it above, or excludes the notion of substance out of rational discourse; whatever havock it makes of substance, or its idea, no one jot of the mischief is to be laid at my door, because that is no principle of mine.

YOUR Lordship ends this paragraph with telling me, that " I, at length, Answer, i. apprehend your Lordship's meaning." P. 14.

I WISH heartily that I did, because it would be much more for your ease, as well as my own. For in this case of substance, I find it not easy to know your meaning, or what it is, I am blamed for. For, in the beginning of this dispute, it is the being of substance, and here again, it is substance itself, is discarded: and, in this very paragraph, writ, as it seems, to explain yourself; so that, in the close of it, you tell me, that " at length I apprehend your meaning to be, " that the notion of substance is excluded out of rational discourse;" the explanation is such, that it renders your Lordship's meaning to me, more obscure and uncertain, than it was before: for, in the same paragraph, your Lordship says, " that, upon my principles, there can be no certain idea at all, of substance;" and also, that " however imperfect and obscure our notions be, yet we are as certain that substances are, and must be, as that there are any beings in the world." So that supposing I did know (as I do not) what your Lordship means, by certain idea of substance; yet I must own still, that what your meaning is, by discarding of substance, whether it be the idea of substance, or the being of substance, I do not know. But that I think, need not much trouble me, since your Lord-

ship does not, that I see, shew how any position, or principle, of mine overthrows, either substance itself, or the idea of it, or excludes either of them out of rational discourse.

Answer I.
p. 14.

IN your next paragraph, you say, "I declare, p. 35. that if any one assert, that we can have no ideas, but from sensation and reflection, it is not my opinion." My Lord, I have looked over that 35th page, and find no such words of mine there; but refer my reader to that and the following pages, for my opinion, concerning ideas from sensation and reflection, how far they are the foundation and materials of all our knowledge. And this I do, because, to those words, which your Lordship has set down as mine, out of the 35th page, but are not there, you subjoin, "that you are very glad of it, and will do me all the right you can, in this matter;" which seems to imply, that it is a matter of great consequence; and, therefore, I desire my meaning may be taken, in my own words, as they are set down at large.

Answer I.
p. 14.

Let. I.
p. 35-38.

THE promise, your Lordship makes me, "of doing me all the right, you can," I return my humble thanks for, because it is a piece of justice, so seldom done in controversy; and because I suppose you have here made me this promise, to authorize me to mind you of it, if at any time your haste should make you mistake my words, or meaning: to have one's words exactly quoted and their meaning interpreted, by the plain and visible design of the author, in his whole discourse, being a right, which every writer has a just claim to, and such as a lover of truth will be very wary of violating. An instance of some sort of intrenchment on this, I humbly conceive, there is in the next page but one, where you interpret my words, as if I excused a mistake, I had made, by calling it a slip of my pen; whereas, my Lord, I do not own any slip of my pen, in that place, but say, that the meaning of my expression there, is to be interpreted by other places, and particularly by those, where I treat professedly of that subject: and that, in such cases, where an expression is only incident to the matter in hand, and may seem not exactly to quadrate with the author's sense, where he designedly treats of that subject, it ought rather to be interpreted, as a slip of his pen, than as his meaning. I should not have taken so particular a notice of this, but that you, by having up these words with an air, that makes me sensible, how wary I ought to be, shew what use would be made of it, if ever I had pleaded the slip of my pen.

Answer I.
p. 16.

Answer I.
p. 15-29.

Answer I.
p. 20.

IN the following pages, I find a discourse drawn up, under several ranks of numbers, to prove, as I guess, this proposition, "that, in my way of ideas, we cannot come to any certainty, as to the nature of substance." I shall be in a condition to answer to this accusation, when I shall be told, what particular proposition, as to the nature of substance, it is, which, in my way of ideas, we cannot come to any certainty of. Because, probably, it may be such a proposition concerning the nature of substance, as I shall readily own, that, in my way of ideas, we can come to no certainty of; and yet, I think, the way of ideas not at all be blamed, till there can be shewn another way, different from that of ideas, whereby we may come to a certainty of it. For it was never pretended, that, by ideas, we could come to certainty, concerning every proposition, that could be made, concerning substance, or any thing else.

Answer I.
p. 100, 101.

BESIDES the doubtfulness, visible in the phrase itself, there is another reason, that hinders me from understanding precisely, what is meant by these words, "to come to a certainty, as to the nature of substance," viz. because your Lordship makes nature, and substance, to be the same: so that to come to a certainty, as to the nature of substance, is, in your Lordship's sense of nature, to come to a certainty, as to the substance of substance; which, I own, I do not clearly understand.

ANOTHER thing, that hinders me, from giving particular answers to the arguments, that may be supposed to be contained in so many pages, is, that I do not see how, what is discoursed, in those thirteen or fourteen pages, is brought to prove this proposition, "that in my way of ideas, we cannot come to any certainty, as to the nature of substance:" and it will require too many words to examine every one of those heads, period by period, to see what they prove; when

when you yourself do not apply them, to the direct probation of any proposition, that I understand.

INDEED, you wind up this discourse with these words, "that you leave the reader to judge, whether this be a tolerable account of the idea of substance, by sensation and reflection." *Ans. That which your Lordship has given, in the preceding pages, "I think is not a very tolerable account of my idea of substance;" since the account you give, over and over again, of my idea of substance, is, that "it is nothing but a complex idea of accidents." This is your account of my idea of substance, which you insist so much on, and which you say, you took out of those places, I myself produced, in my first letter. But if you had been pleased to have set down this one, which is to be found there, amongst the rest produced by me, out of B. ii. c. 12. § 6. of my Essay, viz. "that the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct, particular things, subsisting by themselves; in which, the supposed or confused idea of substance is always the first and chief;" this would have been a full answer to all, that I think, you have, under that variety of heads, objected against my idea of substance. But your Lordship, in your representation of my idea of substance, thought fit to leave this passage out; tho' you are pleased to set down several others, produced both before and after it, in my first letter; which, I think, gives me a right humbly to return your Lordship your own words, "and now I freely leave the reader to judge, whether this, which your Lordship has given, be a tolerable account of my idea of substance."*

THE next point to be considered, is, concerning the immateriality of the soul; whereof there is a great deal said. The original of this controversy, shall set down in your Lordship's own words. You say, "the only reason we had, to engage in this matter, was this bold assertion, that the ideas we have, by sensation, or reflection, are the sole matter and foundation of all our reasoning, and that our certainty lies in perceiving the agreement and disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition; which last, you say, are my own words."

To overthrow this bold assertion, you urge my acknowledgment, "that, upon my principles, it cannot be demonstratively proved, that the soul is immaterial, tho' it be in the highest degree probable:" and then ask, "is not Letter 1. this the giving up the cause of certainty?" *Ans. Just as much the giving up the cause of certainty, on my side, as it is on your Lordship's; who, tho' you will not please to tell, wherein you place certainty, yet it is to be supposed you do place certainty, in something or other. Now let it be what you will, that you place certainty in, I take the liberty to say, that you cannot certainly prove, i. e. demonstrate, that the soul of man is immaterial. I am sure, you have not so much as offered at any such proof, and therefore you give up the cause of certainty, upon your principles: because, if the not being able to demonstrate that the soul is immaterial, upon his principles, who declares, wherein he thinks certainty consists, be the giving up of the cause of certainty; the not being able to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul, upon his principles, who does not tell, wherein certainty consists, is no less a giving up of the cause of certainty. The only odds between these two, is more art and reserve in the one, than the other. And, therefore, my Lord, you must either, upon your principles of certainty, demonstrate that the soul is immaterial, or you must allow me to say, that you too give up the cause of certainty, and your principles tend to scepticism, as much as mine. Which of these two your Lordship shall please to do, will be to me advantageous; for, by the one, I shall get a demonstration of the soul's immateriality, (of which I shall be very glad) and that upon principles, which, reaching farther than mine, I shall embrace, as better than mine, and become your Lordship's professed convert. Till then I shall rest satisfied that my principles, be they as weak and fallible, as your Lordship pleases, are no more guilty of any such tendency, than theirs, who, talking more of certainty,*

tainty, cannot attain to it, in cafes, where they condemn the way of ideas, for coming ſhort of it.

Answer I.
p. 68.

You a little lower, in the ſame page, ſet down theſe as my words, "that I never offered it as a way of certainty, where we cannot reach certainty." I have already told you, that I have been ſometimes in doubt, what copy you had got of my Eſſay; becauſe I often found your quotations out of it, did not agree with what I read in mine: but, by this inſtance here, and ſome others, I know not what to think; ſince in my letter, which I did myſelf the honour to ſend your Lordſhip, I am ſure the words are not, as they are here ſet down. For I ſay not that I offered the way of certainty, there ſpoken of; which looks, as if it were a new way of certainty, that I pretended to teach the world. Perhaps, the difference in theſe, from my words, is not ſo great, that, upon another occaſion, I ſhould take notice of it: but it being to lead people into an opinion, that I ſpoke of the way of certainty, by ideas, as ſomething new, which I pretended to teach the world, I think it worth while to ſet down my words themſelves; which, I think, are ſo penned, as to ſhew a great caution in me, to avoid ſuch an opinion: my words are, "I think it is a way to bring us to a certainty, in thoſe things, which I have offered as certain; but I never thought it a way to certainty, where we cannot reach certainty."

Letter I.
p. 81.

WHAT uſe your Lordſhip makes of the term, offered, applied to what I applied it not, is to be ſeen in your next words, which you ſubjoin to thoſe, which you ſet down for mine: "but did you not offer to put us into a way of certainty? And what is that but to attain certainty in ſuch things, where we could not otherwiſe do it?" Anſw. If this your way of reaſoning here carries certainty in it, I humbly conceive, in your way of certainty, by reaſon, certainty may be attained, where it could not otherwiſe be had. I only beg you, my Lord, to ſhew me the place, where I ſo offer, to put you in a way of certainty, different from what had formerly been the way of certainty, that men, by it, might attain to certainty in things, which they could not, before my book was writ. No body, who reads my Eſſay, with that indifferency, which is proper to a lover of truth, can avoid ſeeing, that what I ſay, of certainty, was not to teach the world a new way of certainty (tho' that be one great objection of your's, againſt my book) but to endeavour to ſhew, wherein the old, and only way of certainty conſiſts. What was the occaſion and deſign of my book, may be ſeen plainly enough, in the epiſtle to the reader, without any need that any thing more ſhould be ſaid of it. And I am too ſenſible of my own weakneſs,

Eſſay, B. ii.
c. 11. § 17.

not to profeſs, as I do, "that I pretend not to teach, but to inquire." I cannot but wonder, what ſervice you, my Lord, who are a teacher of authority, mean to truth, or certainty, by condemning the way of certainty by ideas; becauſe I own, by it, I cannot demonſtrate that the ſoul is immaterial. May it not be worth your conſidering, what advantage this will be to ſcepticiſm, when, upon the ſame grounds, your words here ſhall be turned upon you; and it ſhall be asked, "what a ſtrange way of certainty is this" [your Lordſhip's way by reaſon] "if it fails us in ſome of the firſt foundations of the real knowledge of ourſelves?"

Answer I.
p. 68.

To avoid this, you undertake to prove, from my own principles, that we may be certain, "that the firſt, eternal, thinking being, or omnipotent ſpirit, cannot, if he would, give to certain ſyſtems of created, ſenſible matter, put together, as he ſees fit, ſome degrees of ſenſe, perception, and thought."

Eſſay, B. iv.
c. 3. § 6.

For this, my Lord, is my propoſition, and this the utmoſt, that I have ſaid, concerning the power of thinking, in matter.

Answer I.
p. 69-73.

YOUR firſt argument I take to be this, that, according to me, the knowledge we have being by our ideas, and our idea of matter, in general, being a ſolid ſubſtance, and our idea of body a ſolid, extended, figured ſubſtance; if I admit matter to be capable of thinking, I confound the idea of matter, with the idea of a ſpirit: to which I anſwer, no; no more than I confound the idea of matter, with the idea of an horſe, when I ſay that matter, in general, is a ſolid extended

extended substance: and that an horse is a material animal, or an extended, solid substance, with sense and spontaneous motion.

THE idea of matter is an extended, solid substance; wherever there is such a substance, there is matter, and the essence of matter, whatever other qualities, not contained in that essence, it shall please God to superadd to it. For example, God creates an extended, solid substance, without the superadding any thing else to it, and so we may consider it at rest: to some parts of it he superadds motion, but it has still the essence of matter: other parts of it he frames into plants, with all the excellencies of vegetation, life, and beauty, which is to be found in a rose, or peach-tree, &c. above the essence of matter, in general, but it is still but matter: to other parts he adds sense and spontaneous motion, and those other properties, that are to be found in an elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted, but the power of God may go, and that the properties of a rose, a peach, or an elephant, superadded to matter, change not the properties of matter; but matter is, in these things, matter still. But if one venture to go one step further, and say, God may give to matter, thought, reason, and volition, as well as sense and spontaneous motion, there are men ready presently to limit the power of the omnipotent creator, and tell us, "he cannot do it; because it destroys the essence, or changes the essential properties of matter." To make good which assertion, they have no more to say, but that thought and reason are not included in the essence of matter. I grant it; but whatever excellency, not contained in its essence, be superadded to matter, it does not destroy the essence of matter, if it leaves it an extended, solid substance; wherever that is, there is the essence of matter: and if every thing of greater perfection, superadded to such a substance, destroys the essence of matter, what will become of the essence of matter in a plant, or an animal, whose properties far exceed those of a mere, extended, solid substance?

BUT it is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how matter can think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God, therefore, cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking, is to say, God's omnipotency is limited to a narrow compass, because man's understanding is so; and brings down God's infinite power to the size of our capacities. If God can give no power to any parts of matter, but what men can account for, from the essence of matter, in general; if all such qualities, and properties, must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties of matter, which are, to our conceptions, above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural consequence of that essence; it is plain, that the essence of matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of the sensible parts of this our system. For it is visible, that all the planets have revolutions about certain, remote centers, which I would have any one explain, or make conceivable, by the bare essence, or natural powers, depending on the essence of matter in general, without something added to that essence, which we cannot conceive: for the moving of matter in a crooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can be said in the case; either of which, it is above our reach to derive from the essence of matter, or body in general; tho' one of these two must unavoidably be allowed to be superadded, in this instance, to the essence of matter in general. The omnipotent creator advised not with us, in the making of the world, and his ways are not the less excellent, because they are past our finding out.

IN the next place, the vegetable part of the creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet, he that will look into it, will observe excellencies and operations, in this part of matter, which he will not find contained in the essence of matter in general, nor be able to conceive, how they can be produced in it. And will he therefore say, that the essence of matter is destroyed in them, because they have properties and operations, not contained in the essential properties of matter, as matter, nor explicable by the essence of matter, in general?

LET us advance one step farther, and we shall, in the animal world, meet with yet greater perfections and properties, no ways explicable, by the essence of matter, in general. If the omnipotent creator had not superadded to the earth, which produced the irrational animals, qualities far surpassing those of the dull, dead, earth, out of which they were made, life, sense, and spontaneous motion, nobler qualities, than were before in it, it had still remained rude, senseless matter; and if, to the individuals of each species, he had not superadded a power of propagation, the species had perished with those individuals: but, by these essences, or properties, of each species, superadded to the matter, which they were made of, the essence, or properties, of matter, in general, were not destroyed, or changed, any more than any thing, that was in the individuals before, was destroyed, or changed, by the power of generation, superadded to them, by the first benediction of the Almighty.

IN all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualities, destroys nothing of the essence, or perfections, that were there before, unless there can be shewed a manifest repugnancy between them: but all the proof, offered for that, is only, that we cannot conceive how matter, without such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, in truth, no more than to say, matter in general, or every part of matter, as matter, has them not; but is no reason to prove, that God, if he pleases, cannot superadd them to some parts of matter; unless it can be proved to be a contradiction, that God should give, to some parts of matter, qualities, and perfections, which matter, in general, has not; tho' we cannot conceive how matter is invested with them, or how it operates, by virtue of those new endowments. Nor is it to be wondered, that we cannot, whilst we limit all its operations to those qualities, it had before, and would explain them, by the known properties of matter, in general, without any such superinduced perfections. For, if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing to be, because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be; I shall desire them, who use it, to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make, both in divinity, as well as philosophy; and whether they can advance any thing more in favour of scepticism.

FOR to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking and self-motion, bestowed by omnipotent power, on some parts of matter: the objection to this, is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What is the consequence? ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this stand for a good reason, and then proceed in other cases, by the same. You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter, at any distance, much less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it such a power. You cannot conceive, how matter should feel, or move itself, or affect an immaterial being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it such powers: which is, in effect, to deny gravity and the revolution of the planets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense, or spontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense, nor voluntary motion.

LET us apply this rule one degree farther: you cannot conceive how an extended, solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think: can you conceive how your own soul, or any substance thinks? You find, indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how the action of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my conception; and I would be glad, any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but be convinced of his power, in this instance, which, tho' I every moment experiment, in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of; what would it be less, than an insolent absurdity, to deny his power, in other like cases, only for this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this matter a little farther: God has created a substance; let it be, for example, a solid, extended substance: is God bound to give it, besides being, a power of action? that, I think, no-body will say. He, therefore, may leave it in a state of inactivity, and it will be nevertheless a substance; for action

action is not necessary to the being of any substance that God does create. God has, likewise, created and made to exist, *de novo*, an immaterial substance, which will not lose its being of a substance, tho' God should bestow on it nothing more; but this bare being, without giving it any activity at all. Here are now two distinct substances, the one material, the other immaterial, both in a state of perfect inactivity: now, I ask, what power God can give to one of these substances (supposing them to retain the same distinct natures, that they had, as substances, in their state of inactivity) which he cannot give to the other? In that state, 'tis plain, neither of them thinks; for thinking being an action, it cannot be denied, that God can put an end to any action, of any created substance, without annihilating of the substance, whereof it is an action: and if it be so, he can also, create, or give existence to, such a substance, without giving that substance any action at all. By the same reason, it is plain, that neither of them can move itself. Now I would ask, why omnipotency cannot give to either of these substances, which are equally in a state of perfect inactivity, the same power, that it can give to the other? Let it be, for example, that of spontaneous, or self-motion, which is a power that it is supposed God can give to an unfolid substance, but denied that he can give to a folid substance.

If it be asked, why they limit the omnipotency of God, in reference to the one, rather than the other, of these substances? all that can be said to it, is, that they cannot conceive, how the folid substance should ever be able to move itself. And as little, say I, are they able, to conceive how a created, unfolid substance, should move itself. But there may be something in an immaterial substance, that you do not know: I grant it; and in a material one too: for example, gravitation of matter towards matter, and in the several proportions observable, inevitably shews, that there is something in matter, that we do not understand, unless we can conceive self-motion in matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable attraction in matter, at immense and almost incomprehensible distances: It must, therefore, be confessed, that there is something in folid, as well as unfolid substances, that we do not understand. But this we know, that they may, each of them, have their distinct beings, without any activity, superadded to them; unless you will deny, that God can take from any being its power of acting, which, 'tis probable, will be thought too presumptuous for any one to do; and, I say, 'tis as hard to conceive self-motion in a created, immaterial, as in a material being, consider it how you will: and, therefore, this is no reason to deny omnipotency to be able to give a power of self-motion to a material substance, if he pleases, as well as to an immaterial; since neither of them can have it from themselves, nor can we conceive, how it can be in either of them.

THE same is visible, in the other operation of thinking; both these substances may be made, and exist without thought; neither of them has, or can have, the power of thinking, from itself; God may give it to either of them, according to the good pleasure of his omnipotency; and in which-ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our capacity to conceive, how either of those substances thinks. But for that reason, to deny that God, who had power enough to give them both a being out of nothing, can, by the same omnipotency, give them what other powers and perfections he pleases; has no better a foundation, than to deny his power of creation, because we cannot conceive how it is performed; and there, at last, this way of reasoning must terminate.

THAT omnipotency cannot make a substance to be folid, and not folid, at the same time, I think, with due reverence, we may say; but that a folid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, which have no natural, or visibly necessary, connexion with solidity and extension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing) to be positive in. If God cannot join things together by connexions inconceivable to us, we must deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since every particle of it, having some bulk, has its parts connected by ways inconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties, that are raised, against the thinking of matter, from our
igno-

ignorance, or narrow conceptions, stand not all in the way of the power of God, if he pleases to ordain it so; nor prove any thing against his having actually endued some parcels of matter, so disposed, as he thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can be shewn that it contains a contradiction to suppose it.

THO' to me sensation be comprehended, under thinking in general, yet, in the foregoing discourse, I have spoke of sense in brutes, as distinct from thinking: because your Lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in brutes. But here I take liberty to observe, that, if your Lordship allows brutes to have sensation, it will follow, either that God can, and doth, give to some parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking; or that all animals have immaterial, and consequently, according to your Lordship, immortal souls, as well as men: and to say that fleas and mites, &c. have immortal souls, as well as men, will possibly be looked on, as going a great way to serve an hypothesis, and it would not very well agree with what your Lordship says, *Answ. 2. p. 64.* to the words of Solomon, quoted out of *Ecclef. c. iii.*

I HAVE been pretty large, in making this matter plain, that they, who are so forward to bestow hard censures, or names, on the opinions of those, who differ from them, may consider, whether sometimes they are not more due to their own: and that they may be persuaded a little to temper that heat, which supposing the truth, in their current opinions, gives them (as they think) a right to lay what imputations they please, on those, who would fairly examine the grounds they stand upon. For talking with a supposition, and insinuations, that truth and knowledge, nay, and religion too, stands and falls with their systems, is, at best, but an imperious way of begging the question, and assuming to themselves, under the pretence of zeal for the cause of God, a title to infallibility. It is very becoming, that men's zeal for truth should go, as far as their proofs, but not go for proofs themselves. He that attacks received opinions, with any thing, but fair arguments, may, I own, be justly suspected not to mean well, nor to be led by the love of truth; but the same may be said of him too, who so defends them. An error is not the better for being common, nor truth the worse for having lain neglected: and if it were put to the vote, any where in the world, I doubt, as things are managed, whether truth would have the majority; at least, whilst the authority of men, and not the examination of things, must be its measure. The imputation of scepticism, and those broad insinuations, to render what I have writ, suspected, so frequent, as if that were the great business of all this pains, you have been at about me, has made me say thus much, my Lord, rather as my sense of the way to establish truth in its full force and beauty, than that I think the world will need to have any thing said to it, to make it distinguish between your Lordship's and my design in writing; which, therefore, I securely leave to the judgment of the reader, and return to the argument in hand.

WHAT I have above said, I take to be a full answer to all that your Lordship would infer, from my idea of matter, of liberty, and of identity, and from the power of abstracting. You ask, "how can my idea of liberty agree with the idea, that bodies can operate, only by motion and impulse?" *Answ.* By the omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree, that involve not a contradiction. 'Tis true, I say, "that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else." And so I thought, when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operation: but I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book, that 'tis too bold a presumption to limit God's power, in this point, by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration, that God can, if he pleases, put into bodies, powers, and ways of operation, above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter; but also an unquestionable, and every where visible, instance, that

Answer 1.
P. 73.

Essay, B. ii.
c. 8. § 11.

that he has done so : and, therefore, in the next edition of my book, I shall take care to have that passage rectified.

As to self-consciousness, your Lordship asks, " what is there, like self-consciousness, in matter ?" Nothing at all, in matter, as matter : but that God cannot bestow, on some parcels of matter, a power of thinking, and, with it, self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking, " how is it possible to apprehend, " that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive ?" The weakness of our apprehension I grant, in the case : I confess, as much as you please, that we cannot conceive how a solid, no, nor how an unsolid, created substance thinks ; but this weakness of our apprehensions reaches not the power of God, whose weakness is stronger than any thing in man.

YOUR argument from abstraction, we have, in this question, " if it may be, " in the power of matter, to think, how comes it to be so impossible for such organized bodies, as the brutes have, to enlarge their ideas, by abstraction ?" Answ. This seems to suppose, that I place thinking, within the natural power of matter. If that be your meaning, my Lord, I neither say, nor suppose, that all matter has naturally in it, a faculty of thinking, but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain parcels of matter, ordered by the divine power, as seems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his omnipotency, the faculty of thinking ; that, indeed, I say, and that being granted, the answer to your question, is easy, since, if omnipotency can give thought to any solid substance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that faculty in an higher, or lower, degree, as it pleases him, who knows what disposition of the subject is suited to such a particular way, or degree, of thinking.

ANOTHER argument to prove, that God cannot endue any parcel of matter with the faculty of thinking, is taken from those words of mine, where I shew, by what connexion of ideas, we may come to know, that God is an immaterial substance. They are these : " the idea of an eternal, actual, knowing being, with the idea of immateriality, by the intervention of the idea of matter, and of its actual division, divisibility, and want of perception, &c." From whence your Lordship thus argues, " here the want of perception is owned to be so essential to matter, that God is, therefore, concluded to be immaterial." Answ. Perception and knowledge, in that one, eternal being, where it has its source, 'tis visible, must be essentially inseparable from it ; therefore the actual want of perception in so great part of the particular parcels of matter, is a demonstration, that the first being, from whom perception and knowledge is inseparable, is not matter. How far this makes the want of perception, an essential property of matter, I will not dispute ; it suffices, that it shews, that perception is not an essential property of matter ; and, therefore, matter cannot be that eternal, original being, to which perception and knowledge is essential. Matter, I say, naturally is without perception : " ergo, says your Lordship, want of perception is an essential property of matter, and God doth not change the essential properties of things, their nature remaining." From whence you infer, that God cannot bestow on any parcel of matter (the nature of matter remaining) a faculty of thinking. If the rules of logick, since my days, be not changed, I may safely deny this consequence. For an argument that runs thus, " God does not, ergo, he cannot ;" I was taught, when I came first to the university, would not hold. For I never said God did ; but " that I see no contradiction in it, that he should, " if he pleased, give to some systems of senseless matter, a faculty of thinking ;" and I know no-body, before Des Cartes, that ever pretended to shew that there was any contradiction in it. So that at worst, my not being able to see in matter, any such incapacity, as makes it impossible for omnipotency to bestow on it, a faculty of thinking, makes me opposite only to the Cartesians. For, as far as I have seen, or heard, the fathers of the christian church never pretended to demonstrate, that matter was incapable to receive a power of sensation, perception, and thinking, from the hand of the omnipotent

Creator. Let us, therefore, if you please, suppose the form of your argument right, and that your Lordship means, God cannot: and then, if your argument be good, it proves, that God could not give to Baalam's ass a power to speak to his master, as he did; for the want of rational discourse, being natural to that species, it is but for your Lordship to call it an essential property, and then God cannot change the essential properties of things, their nature remaining; whereby it is proved, that God cannot, with all his omnipotency, give to an ass a power to speak, as Baalam's did.

Answer 1.
p. 78.

You say, my Lord, "you do not set bounds to God's omnipotency: for he may, if he please, change a body into an immaterial substance;" i. e. take away from a substance the solidity, which it had before, and which made it matter, and then give it a faculty of thinking, which it had not before, and which makes it a spirit, the same substance remaining. For if the same substance remains not, body is not changed into an immaterial substance, but the solid substance, and all belonging to it, is annihilated, and an immaterial substance created; which is not a change of one thing into another, but the destroying of one, and making another de novo. In this change, therefore, of a body, or material substance, into an immaterial, let us observe these distinct considerations.

FIRST, you say, God may, if he pleases, take away, from a solid substance, solidity, which is that, which makes it a material substance, or body; and may make it an immaterial substance, i. e. a substance, without solidity. But this privation of one quality, gives it not another: the bare taking away a lower, or less noble, quality, does not give it an higher, or nobler; that must be the gift of God. For the bare privation of one, and a meaner quality, cannot be the position of an higher and better; unless any one will say, that cogitation, or the power of thinking, results from the nature of substance itself, which if it do, then, where-ever there is substance, there must be cogitation, or a power of thinking. Here then, upon your Lordship's own principles, is an immaterial substance, without the faculty of thinking.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this substance, thus deprived of solidity, a faculty of thinking; for you suppose it made capable of that, by being made immaterial; whereby you allow, that the same numerical substance may be sometimes wholly incogitative, or without a power of thinking, and at other times, perfectly cogitative, or endued with a power of thinking.

FARTHER, you will not deny but God can give it solidity, and make it material again: for I conclude, it will not be denied, that God can make it again, what it was before. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, why God, having given to this substance the faculty of thinking, after solidity was taken from it, cannot restore to it solidity again, without taking away the faculty of thinking? When you have resolved this, my Lord, you will have proved it impossible, for God's omnipotence, to give to a solid substance, a faculty of thinking; but 'till then, not having proved it impossible, and yet denying that God can do it, is to deny, that he can do, what is in itself possible; which, as I humbly conceive, is visibly to set bounds to God's omnipotency; tho' you say here, "you do not set bounds to God's omnipotency."

Answer 1.
p. 78.

IF I should imitate your Lordship's way of writing, I should not omit to bring in Epicurus here, and take notice that this was his way, "deum verbis ponere, re tollere:" and then add, "that I am certain, you do not think, he promoted the great ends of morality and religion." For 'tis, with such candid and kind insinuations, as these, that you bring in both * Hobbes and † Spinoza, into your discourse here, about God's being able, if he please, to give to some parcels of matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of thinking: neither of those authors, having, as appears by any passages, you bring out of them, said any thing to this question, nor having, as it seems, any other business here, but, by their names, skilfully, to give that character to my book, with which you would recommend it to the world.

* Answer 1.
p. 55.
† Ibid p. 79.

I PRETEND not to enquire what measure of zeal, nor for what, guides your Lordship's pen, in such a way of writing, as your's has all along been with me: only, I cannot but consider, what reputation it would give to the writings of the fathers of the church, if they should think truth required, or religion allowed them, to imitate such patterns. But, God be thanked, there be those amongst them, who do not admire such ways of managing the cause of truth, or religion; they being sensible, that, if every one, who believes, or can pretend he has, truth on his side, is thereby authorized, without proof, to insinuate, whatever may serve to prejudice men's minds against the other side, there will be great ravage made on charity and practice, without any gain to truth, or knowledge: and that the liberties frequently taken by disputants, to do so, may have been the cause, that the world, in all ages, has received so much harm, and so little advantage, from controversies in religion.

THESE are the arguments, which your Lordship has brought to confute one saying, in my book, by other passages in it; which, therefore, being all but "argumenta ad hominem," if they did prove, what they do not, are of no other use, than to gain a victory over me: a thing, methinks, so much beneath your Lordship, that it does not deserve one of your pages. The question is, whether God can, if he pleases, bestow on any parcel of matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of perception and thinking. You say, "you look upon a *Answer 1.*
"mistake herein, to be of dangerous consequence, as to the great ends of religion and morality:" if this be so, my Lord, I think one may well wonder, why your Lordship has brought no arguments, to establish the truth itself, which you look on to be of such dangerous consequence, to be mistaken in; but have spent so many pages, only in a personal matter, in endeavouring to shew, that I had inconsistency in my book; which, if any such thing had been shewed, the question would be still as far from being decided, and the danger of mistaking about it, as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been said. If, therefore, your Lordship's care of the great ends of religion and morality have made you think it necessary to clear this question, the world has reason to conclude there is little to be said, against that proposition, which is to be found in my book, concerning the possibility, that some parcels of matter might be so ordered by omnipotence, as to be endued with a faculty of thinking, if God so pleased; since your Lordship's concern, for the promoting the great ends of religion and morality, has not enabled you to produce one argument, against a proposition, that you think of so dangerous consequence to them.

AND here I crave leave to observe, that tho', in your title-page, you promise to prove, that my notion of ideas is inconsistent with itself (which if it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconsistent with any thing else) and with the articles of the Christian faith; yet your attempts, all along, have been to prove me, in some passages of my book, inconsistent with my self, without having shewn any proposition, in my book, inconsistent with any article of the Christian faith.

I THINK, your Lordship has, indeed, made use of one argument of your own: but it is such an one, that I confess, I do not see, how it is apt much to promote religion, especially the Christian religion, founded on revelation. I shall set down your Lordship's words, that they may be considered. You say, "that you are of opinion, that the great ends of religion and morality are best *Answer 1.*
"secured, by the proofs of the immortality of the soul, from its nature and p. 54, 55.
"properties; and which, you think, proves it immaterial. Your Lordship does not question, whether God can give immortality to a material substance; but you say, it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own nature, it is not capable of," &c. So likewise you say, "if a man cannot be certain, but that *Answer 2.*
"matter may think (as I affirm) then what becomes of the soul's immateriality p. 28.
"(and consequently immortality) from its operations? But for all this, say I, his assurance of faith remains on its own basis." Now you appeal to any man
"of

" of sense, whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles, which
 " he went upon, in point of reason, doth not weaken the credibility of these
 " fundamental articles, when they are considered, purely as matters of faith?
 " for before, there was a natural credibility in them, on the account of reason;
 " but, by going on wrong grounds of certainty, all that is lost; and, instead of
 " being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. And, if the evidence of faith
 " fall so much short of that of reason, it must needs have less effect upon
 " men's minds, when the subserviency of reason is taken away; as it must be,
 " when the grounds of certainty, by reason, are vanished. Is it at all probable
 " that he, who finds reason deceive him, in such fundamental points, should
 " have his faith stand firm and unmoveable, on the account of revelation? For,
 " in matters of revelation, there must be some antecedent principles supposed,
 " before we can believe any thing, on the account of it."

Ibid. p. 35.

MORE to the same purpose we have some pages farther; where, from some
 of my words, your Lordship says, " you cannot but observe, that we have no
 " certainty, upon my grounds, that self-consciousness depends upon an indivi-
 " dual, immaterial substance; and, consequently, that a material substance
 " may, according to my principles, have self-consciousness in it; at least, that
 " I am not certain of the contrary. Whereupon your Lordship bids me con-
 " sider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole article of the resurrec-
 " tion?" What does all this tend to, but to make the world believe, that I
 have lessened the credibility of the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection,
 by saying, that, tho' it be most highly probable, that the soul is immaterial;
 yet, upon my principles, it cannot be demonstrated; because it is not impossible
 to God's omnipotency, if he pleases, to bestow upon some parcels of matter,
 disposed as he sees fit, a faculty of thinking?

THIS your accusation, of my lessening the credibility of these articles of
 faith, is founded on this, that the article of the immortality of the soul abates of
 its credibility, if it be allowed, that its immateriality (which is the supposed
 proof, from reason and philosophy, of its immortality) cannot be demonstrated
 from natural reason. Which argument of your Lordship's bottoms, as I humbly
 conceive, on this, that divine revelation abates of its credibility, in all those
 articles, it proposes, proportionably as human reason fails to support the testi-
 mony of God. And all that your Lordship, in those passages, has said, when
 examined, will, I suppose, be found to import thus much, viz. Does God pro-
 pose any thing to mankind, to be believed? it is very fit and credible to be be-
 lieved, if reason can demonstrate it to be true. But, if human reason comes
 short, in the case, and cannot make it out, its credibility is thereby lessened;
 which is, in effect, to say, that the veracity of God is not a firm and sure founda-
 tion of faith to rely upon, without the concurrent testimony of reason;
 i. e. with reverence be it spoken, God is not to be believed, on his own
 word, unless, what he reveals, be in itself credible, and might be believed
 without him.

IF this be a way to promote religion, the Christian religion, in all its arti-
 cles, I am not sorry, that it is not a way to be found, in any of my writings;
 for I imagine any thing, like this, would (and I should think deserved to) have
 other titles, than bare scepticism, bestowed upon it, and would have raised no
 small outcry against any one, who is not to be supposed to be in the right, in all
 that he says, and so may securely say what he pleases. Such as I, the "pro-
 " fanum vulgus;" who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have
 nothing to do, but to hearken and believe, tho' what he said should subvert the
 very foundations of the Christian faith.

WHAT I have observed, is so visibly contained in your Lordship's argument,
 that when I met with it, in your answer to my first letter, it seemed so strange,
 for a man of your Lordship's character, and in a dispute in defence of the doc-
 trine of the Trinity, that I could hardly persuade myself, but it was a slip of
 your pen: but, when I found it, in your second letter, made use of again, and
 seriously enlarged, as an argument of weight, to be insisted upon, I was con-
 vinced,

vinced, that it was a principle, that you heartily embraced, how little favourable soever it was to the articles of the Christian religion, and particularly those, which you undertook to defend.

I DESIRE my reader to peruse the passages, as they stand in your letters themselves, and see, whether what you say, in them, does not amount to this, that a revelation from God is more, or less credible, according as it has a stronger, or weaker, confirmation from human reason. For,

1. YOUR Lordship says, "you do not question, whether God can give immortality to a material substance; but you say, it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own nature, it is not capable of." Answer 1. P. 55.

To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonstrate the soul to be immaterial, takes off, not very much, nor at all, from the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed that it shall be immortal: because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another demonstration of a proposition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the evidence of it. For, where there is a clear demonstration, there is as much evidence, as any truth can have, that is not self-evident. God has revealed that the souls of men shall live for ever: but, says your Lordship, "from this evidence, it takes off very much, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which, of its own nature, it is not capable of;" i. e. the revelation and testimony of God loses much of its evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good pleasure of God, and cannot be demonstratively made out, by natural reason, that the soul is immaterial, and, consequently, in its own nature, immortal. For that is all that here is, or can be meant, by these words, "which, of its own nature, it is not capable of," to make them to the purpose. For the whole of your Lordship's discourse here, is to prove, that the soul cannot be material, because, then, the evidence of its being immortal, would be very much lessened. Which is to say, that it is not as credible, upon divine revelation, that a material substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or, which is all one, that God is not equally to be believed, when he declares that a material substance shall be immortal, as when he declares, that an immaterial shall be so; because the immortality of a material substance cannot be demonstrated, from natural reason.

LET us try this rule of your Lordship's a little farther. God hath revealed, that the bodies men shall have, after the resurrection, as well as their souls, shall live to eternity: does your Lordship believe the eternal life of the one of these, more than of the other, because you think you can prove it, of one of them, by natural reason, and of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of divine revelation, in the case, doubt of one of them, more than the other? Or think this proposition less credible, the bodies of men, after the resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, that the souls of men shall, after the resurrection, live for ever? For that he must do, if he thinks either of them is less credible, than the other. If this be so, reason is to be consulted, how far God is to be believed, and the credit of divine testimony must receive its force from the evidence of reason: which is evidently to take away the credibility of divine revelation, in all supernatural truths, wherein the evidence of reason fails. And how much such a principle, as this, tends to the support of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting the Christian religion, I shall leave it to your Lordship to consider. This, I think, I may be confident in, that few Christians have founded their belief of the immortality of the soul, upon any thing but revelation; since, if they had entertained it, upon natural and philosophical reasons, they could not have avoided the believing its pre-existence, before its union to the body, as well as its future existence, after its separation from it. This is justified by that observation of Dr. Cudworth, B. i. c. 1. § 31. where he affirms, "that there was never any of the antients, before christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence."

Answer I.
p. 65.

I AM not so well read, in Hobbes, or Spinoza, as to be able to say, what were their opinions, in this matter. But, possibly, there be those, who will think your Lordship's authority of more use to them, in the case, than those justly decried names; and be glad to find your Lordship, a patron of the oracles of reason, so little to the advantage of the oracles of divine revelation. This, at least, I think, may be subjoined to the words, at the bottom of the next page, that those, who have gone about to lessen the credibility of the articles of faith, which evidently they do, who say, they are less credible, because they cannot be made out demonstratively, by natural reason; have not been thought to secure several of the articles of the Christian faith; especially those of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection of the body, which are those, upon the account of which, I am brought, by your Lordship, into this dispute.

Answer I.
p. 55.

I SHALL not trouble the reader with your Lordship's endeavours, in the following words, to prove, that, if the soul be not an immaterial substance, it can be nothing but life; your very first words visibly confusing all, that you allege to that purpose. They are, "if the soul be a material substance, it is really nothing but life;" which is to say, that, if the soul be really a substance, it is not really a substance, but really nothing else, but an affection of a substance; for the life, whether of a material, or immaterial substance, is not the substance itself, but an affection of it.

Answer I.
p. 57.

2. You say, "altho' we think the separate state of the soul, after death, is sufficiently revealed in the scripture; yet it creates a great difficulty, in understanding it, if the soul be nothing but life, or a material substance, which must be dissolved, when life is ended. For, if the soul be a material substance, it must be made up, as others are, of the cohesion of solid and separate parts, how minute and invisible soever they be. And what is it should keep them together, when life is gone? So that it is no easy matter to give an account, how the soul should be capable of immortality, unless it be an immaterial substance; and then we know, the solution and texture of bodies cannot reach the soul, being of a different nature."

LET it be as hard a matter as it will, "to give an account what it is, that should keep the parts of a material soul together," after it is separated from the body; yet it will be always as easy, to give an account of it, as to give an account, what it is, which shall keep together a material and immaterial substance: and yet the difficulty that there is, to give an account of that, I hope does not, with your Lordship, weaken the credibility of the inseparable union of soul and body, to eternity: and I persuade myself, that the men of sense, to whom your Lordship appeals, in the case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point, much weakened by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and, by your Lordship's permission, would think so still) that the union of parts of matter, one with another, is as much in the hands of God, as the union of a material and immaterial substance; and that it does not take off, very much, or at all, from the evidence of immortality, which depends on that union, that it is no easy matter to give an account, what it is, that should keep them together: tho' its depending wholly, upon the gift and good pleasure of God, where the manner creates great difficulty in the understanding, and our reason cannot discover, in the nature of things, how it is, be that, which your Lordship so positively says, "lessens the credibility of the fundamental articles of the resurrection and immortality."

BUT, my Lord, to remove this objection a little, and to shew of how small force it is, even with your self; give me leave to presume, that your Lordship as firmly believes the immortality of the body, after the resurrection, as any other article of faith: if so, then it being no easy matter to give an account, what it is, that shall keep together the parts of a material soul, to one, that believes it is material, can no more weaken the credibility of its immortality, than the like difficulty weakens the credibility of the immortality of the body. For, when your Lordship shall find it an easy matter, to give an account,

count, what it is, besides the good pleasure of God, which shall keep together the parts of our material bodies to eternity, or even soul and body; I doubt not but any one, who shall think the soul material, will also find it as easy to give an account, what it is, that shall keep those parts of matter, also, together to eternity.

WERE it not, that the warmth of controversy is apt to make men so far forget, as to take up those principles themselves (when they will serve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others, I should wonder to find your Lordship to argue, that, because "it is a difficulty to understand, what should keep together the minute parts of a material soul, when life is gone; and, because it is not an easy matter to give an account how the soul should be capable of immortality, unless it be an immaterial substance:" therefore, it is not so credible, as if it were easy to give an account, by natural reason, how it could be. For to this it is, that all this your discourse tends, as is evident, by what is already set down, out of page 55, and will be more fully made out, by what your Lordship says, in other places, tho' there needs no such proofs, since it would all be nothing against me, in any other sense.

I THOUGHT your Lordship had, in other places, asserted, and insisted on this truth, that no part of divine revelation was the less to be believed, because the thing itself created great difficulty, in the understanding, and the manner of it was hard to be explained, and it was no easy matter to give an account how it was. This, as I take it, your Lordship condemned in others, as a very unreasonable principle, and such, as would subvert all the articles of the Christian religion, that were mere matters of faith, as I think it will: and is it possible, that you should make use of it, here, yourself, against the article of life and immortality, that Christ hath brought to light, thro' the Gospel; and neither was, nor could be made out, by natural reason, without revelation? But, you will say, you speak only of the soul, and your words are, that "it is no easy matter to give an account, how the soul should be capable of immortality, unless it be an immaterial substance." I grant it; but crave leave to say, that there is not any one of those difficulties, that are, or can be raised, about the manner, how a material soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body.

BUT if it were not so, I am sure this principle of your Lordship's would reach other articles of faith, wherein our natural reason finds it not so easy to give an account, how those mysteries are; and which, therefore, according to your principles, must be less credible, than other articles, that create less difficulty to the understanding. For your Lordship says, that you appeal to any man of sense, whether, to a man who thought by his principles, he could, from natural grounds, demonstrate the immortality of the soul, the finding the uncertainty of those principles he went upon, in point of reason, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it, by natural reason, doth not weaken the credibility of that fundamental article, when it is considered, purely as a matter of faith. Which, in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this; that a proposition divinely revealed, that cannot be proved by natural reason, is less credible, than one that can: which seems to me to come very little short of this, with due reverence be it spoken, that God is less to be believed, when he affirms a proposition, that cannot be proved by natural reason, than, when he proposes, what can be proved by it. The direct contrary to which, is my opinion; tho' you endeavour to make it good, by these following words: "if the evidence of faith falls so much short of that of reason, it must needs have less effect upon men's minds, when the subserviency of reason is taken away; as it must be, when the grounds of certainty, by reason, are vanished. Is it at all probable, that he, who finds his reason deceive him, in such fundamental points, should have his faith stand firm and unmoveable, on the account of revelation?" Than which, I think, there are hardly plainer words to be found out, to declare, that the credibility of God's testimony depends on the natural evidence of probability, of the things, we receive from revelation, and rises

Answer 2.
p. 28.

Answer 2.
p. 29.

rises and falls with it; and that the truths of God, or the articles of mere faith, lose so much of their credibility, as they want proof from reason; which, if true, revelation may come to have no credibility at all. For if, in this present case, the credibility of this proposition, the souls of men shall live for ever, revealed in the scripture, be lessened by confessing it cannot be demonstratively proved from reason, tho' it be asserted to be most highly probable; must not, by the same rule, its credibility dwindle away to nothing, if natural reason should not be able to make it out, to be so much as probable, or should place the probability, from natural principles, on the other side? For if mere want of demonstration lessens the credibility of any proposition, divinely revealed, must not want of probability, or contrary probability from natural reason, quite take away its credibility? Here at last it must end, if, in any one case, the veracity of God, and the credibility of the truths we receive from him, by revelation, be subjected to the verdicts of human reason, and be allowed to receive any accession, or diminution, from other proofs, or want of other proofs of its certainty, or probability.

If this be your Lordship's way to promote religion, or defend its articles, I know not what argument the greatest enemies of it could use, more effectual for the subversion of those, you have undertaken to defend; this being to resolve all revelation, perfectly and purely, into natural reason, to bound its credibility by that, and leave no room for faith, in other things, than what can be accounted for, by natural reason, without revelation.

Answer 1.
P. 48---54.

YOUR Lordship insists much upon it, as if I had contradicted what I had said in my Essay, by saying, that, upon my principles, it cannot be demonstratively proved, that it is an immaterial substance in us, that thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the pains to read that chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, that my business, there, was to shew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial, than a material substance; and that, from the ideas of thought, and a power of moving of matter, which we experienced in ourselves (ideas originally not belonging to matter, as matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude, there was an immaterial substance in us, than that we had material parts. These ideas of thinking, and power of moving of matter, I, in another place, shewed, did demonstratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the existence of an immaterial, thinking being, in whom we have the idea of spirit, in the strictest sense; in which sense I also applied it to the soul; in that 23d chapter of my Essay; the easily conceivable possibility, nay, great probability, that that thinking substance, in us, is immaterial, giving me sufficient ground for it. In which sense, I shall think I may safely attribute it to the thinking substance in us, until your Lordship shall have better proved, from my words, that it is impossible it should be immaterial. For I only say, that it is possible, i. e. involves no contradiction, that God, the omnipotent, immaterial spirit, should, if he pleases, give to some parcels of matter, disposed as he thinks fit, a power of thinking and moving; which parcels of matter, so endued with a power of thinking and motion, might properly be called spirits, in contra-distinction to unthinking matter. In all which, I presume, there is no manner of contradiction.

Answer 1.
p. 58---60.

I JUSTIFIED my use of the word, spirit, in that sense, from the authorities of Cicero and Virgil, applying the Latin word, spiritus, from whence spirit is derived, to a soul, as a thinking thing, without excluding materiality out of it. To which your Lordship replies, "that Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, supposes the soul not to be a finer sort of body, but of a different nature from the body.—That he calls the body the prison of the soul.—And says, that a wise man's business is to draw off his soul from his body." And then your Lordship concludes, as is usual, with a question, "is it possible, now, to think so great a man looked on the soul, but as a modification of the body, which must be at an end with life?" Answ. No, it is impossible that a man of so good sense, as Tully, when he uses the word, corpus, or body, for the gross and visible parts of a man, which he acknowledges to be mortal; should look

look on the soul, to be a modification of that body, in a discourse, wherein he was endeavouring to persuade another, that it was immortal. It is to be acknowledged that truly great men, such as he was, are not wont so manifestly to contradict themselves. He had, therefore, no thought, concerning the modification of the body of man, in the case; he was not such a trifler, as to examine, whether the modification of the body of a man was immortal, when that body itself was mortal: and, therefore, that, which he reports, as Dicaearchus's opinion, he dismisses in the beginning, without any more ado, c. 11. But Cicero's was a direct, plain, and sensible enquiry, viz. What the soul was? to see whether, from thence, he could discover its immortality. But, in all that discourse, in his first Book of Tusculan Questions, where he lays out so much of his reading and reason, there is not one syllable, shewing the least thought, that the soul was an immaterial substance; but many things directly to the contrary.

INDEED, (1.) he shuts out the body, taken in the sense he uses, corpus, all Chap. 19, along, for the sensible, organical parts of a man, and is positive, that is not the soul: and body, in this sense, taken for the human body, he calls the prison of the soul; and says a wise man, instancing in Socrates and Cato, is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it. But he no where says any such thing of matter: he calls not matter, in general, the prison of the soul, nor talks a word of being separate from it.

(2.) He concludes, that the soul is not like other things, here below, made up of a composition of the elements, c. 27.

(3.) He excludes the two gross elements, earth and water, from being the soul, c. 26.

So far he is clear and positive: but, beyond this, he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For, in some places, he speaks doubtfully, whether the soul be not air or fire: "*anima sit animus, ignisve nescio*," c. 25. And therefore he agrees with Panætius, that, if it be at all elementary, it is, as he calls it, "*inflammata anima, inflamed air*;" and, for this, he gives several reasons, c. 18, 19. And tho' he thinks it to be of a peculiar nature of its own, yet he is so far from thinking it immaterial, that he says, c. 19. that the admitting it to be of an aerial, or igneous, nature, would not be inconsistent with any thing he had said.

THAT, which he seems most to incline to, is, that the soul was not at all elementary, but was of the same substance with the heavens: which Aristotle, to distinguish from the four elements, and the changeable bodies here below, which he supposed made up of them, called "*quinta essentia*." That this was Tully's opinion, is plain from these words: "*Ergo, animus, qui, ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides audet dicere, deus; & quidem, si deus, aut anima, aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura celestis & terra vacat & humore, sic utriusque harum rerum humanus animus est expers. Sin autem est quinta quædam natura, ab Aristotele inducta; primum hæc & deorum est & animorum. Hanc nos sententiam secuti, his ipsis verbis in consolatione hæc expressimus*;" c. 26. And then he goes on, c. 27. to repeat those his own words, which your Lordship has quoted, out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his treatise de Consolatione, the soul not to have its original from the earth, or to be mixed, or made, of any thing earthly; but had said, "*Singularis est igitur quædam natura & vis animi sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis*." Whereby, he tells us, he meant nothing but Aristotle's "*quinta essentia*;" which being unmixed, being that, of which the gods and souls consisted, he calls it "*divinum, cœleste*," and concludes it eternal; it being, as he speaks, "*sejuncta ab omni mortali concretionem*." From which it is clear, that in all his enquiry about the substance of the soul, his thoughts went not beyond the four elements, or Aristotle's quinta essentia, to look for it. In all which there is nothing of immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wise men have always been) that the soul was immortal; but, for that, it is plain, he never thought of its immateriality; but as the eastern people do, who believe the soul to be immortal, but

Louberé du
Royaume de
Siam, t. 1.
c. 19. § 4.

have nevertheless no thought, no conception of its immateriality. It is remarkable, what a very considerable and judicious author says in the case: "No opinion, says he, has been so universally received, as that of the immortality of the soul; but its immateriality is a truth, the knowledge whereof has not spread so far. And, indeed, it is extremely difficult, to let into the mind of a Siamite, the idea of a pure spirit. This the missionaries, who have been longest among them, are positive in: all the Pagans of the east do truly believe, that there remains something of a man after his death, which subsists independently and separately from his body. But they give extension and figure to that, which remains, and attribute to it all the same members, all the same substances, both solid and liquid, which our bodies are composed of. They only suppose, that the souls are of a matter, subtle enough to escape being seen, or handled—Such were the Shades and Manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And it is, by these figures of the souls, answerable to those of the bodies, that Virgil supposed Æneas knew Palinurus, Dido and Anchises, in the other world."

THIS gentleman was not a man, that travelled into those parts for his pleasure, and to have the opportunity to tell strange stories, collected by chance, when he returned; but one chosen on purpose (and he seems well chosen for the purpose) to enquire into the singularities of Siam. And he has so well acquitted himself of the commission, which his epistle dedicatory tells us, he had, to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable there, that had we but such an account of other countries of the east, as he has given us of this kingdom, which he was an envoy to, we should be much better acquainted, than we are, with the manners, notions, and religions, of that part of the world, inhabited by civilized nations, who want neither good sense nor acuteness of reason, tho' not cast into the mold of the logic and philosophy of our schools.

BUT to return to Cicero: 'tis plain, that, in his enquiries about the soul, his thoughts went not at all beyond matter. This the expressions, that drop from him in several places of this book, evidently shew: for example, that the souls of excellent men and women ascended into heaven; of others, that they remained here on earth, c. 12. that the soul is hot, and warms the body: that, at its leaving the body, it penetrates and divides, and breaks thro' our thick, cloudy, moist air: that it stops in the region of fire, and ascends no farther, the equality of warmth and weight making that its proper place, where it is nourished and sustained with the same things wherewith the stars are nourished and sustained; and that, by the convenience of its neighbourhood, it shall there have a clearer view and fuller knowledge of the heavenly bodies, c. 19. that the soul also, from this height, shall have a pleasant and fairer prospect of the globe of the earth, the disposition of whose parts will then lie before it, in one view, c. 20. that it is hard to determine what conformation, size, and place, the soul has, in the body: that it is too subtle to be seen: that it is in the human body, as in a house, or a vessel, or a receptacle, c. 22. All which are expressions, that sufficiently evidence, that he, who used them, had not, in his mind, separated materiality, from the idea of the soul.

IT may, perhaps, be replied, that a great part of this, which we find in chap. 19. is laid upon the principles of those, who would have the soul to be "anima inflammata, inflamed air." I grant it: but it is also to be observed, that in this 19th and the two following chapters, he does not only, not deny, but even admits, that so material a thing, as inflamed air, may think.

THE truth of the case, in short, is this: Cicero was willing to believe the soul immortal, but, when he sought, in the nature of the soul itself, something to establish this his belief, into a certainty of it, he found himself at a loss. He confessed, he knew not what the soul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues, c. 2, was no reason to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had said, in his 6th book *De Repub.* concerning the soul. The argument, which, borrowed from Plato, he there makes use of,

of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordship will allow to be true: for it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as without end: "Neque nata certe est, & æterna est," says he.

INDEED, from the faculties of the soul, he concludes right, that it is of divine original: but as to the substance of the soul, he, at the end of this discourse concerning its faculties, c. 25. as well as at the beginning of it, c. 22. is not ashamed to own his ignorance of what it is; "anima fit animus, ignisve, nescio; nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quod nesciam. Illud, si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possum, five anima, five ignis fit, animus, eum jurarem esse divinum, c. 25." So that all the certainty he could attain to, about the soul, was, that he was confident there was something divine in it; i. e. there were faculties in the soul, that could not result from the nature of matter, but must have their original from a divine power: but yet those qualities, as divine as they were, he acknowledged might be placed in breath, or fire, which, I think, your Lordship will not deny to be material substances. So that all those divine qualities, which he so much, and so justly, extols in the soul, led him not, as appears, so much as to any the least thought of immateriality. This is demonstration, that he built them not, upon an exclusion of materiality out of the soul; for he avowedly professes, he does not know, but breath, or fire, might be this thinking thing in us: and in all his considerations about the substance of the soul itself, he stuck in air and fire, or "Aristotle's quinta essentia;" for beyond those, 'tis evident, he went not.

BUT, with all his proofs out of Plato, to whose authority he defers so much, with all the arguments, his vast reading and great parts could furnish him with, for the immortality of the soul, he was so little satisfied, so far from being certain, so far from any thought, that he had, or could, prove it, that he, over and over again, professes his ignorance and doubt of it. In the beginning, he enumerates the several opinions of the philosophers, which he had well studied, about it; and then, full of uncertainty, says, "harum sententiarum, quæ vera sit, deus aliquis viderit, quæ veri-simillima magna quæstio," c. 11. And towards the latter end, having gone them all over again, and one after another, examined them, he professes himself still at a loss, not knowing, on which to pitch, nor what to determine: "Mentis acies, says he, seipsam intuens, nonnunquam hebescit, ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, hæsitans, multa adversa revertens, tanquam in rate, in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio," c. 30. And, to conclude this argument, when the person he introduces, as discoursing with him, tells him, he is resolved to keep firm, to the belief of immortality; Tully answers, c. 82. "Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil animis oportet credere; movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute conclusio, labamus, mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas."

So unmoveable is that truth, delivered by the Spirit of truth, that, though the light of nature gave some obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of a future state; yet human reason could attain to no clearness, no certainty about it, but that it was "JESUS CHRIST, alone, who had brought life and immortality to light, thro' the Gospel." Though we are now told, that to own the inability of natural reason, to bring immortality to light, or, which passes for the same, to own principles, upon which the immateriality of the soul (and, as 'tis urged, consequently its immortality, cannot be demonstratively proved; does lessen the belief of this article of revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to light, and which consequently, the scripture assures us, is established and made certain, only by revelation. This would not perhaps have seemed strange from those, who are justly complained of, for slighting the revelation of the Gospel; and therefore, would not be much regarded, if they should contradict so plain a text of scripture, in favour of their all-sufficient reason: but what use the promoters of scepticism and infidelity, in an age,

2 Tim. i. 10.

so much suspected by your Lordship, may make, of what comes from one of your great authority and learning, may deserve your consideration.

AND thus, my Lord, I hope I have satisfied you concerning Cicero's opinion, about the soul, in his first book of *Tusculan Questions*; which, tho' I easily believe, as your Lordship says, you are no stranger to, yet I humbly conceive, you have not shewn (and upon a careful perusal of that treatise again, I think I may boldly say, you cannot shew) one word in it, that expresses any thing like a notion in Tully, of the soul's immateriality, or its being an immaterial substance.

Answer 1.
p. 62, 63.

FROM what you bring out of Virgil, your Lordship concludes, "that he, no more than Cicero, does me any kindness, in this matter, being both assertors of the soul's immortality." My Lord, were not the question of the soul's immateriality, according to custom, changed here, into that of its immortality, which I am no less an assertor of, than either of them, Cicero and Virgil do me all the kindness I desired of them in this matter; and that was to shew, that they attributed the word, *spiritus*, to the soul of man, without any thought of its immateriality; and this the verses, you yourself bring, out of Virgil, *Æn. iv. 385.*

"Et cum frigida mors animæ seduxerit artus,
"Omnibus umbra locis adero; dabis, improbe, pœnas;

confirm, as well as those I quoted, out of his 6th book: and, for this, Monsieur de la Loubere shall be my witness, in the words above set down, out of him; where he shews, that there be those, amongst the heathens of our days, as well as Virgil, and others, amongst the antient Greeks and Romans, who thought the souls, or ghosts, of men departed, did not die with the body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the latter being much more incomprehensible to them than the former. And what Virgil's notion of the soul is, and that corpus, when put in contra-distinction to the soul, signifies nothing, but the gross tenement of flesh and bones, is evident from this verse of his *Æneid. 6. l. 292.* where he calls the souls which yet were visible,

—tenues sine corpore vitas.

Answer 1.
p. 64, 65.

YOUR Lordship's answer concerning what is said, *Ecclef. xii.* turns wholly upon Solomon's taking the soul to be immortal, which was not what I questioned. All that I quoted that place for, was to shew that, spirit, in English, might properly be applied to the soul, without any notion of its immateriality, as *רוח* was by Solomon; which, whether he thought the souls of men to be immaterial, does little appear, in that passage, where he speaks of the souls of men and beasts together, as he does. But farther, what I contended for, is evident from that place, in that the word, spirit, is there applied, by our translators, to the souls of beasts, which your Lordship, I think, does not rank amongst the immaterial, and consequently immortal spirits, tho' they have sense and spontaneous motion.

Answer 1.
p. 65.

BUT you say, "if the soul be not of itself a free-thinking substance, you do not see what foundation there is in nature, for a day of judgment." Answer. Tho' the heathen world did not of old, nor do to this day, see a foundation, in nature, for a day of judgment; yet in revelation, if that will satisfy your Lordship, every one may see a foundation for a day of judgment, because God has positively declared it; tho' God has not, by that revelation, taught us, what the substance of the soul is; nor has any where said, "that the soul of itself is a free agent." Whatsoever any created substance is, it is not of itself, but is, by the good pleasure of its Creator. Whatever degrees of perfection it has, it has from the bountiful hand of its Maker. For it is true, in a natural, as well as a spiritual, sense, what St. Paul says, "not that we are sufficient of ourselves, to think any thing, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God."

2 Cor. iii. 5.

BUT

BUT your Lordship, as I guess, by your following words, would argue, that a material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose, you only mean, that you cannot see, or conceive, how a solid substance should begin, stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that, when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent substance, can move itself, or alter, or stop, its own motion, which it must, to be a free agent; I suppose, you will find it no harder, for God, to bestow this power, on a solid, than an unsolid, created substance. Tully, in the place above quoted, could not conceive this power to be, in any thing, but what was from eternity; "cum pateat, igitur, æternum id esse, quod seipsum moveat, quis est, qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget?" But tho' you cannot see, how any created substance, solid, or not solid, can be a free agent (pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, until your Lordship please to explain it, of either, and shew the manner, how either of them can, of itself, move itself, or any thing else) yet I do not think, you will so far deny men to be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see, how they are free agents, as to doubt, whether there be foundation enough for a day of judgment.

Tusculan.
Quæst. l. 1.
c. 23.

IT is not for me to judge, how far your Lordship's speculations reach; but finding in myself nothing to be truer, than what the wise Solomon tells me; "As thou knowest not, what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow, in the womb of her that is with child; even so, thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things:" I gratefully receive, and rejoice in the light of revelation, which sets me at rest, in many things; the manner whereof my poor reason can, by no means, make out to me: omnipotency, I know, can do any thing, that contains in it no contradiction; so that I readily believe whatever God has declared, tho' my reason find difficulties in it, which it cannot master. As, in the present case, God having revealed that there shall be a day of judgment, I think that foundation enough, to conclude men are free enough to be made answerable for their actions, and to receive, according to what they have done; tho' how man is a free agent, surpass my explication, or comprehension.

Eccl. xi. 5.

IN answer to the place I brought out of St. Luke, your Lordship asks, "Whether, from these words of our Saviour, it follows that a spirit is only an appearance?" I answer, No; nor do I know, who drew such an inference from them: but it follows, that, in apparitions, there is something that appears, and that, that which appears, is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly called *πνεῦμα*, and was often looked upon, by those, who called it *πνεῦμα*, in Greek, and now call it, spirit, in English, to be the ghost, or soul, of one departed: which, I humbly conceive, justifies my use of the word, spirit, for a thinking, voluntary agent, whether material, or immaterial.

Chap. xxiv.
ver. 39.
Answer 1.
p. 66.

YOUR Lordship says, that I grant, that it cannot, upon these principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual substance, in us, is immaterial: from whence you conclude, "that, then, my grounds of certainty, from ideas, are plainly given up." This being a way of arguing, that you often make use of, I have often had occasion to consider it, and cannot, after all, see the force of this argument. I acknowledge, that this, or that proposition cannot, upon my principles, be demonstrated; ergo, I grant this proposition to be false, that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas: for that is my ground of certainty, and, 'till that be given up, my grounds of certainty are not given up.

Answer 1.
p. 67.

YOU farther tell me, that I say, "the soul's immateriality may be proved probable, to the highest degree;" to which your Lordship replies, "that is not the point: for it is not probability, but certainty, that you are promised, in this way of ideas; and that the foundation of our knowledge and real certainty lies in them; and is it dwindled into a probability, at last?" This is, also, what your Lordship has been pleased to object to me, more than once, that I promised certainty. I would be glad to know, in what words this promise is made, and where it stands, for I love to be a man of my word. I have, indeed,

deed, told wherein I think certainty, real certainty, does consist, as far as any one attains it; and I do not yet, from any thing, your Lordship has said against it, find any reason to change my opinion therein: but I do not remember, that I promised certainty, in this question, concerning the soul's immateriality, or in any of those propositions, wherein you, thinking I come short of certainty, infer from thence, that my way of certainty, by ideas, is given up. And I am so far from promising certainty, in all things, that I am accused, by your Lordship, of scepticism, for setting too narrow bounds to our knowledge and certainty. Why, therefore, your Lordship asks me, "and is the certainty" [of the soul's being immaterial] "dwindled into a probability, at last?" will be hard to see a reason for, 'till you can shew that I promised to demonstrate, that it is immaterial; or that others, upon their principles, without ideas, being able to demonstrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into bare probability, upon my principles, by ideas.

Letter I.
p. 113.

Answer I.
p. 89.

ONE thing more, I am obliged to take notice of. I had said, "that the belief of God being the foundation of all religion and genuine morality, I thought no arguments, that are made use of, to work the persuasion of a God, into men's minds, should be invalidated, which, I grant, is of ill consequence." To which words of mine, I find, according to your particular favour to me, this reply; "that here I must give your Lordship leave to ask me, what I think of the universal consent of mankind, as to the being of God? Hath not this been made use of, as an argument, not only by Christians, but by the wisest and greatest men among the heathens? And what then would I think of one, who should go about to invalidate this argument? And that, by proving, that it hath been discovered in these latter ages, by navigation, that there are whole nations at the bay of Soldania, in Brasil, in the Caribbee-islands and Paraquaria, among whom there was found no notion of a God: and even the author of the Essay of Human Understanding hath done this."

To this your question, my Lord, I answer, that I think that the universal consent of mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vastly greater majority of mankind, have, in all ages of the world, actually believed a God; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually disbelieved it; and, consequently, those, who have actually opposed the belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that, comparing those, that have actually disbelieved, with those, who have actually believed a God, their number is so inconsiderable, that, in respect of this incomparably greater majority of those, who have owned the belief of a God, it may be said to be the universal consent of mankind.

THIS is all the universal consent, which truth of matter of fact will allow; and, therefore, all that can be made use of, to prove a God. But, if any one would extend it farther, and speak deceitfully for God; if this universality should be urged in a strict sense, not for much the majority, but for a general consent of every one, even to a man, in all ages and countries; this would make it, either no argument, or a perfectly useless and unnecessary one. For, if any one deny a God, such a perfect universality of consent is destroyed; and if no body does deny a God, what need of arguments to convince atheists?

I WOULD crave leave to ask your Lordship, were there ever in the world any atheist, or no? If there were not, what need is there of raising a question, about the being of a God, when no body questions it? What need of provisional arguments against a fault, from which mankind are so wholly free; and which, by an universal consent, they may be presumed to be secure from? If you say (as I doubt not, but you will) that there have been atheists in the world, then your Lordship's universal consent reduces itself to only a great majority; and then make that majority as great as you will, what I have said, in the place quoted by your Lordship, leaves it in its full force, and I have not said one word, that does, in the least, invalidate this argument for a God. The argument, I was upon there, was to shew, that the idea of God was not innate; and

and to my purpose it was sufficient, if there were but a less number found in the world, who had no idea of God, than your Lordship will allow, there have been, of professed atheists: for whatsoever is innate, must be universal in the strictest sense; one exception is a sufficient proof against it. So that all, that I said, and which was quite to another purpose, did not at all tend, nor can be made use of, to invalidate the argument for a deity, grounded on such an universal consent, as your Lordship, and all that build on it, must own, which is only a very disproportioned majority: such an universal consent my argument, there, neither affirms, nor requires, to be less, than you will be pleased to allow it. Your Lordship, therefore, might, without any prejudice to those declarations of good-will and favour you have, for the author of the Essay of Human Understanding, have spared the mentioning his quoting authors, that are in print, for matters of fact, to quite another purpose, "as going about to invalidate the argument for a deity, from the universal consent of mankind;" since he leaves that universal consent, as entire, and as large, as you yourself do, or can own, or suppose it. But here I have no reason to be sorry, that your Lordship has given me this occasion, for the vindication of this passage of my book, if there should be any one, besides your Lordship, who should so far mistake it, as to think it, in the least, invalidates the argument for a God, from the universal consent of mankind.

BUT, because you question the credibility of those authors I have quoted, Answer 1. which, you say, in the next paragraph, were very ill chosen; I will crave leave P. 89. to say, that he, whom I relied on, for his testimony, concerning the Hotentots of Soldania, was no less a man, than an ambassador from the king of England, to the Great Mogul: of whose relation, Monsieur Thevenot, no ill judge in the case, had so great an esteem, that he was at the pains to translate it into French, and publish it in his (which is counted no unjudicious) collection of travels. But to intercede with your Lordship, for a little more favourable allowance of credit, to Sir Thomas Roe's relation, Coore, an inhabitant of the country, who could speak English, assured Mr. Terry, that they of Soldania had no God. But if he too have the ill-luck to find no credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a divine of the church of England, now living, and admit of his testimony in confirmation of Sir Thomas Roe's. This worthy gentleman, in the relation of his voyage to Surat, printed but two years since, speaking of the same people, has these words; "they are sunk even below idolatry, are destitute of both priest and temple, and, saying a little shew of rejoicing, which is made at the full and new moon, have lost all kind of religious devotion. Nature has so richly provided for their convenience in this life, that they have drowned all sense of the God of it, and are grown quite careless of the next." Terry's Voyage, p. 17 & 23. Mr. Ovington, p. 489.

BUT, to provide against the clearest evidence of atheism, in these people, you say, "that the account given of them, makes them not fit to be a standard for the sense of mankind." This, I think, may pass for nothing, 'till some body be found, that makes them to be a standard for the sense of mankind: all the use, I made of them, was to shew, that there were men in the world, that had no innate idea of a God. But, to keep something like an argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying those casers to be men: what else do these words signify? "a people so strangely bereft of common sense, that they can hardly be reckoned among mankind; as appears by the best accounts of the casers of Soldania," &c. I hope, if any of them were called Peter, James, or John, it would be past scruple, that they were men; however, Courvee, Wewena, and Cousheda, and those others, who had names, that had no place in your Nomenclator, would hardly pass muster with your Lordship. Answer 1. P. 90. Ibid.

MY Lord, I should not mention this, but that what you yourself say, here, may be a motive to you to consider, that, what you have laid such a stress on, concerning the general nature of man, as a real being, and the subject of properties, amounts to nothing, for the distinguishing of species; since you your self

P. 165.

self own, that there may be individuals, wherein there is a common nature, with a particular subsistence, proper to each of them; whereby you are so little able to know, of which of the ranks, or sorts, they are, into which you say, "God has ordered beings, and which he hath distinguished by essential properties, that you are in doubt, whether they ought to be reckoned among mankind, or no?"

GIVE me leave now to think, my Lord, that I have given an answer to all, that is, any way, material, in either of the letters you have honoured me with. If there be any argument, which you think of weight, that you find omitted; upon the least intimation from your Lordship where it is, I promise to consider it, and to endeavour to give you satisfaction concerning it, either by owning my conviction, or shewing what hinders it. This respect I shall think due from me, to your Lordship: tho' I know better to employ the little time, my business and health afford me, than to trouble myself with the little cavillers, who may either be set on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themselves) to meddle in this controversy.

BEFORE I conclude, it is fit I take notice of the obligation I have to you, for the pains you have been at, about my Essay, which, I conclude, could not have been any way so effectually recommended to the world, as by your manner of writing against it. And, since your Lordship's sharp sight, so carefully employed for its correction, has, as I humbly conceive, found no faults in it, which your Lordship's great endeavours, this way, have made out to be really there; I hope, I may presume it will pass the better in the world, and the judgment of all considering men, and make it, for the future, stand better, even in your Lordship's opinion. I beg your Lordship's pardon for this long trouble, and am,

My L O R D,

Oates, May
4, 1706.

Your Lordship's most Humble, and

Most Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

T H E

T H E

I N D E X

T O T H E

First V O L U M E.

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F I N I S.

